LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

A. V. THOMAS & CO. LTD vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFAGRICULTURAL INCOME TAX on 30 November, 1962

Cites 2 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 0
Official PDFBench Sudhansu Kumar Das, Jeevan Lal Kapur, Amal Kumar Sarkar, Mohammad Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal
PETITIONER:
A. V. THOMAS & CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFAGRICULTURAL INCOME TAX
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/11/1962
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
DAS, S.K.
SARKAR, A.K.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
CITATION:
1964 AIR 569 1963 SCR Supl. (2) 608
ACT:
Sales Tax-Goods stored in Travancore-Sale by auction in
Madras by samples-Delivery in Travancore-Consumption neither
in Madras nor in Travancore-Whether sales taxable in
Travancore-Constitution of India, Art. 286 (1).
HEADNOTE:
The sales of teas were by auction which was conducted in
Fort Cochin in Madras State. The price was paid in Fort
Cochin and delivery orders were also given there for goods
which were at Willingdon Island in Travancore Cochin State.
From Willingdon Islands the goods were sent for consumption
to other States and to foreign countries. The State of
Travancore Cochin sought to tax these transactions for sales
tax.
Held that the property in the goods passed when the contract
was accepted on the fall of the hammer in Fort Cochin.
(b)..........................................
Explanation :-For the purpose of sub-clause
(a) a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have
taken place in the State in which the goods
have actually been delivered as a direct
result of’ such sale or purchase for the
purpose of consumption in that State, notwith-
standing the fact that under the general law
relating to sale of goods the property in the
goods has, by reason of such sale or purchase,
passed in another State".
Under the Sale of Goods Act in an auction sale the title in
goods passes and the sale is complete as soon as the hammer
falls. The relevant portion of s. 64 of the Sale of Goods
Act dealing with sale by auction reads as follows
In the case of a sale by auction......
(1) where goods are put up for sale in lots,
each lot is prima
facie deemed to be the subject of the separate
contract of sale;
(2) the sale is complete when the auctioneer
announces its completion by the fall of the
hammer or in the customery manner; and until
such announcement is made any bidder may
retract his bid."
Specific goods in s. 2 (14) of the Sale of Goods Act means
goodsidentified and agreed upon at the time contract is
made. Therefore on the fall of the hammer theoffer is
accepted and if the goods are specified goods the title
passes to the buyer.
In the present case as soon as the hammer fell the title in
the goods passed to the buyer as the goods were specific
goods i.e. goods which were auctioned in full lots and this
event took place at Fort Cochin which was in the State of
Madras. But in the case of unascertained goods the title in
the goods does not pass to the buyer unless and until the
goods are ascertained. It was for this reason that a
distinction was drawn by the Sales tax Appellate Tribunal
between goods which were sold in full lots and those which
were sold in portions. In regard to the former it was held
that the title passed as soon as the hammer fell but not so
in regard to the latter and therefore the sale of "full
lots’ was held to have taken place outside the State of
Travancore Cochin and of portions of lots inside that State.
The case was consequently remanded to the Sales tax Officer
for determining the amount of the tax.
The High Court in revision held that the words in Art. 286
(1) (a) "’outside the State" do not mean transfer of
ownership, according to the Sale of Goods
Act but it was lex situs which determines the taxability of
the transaction and the correct position is that the
ownership in the goods is transferred according to the law
of the place where the goods are situate. Therefore the
sale in the present case was in the State of Travancore
Cochin and there is nothing in the Explanation to Art. 286
(1) (a) which provides to the contrary.
It has been found and it has not been disputed that the
title to the goods in the present case passed at Fort
Cochin. The purchase money was paid there and the purchaser
obtained from the auctioneer delivery notes directing the
godown keepers at Willingdon Island to deliver the goods and
only the actual physical delivery of the goods took place at
Willingdon Island. In these circumstances the question is
whether the sale was "outside" or "inside sale" as the
expressions have been compendiously used in various
judgments to indicate sales taking place within a State or
without it. The Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a) which has
been set out above explains what a sale outside the State
is. According to that Explanation a fiction is created as
between two States, one where the goods are delivered for
consumption in that State and the other where the title in
the goods passes and the former is treated as the situs of
the taxable event to the exclusion of the latter. Therefore
where the Explanation applies the difficulty about the situs
is resolved but in a case like the present one the
difficulty still remains because the explanation does not
operate in the sense that the rival States claiming to tax
the same taxable event are not the States of delivery for
consumption in that State and those where the title in the
goods passes. In somewhat similar circumstances this court
in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1) held
by a majority decision that the opening words of Art: 286
(1) which speak of a sale or purchase taking place and the
non-obstante clause in
(1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 276,286,
the Explanation which refers to the general law relating to
the sale of goods, indicated that it was the "passing of
property within the State" that was intended to be fastened
on, for the purpose of determining, whether the sale in
question was "inside" or "outside" the State and therefore
subject to the operation of the "’Explanation", that State
in which property passed would be the only State which would
have the power to levy a tax on the sale. At page 286 it
was observed:
"The conclusion reached therefore is that
where the property in the goods passed within
a State as a direct result of the sale, the
sale transaction is not outside the State for
the purpose of Art. 286 (1) (a) unless the
Explanation operates".
The majority decision in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v.
State of Bihar (1) concludes the point in favour of the
appellant. On the facts of this case it was found by the
Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal that in regard to the sales of
tea in ’full lots’ the property passed at Fort Cochin and
this view has not been challenged in this court. Therefore,
on the majority decision in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd.
v. State of Bihar (1) the only State which would have the
power to levy a tax on such sales would be the State of
Madras and so far as Travancore Cochin was concerned, the
sale would be an outside sale.
In the present case therefore the sale was an "outside sale"
and cannot be said to be an "inside sale" qua Travancore
Cochin because the title passed at Fort Cochin which is in
the State of Madras. Apart. from that the money was paid
there and the delivery order was also received there even
though the actual physical delivery of goods was made at a
Willingdon Island in the State of Tranvancore Cochin. The
fiction created by the Explanation to, Art. 286 (1)(a) is
inapplicable
(1)[1961] 2 S.C.R. 276,
because there was no delivery as a direct result of sale for
the purpose of consumption in any particular State.
There then remains the question of goods which were exported
out of India from Willingdon Island. In the case of those
goods ’also it cannot be said that there was a sale inside
the ’State of Travancore Cochin because the same
considerations will apply to those sales as to the sales
already discussed i.e. goods the title to which passed at
Fort Cochin were delivered at Willingdon Island and were
delivered for ’consumption in parts of India other than
Travancore Cochin.
In our view therefore the High Court was in error and the
appeal should therefore be allowed and the judgment and
order of the High Court of Kerala set aside. The appellant
will have its costs in this court and in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 628 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 24, 1960, of the Kerala High Court in Tax Revision Case No. 22 of 1957. G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, Advocate General, State of Kerala and Sardar Bahadur, for the respondent. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath andP. L. Vohra, for the interveners. 1962. November30. The Judgement of the, Court was delivered by KAPUR, J.-Thisappeal by certificate of the High Court of Keralaraises the question of the taxability of sales of tea under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, hereinafter termed the Act, and the Rules made thereunder. The assessment period is 1952-53 and the turnover was of a sum of Rs.3,77,644/- on which a tax of Rs. 5900/11/- was levied. The appellant before us is the assessee company and the respondent is the Deputy Commissioner of’ Agricultural Income-tax and Sales tax. Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri on behalf of Outcherloney Valley Estates (1938) Ltd. has applied for intervention on the ground that in case of that company also the State or Kerala has, on similar fact;, levied sales tax on certain transaction that the High Court of Kerala has upheld the taxability of the transactions relying on the judgment which is under appeal in the present case, and that the intervener has obtained Special leave to appeal against that judgment and the records are under print. In view of these circumstances we have allowed that company to intervene in the present appeal. The assessment was made on March 30, 1955, under r. 33(1) of the Act on the ground that the sales of tea had escaped assessment. The appeal against that order was unsuccessful and thereafter a further appeal was taken to the Sales tax Appellate Tribunal which by its order dated August 12, 1957, held that the ban under Art. 286(1)(a) of the Constitution on sales which are outside the State applied, in regard to the sales of ’full lots’ and therefore remanded the case to the Sales tax Officer. Against that order a revision was taken to the High Court which held that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal in regard to the applicability of Art. 286(1)(a) was erroneous and therefore the sales were subject to sales tax under the Act. It is against that judgment and order that the assessee company has come to this court on a certificate of the High Court. Put shortly, the nature and procedure of sales of teas was this; that the teas were stored in the godowns at Willingdon Island which was in the State of Travancore Cochin., samples of those teas etc., were taken to Fort Cochin which at the relevant time was in the State of Madras. There by the samples the teas were sold by public auction in lots, some were purchased in their entirety and others in parts and after the consideration money was paid at Fort Cochin delivery orders. were given to the buyers addressed to the godown keepers at Willingdon Island and actual delivery of tea was taken there. These teas were then sent out from Willingdon Island in Travancore Cochin for consumption either in other parts of India or were exported out of India. The taxability of the sales of teas in the manner abovementioned will depend upon whether the sales can be held to have taken place at Willingdon Island i.e. within the territory of Travancore Cochin State and were liable to the imposition of sales tax under the Act or they were what for convenience are called Ire outside sales" and therefore not subject to sales tax in the State of Travancore-Cochin. The argument raised on behalf of the assessee company was that these sales were effected at Fort Cochin which was outside the territory of Travancore Cochin and therefore were not liable to tax because of the ban imposed by Art. 286(1)(a) of the Constitution. That Aricle with the Explanation at the relevant time was as follows

"Art. 286(1) No law of a State shall impose,

or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the

sale or purchase of goods where such sale or

purchase takes place

(a) outside the State; or

Explanation :-For the purpose of sub-clause

(a) a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have

taken place in the State in which the goods

have actually been delivered as a direct

result of’ such sale or purchase for the

purpose of consumption in that State, notwith-

standing the fact that under the general law

relating to sale of goods the property in the

goods has, by reason of such sale or purchase,

passed in another State". Under the Sale of Goods Act in an auction sale the title in goods passes and the sale is complete as soon as the hammer falls. The relevant portion of s. 64 of the Sale of Goods Act dealing with sale by auction reads as follows In the case of a sale by auction......

(1) where goods are put up for sale in lots,

each lot is prima

facie deemed to be the subject of the separate

contract of sale;

(2) the sale is complete when the auctioneer

announces its completion by the fall of the

hammer or in the customery manner; and until

such announcement is made any bidder may

retract his bid." Specific goods in s. 2 (14) of the Sale of Goods Act means goodsidentified and agreed upon at the time contract is made. Therefore on the fall of the hammer theoffer is accepted and if the goods are specified goods the title passes to the buyer. In the present case as soon as the hammer fell the title in the goods passed to the buyer as the goods were specific goods i.e. goods which were auctioned in full lots and this event took place at Fort Cochin which was in the State of Madras. But in the case of unascertained goods the title in the goods does not pass to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. It was for this reason that a distinction was drawn by the Sales tax Appellate Tribunal between goods which were sold in full lots and those which were sold in portions. In regard to the former it was held that the title passed as soon as the hammer fell but not so in regard to the latter and therefore the sale of "full lots’ was held to have taken place outside the State of Travancore Cochin and of portions of lots inside that State. The case was consequently remanded to the Sales tax Officer for determining the amount of the tax. The High Court in revision held that the words in Art. 286 (1) (a) "’outside the State" do not mean transfer of ownership, according to the Sale of Goods Act but it was lex situs which determines the taxability of the transaction and the correct position is that the ownership in the goods is transferred according to the law of the place where the goods are situate. Therefore the sale in the present case was in the State of Travancore Cochin and there is nothing in the Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a) which provides to the contrary. It has been found and it has not been disputed that the title to the goods in the present case passed at Fort Cochin. The purchase money was paid there and the purchaser obtained from the auctioneer delivery notes directing the godown keepers at Willingdon Island to deliver the goods and only the actual physical delivery of the goods took place at Willingdon Island. In these circumstances the question is whether the sale was "outside" or "inside sale" as the expressions have been compendiously used in various judgments to indicate sales taking place within a State or without it. The Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a) which has been set out above explains what a sale outside the State is. According to that Explanation a fiction is created as between two States, one where the goods are delivered for consumption in that State and the other where the title in the goods passes and the former is treated as the situs of the taxable event to the exclusion of the latter. Therefore where the Explanation applies the difficulty about the situs is resolved but in a case like the present one the difficulty still remains because the explanation does not operate in the sense that the rival States claiming to tax the same taxable event are not the States of delivery for consumption in that State and those where the title in the goods passes. In somewhat similar circumstances this court in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1) held by a majority decision that the opening words of Art: 286 (1) which speak of a sale or purchase taking place and the non-obstante clause in (1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 276,286, the Explanation which refers to the general law relating to the sale of goods, indicated that it was the "passing of property within the State" that was intended to be fastened on, for the purpose of determining, whether the sale in question was "inside" or "outside" the State and therefore subject to the operation of the "’Explanation", that State in which property passed would be the only State which would have the power to levy a tax on the sale. At page 286 it was observed:

"The conclusion reached therefore is that

where the property in the goods passed within

a State as a direct result of the sale, the

sale transaction is not outside the State for

the purpose of Art. 286 (1) (a) unless the

Explanation operates". The majority decision in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1) concludes the point in favour of the appellant. On the facts of this case it was found by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal that in regard to the sales of tea in ’full lots’ the property passed at Fort Cochin and this view has not been challenged in this court. Therefore, on the majority decision in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1) the only State which would have the power to levy a tax on such sales would be the State of Madras and so far as Travancore Cochin was concerned, the sale would be an outside sale. In the present case therefore the sale was an "outside sale" and cannot be said to be an "inside sale" qua Travancore Cochin because the title passed at Fort Cochin which is in the State of Madras. Apart. from that the money was paid there and the delivery order was also received there even though the actual physical delivery of goods was made at a Willingdon Island in the State of Tranvancore Cochin. The fiction created by the Explanation to, Art. 286 (1)(a) is inapplicable (1)[1961] 2 S.C.R. 276, because there was no delivery as a direct result of sale for the purpose of consumption in any particular State. There then remains the question of goods which were exported out of India from Willingdon Island. In the case of those goods ’also it cannot be said that there was a sale inside the ’State of Travancore Cochin because the same considerations will apply to those sales as to the sales already discussed i.e. goods the title to which passed at Fort Cochin were delivered at Willingdon Island and were delivered for ’consumption in parts of India other than Travancore Cochin. In our view therefore the High Court was in error and the appeal should therefore be allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala set aside. The appellant will have its costs in this court and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.