CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 6, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision No. 159 of 1966. G.L. Sanghi and P.C. Bhartari, for the appellants. I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts. Inspector Ahuja inspected the Municipal Council, Raipur, under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961---hereinafter referred to as the Act--and found that 50 transport workers, including drivers, conductors, mechanics, etc., had been employed by the Council but the Council had not been registered as required under s. 3(1) of the Act. He filed a complaint before the Special Magistrate and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, who issued summons to the accused, namely, the Municipal Council and the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Raipur. The accused appeared by counsel and filed preliminary objections. Be fore the Magistrate two. points were taken: (1) that the Municipal Council was not a ’motor transport undertaking’ within s. 2(g) of the Act, and (2) that the Council was exempt under s. 38 of the Act insofar as it uses the vehicles for transporting sick or injured persons. and for maintenance of public order, i.e., for transporting night soil and refuse of the town free of charges. The Magistrate accepted these contentions and dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused persons.
The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, Raipur, who agreeing with the findings of the Magistrate, dismissed the revision. The State then filed a revision under s. 439, Cr. P.C. Three points were debated before the High Court: (1) whether a revision lay under s. 439, Cr. P.C. The contention was that the accused had been acquitted and not discharged and, therefore, only a.n appeal under s. 417. Cr. P.C., lay; (2) that the Municipal Council does not fall within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" in s. 2(g); and (3) that the transport vehicles owned by the Municipal Council are exempt under s. 38(1) of the Act.
The High Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that a revision lay under s. 439, Cr. P.C., because the order passed by the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. On the second point the High Court held that the Municipal-Council fell within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking". On tire third point the High Court held that the vehicles of the Municipal Council did not come within the exemption under s. 38 of the Act.
The same points have been debated before us by the learned counsel. Coming to the first point, we agree with the High Court that the order of the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. It is true that it is a summons case and no formal charge is necessary to be framed under s. 242, Cr. P.C., but even so. here when the accused appeared, before anything was done the accused filed a preliminary objection and no particulars of the offence of which the accused was charged were even stated to him.
Coming to the second point, it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that the. Municipal Council is a motor transport undertaking as defined in the Act. It is necessary to set out the relevant definition in s. 2 of the Act.
"2(g) ’motor transport undertaking’
means a motor transport undertaking engaged in
carrying passengers or goods or both by. road
for hire or reward, and includes a private
carrier;
(n) all other words and expressions
used but not defined in this Act and defined
in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, shall have
the meanings respectively assigned to them in
that Act."
The expression "private carrier" is defined in
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean "an
owner of a transport vehicle other than a
public carrier who uses that vehicle solely
for the carriage of goods which are his
property or the carriage of which is necessary
for the purposes of his business not being a
business of providing transport, of who. uses
the vehicle for any of the purposes specified
in sub-section (2) of section 42." A
"transport vehicle" is defined in the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean "a public service
vehicle or a goods vehicle," and a ":goods
vehicle" is defined to mean "any motor vehicle
constructed or adapted for use for the
carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not
so. constructed or adapted when used for the
carriage of goods solely or in addition to
passengers." "Goods" is defined as follows:
"Goods" includes live-stock, and
anything (other than equipment ordinarily used
with the vehicle) car-
ried by a vehicle except living persons, but
does not include luggage or personal effects
carried in a motor car or in a trailer
attached to a motor car or the personal
luggage of passengers travelling in the
vehicle."
It seems to us that the accused fell within the definition of a "private cartier" inasmuch as the Council owned transport vehicles and used these vehicles solely for the carriage of goods which are its property. In this case we are not concerned with the second limb of the definition, and the authority cited by the learned counsel for the ’accused (Mohamed Zarful Islam v. Birendra Lall(1) which dealt with the second limb, is of no assistance to. us.
The main argument which the learned counsel urges is that the word "includes" in the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" helps him because this shows that it is only an undertaking of a commercial nature which was intended to be included within the definition of "motor transport undertaking". He says that a Municipal Council is not carrying on any business but is carrying on statutory obligations imposed upon it and, therefore, a Municipal Council cannot be called an undertaking.
We are unable to accept this contention. First, the Act provides for the welfare of motor transport workers and regulates the conditions of their work. Such beneficial acts are not, as a rule, construed strictly. Secondly, the words of the definition are plain and not susceptible of any reasonable limitation. It seems to us that by using the word "includes" the. Legislature undoubtedly intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression "motor transport undertaking". The words "private carrier" have been given a specific meaning in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and it is difficult to limit this specific meaning on any reasonable basis. Further, s. 38 of the Act, which exempts certain transport vehicles, also proceeds on the basis that a private carrier who is carrying on activities which are not commercial would be included within the expression "motor transport undertaking".
Relying on the decision of the House of Lords in Dilworth v. The Commissioner of Stamps(2) and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mother Superior Convent School(3), the learned counsel contends that sometimes the legislature uses the word "includes" to mean "means and includes". This is undoubtedly so but we are unable to appreciate how this would help the appellants. (1) A.I.R. 1965 Bom. 120. (2) [1899] A.C. 99. (3) A.I.R. 1958 M.P, 362.
The learned counsel also suggests that we should limit the meaning of the words "private carrier" in the same manner as the Madhya Pradesh High Court limited the meaning of the word "church" occurring in s. 2(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act. We are unable to see any analogy between the two definitions. The definition there is quite different and the High Court was of the view that the scheme of the Act itself shows that what was intended was to regulate, not religious institutions but religious institutions impressed with the character of a public trust."
Coming to the last point, we agree with the High Court that the words "public order" in S. 38(1)(ii) do not include the maintenance of public health. Section 38 reads:
"38. Exemptions.--(1) Nothing contained
in this Act shall apply to or in relation
to any transport vehicle--
(i) used for the transport of sick or injured
persons;
(ii) used for any purpose connected with
the security of India, or the. security of a
State, or the maintenance of public
The learned counsel relies on the decision
of this Court Ramesh Thappar v. The State of
Madras (1). In Ratnesh Thappar’s case the
question before this Court was. "whether the
impugned Act (Madras Maintenance of Public
Order Act, 1949) in so far as it purports by
section 9(1-a) to authorise the Provincial
Government ’for the: purpose of securing the
public safety or the maintenance of public
order, to prohibit or regulate tie entry into
or the circulation, sale or distribution in
the Province of Madras or any part thereof of
any document or class of documents’ is a law
relating to any matter which undermines the
security of or tends to overthrow the State."
Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was,
observed:
"Now ’Public Order’ is an expression of
wide connotation and signifies that state of
tranquillity which prevails among the members
of a political society as a result of internal
regulations enforced by the government which
they have established."
Later he observed:
"’Public safety’ ordinarily means
security of the public or their freedom from
danger. In that sense, anything which tends
to prevent danger to public health may also be
regarded as securing public safety." (1) [1950] S.C.R. 594.
The learned counsel urges that "public order" includes "public safety" and the latter comprises "public health". We see no force in this contention and Ramesh Thappar’s case(1) does not say so. In our view "Public Order" in this context means public peace and tranquillity. We agree with the High Court that the functions of the Municipal Council in carrying night soil and in distributing water do not fail within "maintenance of public order." In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1950] S.C.R. 594.