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Supreme Court of India

SURAT SINGH vs KISHORI LAL & ORS on 22 August, 1969

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PETITIONER:
SURAT SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
KISHORI LAL & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
22/08/1969
BENCH:
ACT:
Delhi Development Authority Act (61 of 1957), Delhi
Development Authority Rules, 1958, r. 3(1)(e), Delhi
Development Authority (Election of Representatives of Delhi
Municipal Council) Rules, 1958, r. 2(5) and Delhi Municipal
Corporation (procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations,
1958, reg. 33-’Validly nominated’, in r. 2(5) of Election of
Representatives Rules-If gives power to Mayor to decide on
disqualifications-Point of order, meaning of-Decision of
Mayor, final-Scope of.
HEADNOTE:
The Delhi Development Authority is constituted under s. 3 of
the Delhi Development Act, 1957. Two. of the members of the
Authority ’are to be representatives of the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi, elected by the Councillors and
Aldermen of the Corporation from among themselves. Rule
3(1) of the Delhi Development Authority Rules, 1958, passed
under the Act, prescribes various grounds of
disqualification for being a member of the Authority. Under
r. 3 (1 )(e) a person is disqualified if he is interested
directly or indirectly in any business of development of
land in Delhi.
The appellant, first respondent, and another, filed
nomination papers for being elected to the Delhi Development
Authority as representatives of the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi. On an objection that the first respondent was
Secretary .....
(3) No member of the Corporation shall sign
as proposer or seconder the
nomination of more candidates than
the number of representatives to be
elected. Any nomination paper subscribed
in contravention of this sub-rule shall be
invalid and shall be declared as such by the
Mayor.
(4)
(5) Where the number of validly
nominated candidates is equal to, or less
than, the number of representatives to be
elected, the Mayor shall declare all such
candidates to be duly elected as
representatives of the Corporation, and where
the number of validly nominated candidates is
more than the number of representatives to be
elected, a poll shall be taken."
Clauses (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) provide
for the method of polling and the declaration of the result
of the poll. But the Act and the rules contain no machinery
for setting aside an election to the Delhi Development
Authority.
It is common ground that the Delhi Corporation Act,
1957 and the rules framed by the Central Government under
s. 56 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 d9 not contain
any express provision authorising the Mayor to reject the
nomination. It was contended however, that the use of
the. expression "validly nominated candidates" in cl.
(5 ) of r. 2 of the Delhi Development Authority (Election
of Representatives of Delhi Municipal Corporation) Rules,
1958 implies that the Mayor has the power to determine
whether a person is validly nominated, and in
determining whether he is validly nominated the Mayor has to
consider not only whether the requirements of clauses
(2) & (3) are complied with, but whether the candidate
nominated is subject to any disqualification. In our
judgment the expression "validly nominated" occurring in
sub-r. (5) of r. 2 of the Election Rules, 1958, implies that
the Mayor may determine whether
the requirements of cls. (2) and (3) are satisfied. The
Mayor cannot obviously hold a detailed enquiry having regard
to the terms of r. 3 of the Delhi Development Authority
Rules to ascertain whether the candidate is subject to any
of the disqualifications set out in that rule. The Rules
provide for diverse grounds of disqualification from
membership of the Authority. A person is unsound mind and
stands so declared by a competent court; if he is an
undischarged insolvent; if he is not a citizen of India, or
has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State,
or is under any acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence to
a foreign State; if he is a licensed architect, draughts
man, engineer, plumber, surveyor or town planner or employee
of a firm of which any such licensed person is also a
partner; if he is interested, directly or indirectly in any
business of development of land in Delhi; if he is
interested in any subsisting contract made with, or any
work being done for, the Authority except as a shareholder
(other than a director) in an incorporated company or as a
member of co-operative society; if he is retained or
employed in any professional capacity either personally or
in the name of a firm of which he is a partner or with which
he is engaged in a professional capacity, in connection with
any cause or proceeding in which the Authority is interested
or concerned; if he, having held any office under the
Government, has been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty
to the State within a period of four years; and if he fails
to pay any arrears of any kind due by him, otherwise than as
an agent, receiver, trustee an executor, to the Authority
within three months after a notice in that behalf has been
served upon him. By cl. (j) of r. 3 in the prescribed
eventualities disqualifications do not operate. Normally the
Mayor cannot in the absence of an express provision hold an
enquiry in a meeting of the Corporation into the several
matters contemplated by r. 3 before he accepts the
nomination paper. In our judgment the High Court was right
in holding that the Mayor was not competent under the Rules
to determine whether a candidate: was under a
disqualification at the date of nomination. The other
argument raised by counsel for the appellant also has no
substance. Objection to the nomination of Kishori Lal was
not raised and could not be raised as a point of order at
the meeting. Rule 33 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
(Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations,
1958provides:
"Any member may at any time during the
meeting of the Corporation submit a point of
order for the decision of the Mayor, but in
doing so shall confine himself to stating the
point and the Mayor shall decide all points of
order which may arise or be referred to him
and his decision shall be final".
A point of order includes an objection raised by a
member at a meeting for breaches of the Rules or
regulations, to some defect in the constitution of the
meeting (e.g. absence of a quorum), to the use of offensive
or abusive language, or to invite. the attention of the
presiding officer that the motion under discussion is not
within the scope of the notice, or to any similar infirmity
or irregularity in the proceeding. In addition to breaches
of the general or special rules use of insulting or bad
language, gross accusations or insinuation and unseemly or
contemptible conduct may be taken exception to in this
manner. (Law and Practice Relating to Meetings. F.
Shackleton. p. 97, 5th Edition). A point of order is
primarily intended to determine the interpretation of the
rules and regulations governing the meeting: it does not
contemplate any discussion on any event. It cannot,
therefore, be in the form of an objection to the competence
of a member to stand for election to a Committee. By the,
Delhi Development Authority Rules, existence of any of the
disabilities referred to in r. 3 constitutes a
disqualification. A claim that a candidate is subject to a
disqualification cannot be decided without evidence and
discussion: such an objection cannot, therefore, form the
subject of a point of order.
Rule 33 has made the decision of the Mayor final. But
it is not intended thereby that a member may be declared
disqualified by an order made without calling for evidence
and without discussion, and by the mere fiat of the Mayor.
Nor is it intended to remove an existing disqualification of
a member without ,evidence and without discussion.
The argument that objection to the nomination paper
of Kishori Lal was raised by way of a point of order was
never raised in the petition and it is clear from the
proceedings of the meeting that it was not treated as a
point of order. Even if it be grated that the objection was
raised and decided by the Mayor as a ’point of order
jurisdiction of the civil court to determine the
existence of a statutory disqualification cannot on that
account be excluded. The finality is only for the purpose
of the procedure and conduct of the meeting and confers no
rights upon any person.
Whether Kishori Lal was at the date of nomination
disqualified from being elected a member of the Delhi
Development Authority will therefore have to be decided in
an appropriate proceeding if he is declared elected at an
election held according to law.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
V.P.S. Appeal
dismissed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2195 of 1968.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 12, 1968 of the Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 34 of 1968. Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the appellant.

D.D. Chawla, Bishamber Lal and H.K. Puri, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Shah, Ag. C.J. One of the items at a meeting of the Delhi Corporation held on April 24, 1967 was the election of two of its representatives on the Delhi Development Authority. Three candidates had filed nomination papers: they were Kishori Lal, Kedar Nath Sahni and Surat Singh. It was objected that Kishori Lal was interested in the business of development of land in Delhi as a shareholder and also as a Director of Capital Land Builders (Private) Ltd. Kishori Lal denied that he was so interested. The Mayor of Delhi who presided at the meeting rejected the nomination paper on the ground that Kishori Lal was interested in the business of sale and purchase of land in Delhi and was on that account disqualified to be a member of the Delhi Development Authority. The two candidates who remained in the field were declared duly elected by the Mayor.

In a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Kishori Lal, Deshpande, J. of the High Court of Delhi quashed the order of the Mayor rejecting the: nomination paper of Kishori Lal and declaring illegal the election of Surat Singh and Kedar Nath Sahni as representatives of the Corporation on the Delhi Development Authority. The learned Judge directed that another election be held according to law. Against the decision of Deshpande, J. appeals were preferred by the Mayor of the Corporation of Delhi and by Surat Singh. The High Court confirmed the order passed by Deshpande, J. With certificate granted by the High Court this appeal is preferred by Surat Singh. The Mayor has not preferred any appeal.

Two contentions are urged in support of this

appeal:

(1) that the Mayor was under the

provisions of the Delhi Corporation Act and

the rules framed thereunder competent to

reject the nomination, power in that behalf

having been conferred upon him; and

(2) in any case, objection against

nomination amounted to raising a point of

order, and the ruling of the Mayo.r on the

point of order was by rule 33 of the Delhi

Municipal Corporation (Procedure and Conduct

of Business) Regulations, 1958, final.

The Delhi Development Authority is constituted under s. 3 of the Delhi Development Act 61 of 1957. Members of the Authority are elected or nominated from different sources. Two of the members of the authority are to be the representatives of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, elected by the Councillors and Aldermen of the Corporation from among themselves. Rules were framed by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by s. 56 of the Delhi Development Act 61 of 1957 called the "Delhi Development Authority Rules, 1958". By rule 3 (1 )(e) a person is disqualified for being chosen as, or for being, a member of the Authority if he is interested directly or indirectly in any business of development of land in Delhi. The Central Government has framed another set of rules under s. 56 of the Delhi Development Act, called the Delhi Development Authority (Election of Representatives of Delhi Municipal Corporation) Rules, 1958. Rule 2, insofar as it is relevant, provides:

"( 1 ) The Election of the representatives

of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi . in

pursuance of clause (e) of sub-section (3) of

section 3 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957

(61 of 1957), shall be held at a meeting of

the Corporation in accordance with the

system of

proportional representation by means of the

single transferable vote and the voting at

such election shall be by secret ballot.

(2) Every candidate for election as

such representative shall be nominated by a

nomination paper in Form 1 which shall be

signed by the candidate and two other members

of the Corporation as proposer and seconder

and delivered to the Municipal

Secretary .....

(3) No member of the Corporation shall sign

as proposer or seconder the

nomination of more candidates than

the number of representatives to be

elected. Any nomination paper subscribed

in contravention of this sub-rule shall be

invalid and shall be declared as such by the

Mayor.

(4)

(5) Where the number of validly

nominated candidates is equal to, or less

than, the number of representatives to be

elected, the Mayor shall declare all such

candidates to be duly elected as

representatives of the Corporation, and where

the number of validly nominated candidates is

more than the number of representatives to be

elected, a poll shall be taken."

Clauses (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) provide for the method of polling and the declaration of the result of the poll. But the Act and the rules contain no machinery for setting aside an election to the Delhi Development Authority.

It is common ground that the Delhi Corporation Act, 1957 and the rules framed by the Central Government under s. 56 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 d9 not contain any express provision authorising the Mayor to reject the nomination. It was contended however, that the use of the. expression "validly nominated candidates" in cl. (5 ) of r. 2 of the Delhi Development Authority (Election of Representatives of Delhi Municipal Corporation) Rules, 1958 implies that the Mayor has the power to determine whether a person is validly nominated, and in determining whether he is validly nominated the Mayor has to consider not only whether the requirements of clauses (2) & (3) are complied with, but whether the candidate nominated is subject to any disqualification. In our judgment the expression "validly nominated" occurring in sub-r. (5) of r. 2 of the Election Rules, 1958, implies that the Mayor may determine whether the requirements of cls. (2) and (3) are satisfied. The Mayor cannot obviously hold a detailed enquiry having regard to the terms of r. 3 of the Delhi Development Authority Rules to ascertain whether the candidate is subject to any of the disqualifications set out in that rule. The Rules provide for diverse grounds of disqualification from membership of the Authority. A person is unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; if he is an undischarged insolvent; if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or is under any acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State; if he is a licensed architect, draughts man, engineer, plumber, surveyor or town planner or employee of a firm of which any such licensed person is also a partner; if he is interested, directly or indirectly in any business of development of land in Delhi; if he is interested in any subsisting contract made with, or any work being done for, the Authority except as a shareholder (other than a director) in an incorporated company or as a member of co-operative society; if he is retained or employed in any professional capacity either personally or in the name of a firm of which he is a partner or with which he is engaged in a professional capacity, in connection with any cause or proceeding in which the Authority is interested or concerned; if he, having held any office under the Government, has been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State within a period of four years; and if he fails to pay any arrears of any kind due by him, otherwise than as an agent, receiver, trustee an executor, to the Authority within three months after a notice in that behalf has been served upon him. By cl. (j) of r. 3 in the prescribed eventualities disqualifications do not operate. Normally the Mayor cannot in the absence of an express provision hold an enquiry in a meeting of the Corporation into the several matters contemplated by r. 3 before he accepts the nomination paper. In our judgment the High Court was right in holding that the Mayor was not competent under the Rules to determine whether a candidate: was under a disqualification at the date of nomination. The other argument raised by counsel for the appellant also has no substance. Objection to the nomination of Kishori Lal was not raised and could not be raised as a point of order at the meeting. Rule 33 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1958provides:

"Any member may at any time during the

meeting of the Corporation submit a point of

order for the decision of the Mayor, but in

doing so shall confine himself to stating the

point and the Mayor shall decide all points of

order which may arise or be referred to him

and his decision shall be final".

A point of order includes an objection raised by a member at a meeting for breaches of the Rules or regulations, to some defect in the constitution of the meeting (e.g. absence of a quorum), to the use of offensive or abusive language, or to invite. the attention of the presiding officer that the motion under discussion is not within the scope of the notice, or to any similar infirmity or irregularity in the proceeding. In addition to breaches of the general or special rules use of insulting or bad language, gross accusations or insinuation and unseemly or contemptible conduct may be taken exception to in this manner. (Law and Practice Relating to Meetings. F. Shackleton. p. 97, 5th Edition). A point of order is primarily intended to determine the interpretation of the rules and regulations governing the meeting: it does not contemplate any discussion on any event. It cannot, therefore, be in the form of an objection to the competence of a member to stand for election to a Committee. By the, Delhi Development Authority Rules, existence of any of the disabilities referred to in r. 3 constitutes a disqualification. A claim that a candidate is subject to a disqualification cannot be decided without evidence and discussion: such an objection cannot, therefore, form the subject of a point of order.

Rule 33 has made the decision of the Mayor final. But it is not intended thereby that a member may be declared disqualified by an order made without calling for evidence and without discussion, and by the mere fiat of the Mayor. Nor is it intended to remove an existing disqualification of a member without ,evidence and without discussion.

The argument that objection to the nomination paper of Kishori Lal was raised by way of a point of order was never raised in the petition and it is clear from the proceedings of the meeting that it was not treated as a point of order. Even if it be grated that the objection was raised and decided by the Mayor as a ’point of order jurisdiction of the civil court to determine the existence of a statutory disqualification cannot on that account be excluded. The finality is only for the purpose of the procedure and conduct of the meeting and confers no rights upon any person. Whether Kishori Lal was at the date of nomination disqualified from being elected a member of the Delhi Development Authority will therefore have to be decided in an appropriate proceeding if he is declared elected at an election held according to law. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.