LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

SHEO NATH vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH on 15 October, 1969

Cites 4 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 0
Official PDFBench Sarv Mittra Sikri, Pingle Jaganmohan Reddy
PETITIONER:
SHEO NATH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
15/10/1969
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
CITATION:
1970 AIR 535 1970 SCR (2) 796
1969 SCC (3) 116
ACT:
Evidence Act, (1 of 1872)-Section 114 illustration (a)
Recovery from appellant’s shop of cloth stolen in dacoity-
Conviction under s. 396 I.P.C. solely based on discovery of
cloth and their identification- Inferences to be drawn under
s. 114, Evidence Act.
HEADNOTE:
The house of the appellant, a cloth merchant, was searched
and three lengths of cloth were recovered which were
subsequently identified as having been stolen from a shop in
a dacoity in which clothes, ornaments, cash etc. were
stolen. The appellant was not named by the eye-witnesses or
in the dying declaration as having taken part in the
dacoity. Relying on the discovery of the cloth and their
identification the High Court convicted him under s. 396
Penal Code. The Court observed that it was legitimate to
infer that he was one of the dacoits in view of illustration
(a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In the appeal to

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1969. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 2, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1277 of 1968. R. L. Kohli, for the appellant. O. P. Rana, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. The only question which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether the appellant, Sheo Nath, should be convicted under s. 396, I.P.C., or s. 411, I.P.C., or S. 412, I.P.C. The facts as found by the High Court are these. A dacoity was committed at the shop of Ram Murat in Dhaneja village by 15 to 20 persons on August 19, 1966, at about 11.30 p.m. One dacoit, Ram Shankar, was armed with a gun while others carried spears, Gandasas and lathis. During the course of the dacoity Ram Murat was injured. One Pancham, who lived in a house not far from Ram Murat’s shop, and two others came running on heating the noise. Pancham was shot down with the gun by dacoit Ram Shankar. The dacoits then escaped with clothes, ornaments, cash, etc., looted from Ram Murat’s shop. After the dacoits left Ram Murat dictated a report about the occurrence in which lie named Ram Shankar Singh, Jaintri Prasad Singh, Nanhe Singh and Sulai accused as having been among the culprits and this report was sent to the Jalalpur police station, five miles away, where it was received-and recorded at 6 a.m. next morning. On August 22, 1966, i.e., three days after the dacoity, the house of Sheo Nath, appellant, was searched and three lengths of cloth were recovered which were subsequently identified by Ram Murat and a tailor named Bismillah as having been stolen from Ram Murat’s shop in the dacoity. The High Court, agreeing with the learned Sessions Judge, relied on the evidence of three eye-witnesses regarding the manner in which the occurrence took place and regarding the participation of the four named accused persons. Sheo Nath had not been named by the eye-witnesses or in the dying declaration of Panchain and no witness claimed to have identified him taking part in the dacoity. But, relying on the discovery of three lengths of cloth and their identification, the High Court convicted Sheo Nath under s. 396, I.P.C. The High Court observed :

"From the material on record we are fully con-

vinced that the Exhs. 2 and 3 were stolen from

the shop of Ram Murat in the course of the

dacoity committed in the night between 19 to

20 August 1966, and since they were recovered

from the possession of Sheonath appellant only

2 or 3 days later, it is legitimate to infer

that he was one of the dacoits vide

illustration (a) to section 114 of the

Evidence Act. Sheo Nath, therefore, has been

rightly convicted under section 396, I.P.C."

The learned counsel for the appellant contends

that in the circumstances of the case the High

Court should not have convicted the appellant

under s. 396, I.P.C., but only under s. 411

I.P.C. Section 114 of the Evidence Act and

illustration (a) read as follows :

" 114. The Court may presume the existence of

any fact which it thinks likely to have

happened, regard being had to the common

course of natural events, human conduct and

public and private business, in their relation

to facts of the particular case.

illustrations.

The Court may presume-

(a) that a man who is in possession of

stolen goods after the theft, is either the

thief or has received the goods knowing them

to be stolen, unless he can account for his

possession."

This Section was considered by this Court in

Sanwal Khan v. State of Rajasthan(1). This

Court, after considering some High Court

cases, observed :

"In our judgment no hard and fast rule can be

laid down as to what inference should be drawn

from a certain circumstance. Where, however,

the only evidence against an accused person is

the recovery of stolen property and although

the circumstances may indicate that the theft

and the murder must have been committed at the

same time, it is not safe to draw the

inference that the person in possession of the

stolen property was the murderer. Suspicion

cannot take the place of proof." In Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2) this Court held that " recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property while it would be presumptive evidence against a prisoner on the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against him on the charge of murder." On the facts of that case this Court held that the appellant was rightly convicted of the offence of murder and robbery. But, apart from the possession of stolen property, there were other circumstances indicating that the appellant was guilty of murder and robbery. The circumstances were that the appellant in that case had travelled with the deceased on his bullock cart alone and the deceased never reached his home and was found murdered. The appellant was found in possession of the goods ,of the deceased three days after and the appellant made no effort to trace the whereabouts of the deceased or lodge information of his disappearance from the bullock cart. In the present case three presumptions are possible from the recovery of the stolen goods from the appellant three days after the occurrence of the dacoity

(1) that the appellant took part in the

dacoity;

(2) that he received stolen goods knowing

that the goods were stolen in the commission

of a dacoity; and

(3) that the appellant received these goods

knowing them to have been stolen.

(1) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 54.

(2)[1956] S.C.R. 191. The choice to be made, however, must depend on the facts proved in this case. It is quite clear that all the property which was, stolen by the dacoits was not recovered from the appellant. We may repeat that clothes, ornaments, cash, etc. were stolen. The only articles that were found with the appellant were a length of muslin (Exh. 2) and a length of charkhana doriya (Exh. 3). The appellant is stated to be a cloth merchant and he may well have acquired these goods as a receiver. It has not been shown that in the village in which the appellant lived it was known that a dacoity had taken place and goods had been stolen in the dacoity. On the facts of this case it seems to us that the, only legitimate presumption to be drawn is that the appellant knew that the, goods were stolen but he did not know that they were stolen in a dacoity. The appellant, therefore, can only be convicted under s. 411, I.P.C. In this connection we may refer to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Bhurgiri v. The State(1) (Wanchoo, C.J., and Dave, J.). Wanchoo, C.J., after holding that the recovery of ornaments from Bhurgiri had been established, observed :

"The next question is whether on this evidence

Bhurgiri can be convicted for dacoity. The,

recovery took place five days after the

dacoity. It is not impossible that during

that period the property might have passed

from the dacoits to a receiver. Under these

circumstances, we are of opinion that it would

not be safe to convict Bhurgiri of dacoity on

the evidence of this recovery alone. It would

be more proper to convict him as a guilty

receiver.

Then the question arises whether he should be

convicted under section 411 or 412, I.P.C. So

far as section 411 is concerned, he is clearly

guilty under that section. The presumption

under section 114 applies, and we can safely

presume that he is a guilty receiver of stolen

property particularly when we find that the

property was kept in the Bara, and not at his

own house. He must have, had reason to

believe that it was stolen when he received

the property, and that is why he left it in

the Bara. But we feel that it would not be

proper to convict him under section 412

because that section requires that the

receiver should know or have reason

(1) I.L.R. [1954] Rai. 476, 482-83.

to believe that the property had been

transferred by the commission of dacoity. The

prosecution, in our opinion has to show

something more than the mere possession of

stolen goods for a conviction under section

412. If the prosecution is only able to show

mere possession, the proper section to use is

411." In the result the appeal is allowed and the appellant convicted under s.411,I.P.C., instead of s. 396, I.P.C.,and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. R.K.P.S Appeal allowed.