LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA vs NASIMKHAN AHMAD KHAN MALI KHAN, ETC on 17 August, 1970

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Official PDFBench Kowdoor Sadananda Hegde, Inder Dev Dua
PETITIONER:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NASIMKHAN AHMAD KHAN MALI KHAN, ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
17/08/1970
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
DUA, I.D.
CITATION:
1971 AIR 381 1971 SCR (2) 833
1970 SCC (2) 454
ACT:
Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 1938, s. 5(1)(a)--Scope
of--If should have been applied in a case where strikers
caused grievous bodily harm to loyal workers.
HEADNOTE:
The respondents were employees of B.E.S.T. running bus
services in the city of Bombay. They were members of a
Union known as B.E.S.T. Union which declared a strike in
August, 1963. As a result several workers struck work but
some disregarded the call for strike and continued to work.
On the third day of the strike the respondents stopped a bus
in operation and attacked and seriously injured the
conductor and the driver of the bus as well as a police
constable. The respondents were thereafter tried and
convicted on various, charges and the trial judge imposed
sentences of two years imprisonment on one respondent and
one year imprisonment on the others. In their appeal to the
High, Court the respondents did not challenge their
driver..........
From this summary of the facts found, it is quite clear that
the offence committed by the respondents was a serious one.
It did not only result in serious damage to the bus it also
caused serious injuries to the conductor and the driver.
After taking all the facts into consideration, the learned
trial judge convicted the respondents under various charges.
The sentences imposed on various charges were made to run
concurrently and the maximum sentence imposed to Accused
No.-1 (respondent in Cr. Appeal No. 181 of 1967) is two
years and on the rest one year. The sentences imposed by
the learned trial Judge cannot be considered by any standard
as having been excessive.
The accused took up the matter in appeal to the High Court
of Bombay and the same was heard by Paranjape J. At the
hearing Counsel for the accused did not challenge the
conclusion reached by the trail court or the conviction of
the respondents.They merely prayed for alternation of the
sentences. The learned judge. in our opinion erroneously
acceded to this request. He thought that on the facts and
circumstances proved in this case, it is sufficient to take
action against the respondents under s. 5 (1) (a) of the
Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 1938. This is what the
learned judge observed
"It is clear that these offences were-
committed by the accused who entertained wrong
notions as to- the manner in which they could
make the strike successful. Obviously the
persons who had sponsored the strike were the
leaders of the Union of which the accused were
members and no doubt the leaders of the Union
could have observed greater restraint and
could have controlled the members in a better
manner. But the fact still remains that the
accused have acted on a sudden impulse and on
account of the heat and anger that was
generated, they have committed these acts of
violence. The accused do not belong to the
regular class of criminals. They were honest
workers and if on account of their wrong
notions about the manner in which they could
better the conditions of their lives they have
committed these offences, I do not see how any
useful purpose will be served by asking them
to undergo a sentence of imprisonment
immediately. I-think a better social and
useful purpose will be served if I direct each
of these accused to enter into a bond under s.
5 (1) (a) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders
Act, 1938, instead of sentencing them at once
to undergo imprisonment.
Some of the findings reached by the learned judge are
factually incorrect. His notions about the social purpose
behinds.5(1)(a) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act,
1938 may endanger law and order. It may encourage violence.
The learned judge seriously erred in thinking that the
respondents acted on a sudden impulse and on account of the
heat and anger that was generated. It is clear from the
facts established in the case that the acts complained of
were done after premeditation. It was a concerted and a
well planned attack. No one but a mad man commits a crime
without some motive or some real or imaginary grievance. If
perverted notions are considered as mitigating circumstances
then there will be chaos in society. We do not know what
the learned judge meant by saying that the accused did not
belong to a regular class of criminals. Most accused who
come up before courts are not old offenders nor do they
belong to any criminal tribe. That does not mean that the
offence committed by them should not be dealt with in
accordance with law.
Section 5 (1) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 193
8 reads
,,Notwithstanding anything contained in
any,enactment for the time being in force,
when-
(a) any male person is. convicted of an
offence not punishable with death or
transportation for life, or
(b) any woman is. convicted of an offence of
any kind, if it appears to the. court by which
the offender is convicted, that regard being
bad to the age, character, antecedents or
physical or mental condition of the offender,
or to the circumstances in which the offence
was committed, it is expedient that the
offender should be released on probation of
good conduct, the court, may for reasons to be
recorded in writing instead of sentencing him
at once to any punishment, direct that he be
released on his entering into a bond, with or
without sureties, to appear and receive
sentence when called upon during such period
not being less than one year and not exceeding
three years as the court may direct, and in
the meantime to keep the peace and be of good
behaviour."
In this case, the learned appellate judge did not take into
consideration the age or the physical or mental conditions
of the offenders. So far as the character of the accused is
concerned, he could have considered it only in the context
of what they did on the day of the occurrence. There was no
other material before him. The offences committed by them
show that they are desperate characters. The only thing
that the learned appellate judge can be said to have
considered is the circumstances in which the: offences were
committed. The fact that there was a call for strike is no
ground for arson and assault of a grievous character. No
section of the society can be permitted to take law into its
own hand. There are ways to remedy social injustices. No
individual can take upon himself the right to remedy any
wrong done to him. It is impossible to have an orderly
society, if we take to the ways of the jungle. There may be
a genuine desire to change the present social order but that
must and can be done through the instrumentalities of the
State. In the final analysis, it is the people of this
country through their representatives that must decide the
social goals. If social wrongs are sought to be remedied in
the streets then there can be neither peace nor progress.
Without progress the attainment of social justice is
impossible. Under our Constitution the rule of law has been
made our way of life. It is a, fallacy to think that rule
of law and the law of the jungle can coexist.
After having expressed our views on the question presented
for our determination and thereby corrected the error of law
committed by the High Court, we feel there is no need at
present to send the respondents to jail by having recourse
to our power under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The
offence in this case was committed as far back as in August,
1963. The respondents are all workers-
We are told that as a result of this incident they have been
dismissed from service. Most of them have not even put in
their appearance in these appeals. The judgment of the High
Court was delivered on 5th November, 1966 nearly four years
back. The suspended sentence imposed by the High Court has
now been fully undergone by the respondents. We take it
that the State filed these appeals primarily to get an
authoritative interpretation of S. 5(1) of the Bombay
Probation of Offenders Act, 1938. That purpose is now
achieved. Hence we dismiss these appeals subject to the
observations made above.
R.K.P.S. Appeals dismissed.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. 181 and 182 of 1967. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 31, 1966 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 356 and 357 of 1965. H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant. Hardev Singh, for the respondent (in C.A. No.. 181/67). The Judgement of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In these appeals by special leave, we are only concerned with the question of sentence. The respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 182 of 1967 are not represented though they were served with the notice of the appeal. The question of sentence in this case has assumed considerable importances In order to assess that question, it is necessary to refer to the incidents that led up to the prosecution of the respondents. The respondents in both the appeals were prosecuted in case No. 254 of 1964 in the court of Sessions for Greater Bombay. They were charged with various offences. These respondents were members of a Union known as B.E.S.T. Union. In about the middle of August _of 1963, that Union declared a strike. B.E.S.T. is running bus services in the city of Bombay. As a result of the declaration of the strike several workers struck work. It appears that some of the workers disregarded the call for strike and continued to work. On the third day of the strike when a single Decker but No. BMR 3561 was proceeding on the road, the respondents and others stopped the bus and the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 181 of 1967 threw burning petrol on the conductor, Abdul Kadar as a result of which Abdul Kadar sustained several severe injuries. His face was partially burnt up. At the time of the occurrence one of the respondents caused grievous hurt to the driver, Kamalashankar Mishra. During the course of the incident, injuries were also caused to police constable Namdeo Arjun Kharat who was on bandobast duty in the bus. Injuries sustained by the conductor and the driver were quite serious. The conductor sustained bums on the fare left ear and in the arms and he had to be in the hospital for over 20 days. The driver’s left ear was cut and the flap of the ear was hanging. Further there was a fracture of cartilage. The learned trial judge summarised the prosecution case thus

"The miscreants had invaded the bus from both

the sides : some came from the front side and

some from the rear near the entrance. They

were not bona fide passengers. Though they

rushed dear the entrance they did not enter

the bus but engaged the conductor in talking.

Accused No. 2 was one of the persons invading

the bus from the front. He tampered with the

machine which stopped and the bus could not

start. Some of them had assaulted the driver

and accused No. 1 had thrown the container

with the burning petrol into the bus which

clearly shows that the common object of the

offenders was to break down the bus service,

run and operated by the loyal servants and to

intimidate them by acts of violence and

causing damage and destruction by fire to the

vehicle. It is clear that on the rear side

there were accused Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 and

others. On the front side there were accused

No. 2 and two others, who bad assaulted the From this summary of the facts found, it is quite clear that the offence committed by the respondents was a serious one. It did not only result in serious damage to the bus it also caused serious injuries to the conductor and the driver. After taking all the facts into consideration, the learned trial judge convicted the respondents under various charges. The sentences imposed on various charges were made to run concurrently and the maximum sentence imposed to Accused No.-1 (respondent in Cr. Appeal No. 181 of 1967) is two years and on the rest one year. The sentences imposed by the learned trial Judge cannot be considered by any standard as having been excessive. The accused took up the matter in appeal to the High Court of Bombay and the same was heard by Paranjape J. At the hearing Counsel for the accused did not challenge the conclusion reached by the trail court or the conviction of the respondents.They merely prayed for alternation of the sentences. The learned judge. in our opinion erroneously acceded to this request. He thought that on the facts and circumstances proved in this case, it is sufficient to take action against the respondents under s. 5 (1) (a) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 1938. This is what the learned judge observed

"It is clear that these offences were-

committed by the accused who entertained wrong

notions as to- the manner in which they could

make the strike successful. Obviously the

persons who had sponsored the strike were the

leaders of the Union of which the accused were

members and no doubt the leaders of the Union

could have observed greater restraint and

could have controlled the members in a better

manner. But the fact still remains that the

accused have acted on a sudden impulse and on

account of the heat and anger that was

generated, they have committed these acts of

violence. The accused do not belong to the

regular class of criminals. They were honest

workers and if on account of their wrong

notions about the manner in which they could

better the conditions of their lives they have

committed these offences, I do not see how any

useful purpose will be served by asking them

to undergo a sentence of imprisonment

immediately. I-think a better social and

useful purpose will be served if I direct each

of these accused to enter into a bond under s.

5 (1) (a) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders

Act, 1938, instead of sentencing them at once

to undergo imprisonment. Some of the findings reached by the learned judge are factually incorrect. His notions about the social purpose behinds.5(1)(a) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 1938 may endanger law and order. It may encourage violence. The learned judge seriously erred in thinking that the respondents acted on a sudden impulse and on account of the heat and anger that was generated. It is clear from the facts established in the case that the acts complained of were done after premeditation. It was a concerted and a well planned attack. No one but a mad man commits a crime without some motive or some real or imaginary grievance. If perverted notions are considered as mitigating circumstances then there will be chaos in society. We do not know what the learned judge meant by saying that the accused did not belong to a regular class of criminals. Most accused who come up before courts are not old offenders nor do they belong to any criminal tribe. That does not mean that the offence committed by them should not be dealt with in accordance with law. Section 5 (1) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 193 8 reads

,,Notwithstanding anything contained in

any,enactment for the time being in force,

when-

(a) any male person is. convicted of an

offence not punishable with death or

transportation for life, or

(b) any woman is. convicted of an offence of

any kind, if it appears to the. court by which

the offender is convicted, that regard being

bad to the age, character, antecedents or

physical or mental condition of the offender,

or to the circumstances in which the offence

was committed, it is expedient that the

offender should be released on probation of

good conduct, the court, may for reasons to be

recorded in writing instead of sentencing him

at once to any punishment, direct that he be

released on his entering into a bond, with or

without sureties, to appear and receive

sentence when called upon during such period

not being less than one year and not exceeding

three years as the court may direct, and in

the meantime to keep the peace and be of good

behaviour." In this case, the learned appellate judge did not take into consideration the age or the physical or mental conditions of the offenders. So far as the character of the accused is concerned, he could have considered it only in the context of what they did on the day of the occurrence. There was no other material before him. The offences committed by them show that they are desperate characters. The only thing that the learned appellate judge can be said to have considered is the circumstances in which the: offences were committed. The fact that there was a call for strike is no ground for arson and assault of a grievous character. No section of the society can be permitted to take law into its own hand. There are ways to remedy social injustices. No individual can take upon himself the right to remedy any wrong done to him. It is impossible to have an orderly society, if we take to the ways of the jungle. There may be a genuine desire to change the present social order but that must and can be done through the instrumentalities of the State. In the final analysis, it is the people of this country through their representatives that must decide the social goals. If social wrongs are sought to be remedied in the streets then there can be neither peace nor progress. Without progress the attainment of social justice is impossible. Under our Constitution the rule of law has been made our way of life. It is a, fallacy to think that rule of law and the law of the jungle can coexist. After having expressed our views on the question presented for our determination and thereby corrected the error of law committed by the High Court, we feel there is no need at present to send the respondents to jail by having recourse to our power under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The offence in this case was committed as far back as in August, 1963. The respondents are all workersWe are told that as a result of this incident they have been dismissed from service. Most of them have not even put in their appearance in these appeals. The judgment of the High Court was delivered on 5th November, 1966 nearly four years back. The suspended sentence imposed by the High Court has now been fully undergone by the respondents. We take it that the State filed these appeals primarily to get an authoritative interpretation of S. 5(1) of the Bombay Probation of Offenders Act, 1938. That purpose is now achieved. Hence we dismiss these appeals subject to the observations made above. R.K.P.S. Appeals dismissed.