ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 384 of 1970. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. S. Lakshminarasu, for the petitioner. R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court has delivered by Bhargava, J. Abdul Ghani has filed this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging that his detention in jail is illegal. He has been detained in pursuance of an order passed by the District Magistrate of Poonch in the State of Jammu & Kashmir under section 3(2) read with section 5 of the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). That order is reproduced below :-
"Whereas, 1, Syed Mohammad Shaffi Andrabi,
IAS, District Magistrate, Poonch am satisfied
that with a view to preventing Abdul Gani s/o
Asdha Caste Rather Kashmiri Muslim r/o Chohana
P/S Surankote District, Poonch, from acting
in-a manner prejudicial to the security of the
State, it is necessary so to do.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers
conferred by section 3 (2) read with section 5
of the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention
Act, 1964, 1, Syed Mohd. Shaffi Andrabi, IAS,
District Magistrate. Poonch, hereby direct
that the said Abdul Gani be detained in
Central Jail Jammu subject to such conditions
as to maintenance of discipline and punishment
for breaches of discipline as have been
specified in the Jammu & Kashmir Detenu
General Order of 1968.
Issued this day the 9th May 1970 under my hand
and seal.
Sd S.M.S. Andrabi, IAS
District Magistrate, Poonch." The order was passed on 9th May, 1970, and on the same day, the District Magistrate issued a direction under the proviso to section 8 of the Act which reads as follows :-
"Whereas Abdul Gani s/o Asdha Caste Rather
Kashmiri Muslim r/o Chohana p/s Surankote
District Poonch, has been detained in
pursuance of order No. 38/PDA/70 dated 9th
May, ’70 made by me under section 3(2) read
with section 5 of the Jammu & Kashmir
Preventive Detention Act, 1964, with a view to
preventing him from acting in a manner preju-
dicial to the security of the State and;
Whereas, I consider it against the public
interest to disclose the ground of detention
to the said Abdul Gani s/o Asdha Caste Rather
Kashmiri Muslim r/o Chohana p/s Surankote,
District Poonch.
Now, therefore, in pursuance of section 8 read
with section 13-A of the said Act, I hereby
direct that the said Abdul Gani be informed it
is against the security of the State to
disclose to him the grounds on which his
detention order was made.
Issued this day the, 9th of May ’70 under my
hand and seal.
Distt. Magistrate Poonch." The petitioner was actually detained on the 22nd May, 1970, in pursuance of the detention order and, on the same day. he was informed that it is against public interest to disclose to him. the grounds on which the detention order was made in pursuance of the direction made by the District Magistrate, mentioned above. On this information being conveyed to him, his signatures were taken in token thereof on the back of the paper on which this direction had been issued by the District Magistrate. His detention was subsequently confirmed by the State Government, after the grounds on which the order had been made and the other particulars having bearing on the matter had been examined by the Chief Minister. On these facts, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has challenged the, validity of the detention on seven different grounds. The first ground is that, when the Constitution of India was applied to the State of Jammu & Kashmir by the order of the President under Art. 370 of the Constitution, Article 35 was modified in its application to the State of Jammu & Kashmir by adding clause. (c) which reads as follows :-
"35. (c) No law with respect to preventive
detention made by the Legislature of the State
of Jammu & Kashmir, whether before or after
the commencement of the Constitution
(Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Order, 1954,
shall be void on the ground that it is
inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Part, but any such law shall, to the
extent of such inconsistency, cease to have
effect on the expiration of fifteen years from
the commencement of the said Order, except as
respects thing done or omitted to be done
before the expiration thereof". It is by virtue of this clause (c) of Art. 35 as contained in the Constitution applied to the State of Jammu & Kashmir that the provisions of the proviso to section 8 and section 13-A of the Act cannot be challenged on the ground of contravening the provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution. This point was considered by a Bench of this Court in Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Another,(1) where the validity of the proviso to S. 8 and of s. 13A of the Act was upheld. Learned counsel has urged that, in that case, the Court left the question open whether Art. 35(c) of the Constitution had been validity or invalidily introduced in the Constitution in its application to Jammu & Kashmir. His argument is that this article was introduced by an order made by the President in exercise of his powers under Art. 370 and, by this provision, the fundamental right of a detenu to seek the remedy against the detention in the Supreme Court of India had been abridged, so that the application of this provision was in contravention of Art. 32(4) of the Constitution and, consequently, void. This submission made by learned counsel, on the face of it, has no substance at all. The introduction of the Provision contained in Art. 35(c), when applying the Constitution to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, did not in any way affect the right of a citizen of Jammu and Kashmir to move the Supreme Court of India, for an appropriate writ under Art. 32. The effect of that amendment only was that, when approaching the Supreme Court, the, detenu could not challenge the validity of the Act on the Lyround that any provision of it contravened the provisions of Art, This modification in the Constitution had, therefore. no bearing at all on Art. 32(4). Further, under Art. (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 365. 370, the President is given the full discretion to apply the Constitution with such exception and modifications as he may, by order specify. It was at the initial stage , when applying the Constitution to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, that this modification was made in Art. 35 This was, therefore, not a case where any provision of the Constitution as already applied to Jammu & Kashmir was being modified in which case only a question could arise whether that modification was permissible. The modification at the initial stage of applying the Constitution itself cannot be challenged on the ground that it abridges any of the fundamental rights. _At the time- of applying the Constitution, no such fundamental rights existed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. They came into existence only by virtue of the Order of the President applying the Constitution and at that stage they came into force in the modified form in which they were applied. This point raised by learned counsel, therefore, has no force at all. The second point urged was that, in the direction given under the proviso to s. 8, the District Magistrate merely ordered that the petitioner be informed that it was not. in ’Public interest to disclose the grounds of detention to him, and failed to add a further direction that a copy of that order must be actually served on the petitioner. It was urged that a copy of that direction in writing should have been delivered to the petitioner and, for this proposition, reliance was placed on the, decision of this Court in Harikishan v. The State of Maharashtra & Others(1). That case, however, has no application at all, because, in that case, the question that arose was whether it was necessary that a copy of the grounds of detention, which ’Were quite lengthy, should be delivered to the detenu in addition to those grounds being communicated to him by being read out and translatede In the present case, under the proviso to section 8, no grounds of detention have been served and. there is no question of the petitioner knowing the grounds in detail id order to make a representation against them. He was only to be informed that it was not in the public interest to disclose the grounds. For such information, there was no need that the copy of that order must be served on him The third point urged raises a question of, fact. According to the Petitioner, he was never given this information and his, signatures were taken on a blank sheet of paper. This argument is based on assertion of wrong facts. We have seen the original order issued under the proviso to section 8.At the time when the information in pursuance of. it was given to the. (1) [1962]Supp.2S.C.R.918. petitioner, an endorsement was made on the back in Urdu reciting the fact that the petitioner hack been informed as directed and it was under this endorsement that the signature of the petitioner was taken. The petitioner’s signature is also in Urdu and the handwriting shows that he can read and write Urdu very well. Since he signed under, the endorsement, it is clear that he must have known what he was signing and his assertion in the present case that his signatures were taken on a blank paper is totally false. The fourth point merged was that the District Magistrate, when making the order for detention, did not apply his mind, because his order does not mention the existence of any materials which could have impelled him to make, the order of detention of the petitioner. In the order made under section 3 of the. Act, the existence of material does not require to be mentioned. The order recites that the District Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State. That this satisfaction: was based on materials is further clarified by the order of the Government confirming the detention which mentions that the District Magistrate to the Government the grounds had, with his report, sent on which the order had been made as well as well as other particulars having bearing on the matter., It is, therefore not a case where the District Magistrate can be held to have passed an order without any material at all. The fifth point. urged is that, in the order of detention, the District Magistrate has when giving the reason for making the order, stated that he is satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a, view to preventing the petitioner from acting in "a" manner prejudicial to the security of the State, while section 3 of the Act mentions that such an order can be made, if the. Government or the District Magistrate is satisfied with respect to any person that it is necessary to make the order with a view to preventing him from acting in "any" manner prejudicial to the security of the State. According to learned, counsel, the District Magistrate, by using the word "a" before the word "manner" instead of the word "any" as used in the statute, made an order which is outside the scope of the statute. The argument is clearly misconceived. The expression "acting, in any manner" used in the Act clearly. covers a case where the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is that the person, in respect of Whom the order is going to be made, is to be prevented from "acting in a manner" prejudicial to the security of the State. The point raised has merely to be stated to be rejected. The sixth point argued was that, in the order containing the direction that the petitioner be informed that it is not in public interest to communicate the grounds of detention to him, the District Magistrate has referred to the petitioner as one who "has been" detained, which shows that, on 9th May, 1970, when,,-this order was made, the petitioner was already under detention, so that the plea of the(, petitioner that he was actually in custody earlier than 22nd May, 1970, is correct. Since there was no authority for earlier detention, his detention must be held to be illegal. It is true that the language used in the order under the proviso to section 8 is incorrect. It is clear that both the order of detention under section 3 and this direction under the proviso to section 8 were passed by the District Magistrate on the same day one after the other. The proviso to section 8 permits the District Magistrate to make the direction at the same time when the order of detention is made under section 3, and this is what the District Magistrate actually did. He appears to have used the expression "has been" by mistake. It has been established by affidavits filed on behalf of the Government that, in pursuance of the order of detention dated 9th May, 1970, the petitioner was actually detained on 22nd May, 1970 and not before the order containing the direction under the proviso to section 8 was issued. The use of this incorrect expression does, not imply that the detention was illegal. The seventh and the last point urged was that, under the proviso to section 8 of the Act, non-communication of the grounds of detention is permissible if communication; of grounds is against public interest, while, in the direction made by the district Magistrate, he has stated that it is against the interests of the security of the State. This is mere quibbling. Any action in the interest of the security of the State is clearly in public interest, so that the direction was fully covered by the proviso to section 8. None of the grounds urged,_thus, has any force. The detention of the petitioner is valid. The petition is dismissed. V.P.S. Petition dismissed.