CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1110 of 1971. From the judgment and decree dated the 8th September, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 826 of 1969. G. N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana, for the appellants. R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala and V. J. Francis, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered byMATHEW, J. This appeal, by certificate, is directed against the judgment and decree dated September 8, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court. The short facts of the case are as follows. The respondent Sughar Singh was a permanent head constable in the U.P. Police Force between 1950 and 1960. Some time in 1960, he was deputed for training as a cadet sub-inspector at the Armed Police Training Centre at Sitapur. On March 16, 1961, Sughar Singh was appointed an officiating Platoon Commander. He worked in that post till August, 1968. While working as a Platoon Commander, on July 22, 1966, the respondent was served with a notice by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur, in which he was asked to show cause within 10 days’ of the receipt of that notice as to why the following adverse entry should not be entered in his character roll
"1966-is suspected to have got entries of date
of birth and educational qualifications
altered on the authority of a fictitious
certificate which had to be corrected later
on. Severly warned." The respondent submitted an explanation in accordance with the terms of this notice on July 30, 1966. The "planation was not, however, found acceptable and an adverse entry was actually made in his character roll in 1966. On August 12, 1968, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kanpur Range, U.P. passed an order to the following effect
"Order No. 1207/P.14.Q.-No. T 13 B 68
Order-On his reversion from the post of
Officiating SubInspector, Armed Police, Shri
Sughar Singh is taken back on his substantive
post of Head Constable". The order is in Hindi but we have set out an English translation of the order which we found included in the records. The respondent challenged this order of reversion by a writ petition filed in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. His petition was, at first dismissed by a learned Singl e Judge of the High Court on May 12, 1969. He filed a special, a Division Bench. One of the Judges of this Division the appeal and quashed the order of reversion. The other learned Judge, however, was of a different view and held that the respondent’s appeal was liable to be dismissed. The matter, thereafter, was referred to a third learned Judge who found in favour of the respondent and quashed the order of reversion. In view of the opinion of the third learned Judge, the special appeal filed by the respondent was allowed by a judgment of September 8, 1970 and the order reverting the present respondent to his post of head constable was quashed. The appellants have now come on appeal before this Court against the order of the Allahabad High Court. The short question that arises for determination is as to whether the order of August 12, 1968, was made in violation of article 311 of the Constitution of India or in violation of any right of the respondent under article 16 of the Constitution. For answering this question the first essential is to determine what was exactly the nature of the appointment of Sughar Singh when he was posted as a Platoon Commander. Both parties accept the proposition that the rank of Platoon Commander is the same as that of a Sub-Inspector of Police. The appellants contend that Sughar Singh was never appointed substantively to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police and that he was merely officiating as a Platoon Commander in August 1968 when he was reverted to his-substantive post of Head Constable. The respondent on the other- hand, contends that before he was appointed as a Platoon Commander, he had been appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police and that even if his appointment to the post of a Platoon Commander was in an officiating capacity, his substantive rank was that of a Sub-Inspector of Police. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the framing of the order dated March 21 1961 which was in the following terms "Order-On completion of the practical training on March 16, 1961, the following S.I.A.P. Cadres are allotted to P.A.C. for posting as offg. Platoon Commanders : Name Distt/Unit of lien Residerce xx xx xx Sughar Singh Agra Etawah xx xx xx
Sd. M.U. Abmald I.P.S.
Dy. Inspr. Gen. of Police, Headquarter, U.P.". The order was made in respect of 15 head constables and reads as if all the officers mentioned therein who were posted as officiating Platoon ,Commanders already belonged on the relevant date to the S.I.A.P. Cadre i.e., they were sub-inspectors in the Armed Police. The respondent’s counsel argued that the order specifically described the respondent as a Sub-Inspector belonging to the Armed Police Cadre and the obvious intent of that order was to allot him to the Provincial Armed Constabulary in the post of Officiating Platoon Commander. The argument, in other words, was that independently of and prior to the appointment of the respondent to the post of a Platoon Commander, he had been enjoying the status of a SubInspector. It was further contended that since the respondent’s status as a Sub-Inspector of Police is not qualified as either officiating or temporary, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that on completion of his training he had already been appointed as a SubInspector substantively. The order of March 21, 1961 was merely an order of posting and not an order indicating the appointment of the respondent to, a particular cadre. We are unable to accept this argument of the respondent & counsel. To understand the position clearly, one has to refer to certain provisions of the Police Regulations under which the respondent had been selected for promotion from the post of Head Constable to the rank of Sub-Inspector in the Armed Police :
"406(b) Armed Police-Permanent promotions to
the rank of sub-inspector in the armed police
are made by Deputy Inspectors General from the
list of those who have ,qualified at the
course prescribed under paragraph 448.
Superintendents may promote in officiating or
temporary vacancies.
447. Recruitment to the rank of sub-inspector
Armed Police/Platoon Commander will be made in
the following manner
" (a) 80 per cent of the posts both temporary
and permanent in the combined cadre of sub-
inspector, Armed Police/ Platoon Commander
will be filled in by selection of men from the r anks.
"(b) The remaining 20 per cent of the posts
both temporary and permanent in the combined
cadre of Sub-Inspector, Armed Police/Platoon
Commander will be filled in by direct
recruitment.
"For category (a) the Range Deputy Inspectors
General of Police, Deputy Inspector General,
Provincial Armed Constabulary and the Deputy
Inspector General of Police Headquarters in
the cases of the Railway Police, win nominate
from time to time as required by the Inspector
General such number of head constables of the
Armed Police as may be specified.
"For category (b) selection of the required-
number of candidates will be made by a
committee consisting of the
Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector
General Provincial Armed Constabulary and one
more Deputy Inspector General nominated by
Inspector General.
"448(i) Candidates. nominated or selected
under paragraph 447, will undergo a course of
training of 7 months’ duration at the armed
training centre Sitapur including one month’s
practical training in the Provincial Armed
Constabulary, Units.
(ii) Before taking training under the above
sub-para, candidates selected under para
447(b) shall undergo a successful preliminary
training for a period of two months at the
Armed Training Centre, Sitapur.
"448-A. Relative seniority will be governed
by the date of passing the Sub-Inspector Armed
Police Course and for men passing the same
course by the position obtained in the. final
examination of sub-inspector Armed Police
Course between two men obtaining equal marks
in the same final examination (i) promoted man
will take seniority over directly recruited
candidate (ii) if both men are directly
recruited the age will be the determining
factor and in the case of the ranker cadets it
will be the length of service". Certain things are clear from the above regulations. There is a combined cadre of Sub-Inspectors of Armed Police and Platoon Commanders. ’Mat means there is no difference in rank between a Sub-Inspector of Armed Police and a Platoon Commander. Eighty per cent of the posts of this cadre are filled up by promotion from the, ranks and twenty per cent by direct recruitment. These appointments whether by promotion or by direct recruitment are made to posts which may be temporary or permanent. When appointments are made by promotion, the promoters are nominated from among the head constables of the Armed Police. As soon as the selection of’ nominees is made, they have to undergo first a preliminary training for a period of two months and, if successful in that training, a further training of 7 months at the Armed Police Training Centre, Sitapur. There are certain rules for determining the relative seniority of the promotees inter se and also vis-a-vis the direct recruits. We are not concerned with those rules in this appeal. In the light of these regulations and from the facts set out in the different affidavits on record, it is clear that the respondent was selected for training as a cadet SubInspector under Regulation 447 of the Police Regulations and on his successful completion of the’ training he was promoted to the combined cadre of ’Sub-Inspector, Armed Police/Platoon Commander". The order of March 21, 1961 was the order posting the respondent and his other colleagues who were successful in the training to certain vacant posts in that combined cadre of Sub-Inspector and Platoon Commander for the, first time.. The order is not happily worded. The order seems. to make a kind of distinction between the rank of Sub-Inspector of the Armed Police Cadre and the rank of a Platoon Commander, though, in fact, there was no such distinction. Regulation 447 (a) makes that position indubitably clear. The respondent’s contention that he was first appointed SubInspector and then posted as a Officiating Platoon Commander, is based on this obvious erroneous drafting of the order of March 21, 1961. Had the respondent been appointed in the first instance to the post of a Sub-Inspector and then posted as a Platoon Commander, it would have been possible for him to produce the first order by which he claims to have been promoted to the cadre of sub-inspector. He produced no such order. In fact, there can be little doubt that there, was no such order. The order of March 21, 1961 was an order passed immediately after the completion of the practical training on March 21, 1961. That is clear from the order itself. There is no room for any order intervening the completion of the practical training and the passing of the posting order on March 21, 1961. Having regard to these considerations, it is impossible for us to accept the respondent’s contention that he, had been appointed substantively to the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police. In our opinion, his first appointment was as an officiating Platoon Commander and he was never given a substantive rank in the combined cadre of.Sub-Inspectors, Armed Police and Platoon Commanders. We now turn to the question whether the order of reversion of the respondent was either a reduction in rank in contravention of article 311 of the Constitution or a contravention of the respondent’s fundamental right under article 16 of the Constitution. Though the law in this matter has been laid down in a large number of decisions of this Court, considerable difficulty arises in applying the various principles enunciated by those decisions to the facts of any- particular case. The first decision which has now become a locus classicus on the subject is the decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. The Union of India(1). The principles that were laid down in that case are as follows
(1) Article 311 of the Constitution of India
makes no distinction between permanent and
temporary posts and extends its protection
equally to all government servants holding
permanent or temporary posts or officiating in
any of them.
(2) The protection of article 311 is
available only where dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by
way of punishment and not otherwise.
(3) If the termination of service or
reduction in rank is not by way of punishment,
article 311(2) is not attracted. To determine
whether the termination or the reduction is by
way of punishment one has to consider whether
the servant has the right to hold the post
from which he has been either (1) [1958] S.C.R. 828. 3 41 removed or reduced. In the case of a probationary or officiating appointment to a permanent or temporary post there is no such right. This does not mean, however, that the termination of service or reduction in rank of a servant who has no right to the post can never be dismissal or removal or reduction by way of punishment. If government expressly chooses to penalise the servant for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or the like by inflicting on him the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction, the requirements of article 311 must be complied with.
(4) A reduction in rank must be a punishment
if it carries penal consequences with it and
the two tests to be applied are:
(i) Whether the servant has a right to the
post or the rank; and
(ii) whether evil consequences such as
forfeiture of pay and allowances, loss of
seniority in his substantive rank, stoppage or
postponement of future chances of promotion
follow as a result of the order ?
Where either of these tests apply, the
reduction in rank must be one within the
meaning of article 311(2) of the Constitution
and will attract its protection. The principles formulated in Parshotam Lal Dhingr’s case have furnished the principal guidelines in all future cases relating to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of Government servants.As we have already said,however, the matter is not altogether free of difficulty even after the formulation of these principles. Depending on the nature and circumstances of each individual case it has often been necessary to clarify and modify these principles in certain respects. In this process, sometimes new but analogous principles have been evolved and sometimes the old principles have been themselves elaborated, analysed and re-formulated in a different language. It is necessary at this stage to refer to one special difficulty which has been created by the process of elaboration and reformulation which we have mentioned just now. Sometimes in applying the principles of Parshotam Lal Dhingra’s case to the facts of a particular case, one aspect had to be emphasised in view of the peculiar circumstances of that case and in doing so this Court gave a special formulation which covered the facts of that case. That principle was later found either inadequate or inapplicable in another case Where the facts and circumstances have been slightly different and which called for emphasis on a different aspect of the rules. In this way, this Court has found it necessary to mould, the principles to suit the needs of the varying circumstances of different cases. The original principles were not intended to be abandoned but re-shaving of the principles became necessary and even unavoidable to fit them accurately and appropriately to new set of circumstances. This has often led to formulation of principles with varying contours which superficially at least seem to suggest that some of them are anomalous and even contradictory. If, however, the prnciples are construed with reference to the facts of any, particular casefor which they have been evolved, it will, we believe be found thatthere is no fundamental discrepancy or contradiction in the principles. Confusion has arisen particularly in respect of cases where this Court has had to deal with orders of government from the aspect of the motive underlying those orders. What’ is the weight to be given to motive in deciding whether a particular order is penal in character and therefore falling within the mischief of article 311 of the Constitution or whether it has been passed for departmental considerations and in exigencies of public service. It is well recognised that very often the motive of a particular order of government and the language and terms of the order itself are not in harmony. In many, cases though government take action under the terms of a contract of employment or under the specific service rules for the purpose of terminating the service or reducing the rank of an officer, the real motive or inducing factor which influences the government to take action is different and is connected with some disqualification or inefficiency of the officer. In other words. government while pretending to act in terms of the contract of service or service rules, in reality wants to get rid of the officer concerned or to reduce him to a lower rank by way of punishment for his misconduct or inefficiency or disqualification. In such a case, the action taken by government is in an innocuous form but the real intent of it is penal. Such a situation was contemplated by Das, C.J. in Parshotam Lai Dhingra’s case. He observed
"It is true that the misconduct, negligence
inefficiency or other disqualification may be
the motive or the inducing factor which
influences the government to take action under
the terms of contract of employment or the
specific service rule, nevertheless, if a
right exists, under the contract or the rules,
to terminate the service, the motive operating
in the mind of the government is as Chagla,
C.J. has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of
India (A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 455) wholly
irrelevant. In short, if the termination of
service is founded on the right flowing from
contract or the service rules, then, prima
facie the termination is not a punishment and
carries with it no evil consequences and so
article 311 is not attracted." Following this enunciation of the principle this Court has in many later cases refused to give any weight to the motive operating in the mind of the authority which passes an order terminating the service of a temporary servant or reducing the servant in rank so long as the particular action taken was "founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules." Since we are concerned in this case with a case of reversion- we propose to confine our attention to the different circumstances in which an order of reversion may be made. An order of reversion is, in its immediate effect bound always to a reduction in rank. Even a reversion from a higher but temporary or officiating rank to a lower substantive rank is in a sense a reduction. But such orders of reversion are not always reduction in rank within the meaning of article 31 1. If the officer is promoted substantively to a higher post or rank, he gets a right to that particular post or rank and if he is afterwards reverted to the lower post or rank which he held before, it is a "reduction in rank" in the technical sense in which the expression is used in article 31 1. The real test in all such cases is to ascertain if the officer concerned has a right to the post from which he is reverted. If he has a right to the post then a reversion is a punishment and cannot be ordered, except in compliance with the provisions of article 3 1 1. If, on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of article 3 1 1. But even in this case, he cannot be reverted in a manner which will show conclusively that the intention Was to punish him. The order itself may expressly state that the officer concerned is being reverted by way of punishment In fact the order may in various other ways cast a stigma on the officer concerned. In all such cases, the order is to be taken as a punishment. Sometimes again’ the order of reversion may bring up-on the officer certain penal consequences like forfeiture ,of pay and allowances or loss of seniority in the subordinate rank, or the stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion: in such cases also the government servant must be regarded as having been punished and his reversion to the substantive rank must be treated as a reduction in rank. In such a case article 311 will be attracted. In State of Punjab and Another v. Sukh Raj Bahadur(1), Mitter, J.. after analysing the decisions of this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India(2), State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das(3) R. C. Lacy v. State of Bihar(4), Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab(5), Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India(6) and A. G. Benjamin v. Union of India(7), has formulated the following propositions
1.The services of a temporary servant or
a probationer can be terminated under the
rules of his employment and such termination
Without anything more would not attract the
operation of article 311 of the Constitution.
2.The circumstances preceding or attendant
on the order of termination of service have to
be examined in each case, the motive behind it
being immaterial.
3.If the order visits the public servant
with any evil consequences or casts an
aspersion against his character or integrity,
it must be considered to be one by way of
punishment, no matter whether he was a mere
probationer or a temporary servant. (2) [1958] S.C.R. 828. (3) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 6()6. (4) C.A. No 590 of 1962 decided on 23-10-63. (5) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 716.(6) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449. (7) C.A. No. 1341 of 1966 decided on 13-12-1966. 10-522SCI/ 74
4.An order of termination of service in
unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry
launched by the superior authorities only to
ascertain whether the, public servant should
be retained in service, does not attract the
operation of article 311 of. the Constitution.
5.If there be a full-scale departmental
enquiry envisaged by article 311 i.e. an
Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge. sheet
submitted, explanation called for and
considered, any order of termination of
service made thereafter will attract the
operation of the said article." In Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1), this Court refused to interfere with an order terminating the services of an officer who had been temporarily appointed to the Judicial Service of Madhya Pradesh under rule 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and QuasiPermanent Service) Rules, 1960, without passing any stigma on the officer concerned and merely stating that his services were terminated from a specified date. Even though the order of termination had been preceded in that case by an informal enquiry into the conduct of the officer with a view to ascertain if he should be retained in service, this Court followed the decision in State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur (supra) and observed
"On the face of it the order did not cast any
stigma on the appellant’s character or
integrity nor did it visit him with any evil
consequences. It was not passed by way of
punishment and the provisions of article 311
were not attracted." In the Union of India v. Gajendra Singh(2), this Court sustained an order passed by the Union of India reverting an officiating Naib Tehsildar to his permanent post of Kanungo on the ground that he could not pass the departmental examination. This Court clearly held in that case that "appointment to a post on officiating basis is, from the nature of employment, itself of a transitory character and in the absence of any contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointment is that it is terminable at any time. The Government servant so appointed acquires no rights to the post. But if. the order entails or provides for forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in the substantive rank Or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion then that circumstance may indicate that though, in form, the government had purported to exercise its undoubted right to terminate the employment, in truth and reality, the termination was by way of penalty,". Let us now consider whether in the light of the various cases decided by this Court the order of reversion amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. We will apply all the different tests laid down by this Court one by one. First, the order is not attended with any stigma. The order merely states that Sughar Singh is reverted and that he is reverted to his substantive post of head constable. By no stretch of imagination can this language be construed as I casting a stigma on the respondent. Secondly, there is nothing to show that Sughar Singh has lost his seniority in the substantive rank. It is true that some of his colleagues who were also holding the substantive post of head constable and who had also been appointed in an officiating capacity to the post of Platoon Commanders were not reverted on the day when the respondent was reverted. But that cannot be regarded as a penal consequence by way of loss of seniority in the substantive rank. In Divisional Personnel Officer v. Raghavendrachar(1), this Court has clearly held that where a number of employees are placed on a senior list on a provisional basis they do not get-any indefeasible right to retain their seniority on that provisional basis so that the reversion of a person who was in the list does not constitute a reduction in rank merely on the ground that persons lower in the rank have not been reverted. Thirdly, there, is no evidence to show and, in fact, it was not contended on behalf of the respondent that there has been any forfeiture of his pay or allowances or any loss in the seniority in the substantive rank which is, one must remember, the rank of Head Constables. On a careful scrutiny of the order of reversion we do not find any indication that it affects the seniority of Sughar Singh in his substantive rank or that it affects his chances of his future promotion from that rank. It is true that Sughar Singh will be deprived by the order of reversion of the post of Platoon Commander but that is not considered a penal consequence. Such deprivation is the usual consequence of any order of reversion from the officiating post which an ’incumbent has no right to hold. Such deprivation has been held by this Court not to be an order attended with penal consequences (see Union of India v. Jeewan Ram(2). It has been suggested that the motive behind the reversion was really the infliction of punishment. There was a formal proceeding held against the respondent and the explanation that he had submitted in reply to the charges made out against him had not been accepted by his superior officers. The order of reversion which came soon after this must, it was suggested, be connected with the disciplinary proceedings and the order of reversion must be taken as motivated by the desire to punish him. The reply to this suggestion is two-fold. The proceedings had been drawn up two years before the order of reversion. The proceedings were limited in nature. The only punishment proposed in the proceedings was the making of certain adverse entries in the character roll. That penalty, had already been imposed on the respondent. There is nothing to show that after two years the authorities proposed to rake up that matter and inflict a heavier punishment on the respondent than they had previously proposed and also inflicted. Besides, it is well-known that in a matter like this we are concerned only with the question whether the order of reversion entails any penal consequence. We are not concerned with the motive behind the reversion (see Madhav v. State of Mysore(3) and State of Bombay v. Abraham (4). (2) A.1.R. 1958 S.C. 905. (3) A.I.R. 1962 S.C.R. 11. (4) A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 794. The respondent’s counsel then challenged the order of reversion on another ground. He pointed out that at least 200 head constables who had taken training as Cadet SubInspectors of Armed Police at Sitapur after the respondent and who were junior to the respondent have still been allowed to retain their present status as Sub-Inspector and have not been reverted to their substantive post of Head Constable. Unless this can be justified as a measure of punishment, the reversion of the respondent would amount to discrimination in contravention of the provisions of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The facts on which this contention is based are found in paragraphs 7 and 20 of the petition. The contention itself is to be found in ground No. 3 of the writ petition. The complaint, we must say, is one which has to be sustained. No possible explanation in this extreme form of discrimination has been shown to us. Indeed, it appears from the judgment of the third learned Judge who heard the petition in the High Court that in answer to a question put by him, the standing counsel appearing for the State clearly stated that the order of reversion was a result of the adverse entry made in the appellant’s confidential character roll.’ If this statement of the learned standing counsel has to be accepted, it is impossible to resist the suggestion that the respondent’s order of reversion was really an order of punishment in disguise in which event the order must be struck down for non-compliance with the requirements of article 311 of the Constitution. The appellant in fact faces a dilemma. If it was not a case of punishment, it becomes difficult to explain why this discrimination was made against the respondent visa-vis at least 200 other officers who were junior to him in the substantive cadre. That would make the order liable to be struck down as violative of article 16 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to State of Mysore v. P. R. Kulkarni(1), where an order of reversion was struck down by this Court on the ground of "unjustifiable discrimination" which brought the order within the mischief of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the order has to be justified with reference to the adverse entry in the character roll, it becomes not merely a case of double punishment, but also a case of infringement of article 311 of the Constitution. It is true that the order ex-facie does not show anything which can suggest the contravention of article 311 of the Constitution. We have already analysed the order and discussed that aspect of the matter. But the compelling logic of the totality of circumstances attending the order of reversion indicates that if the order is not discriminatory and has to be justified with reference to the proceedings against the respondent and the earlier order regarding his character roll, it is impossible to avoid the criticism that it was really a punishment in the garb of an order of reversion. In the State of Bihar and Others v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra(2), this Court was called upon to consider the effect of an order of reversion passed on a member of the Bihar Police Force who, while holding the substantive post of Sergeant, was promoted to officiate temporarily as Subedar Major in 1948 but was subsequently in 1950 reverted to his substantive post. The High Court of Patna found that the reversion was not in the usual course or for administrative reasons but it was after the finding (1) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 217O. on an enquiry about some complaint against the plaintiff and by way of punishment to him. The matter having come on appeal to this Court, this Court held that the form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature and might often be a cloak or camouflage for an order founded on misconduct. This Court further observed:
"It may be that an order which is innocuous on
the face and does not contain any imputation
of misconduct is a circumstance or a piece of
evidence for finding whether it was made by
way of punishment or administrative routine.
But the entirety of circumstances preceding or
attendant on the impugned order must be
examined and the over-riding test will always
be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or
is the very foundation of the order." In the instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the peculiar circumstance that from out of a group of about 200 officers most of whom are junior to the respondent, the respondent alone has been reverted to the substantive post of Head Constable makes it absolutely clear that there was no administrative reason for this reversion. In fact there was no suggestion at any time made on behalf of the appellant that the post has been abolished or that respondent was, for administrative reasons, required to go back to Ms own post of Head Constable. This circumstance only corroborates what the learned standing counsel for the State admitted before the High Court that the foundation of ,the order of reversion is the adverse entry made in his character roll. In this view of the matter, we have no doubt. that the order was passed way of punishment, though all outward indicate show the order to be a mere order of reversion. Even if it were not so, we have no doubt that the order would be liable to be quashed on the ground of contravention of articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. In these circumstances, the appeal mu% be dismissed with costs and we do so. Before parting with this case, we think it only fair to mention that in Writing this judgment we have derived considerable assistance from a draft of the judgment prepared by our late-.Brother Mukherjea, J. ,who sitting with us, heard the case in the first instance. B.P.R. Appeal dismissed,