CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 333 of 1969.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Order dated the 22-81968 the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 427 of 1968). B. Sen and H.K. Puri, for the appellant S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and K.R.Nagaraja. for respondent No. 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by--
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgement of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. dismissing in litnine an appeal against a judgment and order of a learned single Judge of that Court by which a Writ Petition made to the High Court had been granted.
We have been taken through the very detailed judgment of the learned single Judge where all the relevant facts are considered in detail. The questions which have been raised before us are: firstly, whether the learned single judge was justified in considering the facts of the case and recording certain findings of fact without having even the advantage’ of the record of the proceedings of the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner, and other officers who had given certain other findings in favour of the appellant; secondly, whether the learned single Judge’s findings of fact are correct; and, thirdly, whether any such apparent error was disclosed in the proceedings of the authorities acting under the Refugees Rehabilitation and Settlement Act as to justify interference by the High Court. It was urged that a mistake apparent on the face of the record has to be one which does not necessitate delving deep into facts on record to discover it after a re-examination of questions of fact which ought to be left to the authorities empowered to give these findings. It is true that the High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the authorities which are empowered to give their decisions in such cases. Apart from jurisdictional errors, the High Court may correct errors apparent on the face of the record. An error to be apparent must, according to a rough test laid down by this Court in S.L. Hedge & Ors. v. M.B. Tirumale(1), be one which does not take prolonged arguments to bring it to the surface. These propositions are quite well established.
It is, however, also a settled rule of practice of this Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretionary powers of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution merely because two views are possible upon the facts of a case. Furthermore, in order to induce this Court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution the the question must involve at least a matter of public or general importance or the injustice suffered by an individual due to an error of law should be so gross as to touch the conscience of this Court in which case it would be deemed to be one of more than private importance.
The case before us is one of a competition between two auction purchasers of the same property put up for sale at two different auctions by the Managing Officer, Amritsar. The first was in favour of the respondent Smt. Rup Kaur, held on 20th August, 1959, and the second in favour of. Beant Singh, the appellant, held on 10th May, 1961, on the assumption that the first auction could be cancelled. The broad material facts, apparent from the original official record, which is now before us, are stated below.
At the auction sale on 20th August, 1959, held by the Managing Officer, Amritsar, Rup Kaur’s bid of Rs. 32,000/-, being the highest, was accepted and this fact was communicated to her by a letter dated (1) [1960] (1) S.C.R. 890. 11th September, 1959, sent through her son and general attorney M.S. Grewal. This letter was in the following terms:
"Dear Sir/Madam,
I am to inform you that your bid for Rs.
32,000/(Rupees thirty two thousands only) in
respect of property No. B-XII-18-S-14 (Portion
I and III) Hide Market Amritsar has been
accepted as per terms and conditions of the
auction.
2. You have executed an indemnity bond
in lieu of the earnest money due from you for
adjustment against the compensation admissible
on your verified claim(s). For this purpose
please furnish if you have not already done at
the time of auction the registration number of
your compensation application, so as to reach
this office within seven days of the issue of
this letter. In case you intend to associate
any other claimants with you in the purchase
of the above mentioned property you should
also submit affidavits of association duly
completed by you and by each of your asso-
ciates, as per specimen attached to this
office within the period specified above.
3. The balance of the purchase money, if
any, found due from you, after scrutiny of
your compensation application and that of your
associates will be communicated to you in due
course.
Yours
faithfully,
Sd/-
District Rent &
Managing Officer,
Amri tsar". The above mentioned letter showed that the contesting respondent being a displaced person had executed an indemnity bond and had to furnish some information so that adjustment of the compensation due to her may be made against the amount which she had to deposit. What was that information? On the margin of the front page of this letter is a partially illegible writing running from top to bottom of the printed full-scap sheet on the original record. With some difficulty the following part only can be read: "You are required to submit the following documents regarding provisional possession within seven days from the receipt of this letter failing which your case wilt be .... " After "will be" nothing is found written. It is disputed between the parties whether this writing in hand of the margin existed on the letter received by Smt. Rup Kaur’s attorney. However, even looking at the copy on the original record, the meaning is not at all intelligible. If it existed, it could only confuse and not enlighten the recipient as to what was to be done.
An order was then passed, on 8th March, 1961, which runs as follows:
"ORDER,
Smt. Roop Kaur through her attorney Shri
M.S. Grewal the auction purchaser of unit No.
B.XIII-18-S-14 (Portion I and III) Hide Market
Amritsar has failed to deposit the balance
sale price amounting to Rs. 28,000/- in spite
of issue of registered notice for 2-1-61. Her
bid is, therefore, cancelled and earnest money
forfeited. Settlement Officer Jullndur may be
requested to deduct Rs. 3200/- as earnest
money out of CA No. P/J/I0110. The applicant
may be informed accordingly and property
disposed of in the next sale programme.
Announced.
Dated 8-3-61. Sd/-
Distt. Rent &
Managing Officer,
Am ritsar". This order does not state that parties were duly heard. It is disputed whether the notice mentioned in it, alleged to have been sent to Smt. Rup Kaur on 18-12-1960 asking her to. appear on 2-1-1961, was received by the contesting respondent.’ Even if the learned Single Judge’s finding that it was not received at all by her were not correct, the time fixed for her appearance was too short. Furthermore, the allegation that she had been called upon, presumably by the letter dated 11-9-1959 to deposit Rs. 28,000/- was, on the face of it, untrue. Despite a report in her favour by the Regional Settlement Commissioner, who investigated the facts and reported to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, that she had not been properly served, justice was denied to her by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 26-6-1963.
The learned single Judge had examined the facts and pointed out other obvious illegalities at earlier stages showing that provisions of Rules 90 and 92 and 105 of the Displaced Persons Compensation & Rehabilitation Rules 1955 were not complied with in cancelling the sale. According to Rup Kaur, who filed some application on 9th May, 1961, when she learnt what had happened, she had also filed an appeal against the order of 8th March, 1961, and made a request for extension of time for payment of the balance of the purchase money, but, on 14th June, 1961, the following order was passed by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner on her appeal:
"This is an appeal against the order of
Distt. Rent & Managing Officer Amritsar dated
8-3-61 whereby he cancelled the appellants bid
and forfeited the earnest money on account of
his failure to deposit the balance price of
property No. B. XIII-18-S-14 (Portion I & III)
Hide Market Amritsar purchased by him at the
open auction within the specified time. For
all intents and purposes this appeal is for
extension of time to deposit the balance
purchase price.
Extension of time is an administrative
matter for which no judicial action is called
for. Dismissed. Inform the appellant
accordingly".
The learned Single Judge pointed out that the above mentioned order of the Appellate authority was also void for contravening the provisions of Rule 105 as interpreted by a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab in Hira Lal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi(1), so that it was the duty of the Settlement Commissioner, to fix a date for hearing and to inform the ’appellant it was not discharged. Apparently, the appeal was decided without informing the contesting respondent Smt. Rup Kaur when her appeal would be heard. Rule 105, which was thus contravened, provides:
"105. Provisions of Order XLI of the
Code of Civil procedure apply to appeals and
revisions.Except as otherwise expressly
provided in the Act or in these rules, the
procedure laid down in order XLI of the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act V of 1908)
shall,. so far as may be applicable, apply to
the hearing and disposal of ap.peals and
revisions and the Act".
Furthermore, extension of time was not just an "administrative matter". The question whether Rup Kaur had made out a case for it or not should have been quasi-judicially considered and decided. Indeed, if provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were applied to these appeals and extension of time was only a relief sought, the discretion to grant it or refuse it had to be judicially and judiciously exercised. The order was made on an apparently wrong assumption.
The learned single Judge had restored the position to what it was when the letter dated 11th September, 1959, was received by M.S. Grewal, the son and general attorney of Rup Kaur, and had directed the Managing Officer to proceed in accordance with Law. After having heard Learned Counsel for both sides at some length, we are not satisfied that any injustice has been done to the appellant who will, no doubt, get back whatever money he may have deposited. We think, that, in the circumstances of the case, it could not be said that the learned single Judge’s conclusion, that provisions of Rule 90 had not been complied with in dealing with the case of Rup Kaur, who had suffered injustice, was erroneous. The learned Judge had stated his conclusion as follows:
"A mere reading of the above-quoted
provision shows that one of the conditions
precedent entitling the Rehabilitation
Authorities to cancel the sale and to forfeit
the initial deposit is the service on the
auction purchaser of a notice specified in
sub-rule (11), sub-rule (12) or sub-rule (13)
of rule. 90. The petitioner admittedly
complied with the requirement of the notice
under sub-rule (12) of rule 90 (Annexure "F")
and no notice in terms of the requirements of
subrule (13) of rule 90 was ever admittedly
issued to or
(1) (1961) P.L.R. 560.
served on the petitioner. In these
circumstances, the Rehabilitation Authorities
has no jurisdiction whatsoever for
cancelling the sale in favour of the
petitioner on account of alleged non-payment
of the balance of the purchase price and for
forfeiting the initial deposit made by her.
In this view of the matter, the impugned
orders cancelling the sale in favour of the
petitioner and forfeiting her initial deposit
are wholly without jurisdiction and cannot
possibly be sustained. Errors of law in the
orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner
and the order Rehabilitation Authorities are
apparent on their face inasmuch as the said
orders have been passed in absolute ignorance
of the statutory provisions referred to
above".
We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the view taken by the High Court. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal. But, in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. M.R. Appeal dismissed.