CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 949 of 1977. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-10-1976 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.0., No. 170 of 1976. Naunit Lal, R. K. Baweja and Miss Lalita Kohli, for the Appellant. S. L. Watel, C. R. Somasekharan, R. Watel and M. S. Ganesh, for the Respondent. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by GUPTA, J.-On her application made under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the respondent was granted a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi on August 27, 1973. A little over two years after that decree was passed, on October 28, 1975 she presented a petition under section 13 ( IA) (ii) of the Act in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce. Section 13 (IA) (ii) as it stood at the material time reads :
"Either party to a marriage, whether
solemnized before or after the commencement of
this Act, may also present a petition for the
dissolution of the marriage by a decree of
divorce on the ground-
(i) x x
(ii) that there has been no restitution of
conjugal rights as between the parties to the
marriage for a period of two years or upwards
after the passing of a decree for restitution
of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which
they were parties. The provision was amended in 1976 reducing the period of two years to one year, but this amendment is not relevant to the present controversy. In the petition under section 1 3 (IA) (ii) she-we shall hereinafter refer to her as the petitioner-stated that there had been ’no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties to the marriage after the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and that there was no other legal ground why the relief prayed for should not be granted. Her husband, the appellant before us, in his written statement admitted that there had been no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties after the passing of the decree in the earlier proceeding, but stated that he made attempts "to comply with the decree (for restitution of conjugal rights) by writing several registered letters to the petitioner" and "otherwise" inviting her to live with him. He complained that the petitioner "refused to receive some of the letters and never replied to those which she received", and according to him the petitioner "has herself prevented the restitution of conjugal rights she prayed for and now seeks to make a capital out of her own wrong". The objection taken in the written statement is apparently based on section 2 3 (1 ) (a) of the Act. The relevant part of section 2 3 (1) (a) states : Decree in proceedings.
"23. (1) In any proceeding under this Act,
whether defended or not, if the court is
satisfied that-
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief
exists and the petitioner........ is not in
any way taking advantage of his or her own
wrong or disability for the purpose of such
relief...... "
On the pleadings the following issue was
raised as issue No. 1
"Whether the petitioner is not in any way
taking advantage of her own wrong for the
reasons given in the written statement ?"
Subsequently the following additional issue
was also framed
"Whether the objection covered by issue No. 1
is open to the respondent under the law ?" This additional issue was heard as a preliminary issue. The Additional District Judge, Delhi, who heard the matter, relying on a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court reported in I.L.R. (1971) 1 Delhi 6, (Ram Kali v. Gopal Dass), and a later decision of a learned single Judge of that court reported in I.L.R. (1076) 1 Delhi 725, (Gajna Devi v. Purshotam Giri) held that no such circumstance has been alleged in the instant case from which it could be said that the petitioner was trying to take advantage of her own wrong and, therefore, the objection covered by issue No. 1 was not available to the respondent The Additional District Judge accordingly allowed the petition and granted the petitioner a decree of divorce as prayed for. An appeal from this decision taken by the husband was summarily dismissed by the Delhi High Court. In the present appeal the husband questions the validity of the decree of divorce granted in favour of the petitioner. Section 13 (IA) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 allows either party to a marriage to present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for the period specified in the provision after the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Sub-section (IA) was introduced in section 13 by section 2 of the Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1964 (44 of 1964). Section 13 as it stood before the 1964 amendment permitted only the spouse who had obtained the decree for restitution of conjugal rights to apply for relief by way of divorce; the party against whom the decree was passed was not given that right. The grounds for granting relief under section 1 3) including sub-section (IA) however continue to be subject to the provisions of section 23 of the Act. We have quoted above the part of section 23 relevant for the present purpose. It is contended by the appellant that the allegation made in his written statement that the conduct of the petitioner in not responding to his invitations to live with him meant that she was trying to take advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of relief under section 1 3 (1 A) (ii) On the admitted facts, the petitioner was undoubtedly entitled to ask for a decree of divorce. Would the allegation, if true, that she did not respond to her husband’s invitation to come and live with him disentitle her to the relief ? We do not find it possible to hold that it would. In Ram Kali’s case (supra) a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court held that mere non-compliance with the decree for restitution does not constitute a wrong within the meaning of section 2 3 (1) (a). Relving on and explaining this decision in the later case of Gajna Devi v. Purshotam Giri (supra) a learned Judge of the same High Court observed
"Section 23 existed in the statute book prior
to the insertion of section 13(1A)...... Had
Parliament intended that a party which is
guilty of a matrimonial offence and against
which a decree for judicial separation or
restitution of conjugal rights had been
passed, was in view of section 23 of the Act,
not entitled to obtain divorce, then it would
have inserted an exception to section 13 (1 A)
and with such exception, the provision of
section 13(1A) would practically become re-
dundant as the guilty party could never reap
benefit of obtaining divorce, while the
innocent party was entitled to obtain it even
under the statute as it was before the
amendment. Section 23 of the Act, therefore,
cannot be construed so as to make the effect
of amendment of the law by insertion of sec-
tion 13(1A) nugatory.
advantage of his or her own wrong" occurring
in clause(a) of section 23(1) of the Act does
not apply to taking advantage of the statutory
right to obtain dissolution of marriage which
has been conferred on him by section 13(1A).
In such a case, a party is not taking
advantage of his own wrong, but of the legal
right following upon of the passing of the
decree and the failure of the parties to
comply with the decree............" In our opinion the law has been stated correctly in Ram Kali v. Gopal Das (supra) and Gajna Devi v. Purshotam Giri (supra). Therefore, it would not be very reasonable to think that the relief which is available to the spouse against whom a decree for restitution has been passed, should be denied to the one who does not insist on compliance with the decree passed in his or her favour. In order to be a ’wrong’ within the meaning of section 23 (1) (a) the conduct alleged has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion, it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled. In the case before us the only allegation made in the written statement is that the petitioner refused to receive or reply to the letters written by the appellant and did not respond to his other attempts to make her agree to Eve with him. This allegation, even if true, does not amount to misconduct grave enough to disentitle the petitioner to the relief she has asked for. The appeal is therefore dismissed but without any order as to costs. P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.