CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1969. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Decree/Order dated 31-10-67 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 238 of 1966. R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and V. J. Francis for the Appellant. B. P. Singh for Respondents Nos. 2-3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J. The litigation culminating in this appeal by special leave has a long and chequered history which may be summarised thus By deed dated July 20, 1945, registered on July 30, 1945, Chaudhary Vijay Kunwar singh and virendra kunwar Singh, Zamin- dars of Mithanpur (U.P) leased out ten plots of land admeasuring 6.63 acres situate in Mahal Safed Mouza Mahendri Sikandarpur Pargana Amroha District Moradabad which were in their possession as khudkhast’ (self-cultivating possession) to Sher Singh the original appellant, for a period of ten years beginning from the year 1353 Fasli to the end of the year 1362 Fasli. Nearly a month and a half later i.e. on September 6, 1945 the said Chaudhary, Vijay Kunwar Singh and Virendra Kunwar Singh alongwith their mother, Smt. Savitri Kunwar Singh, executed a sale deed in respect of their proprietary right and interest in the aforesaid plots of land in favour of Kaley Singh, Harbans Singh and Nihal Singh, brothers of Sher Singh, and one Chajju Singh. On the basis of this lease deed, Sher Singh, claimed to have obtained possession of the aforesaid plots of land and was recorded as a hereditary tenant in respect thereof in the revenue record. Asserting their right of pre-emption in respect of the aforesaid transaction of sale on the ground of their being co-sharers in the Mahal in which the said plots of land are, situate, Jai Kumar Singh and Roop Kumar Singh, respondents 2 and 3 herein, brought four suits in the Court of the Munsif, Moradabad against the aforesaid vendors and vendees and Sher Singh for possession of the land as also for cancellation of the aforesaid lease deed in favour of Sher Singh on the ground that it was fictitious and fraudulant and was executed with a view to defeat their right of pre-emption. These suits were decreed by the Munsif in favour of respondents 2 and 3 on April 26, 1947. On appeal, the Civil Judge, Moradabad, by Ms judgment dated November 9, 1948 affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Although the vendors, Kaley Singh and others did not prefer an appeal from the pre-emption decree passed against them, Sher Singh did not rest content and took the matter in further appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in so far as his right to and ejectment from the plots of land in question and cancellation of the aforesaid lease deed in his favour were concerned. By its judgment and decree dated April 13, 1953, the High Court allowed’ the appeal of Sher Singh holding that the revenue courts alone had jurisdiction to entertain the suit seeking relief of ejectment of the lessee (Sher Singh) and the civil courts had no such jurisdiction. The High Court accordingly set aside the decree passed against Sher Singh. Meanwhile the Uttar Pradesh Legislature passed the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’). ’though the Act came into force in the State on January 26, 1951, the issue of notification under section 4 thereof was made to coincide with the commencement of 1360 Fasli i.e. July 1, 1952. Pursuant to the observations made by the High Court in its aforesaid judgment dated April 13, 1953, disposing of the appeal of Sher Singh, respondents 2 and 3 filed ejectment suits against Sher Singh under section 209 of the Act which were dismissed on November 20, 1953. The first appeals preferred against the dismissal of these suits also proved abortive as they were dismissed on September 1, 1959. Respondents 2 and 3 thereupon took the matter in second appeal to the High Court which was stayed on account of the commencement of the consolidation operations in the village. in which the plots of land in question are situate. Thereafter respondents 2 and 3 filed objections under section 9(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter called ’the 1953 Act’) disputing the correctness of the entries in the records showing Sher Singh as ’Bhumidar’ of the plots of land in question and praying that the latter’s name be expunged from the records and in his place, their names be substituted as Bhumidars but the same were rejected by the Consolidation Officer IV at Kanth vide his orders dated December 24, 1961. The order passed by the 12-329SCI/78 Consolidation Officer, Kanth, rejecting the objections of respondents 2 and 3 to the entries in the records was upheld by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Amroha, in first appeal as also by the Deputy Director, Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow in second appeal by orders made on April 16, 1961 and August 21, 1962 respectively. Dissatisfied with these orders of the Consolidation authorities, respondents 2 and 3 took the matter in revision under section 48 of the 1953 Act to the Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P. who allowed the same and set aside the concurrent orders of the Consolidation Officer,, the Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director, Consolidation, holding that the lease in favour of Sher Singh was fictitious; that the basis of Sher Singh’s title viz. the aforesaid lease being fictitious intended to defraud the preemptors, the recorded entries in favour of Sher Singh could confer no title upon him; that Sher Singh’s position could be deemed to be only that of an agent carrying on cultivation on behalf of his brothers, the vendees, who were entitled to the land in view of the sale in their favour till it was pre-empted and that ’the effect of his finding would be that the possession of Sher Singh after execution of the Patta shall be deemed to be the possession of the vendees as Sher Singh bad himself no title to the land.’ Finally holding that the case of respondents 2 and 3 was covered by section 18 of the Act and that the possession of the vendees would ensure to the benefit of the pre-emptors, the Joint Director ordered their names to be substituted in the relevant records observing that they would be deemed to be holders of the land as ’kbudkbast’. It is this order of the Joint Director which was challenged before the High Court by Sher Singh in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and on the failure thereof has been impugned before us. Appearing for the appellants, Mr. Garg has contended that since the jurisdiction exercisable by the Joint Director, Consolidation, under section 48 of the 1953 Act as it stood on the relevant date was limited to cases of errors of jurisdiction and the orders passed by the Consolidation Officers subordinate to him did not suffer from any such infirmity the Joint Director, Consolidation, clearly exceeded the limits of his power by reversing the concurrent findings of fact arrived at and the orders passed by them. He has further urged that the finding of the Joint Director that the lease in favour of Sher Singh was fictitious cannot also be upheld as there is no material on the record to sustain that finding and all the authorities below the Joint Director bad concurrently held that the lease in favour of Sher Singh was valid and that he had not merely been recorded in the revenue records as being in possession of the land in question but was found to be in actual possession thereof pursuant to the lease deed. He has further urged that as Sher Singh actually held the land as a hereditary tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting he became sirdar of the land under section 19 of the Act and on deposit to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to ten times the land revenue, in terms of section 134 of the Act he became a Bhumidar. He has in the alternative urged that as Sher Singh was in self-cultivating occupation of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and was recorded as such in the relevant records, he at any rate acquired the right of an adhivasi under section 20(b) (ii) of the Act. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha has, on the other hand, urged that the subordinate consolidation officers having omitted to determine the vital question of the validity of the lease deed in favour of Sher Singh, the Joint Director of Consolidation was justified in going into the same and coming to the conclusion (on the basis of the close relationship of Sher Singh with the vendees and the subsequent transfer by him of the plots of land in question in favour of his nephew) that the transaction of the lease was sham and fictitious. He has further urged that actual physical occupation of the land is not essential to attract the applicability of section 18 of the Act and the requirement of the section is satisfied even. when subsisting right and title to possession over the land on the date of vesting on the basis of decree of pre-emption as in the instant case is established. He has further urged that the entries in the revenue records in favour of Sher Singh being fictitious and his possession of the plots of land in question being merely on behalf of the vendees, Sher Singh could neither acquire sirdari rights under section 19 nor adhivasi rights under section 20(b) (ii) of the Act., The principal question that falls for our determination in this case is whether in passing the impugned order, the Joint Director of Consolidation, exceeded the limits of the jurisdiction conferred on him under section 48 of the 1953 Act. For a proper decision of this question, it is necessary to advert to section 48 of the 1953 Act is it stood on the relevant date before its amendment by Act No. VIII of 1963
"Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act: The Director of Consolidation
may call for the record of any case if the
Officer (other than the Arbitrator) by whom
the case was decided appears to have exercised
a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or to
have failed to exercise jurisdiction so
vested, or to have acted in the exercise of
his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial
irregularity and may pass such orders in the
case as it thinks fit." As the above section is pari materia with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be profitable to ascertain the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It is now well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. If a subordinate court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the- court to try the dispute itself. The legal position was succinctly laid down by the Privy Council as early as 1884 in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh(1) in the following words :-
"The question then is, did the judges of the
lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of
their jurisdiction, act illegally or with
material irregularity. It appears that they
had perfect jurisdiction to decide the
question which was before them, and they did
decide it. Whether they decided rightly or
wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the,
case; and even if they decided wrongly, they
did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally
or with material irregularity." Again in Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar(2) the Privy Council while discussing the scope of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure observed :
"It will be observed that the section applies
to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise
or non-exercise of it, or the illegal
assumption of it. The section is not directed
against conclusions of law or fact in which
the question of jurisdiction is not involved." In N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras(3), the Privy Council observed that "section 115 empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters, (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. And if the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law." The above quoted observations made by the Privy Council have been approved and affirmed by this Court in a number of cases. In Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors. (4) Vora Abbashhal Ali-mohomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai(5) and D.L.F. Housing & Construction Company Private Ltd., New Delhi v. Sarup Singh & Ors.(6), this Court, however, draw a distinction between the errors committed by subordinate courts in deciding questions of law which have relation to, or are concerned with, question of jurisdiction of the said court, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. (1) (1884) LR. 11 LA. 237. (2) (1917) LR 44 I.A. 261. (3) (1948-49) LR 76 I.A. 67. (5) AIR 1964 SC 1341. Again in Pandurang Dhoni Chougate v. Maruti Hari Jadhav(1) this Court held :
"The provisions of s. 115 of the Code have
been examined by judicial decisions on several
occasions. While exercising its jurisdiction
under s. 115, it is not competent to the High
Court to correct errors of fact however gross
they may be, or even errors of law, unless the
said errors have relation to the jurisdiction
of the Court to try the dispute itself. As
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s. 115 indicate,
it is only in cases where the subordinate
Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested
in it by law, or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the
exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with
material irregularity that the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly
invoked. It is conceivable that points of law
may arise in proceedings instituted before
subordinate courts which are related to
questions of jurisdiction. It is well settled
that a plea of limitation or a plea of res
judicata is a plea of law which concerns the
jurisdiction of the court which tries the
proceedings. A findings on these pleas in
favour of the party raising them would oust
the jurisdiction of the court and so, an
erroneous decision on these pleas can be said
to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction
which fall within the purview of s. 115 of the
Code. But an erroneous decision on a question
of law reached by the subordinate court which
has no relation to questions of jurisdiction
of that court cannot be corrected by the High
Court under S. 115."
Again in M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur(2), this
Court observed
"The ’jurisdiction’ is a verbal coat of many
colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to
have had the meaning which Lord Reid ascribed
to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Com-
pensation Commissioner (1969) 2 A.C. 147,
namely, the entitlement ’to enter upon the
enquiry in question’. If there was an
entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into the
question, then any subsequent error could only
be regarded as an error within the
jurisdiction." The position that emerges from these decisions is that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters : (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to have exercised jurisdiction; and failed to do so (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provisions of law, or with material irregularity by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the) ultimate decision. And if the High Court is satisfied that there is no error in regard to any of these three matters, it has no power to interfere merely because it differs from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. A distinction must be drawn between the errors committed by subordinate courts in deciding question of law which have relation to, or are concerned with, questions of jurisdiction of the said courts, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. An erroneous decision on a question of fact or of law reached by the subordinate court which has no relation to question of jurisdiction of that court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under section 115. Applying the tests as extracted above to the facts of the instant case, we have no hesitation in holding that the Joint Director of Consolidation ignored the limitation that existed on his power under section 48 of the 1953 Act as it stood on the relevant date and illegally assumed jurisdiction which he did not possess. It is not and cannot be disputed that the consolidation authorities subordinate to the Joint Director of Consolidation possessed plenary jurisdiction and competence to go into the question of the correctness or otherwise of the entries in the revenue records relating to Sher Singh’s possession over the plots of land in question. That they arrived at a concurrent finding of fact that Sher Singh, was in actual possession of the land on his own behalf on the relevant date on the basis of the aforesaid valid lease deed is also evident from the following observations made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Amroha in his aforesaid decision dated April 16, 1962 :-
"I have carefully gone through the record and
also heard the learned counsels for the
parties at length and also perused the case
law. It is admitted that the appellants have
never been able to obtain possession over the
disputed land. In the revenue records name of
respondent Sher Singh exists throughout from
1353 F upto the date of vesting and onwards
also. Appellant’s allegation is that actually
the brothers of Sher Singh who purchased the
land in dispute are in possession but there is
absolutely no oral or documentary evidence in
support of this contention. Appellant Jai
Kumar Singh himself admits that in the. land
purchased by Kaley Singh, Chajjoo Singh and
others, Sher Singh has no interest and these
brothers also take food separately. I agree
with the learned Consolidation Officer that
the simple fact that the proprietary rights
have been transferred to the brothers of Sher
Singh is not at all sufficient to prove that
the lease was a fictitious document executed
simply to deprive the appellants of their
rights of pre-emption. It is worth mentioning
that the lease was executed in 1945 and
zamindari abolished in 1952. It does not
appeal to me that any one could have an idea
that the interests of the landlords will be
extinguished in this manner and therefore the
vendors executed a fictitious deed to deprive
the appellant of his rights of pre-emption. ..
The vendees Kaley Singh and others had only
purchased proprietary interest in the disputed
land and they were not its khud kasht
holders...... It is obvious that Kaley Singh
and other the original vendees purchased the
land subject to
the possession of respondent Sher Singh and
their proprietary interest would have come to
an end at the date of vesting.......
Considering the entire evidence on record, I
hold that the land in dispute could not have
been the khudkasht of the original vendees and
they could not have acquired Bhumidhari rights
u/s 18 of the Z.A. & L.R. Act and therefore
the appellants who stepped into their shoes
cannot have better rights...... It may also be
mentioned that respondent Sher Singh has not
been in possession as a trespasser but on the
basis of a valid lease." It may also be noted that the Deputy Director of Consolidation after discussing the entire evidence and holding that Sher Singh was lessee in possession of the land and neither the vendees had ever held the land in question as khudkhast holders nor could they be deemed to be the khudkhast holders thereof dismissed the appeal preferred by respondents 2 and 3 with the following observations :-
"The concurrent finding of the lower courts
was therefore correct and justified." Thus the subordinate Consolidation authorities not having acted illegally in exercising their jurisdiction, the Joint Director of Consolidation was not competent to interfere with their decisions. It would be appropriate at this stage to observe that were relationship of Sher Singh with three out of four vendees on which the Joint Director of Consolidation has relied was not enough to warrant the finding that the aforesaid lease granted in his favour was fictitious. Even the subsequent transfer of the land in question in favour of his nephew to which reference has been made in a casual and laconic manner by the Joint Director of Consolidation cannot lead to the conclusion that the lease was fictitious. Our attention has not been drawn to any evidence which may indicate as to when the said transfer was made nor has any material been placed before us to show that the nephew in whose favour the land was transferred was the son of any one of Sher Singh’s three brothers who were co-vendees with Chajju Singh. The nature and character of the so called transfer by Sher Singh in favour of his nephew is also shrouded in mystery. In the circumstances, the finding of the Joint Director of Consolidation that the aforesaid lease in favour of Sher Singh was fictitious cannot be sustained. Let us now see whether Sher Singh acquired the rights of a Bhumidhar, or a sirdar or an Adhivasi under the Act. It would be apposite for this purpose to refer to the object and a few relevant provisions of the Act. As apparent from its preamble, the Act was designed by the State Legislature principally to do away with the Zamindari system which involved intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State in Uttar Pradesh, to provide for the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent upon the aforesaid abolition and acquisition. To attain this object, the Legislature empowered the, State Government to declare by means of a notification that as from a specified date, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh or in specified area or areas thereof shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of that date (which would be called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest except as provided in the, Act in the State free from all encumbrances. As already stated, though the Act came into force on January 25, 1951, the notification alluded to in section 4 was issued and published in the Extraordinary issue of the State Gazette on July 1, 1952 which coincided with the commencement of 1360 Fasli. The consequences of the vesting of an estate ensuing from the notification issued under section 4 are detailed in section 6 of the Act which, in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of the case, provides as under
"6. Consequences of the vesting of an estate
in the State.When the notification under
section 4 has been published in the Gazette
then, notwithstanding anything contained in
any contract or document or in any other law
for the time being in force and save as,
otherwise provided in this Act, the con-
sequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from
the beginning of the date of vesting, ensure
in the area to which the notification related,
namely-
(a) all rights, title and interest of all
the intermediaries-
(i) in every estate in such area including
land (cultivable or barren), grove-land,
forests whether within or outside village
boundaries, trees (other than trees in village
abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks,
ponds, water channels, ferries, pathways,
abadi sites, hats, bazars and melas [other
than hats, bazars and melas held upon land to
,Which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1)
of section 18 apply.], and
(ii) in all sub-soil in such estates
including rights, if any, in mines and
minerals, whether being worked or not;
shall cease and be vested in the State of
Uttar Pradesh free from all
encumbrances;........
(i) all suits and proceedings of the nature
to be prescribed pending in any court at the
date of vesting, and all proceedings upon any
decree or order passed in any such suit or
proceeding previous to, the date of vesting,
shall be stayed.........." Section 7 of the Act which deal with saving in respect of certain rights inter alia lays down that nothing contained in Chapter 11 shall in any way affect the right of any person-(aa) being a bhumidhar, sirdar, adhivasi, or asami of any land, to continue to enjoy any assessment or any similar right for the more beneficial enjoyment of the land, as he was enjoying on the date immediately preceding the date, of vesting. It would be convenient at this stage to notice sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Act which are couched in the following terms :-
"18. Settlement of certain lands with
intermediaries or cultivators as bhumidhars.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of Sections
10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands-
(a) in possession of or held or deemed to be
held by an intermediary as sir, khudkasht or
an intermediary’s grove,
(b) held as a grove by, or in the personal
cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh.
(c) held by a fixed-rate tenant or a rent-
free grantee as such, or
(d) held as such by-
(i) an occupancy tenant,
(ii) a hereditary tenant,
(iii) a tenant on patta dawami or to transfer
the holdinstamrari referred to in section 1 7
(e) held by a grove-holder
possessing the right
to transfer the holding by sale
on the date immediately preceding the date of
vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the
State Government with such intermediary,
lessee, tenant, grantee or grove holder, as
the case may be, who shall, subject to the
provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or
retain possession as bhumidhar thereof.
(2) Every person belonging to the class
mentioned in Section 3 or sub-section (2) of
Section 3-A of the United Provinces
Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of
Privileges) Act, 1949, who has been granted
the declaration referred to in section 6 of
the said Act in respect of any holding or
share thereof shall, unless the declaration is
subsequently set aside, be deemed to be the
bhumidhar of the holding or the share in
respect of which the declaration has been made
:-and continues in force.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the United Provinces Agricultural Tenants
(Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, any
declaration granted under section 6 of the
said Act in favour of a tenant to whom sub-
section (2) of ’Section 10 applies, shall be
and is hereby cancelled and the amount
deposited by him under Section 3 or 6 of the
said Act shall, after deducting the amount
which might have been paid or be payable by
the State Government to his landholder under
Sections 7 and 8 of the said Act, be refunded
to the person entitled in such manner as may
be prescribed."
19.Land in the holding to be settled with the
tenants thereof as sirdar.-All land, held or
deemed to have been held on the date
immediately preceding the date of vesting by
any person as-
(i) a tenant holding on special terms in
Avadh
(ii) an ex-proprietary tenant
(iii) an occupancy tenant
(iv) a hereditary tenant
(v) a grantee at favourable rate of rent
(vi) a non-occupancy tenant of tea estates
notified as such in a notification issued
under sub-section (5) of section 30 of the
United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939,
(vii) a sub-tenant referred to in sub-section
(4) of section 47 of the United Provinces
Tenancy Act, 1939 and
(Viii)...
(ix) all land referred to in section 17 held
on the said date by any person on patta dawami
or istamrari, shall, save in cases Provided for in clause (d) of subsection (1) of Section 18, be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such person, who shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled, except as provided in sub-section (2) of section 18, to take or retain possession as a sirdar thereof.
20. A tenant of sir, sub-tenant or an
occupant to be an adhivasi-Every person who-
(a) on the date immediately preceding the
date of vesting was or has been deemed to be
in accordance with the provisions of this Act
(i) except as provided in sub-clause (i) of
clause (b), a tenant of sir other than a
tenant referred to in clause (ix) of section
19 or in whose favour hereditary rights accrue
in accordance with the provisions of Section
10,.or
(ii) except as provided in sub-clause (i) of
clause (b), a sub-tenant other than a sub-
tenant referred to in proviso to sub-section
(3) of Section 27 of the United, Provinces
Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, or in sub-
section (4) of Section 47 of the United
Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, of any land other
than grove-land
(b) was recorded as occupant
(i) of any land other than grove-land or
land to which Section 16 applies or land
referred to in the proviso to sub-section (3)
of Section 27 of the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment)
Act, 1947, in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356
F. prepared under sections 28 and 33
respectively of the U.P. Land Reforms Act,
1901, or who was on the date immediately
preceding the date of vesting entitled to
regain possession thereof under clause (c) of
sub-section (1) of section 27 of the United
Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, or
(ii) of any land to which Section 16 applies,
in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 Fasli
prepared under sections 28 and 33 respectively
of the United Provinces Land Reforms Act, 1901
but who was hot in possession in the year 1359
F.,
shall, unless he has become a bhumidhar of the
land under sub-section (2) of Section 18 or an
asami under clause (h) of section 21, be
called adhivasi of the land and shall, subject
to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to
take or retain possession thereof.
Explanation 1-Where a person referred to in
clause (b) was evicted from the land after
June 30, 1948, he shall notwithstanding
anything in any order or decree, be deemed to
be a person entitled to regain possession of
the land.
Explanation II-Where any entry in the records
referred to in clause (b) has been corrected
before the date of vesting under or in,
accordance with the provisions of the U.P.
Land Revenue Act, 1901, the entry so corrected
shall, for the purposes of the said clause,
prevail.
Explanation III.-For the purposes of
Explanation II an entry shall be deemed to
have been corrected before the date of vesting
if an order or decree of a competent court
requiring any correction in records had been
made before the said date and had become final
even though the correction may not have been
incorporated in the records.
Explanation IV.-For purposes of this section
’occupant’ as respects any land does not
include a person who was entitled as an
intermediary to the land or any share therein
in the year 1356 Fasli." The expression ’Khudkasht’ not having been defined in the Act, we shall have, as ordained by section 3 (26) of the Act, to refer to section 3(9) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, to find out its meaning:
"Section 3(9) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 :
"khudkasht" means land other than sir
cultivated by a landlord, and under-proprietor
or a permanent tenure-holder as such either
himself or by servants or by hired labour." We may now advert to sections 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139 and 09 of the Act which are also material for our purpose :
"131. Sirdar-Every person belonging to Any of
the following classes shall be called a sirdar
and shall have all rights and be subject to
all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon
sirdars by or under this Act, namely-
(a) every person who., as a consequence of
the acquisition or estates, becomes a sirdar
under section 19,
(b) every person who is admitted as sirdar
of vacant land under the provisions of this
Act, and
(e) every person who in any other manner
acquires the rights of a sirdar under or in
accordance with the provisions of this Act or
of any other law for the time being in force."
134. Acquisition of bhumidhari rights by a
sirdar(1) If a sirdar belonging to the class mentioned in clause (a) of Section 131 pays or offers to pay to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to ten times the land revenue payable deemed to be payable on the date of application for the land of which he is the sirdar, he shall upon an application duly made in that behalf to an Assistant Collector, be entitled, with effect from the date on which the amount has been deposited, to a declaration that he has acquired the rights mentioned in Section 137 in respect of such land : Provided that the right to pay or offer to pay the amount aforementioned shall cease on the expiry of three months from the date to, be notified by the State Government. Explanation I-In this sub-section ’land’ includes share in land. Explanation II-For the purpose of this section the land revenue payable shall-
(a) in respect of land referred to in the
proviso to clause (a) of sub-section 246, be
an amount arrived at after all the increases
have been given effect to; and
(b) in respect of land to which the proviso
to section 247 applies, be an amount
determined at hereditary rates under that
section. (2) The amount referred to in-sub-section (1) may be paid in cash or, if the State Government so prescribes, in form of bonds or otherwise. 135. Treasury challan to accompany the application under Section 134.-The application referred to in Section 134 shall be accompanied where the amount is paid cash, by a treasury challan and in any other case, by such document or evidence as may be prescribed showing that the amount aforesaid has been deposited and shall briefly describe the right in which the applicant claims the land. 136. Amount to be deposited under section 134.-Where a sirdar or his predecessor-in-interest was’, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, a hereditary tenant of the holding, the amount to be deposited under section 134 shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, be equal to ten times the land revenue payable by him or, if the said land revenue exceeds an amount double that computed at the applicable hereditary rates, ten times such amount. 137. Grant of certificate.--(1) If the application has been duly made and the Assistant Collector is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the declaration mentioned in Section 134, he shall grant a certificate to that effect. (2) Upon the grant of the certificate under sub-section (1) the: sirdar shall, from the date on which the amount referred to in sub-section (1) of section 134 has been deposited-
(a) become and be deemed to be a bhumidhari
of the
holding or the share in respect of which the
certificate has been granted, and
(b) be liable for payment of such reduced
amount on account of land revenue for the
holding or his share therein, as the case may
be, as shall be one-half of the amount of land
revenue payable or deemed to be payable by him
therefor on the date of application.
Provided further that in the cases referred to
in Explanation II of Section 134 the sirdar
shall, during the period a reduced amount is
payable in accordance with Section 246 or 247,
be liable for payment of one-half of the
amount payable from time to time.
Explanation.-For purposes of clause (b) the
land revenue payable by a sirdar on the date
aforesaid shall, where it exceeds an amount
double that computed at the hereditary rates
applicable, be deemed to be equal to such
amount.
(2-A). Where the amount referred to in sub-
section (1) of section 134 is deposited on a
date other than the first day of the
agricultural year, the land revenue payable by
the bhumidhar under clause (b) of sub-section
(2) for the
remainder of the agricultural year in which
the amount is deposited shall be determined in
such manner as may be prescribed.
139. Acquisition of bhumidhari rights by a
sirdar of the class mentioned in clause (b) of
Section 131.-The provisions of Section 134 and
Sections 135 and 137, shall mutatis mutandis
apply to a sirdar belonging to the class
mentioned in clause (b) or (c) of section 131.
209. Ejectment of persons occupying land
without title-
(1) A, person taking or retaining possession
of land
otherwise than in accordance with the
provisions of the law for the time being in
force, and-
(a) where the land forms part of the holding
of a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami without the
consent of such bhumidhar, sirdar or asami,
(b) where the land does not form part of the
holding of a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami
without consent of the Gaon Sabha,
shall be liable to ejectment on the suit, in
cases referred to in clause (a) above, of the
bhumidhar, sirdar or asami concerned, and in
cases referred to in clause (b) above, of the
Gaon Sabha and shall also be liable to pay
damages.
(2) To every suit relating to a land
referred to in clause
(a) of sub-section (1) the State Government
shall be impleaded as a necessary party." A close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the above quoted provisions of law leaves no room for doubt in our mind that Sher Singh acquired the rights of a Bhumidhar as hereinafter stated. As already indicated, there is nothing on the record before us to establish that the aforesaid lease deed in favour of Sher Singh was fictitious or that the entires made in the revenue record on the basis of that deed were not genuine or did not conform to the true factual position and that Sher Singh was not in possession of the fields in question on his own behalf. Consequently as Sher Singh was holding the said fields as a hereditary tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, he became entitled to retain possession thereof as a Sirdar under section 19 of the Act and on depositing to the credit of the State Government in the manner provided in section 134 and other allied provisions of the Act an amount equal to ten times the land revenue payable or deemed to be payable, he became entitled to a declaration that he had acquired the rights of a Bhumidhar mentioned in section 137- of the Act in respect of the said fields and to the grant of a certificate to that effect. In view of our aforesaid findings, it is unnecessary to examine the alternate contention raised on behalf of the appellants that as Sher Singh was in self-cultivating possession of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and was recorded as such in the relevant record, he in any case acquired the right of an Adhivasi under section 20(b) (ii) of the Act or to go into the contention of Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha that the actual physical possession of the land is not necessary to attract the applicability of section 18 of the Act and the requirement of the section is satisfied even when subsisting right and title to possession over the land on the date of vesting is established. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments and orders of the High Court as also the decision of the Joint Director of Consolidation and restore that of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lucknow. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. S.R. Appeal allowed.