CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1 278 of 1978.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order 1511-1976 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 96 of 1971.
B. Dutta for the Appellant.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Addl. Sol. General and R. N. Sachthey for Respondents 1 and 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
We granted special leave and heard arguments on the limited question whether "brick-earth" is a ’minor mineral’ within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 3 (e) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development’) Act. 1957.
The definition is as follows:
"Minor mineral’ means building stones, gravel?
ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for
prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the
Central Government may, by Notification in the official
Gazette declare to be minor mineral ;" In exercise of the power conferred by Section 3(e) of the Act, the Central Government declared the following minerals to be minor minerals
"Boulder, Shingle, Chalcedony pebbles used for
ball mill purposes only, limeshell kanker and limestone
used for lime burning, murrum, brick-earth, fuller’s
earth, bentonite road metal, reh-matti, slate and shale
when used for building material;"
The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that a substance had to be a mineral before it could be notified as a minor mineral pursuant to the power under Section 3(e) of the Miens and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. He urged that brick-earth was not a mineral and, therefore, it could not be notified a minor mineral.
We agree with the learned Counsel that a substance must first be a mineral before it can be notified as a minor mineral pursuant to the power vested in the Central Government under Section 3(e) of the Act. The question, therefore, is whether brick-earth is a mineral. The expression "Minor Mineral" as defined in Section 3(e) includes ’ordinary clay’ and ’ordinary sand’. If the expression "minor mineral" as defined in Section 3(e) of the Act includes ’ordinary clay’ and
‘ordinary sand’, there is no reason why earth used for the purpose A of making bricks should not be comprehended within the meaning of the word "any other mineral" which may be declared as a "minor mineral" by the Government. The word "mineral" is not a term of art. It is a word of common parlance, capable of a multiplicity of meaning depending upon the context. For example the word is occasionally used in a very wide sense to denote any substance that is neither animal nor vegetable. Sometimes it is used in a narrow sense to mean no more than precious metalls like gold and silver. Again, the word "minerals" is often used to indicate substances obtain- . ed from underneath the surface of the earth by digging or quarrying. But this is not always so as pointed out by Chandrachud, J (as he then was) in Bhagwan Dass v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(1) where the learned judge said (at p. 874):
’It was urged that the sand and gravel are
deposited on the surface of the land and not under the
surface of the soil and therefore they cannot be called
minerals and equally so, any operation by which they
are collected or gathered cannot properly be called a
minerals operation. It is in the first place wrong to
assume that mines and minerals must always be sub-soil
and that there can be no minerals on the surface of the
earth. Such an assumption is contrary to informed
experience. In any case, the definition of mining
operations and minor minerals in section 3(d) and (e)
of the Act of 1957 and Rule 2(S) and (7) of the Rules
of 1963 shows that minerals need not be subterranean
and that mining operations cover every operation
undertaken for the purpose of "Winning" any minor
mineral. "Winning" does not imply a hazardous or
perilous activity. The word simply means extracting a
mineral" and is used generally to indicate,- any
activity by which a mineral is secured. "Extracting" in
turn means drawing out or obtaining. A tooth is
’extracted’ as much as the fruit juice and as much as a
mineral. Only that the effort varies from tooth to
tooth, from fruit to fruit and from mineral to
mineral".
We may also refer to Northern Pacific Railway Company v. John A. Sodrberg(2) where the Supreme Court of United States observed as follows (at page 581):
"The word ’mineral’ is used in so many senses,
dependant upon the context, that the ordinary
definitions of the dictionary throw but little light
upon its significance in a (1) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 869. (2) 47 L. Fd.575
given case. Thus, the scientific division of all matter
into the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom would be
absurd as applied to a grant of lands, since all lands
belong to the mineral kingdom, and therefore, could not
be excepted from the grant without being destructive of
it. Upon the other hand, a definition which would
confine it to the precious metals-gold and silver-would
so limit its application as to destroy at once half the
value of the exception. Equally subversive of the grant
would be the definition of minerals found in the
Century Dictionary: as "any constituent of the earth’s
crust" ; and that of Beinbridge on Mines: "All the Sub-
stances stances that now form, or which once formed, a
part of the solid body of the earth". Nor do we
approximate much more closely to the meaning of the
word by treating minerals as substances which are
""mined"" as distinguished from those are "quarried",
since many valuable deposits of gold, copper, iron, and
coal lie upon or near the surface of the earth, and
some of the most valuable building stone, such for
instance, as the Caen stone in France, is excavated
from mines running far beneath the surface. This
distinction between under ground mines and open
workings was expressly repudiated in Midland C. v.
Haunchwood Brick & Tile Co. (L.R 20 Ch. Div. 552) and
in Hext v. Gill (L.R. 7 Ch. 699)"
The Supreme Court of United States also referred to several English cases where stone for road making or paving was held to be ’minerals’ as also granite, sandstone, flint stone, gravel, marble, fire clay, brick clay, and the like. It is clear that the word ’mineral’ has no fixed but a contextual connotation.
The learned Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Todd Birleston and Co. v. The North Eastern Railway Co.(l) and to Stoud’s Judicial Dictionary to urge that clay, brick-earth and the like have sometimes been held not to be minerals by English Courts. As we said earlier the word mineral is an elastic word whose meaning depends upon the setting in which it is used. For instance, in the case cited, the question was whether clay forming the surface or subsoil, and constituting the "land" compulsorily taken for the purposes of a railway, was not a mineral WITH the meaning of Sections 77, 78 or 79 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act. The answer was that ’clay’ was not a mineral for the purposes of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act. Any other conclusion, in the context of the Act, would have led to the absurd (1) [1903] I K.B. 603 . result that the original owner whose land had been taken would be entitled to dig and take away the clay from the land on which the Railway was constructed, thus defeating the very object of the compulsory taking. On the other hand, as noticed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in several English cases clay, gravel, sand, stone etc. has been held to be minerals. That is why we say the word mineral has no definite meaning but has a variety of meanings, depending on the context of its use. In the context of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, we have no‘ doubt that the word ’mineral’ is of sufficient amplitude to include ’brick-earth’. As already observed y us, if the expression ’minor mineral’ as defined in the Act includes ’ordinary clay’ and ’ordinary sand’. there is no earthly reason why ’brick-earth’ should not be held to be ’any other mineral’ which may be declared as ’minor mineral.. We do not think it necessary to pursue the matter further except to say that this was The view taken in Laddu Mal v. State of Bihar(l) Amar Singh Modilal v. State of Haryana(2) and Sharma & Co. v. State of U.P.(3). We do not agree with the view of the Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal v. Jagadamba Prasad (4) that because speaks of ’ordinary earth’ as a mineral it is not a minor mineral as defined in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. S.R. Appeal dismissed (1) A.I.R 1965 Patna 491 (2) A.I.R 1972 Punj. & Har. 356 (3) A.I.R.. 1975 All. 86. . (4) A.I.R.. 1969 Cal. 2XI.