CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 91 of
From the Judgement and order dated 21.8.1978 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 378 of 1963.
Civil Appeal No. 639 of 1985
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.12.1984 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1721 of 1976.
S.K. Bagga for the Appellants.
H.K. Puri for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANGANATH MISRA, J. These two appeals by special leave are directed against two different judgments of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in suits for pre-emption. The facts of the two cases are different CA. 639/85
In this Appeal the alienation was on November 22, 1972, by one Nathu and his wife Smt. Singari in favour of outsiders, Plaintiffs claimed possession of the property by way of pre-emption on the ground that they have superior rights being father’s brother’s sons of Nathu covered under Section 15(1)(a) THIRDLY of the Punjab Pre emption Act, 1913. That claim was decreed so far as Nathu’s half share in the property was concerned and the claim as against the alienation of half share by his wife was rejected. The alienees’ appeal to the District Judge as also the High Court did not succeed.
A constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Atam Parkash v. State of Haryana, [1986] 1 Scale 260, has recently held:
"There is, therefore, no reasonable classification
and clauses ’First’, ’Secondly’ and ’Thirdly’ in
s. 15(1)(a)....are, therefore, declared ultra
vires the Constitution." The result of this decision in Atam Parkash’s case is that s. 15(1)(a) THIRDLY is, and was not, available to the plaintiffs to base their claim of pre-emption upon. CA. 639/85 has, therefore, to be allowed and the decree passed by the trial Court as upheld in the first and second appeals must be reversed. Plaintiffs’ suit for pre-emption has to be dismissed. Since the reversal is the outcome of a judgment delivered by this Court during the pendency of the civil appeal, we direct parties to bear their respective costs throughout. CA. 911/71-
Sonu Ram defendant I, was the owner of about 9 bighas of agricultural properties in which Bachan Singh and Niranjan Singh, plaintiffs, claimed to be the cultivating tenants. Sonu Ram sold the property under a registered sale deed dated July 22, 1959. The tenant filed a suit on July 21, 1960, for a decree for possession by preemption. With effect from February 4, 1960, Section 15 of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 (’the Act’ for short), was amended by Act 10 of 1960. Under the amendment, inter alia, a new clause was inserted in s.15(1)(a), namely, "FOURTHLY" which reads as under:
"FOURTHLY, in the tenant who holds, under tenancy
of the vendor the land or property sold or a part
thereof."
The Amending Act brought in a new provision by way of Section 31 to the following effect:
"Punjab Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1960, to
apply to all suits-No Court shall pass a decree in
a suit for preemption whether instituted before or
after the commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption
(Amendment) Act, 1960, which is inconsistent with
the provisions of the said Act."
The trial Court as also the first appellate Court took the view that on the date when the sale took place the plaintiffs had no right of pre-emption and as such the claim was not maintainable. Before the High Court in Second Appeal the appellants placed reliance on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Amir Singh & Anr. v. Ram Singh & Ors., [1963] 3 S.C.R. 884. The High Court took the view that on the date of sale the plaintiffs had no right infringed though they had such right on the date of the suit. As one of the requirements of the law was that the plaintiffs to succeed in a suit for pre-emption should have a superior right of pre-emption on the date of sale also the plaintiffs’ claim could not be decreed. The High Court, therefore, upheld the decree of the courts below.
We have heard learned counsel for both the sides at some length and are inclined to agree with the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants that all the three courts have gone wrong in dismissing the claim. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Constitution Bench in Amir Singh’s case categorically held:
"It is, however, urged that the law of pre-emption
requires that the pre-emptor must possess the
right to pre-empt at the date of the sale, at the
date of the suit and at the date of the decree.
This position cannot be disputed. But when it is
suggested that the respondents cannot claim that
they had the right when they brought the present
suit or when the sales were effected, the argument
ignores the true effect of the retrospective
operation of s. 31 and s. 15. If the inevitable
consequence of the retrospective operation of s.
31 is to make the substantive provisions of s. 15
also retrospective, it follows that by fiction
introduced by the retrospective operation, the
rights which the respondents claim under the
amended provisions of s. 15 must be deemed to have
vested in them at the relevant time. If the
relevant provisions are made retrospective by the
legislature, the retrospective operation must be
given full effect to, and that
meets the argument that the right to pre-empt did
not exist in the respondents at the time when the
sale transactions in question took place.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the respondents
are entitled to claim that they should be given an
opportunity to prove their case that as tenants of
the lands in suit they have a right to claim pre-
emption."
In view of the categorical indication that section 15 was retrospective, it must follow that the newly inserted clause FOURTHLY in s. 15(1)(a) of the Act was in existence at all relevant times. So far as facts of this case are concerned, the plaintiffs must be presumed to have had a right to pre-empt on the date of sale. Admittedly, the suit was filed subsequent to the amendment. It is a well-settled principle of law that when the legislature makes provision for a deeming situation to give effect to the mandate of the legislature, all things necessary to effectuate the retrospective intention must be deemed to have existed. All the courts in our view clearly went wrong in dealing with the legal situation. The High Court erroneously distinguished the rule in Amir Singh’s case even though the ratio applied in all fours. The judgments and decrees of all the three courts are set aside. The plaintiffs are found entitled to pre-empt the alienee under s. 15(1)(a) FOURTHLY of the Act as amended by the Act of 1960. We allow the appeal, reverse the decrees of all the courts below and direct that the plaintiffs’ suit shall be decreed. Plaintiffs shall be entitled to their costs throughout. The trial Court is directed to give effect to the decree passed by this Court. M.L.A. Appeal allowed.