State of Andhra Pradesh & ors., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 635; Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and others, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 315; Abdul Gaffer v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1496 and Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 360, referred to. H
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 450 of 1987
From the Judgment and order dated 26.3.1987 of the Allahabad High Court in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 17849 of 1986.
D.K. Garg for the Appellant.
Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.C. RAY, J. Special leave granted. Arguments heard.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 26th March, 1987 in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 17849 of 1986 dismissing the writ petition and confirming the order of detention passed against the appellant by the District Magistrate, Allahabad.
The respondent No. 2, District Magistrate, Allahabad clamped upon the appellant an order of detention under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 and the appellant was detained at Central Jail, Naini on October 10, 1986. On the same day the grounds of detention were served on the appellant. Two grounds of detention mentioned in the grounds of detention are stated hereinbelow:-
1.That the appellant on 2.10.1986 threatened the shopkeepers of Khalasi Line locality in order to extort money anc} was saying that appellant could not come for the last auction because the police were present on that occasion and that the shopkeepers bad not given the appellant the money received in the above auction. Further that the shopkeepers should collect money and give it to the appellant or else the appellant would shoot all of them. As a result of this the place was terror-stricken and the shops and houses closed down. A report of this incident was made by the picket employed at police station Kydganj, i.e. report No. 38 time 20. 10 dated 2. 10.86. This was investigated by Dev Shankar, S.I. Of police station Kydganj and the details written in report No. 2 time 00.30 dated 3. 10.86 in the general diary as Case crime No. 248/86, Section 307 I.P.C. and case crime No.249/86, Section 4/5 Explosives Act, Police Station, Kydganj, Allahabad.
2.On 3. 10. 1986, the appellant armed with illegal
bombs went towards Uttam Talkies. Kydganj,
Allahabad with the intention of committing serious
offence. On information being received, the police
went to arrest the appellant. That the appellant
with the intention to kill lobbed a bomb but the
police party escaped it by a hair’s breadth and
the bomb exploded. As a result of this there was a
stampede in the public, the doors and windows of
the houses and shops closed down, the traffic
stopped and the people were terror-stricken. The
police arrested appellant on the spot and
recovered 3 illegal bombs from the appellant.
The appellant has also been supplied with a copy of a confidential letter written by the Superintendent of Police, Allahabad to District Magistrate, Allahabad dated 9.10.1986. The said letter was written by the Superintendent of Police on the recommendation of the Station officer, Kydganj, Allahabad on 5. 10. 1986. The appellant has also been supplied with the copy of the report No. 38 in which it is alleged that the appellant threatened the shopkeepers of Khalasi Line in an attempt to extort money. He was also supplied with the copy of the report which was registered as case crime No. 248 of 1986 under section 307 I.P.C. and case crime No. 249 of 1986 under section 4/5 of the Explosives Act. The appellant made representation against the grounds of detention before the authorities concerned but his representation was rejected and the order of detention was confirmed. E
The appellant challenged the order of detention by a writ of Habeas Corpus before the High Court of Allahabad on the ground inter alia that the grounds of detention are absolutely vague and there is complete non-application of mind by the detaining authority in coming to the subjective satisfaction, that the order of detention passed on the appelant while he was in custody is wholly arbitrary and unwarranted and the two cases disclosed in the grounds of detention relate to law and order problem and not to the disturbance of public order. The criminal proceedings pending in respect of the case should not have been bypassed by taking recourse to the order of detention of the appellant who is already in custody and there was no likelihood nor any possibility of his indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as the appellant has not made any application for bail in the said case. The detention order has, therefore, been assailed as illegal and bad and so the same is invalid in law.
The High Court after hearing the appellant, by its judgment and H order dated 26th March, 1987 dismissed the writ petition No. 17849 of 1986 holding that the order of detention passed by the detaining authority while the appellant was in jail could not be held to be illegal in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Aggrieved by the said order the instant appeal by special leave was filed in this court.
An affidavit in counter verified by one O.P. Ojha, Station officer, Police Station, Kydganj, Allahabad has been filed. It has been stated in paragraph 4(iii) of the counter affidavit that the appellant’s history starts from 1955 and he involved himself in a large number of criminal cases. His name in the history sheet was included by the police. It has been further stated that out of fear the shopkeepers of the village dare not disclose their names and the people of Khalasi Line dare not depose against the appellant since he is a goonda of the locality and people are afraid of him. It has been further stated that this is the reason for nonappearance of the shopkeepers and others as witnesses. The first incident dated October 2, 1986 was registered in G.D. No. 38 of the said date and the second incident which occurred on October 3, 1986 was registered as case crime No. 368 of 1986 under section 302/307/120-B, I.P.C. It has been further stated that these two incidents created terror to the shopkeepers and the people of the locality. This resulted in a great problem of public order. It has been stated further that after being convinced of the gravity of the situation created by the appellant and his accomplice, the District Magistrate after fully satisfying himself about the state of affairs, passed the order of detention of the appellant. It has also been stated that the detention order was passed mainly on the basis of two criminal acts committed by the appellant on October 2 and 3, 1986. Before passing the detention order the District Magistrate fully satisfied himself of all the conditions for passing a detention order under the National Security Act. It has also been stated that it is wrong that the allegations made in the reports dated October 2 and 3, 1986 are false. The District Magistrate fully satisfied himself after perusing all the records before he passed the order of detention against the appellant. The cases which have been reported on October 2 and 3, 1986 are pending trial before the Court. It has also been stated that the order of detention was passed by the District Magistrate on the basis of the information gathered by him from the reports submitted by the police. It has also been stated that the appellant has already applied for bail in crime case No. 248/86 under section 307 I.P.C. and crime case No. 249/86 under section 4/5 of Explosives Act. Notices of bail applications in connection with these two cases were served on the State Government prior to the passing of the detention order by the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate passed the detention order dated October 10, 1986 when the appellant was already in jail on the apprehension that the appellant is likely to be released on bail in the near future and that if the appellant is bailed out, the public order problem will become worse. The detention order was passed with the object of preventing the appellant from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Hence the detention order is legal in all respects. The history sheet of crime cases against the appellant has been annexed to the said affidavit.
Before proceeding to consider the case on merits it is relevant to quote the provisions of Section 3 sub-section (2) of National security Act, 1980. Sec. 3(2):The Central Government or the State Government
may, if satisfied with respect to any person that
with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the security of the State.
Or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order or from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies
and services essential to the community it is
necessary so to do, make an order directing that
such person be detained.
On a plain reading of Section 3(2) of the said Act it becomes clear that the Central Government or the State Government or the District Magistrate authorised by the State Government in writing may pass an order of detention against a person on being satisfied that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make an order directing that such person be detained.
In the instant case the order of detention has been made by respondent No. 2, District Magistrate, on the basis of two criminal cases in respect of two incidents which occurred on October 2 and 3, 1986. So far as the case being G.D. No. 38 is concerned, allegation was that the appellant was threatening the traders of Khalasi Line who participated in the auction at the fort and he was saying that he could not collect money from them on the last occasion because the police were posted there but in case they did not collect money and give it to him he would shoot all of them. Because of this terror the shopkeeprs closed the doors and windows of their shops and houses. The report of this incident was made by the picket employed at police station, Kydganj. It appears from this report that there are no particulars about the shopkeepers who have been terrorised and threatened for payment of money nor the names of any of the witnesses in whose presence the threat or terror was given and money was demanded, are mentioned at all. The report is absolutely vague and it is not possible for the detenu to give an effective representation against the aforesaid ground which is one of the constitutional requirement enjoined in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The second ground which leads to crime case No. 248/86 under section 307 I.P.C. and case crime No. 249 under section 4/5 of Explosives Act and which occurred on October 3, 1986 at about 10 A.M. On the complaint of Sub-Inspector Yatendra Singh through special court, Allahabad also does not disclose any particulars as to the shopkeepers in whose presence the alleged bombs were thrown by the appellant and his associate and who were terrified and panic-stricken and put down their shutters, nor the names of any of the witnesses have been mentiond in respect of the said incident.
The meaning of the word ’public order’ has been determined by this Court in the case of Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal. [1972] 3 SSC 83 1. In this case it has been held that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order.
In the case of Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal and others, [19751 3 SCC 198 this Court has observed that the following principles emerge from the judicial decisions:First: merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a
criminal court for the commission of a criminal
offence or to be proceeded against for preventing
him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter
VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not
by itself debar the Government from taking action
for his detention under the Act. Second: the fact that the Police arrests a person and
later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps
to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal
Procedure and even lodges a first information
report may be no bar against the District
Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive
detention. Third: where the concerned person is actually in jail
custody at the time when an order of detention is
passed against him and is not likely to be
released for a fair length of time, it may be
possible to contend that there could be no
satisfaction on the part of the detaining
authority as to the likelihood of such a person
indulging in activities which would jeopardise the
security of the State or the public order. Fourth: the mere circumstance that a detention order is
passed during the pendency of the prosecution will
not violate the order. Fifth: the order of detention is a precautionary measure.
It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the
future behaviour of a person based on his part
conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances.
This has been followed in Kanchanlal Meneklal Chokshi v. State of Gujarat and others, [ 1979] 4 SCC 14 wherein it has been observed that:
"The ordinary criminal process is not to be
circumvented or short circuited by ready resort to
preventive detention. But, the possibility of
launching a criminal prosecution is not an
absolute bar to an order of preventive detention.
Nor is it correct to say that if such possibility
is not present to the mind of the detaining
authority the order of detention is necessarily
bad. However, the failure of the detaining
authority to consider the possibility of launching
a criminal prosecution may, in the circumstances
of a case, lead to the conclusion that the
detaining authority had not applied its mind to
the vital question whether it was necessary to
make an order of preventive detention. Where an
express allegation is made that the order of
detention was issued in a mechanical fashion
without keeping present to its mind the question
whether it was necessary to make such an order
when an ordinary criminal prosecution could well
serve the purpose, the detaining authority must
satisfy the Court that question too was borne in
mind before the order of detention was made. If
the detaining authority fails to satisfy the Court
that the detaining authority so bore the question
in mind the Court would be justified in drawing
the inference that there was no application of the
mind by the detaining authority to the vital
question whether it was necessary to preventively
detain the detenu. "
In the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and others, [1966] l SCR 709 it has been observed by this Court that:
"The contravention of law always affects order but
before it can be said to affect public order, it
must affect the community or the public at large.
There are three concepts according to the learned
Judge (Hidayatullah, J) i.e. ’’law and order’’,
"public order" and "security of the State’ . It
has been observed that to appreciate the scope and
extent of each of them, one should imagine three
concentric circles. The largest of them
represented law and order, next represented public
order and the smallest represented the security of
the State. An act might affect law and order but
not public order just as an act might affect
public order but not the security of the State.’’
As observed in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 288:
"Public order is the even tempo of the life of the
community taking the country as a whole or even a
specified locality. Disturbance of public order is
to be distinguished from acts directed against
individuals which do not disturb the society to
the extent of causing a general disturbance of
public tranquility. It is the degree of
disturbance and its effect upon the life of the
community in a locality which determines whether
the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law
and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another.
People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the
life of the community keeps moving at an even
tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take
another case of a town where there is communal
tension. A man stabs a member of the other
community. This is an act of a very different
sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects
the even tempo of life and public order is
jeopardized because the repercussions of the act
embrace large sections of the community and incite
them to make further breaches of the law and order
and to subvert the public order. An act by itself
is not determinant of its own gravity. In its
quality it may not differ from another but in its
potentiality it may be very different."
This has been followed in the case of Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 1 SCC 498 and Nand Lal Roy alias Nonda Dulal Roy v. State of West Bengal, [ 1972] 2 SCC 524.
Thus from these observations it is evident that an act whether amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach of public order solely depends on its extent and reach to the society. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large and or the even tempo of the community that it becomes a breach of the public order.
In the case of S.K. Kedar v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCC 816 this Court has observed that :-
"The question whether a person has only committed
a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner
likely to cause a disturbance of the public order
is one of degree and the extent of the reach of
the act upon the society. An act by itself is not
determinative of its own gravity. In its quality
it may not differ from another but in its
potentiality it may be very different. Similar
acts in different contexts affect differently law
and order on the one hand and public order on the
other. It is always a question of degree of the
harm and its effect upon the community. Public
order is the even tempo of the life of the
community taking the country as a whole or even a
specified locality. It is the degree of
disturbance upon the life of the community which
determines whether the disturbance amounts only to
a breach of the law and order."
This Court has further observed in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, [ 1982] 2 SCC 403 while dealing with the distinction between ’public order’ and ’law and order’ to which one of us is a party that:-
"The true distinction between the areas of ’public
order and ’law and order’ lies not in the nature
of quality of the act, but in the degree and
extent of its reach upon society. The distinction
between the two concepts of ’law and order’ and
’public order’ is a fine one but this does not
mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts
similar in nature but committed in different
contexts and circumstances might cause different
reactions. In one case it might affect specific
individuals only and therefore touch the problem
of law and order. The act by itself therefore is
not determinant of its own gravity. It is the
potentiality of the
act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the
community which makes it prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order."
On a conspectus of all these decisions it has been observed by this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Shankar Tewari, [ 1987] 2 SCC 490 that conceptually there is difference between law and order and public order but what in a given situation may be a matter covered by law and order may really turn out to be one of public order. One has to turn to the facts of each case to ascertain whether the matter relates to the larger circle or the smaller circle. An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquility. When communal tension is high, an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community. An order of detention made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to. Thus whether an act relates to law and order or to public order depends upon the impact of the act on the life of the community or in other words the reach and effect and potentiality of the act if so put as to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community, it will be an act which will affect public order.
In the present case so far as the first incident which occurred on 2. 10.1986 is concerned, the ground is vague in as much as neither the names of the witnesses in whose presence the threat was given and the incident occurred, have been mentioned. As regards the second incident which occurred on 3. 10.1986, case crime No. 248 86 under Section 307 I.P.C. and No. 249/86 under Section 4/5 Explosives Act respectively are pending trial.
It is also pertinent to remember in this connection that a case crime No. 200 of 1986 under section 323/504/506/426 I.P.C. read with section 2 3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities Act No. 4 of 1986 by the police of the police station, Naini, a copy of which was annexed as annexure I to this appeal, was registered against the appellant. The said case was challenged by an application under section 482 Cr. P.C. in the High Court. The said application was admitted on 2.6.1986 and it is pending as Criminal Misc. Application No. 6638 of 1986. The High Court while admitting the case had granted stay of arrest of the appellant. Furthermore, the appellant was taken in custody and he was in jail as an under-trial prisoner on October 10. 1986 when the impugned order of detention was clamped upon him by the detaining authority, the respondent No. 2. The appellant has stated in his appeal before this Court that till date he had not applied for bail in case crime No. 248 1986 under section 307 I.P.C. and case crime No. 249 1986 under section 4/5 of the Explosives Act as well as the case registered in report No. 38 dated October 2, 1986 at police station, Kydganj. The question is whether there is possibility of the detaining authority to be satisfied that the appellant is likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as there is no likelihood of his being released from jail custody immediately. This specific question arose in the case of Masood Alam v. Union of India, AIR 1973 (SC) 897 wherein it has been observed that:
"The order of detention served upon the detenu
while he was in jail is not invalid rendering the
petitioner’s detention as void. There is no legal
bar in serving an order of detention on a person
who is in jail custody if he is likely to be
released soon thereafter and there is relevant
material on which the detaining authority is
satisfied that if freed, the person concerned is
likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the
security of the state or maintenance of public
order."
In the case of Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan & Anr., [ 1964] 4 SCR 92 1 it has been observed that:
"The first stage in the process is to examine the
material adduced against a person to show either
from his conduct or his antecedent history that he
has been acting in a prejudicial manner. If the
said material appears satisfactory to the
authority, then the authority has to consider
whether it is likely that the said person would
act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not
prevented from doing so by an order of detention.
If this question is answered against the
petitioner, then the detention order can be
properly made. It is obvious that before an
authority can legitimately come to the conclusion
that the detention of the person is necessary to
prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner,
the authority has to be satisfied that if the
person is not detained, he would act in a
prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates
freedom of action to the said person at the
relevant time. If a person is already in jail
custody, how can it rationally be postulated that
if he is not detained, h would act in a
prejudicial manner? At the point of time when an
order of detention is going to be
served on a person, it must be patent that the
said person would act prejudicially if he is not
detained and that is a consideration which would
be absent when the authority is dealing with a
person already in detention. The satisfaction that
it is necessary to detain a person for the purpose
of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial
manner is thus the basis of the order under s.
3(1)(a), and this basis is clearly absent in the
case of the petitioner."
In the instant case there is nothing to show that in consideration of his previous conduct and acts there. is a likelihood of the appellant indulging in activities prejudicial] to the maintenance of public order if he is set free and/or released from custody.
It has been observed in the case of Merugu Satyanarayana etc. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, [ 1983] 1 SCR 635 by this Court that before making an order of detention in respect of a person already confined to jail "it must be present to the mind of the detaining authority that keeping in view the fact the person is already indetention a preventive detention order is still necessary. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must comprehend the very fact that the person sought to be detained is already in jail or under detention and yet a preventive detention order is a compelling necessity. If the subjective satisfaction is reached without the awareness of this very relevant fact the detention order is likely to be vitiated. But as stated by this Court it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
It has further been observed as follows:-
"We are completely at a loss to understand how a
Sub Inspector of Police can arrogate to himself
the knowledge about the subjective satisfaction of
the District Magistrate on whom the power is
conferred by the Act. If the power of preventive
detention is to be conferred on an officer of the
level and standing of a Sub-Inspector of Police,
we would not be far from a Police State.
Parliament has conferred power primarily on the
Central Government and the State Government and in
some specific cases if the conditions set out in
sub-section (3) of section 3 are satisfied and the
notification is issued by the State Government to
that effect, this extra-ordinary power of
directing preventive detention can be exercised by
such highly placed officers as
District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police. In
this case the District Magistrate, the detaining
authority has not chosen to file his affidavit.
The affidavit in opposition is filed by a Sub-
Inspector of Police. Would this imply that Sub-
Inspector of Police had access to the file of the
District Magistrate or was the Sub-Inspector the
person who influenced the decision of the District
Magistrate for making the detention order? From
the very fact that the respondents sought to
sustain the order by filing an affidavit of Sub-
Inspector of Police, we have serious apprehension
as to whether the District Magistrate completely
abdicated his functions in favour of the Sub-
Inspector of Police."
In a recent case of Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and others, AIR 1986 (SC) 3 15 it has been observed that:
"It is clear that the order of detention was
passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive
that in case the detenu was released on bail he
would again carry on his criminal activities in
the area. If the apprehension of the detaining
authority was true, the bail application had to be
opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge
against that order in the higher forum had to be
raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in
detention as an undertrial prisoner was likely to
get bail an order of detention under the National
Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. We
are inclined to agree with counsel for the
petitioner that the order of detention in the
circumstances is not sustainable and is contrary
to the well settled principles indicated by this
Court in series of cases relating to preventive
detention. The impugned order, therefore, has to
be quashed.
In the instant case the detaining authority, respondent No. 2 has not come forward to file an affidavit stating whether he has taken into consideration the fact that the appellant was already in judicial custody and on considering his past activities he was subjectively satisfied that if set free or released from jail custody on bail, there was likelihood of the appellant indulging in criminal activities endangering public order. On the other hand, the Station officer of the Police Station, Kydganj, Shri O.P. Ojha has filed a counter stating that the District Magistrate passed the impugned detention order when the appellant was already in jail on the apprehension that the appellant is likely to be released on bail in the near future and if the appellant is bailed out, the public order problem will become worse. This clearly goes to show that the Sub-Inspector has arrogated to himself the knowledge about the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate on whom the power is conferred by the Act. The District Magistrate, the detaining authority in this case has not chosen to file his affidavit. The affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Station officer of Police implies that he has access to the file of the District Magistrate or he influenced the decision of the District Magistrate for making the detention order. This is also clear from the confidential report submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad to the District Magistrate, Allahabad as well as from the report of the SubInspector of Police annexed with the said report wherein it has been specifically stated that it was apprehended that the appellant, Gulab Mehra who is at present in Naini jail and who has applied for bail, if enlarged on bail, public order will be disturbed. There is nothing to show that there was awareness in the mind of the District Magistrate, the detaining authority of the fact that the appellant was in jail at the time of clamping of the order of detention, and the detaining authority was satisfied in considering his antecedents and previous criminal acts, that there is likelihood of his indulging in criminal activities jeopardizing public order if he is enlarged on bail and that there is every likelihood that the appellant will be released on bail within a short time. On this ground alone, the order of detention is invalid. It may also be stated in this connection that the respondents can very well oppose the bail application when it comes for hearing and if at all the appellant is released on bail the respondents are not without any remedy. They can also file application in revision for cancellation of the bail application. In such circumstances, we cannot but hold that the passing of the order of detention of the appellant who is already in custody is fully bad and as such the same is invalid in law. We have already said hereinbefore that the respondents can very well proceed with the criminal case under section 307 of I.P.C., execute it against the appellant and can get him punished if the case is approved beyond doubt against the appellant. It is pertinent to mention in this connection the case of Abdul Gaffer v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 (SC) 1496 wherein the order of detention was passed in respect of three cases registered against the petitioner. These are as follows:-
(1) The petitioner along with his associates on 18.7.1971 being armed with deadly weapons like daggers etc. committed thefts in respect of D.O. plates from the railway yard and on being challenged, pelted stones causing injury to the R.P.F. party. The R.P.F. party had
to open fire but the petitioner and his associates fled away. A
(2) On 25.11.1971 the petitioner along with his associates being armed with deadly weapons committed theft in respect of batteries from empty rakes standing on the railway track. Being challenged by the R.P.F. party the petitioner and his associates pelted stones. The R.P.F. party fired two rounds whereby one of his associates was injured and arrested at the spot.
3.On 20.2. 1972, at Howrah Goods Yard near Oriapara Quarters, the petitioner along with his associates being armed with deadly weapons viz. bombs, iron rods etc. committed theft of wheat bags from a wagon and on being challenged by the R.P.F. party the petitioner and his associates pelted stones and hurled bombs. As a result of this act train services on Howrah-Burdwan line was suspended for a considerable period. Three cases were registered in respect of these offences and order of detention was made by the District Magistrate. The detaining authority, however, did not file an affidavit but his successor-in-office in response to Rule Nisi issued by the High Court filed the counter. It has been observed firstly that the detaining authority has not filed the counter affidavit and the return filed in his place by his successor-in-office does not satisfactorily explain why the prosecution of the petitioner for the substantive offence in respect of which he was arrested and named in the F.I.R. was not proceeded with. According to the counsel the so-called explanation given in the counter that the witnesses being afraid were not coming forward to give evidence was too ridiculous to be believed by any reasonable person. The Sub Inspector of Police who made the panchnama could certainly not be afraid of giving evidence. The other material witnesses who could give evidence were the members of the R.P.F. party. It is a para police organisation. The bald but sweeping allegation in the counter that these witnesses were also afraid of giving evidence in court against the petitioner is a version which is too incredulous to be swallowed even by an ultra credulous person without straining his credulity to the utmost. The order of detention was therefore held invalid. In the instant case the police officers who withnessed the hurling of bombs and the Sub-Inspector of Police who recorded the F.I.R. can come forward to give the evidence. Therefore, in such circumstances, the open statement made in the affidavit of the Sub-Inspector of Police that the witnesses are afraid of disclosing their names and coming H forward to give evidence is wholly incredulous and it cannot be accepted. The prosecution of the appellant for the substantive offences can be properly proceeded with in this case In the case of Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta & Anr., [1970] 3 SCR 360 the petitioner along with his associates committed various acts of crime on three occasions. On the first occasion he attacked the people of a locality with a knife and by hurling bottles at them. On the other two occasions he attacked the people of another locality, by hurling bomes at them. It was held that the incidents were not interlinked and could not have prejudiced the maintenance of public order. On considering these decisions, we are constrained to hold that the clamping of the order of detention is not in accordance with the provision of the Act. Furthermore, the history-sheet does not at all link to the proximity of the two incidents on the basis of which the o order of detention was made. It has been vehemently urged before us by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that in none of the cases mentioned in the history-sheet the appellant has been convicted and moreover these cases related to a period much earlier than the period in which the two cases have occurred. It has also been submitted in this connection by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had not been convicted in any of the cases and the submission of the Sub-Inspector of Police that the witnesses are afraid of disclosing their names and coming forward to give evidence is wholly incorrect and false in as much as witnesses in fact gave the evidence in a criminal case which ended in acquittal. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that the shopkeepers of the locality where the alleged hurling of bombs took place have made an application in this case that no such incident occurred on the said dates. In the premises, aforesaid, we hold that the impugned order of detention is illegal and invalid and we allow the appeal setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court without any order as to costs. S.L. Appeal allowed.