ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1830-32 of 1981. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
U.R. Lalit, V.N. Ganpule, A.B. Lal and Ms. Punam Kumari for the Petitioners.
V.C. Mahajan, Ms. A Subhashini, P.H. Parekh, A.S. Bhasme and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
OJHA, J. The petitioners in these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution hold land within the city of Sholapur in the State of Maharashtra. According to the petitioners development plan has been sanctioned with regard to land situated m the city of Sholapur including the petitioners’ land under the Maharashtra Regional and Town planning Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966) and some land of the petitioners was reserved for public purpose under that Act. The Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act was brought into force on 28th February, 1976 and proceedings for acquisition of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit placed under the Act were initiated against the petitioners. These writ petitions have been filed for the following reliefs:
(a) It may be declared that the Urban Ceiling
Act does not apply to lands reserved for a
public purpose under the Maharashtra Regional
Town Planning Act, 1966:
(b)The proceedings for determination of ceil-
ing be declared void and quashed so far as the
lands are reserved for public purpose;
(c) The State Government be restrained from
taking any action under Section 10(3) of the
Ceiling Act;
(d) The final statement under Section 9 of the
Ceiling Act be amended suitably;
(e) A Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of
Mandamus be issued restraining the State
Government or its agents from acquiring and/or
taking possession of final plots Nos. 26, 22,
42, 28A and 44A/1;
(f) Sections 10, 11 and 23 of the Ceiling Act
be declared ultra vires of Articles 14 and 31
of the Constitution;
(g) Any other order and/or direction as this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit, be passed.
It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 125 of the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 contemplates, inter alia, that any land required, reserved or designated in a development plan for a public purpose shall be deemed to be land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whereas Section 126 thereof contains the procedure for acquisition of land required for public purposes. According to learned counsel if land is acquired as contemplated by Sections 125 and 126 aforesaid, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to the acquisition of the said land with the modification that the market value of the land shall be computed as contemplated by sub-section (3) of Section 126 whereas if the land was acquired under the Act, compensation payable would be much less as contemplated by Section 11 of the Act and that too with a ceiling of two lakhs of rupees as provided by sub-section (6) thereof. It has been urged that it is left to the sweet will of the authorities concerned to acquire land either under Sections 125 and 126 of the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 or under the provisions of Section 10 of the Act and that since in the event of proceedings for acquisition being taken under Section 10 of the Act as is sought to be done in the case of the petitioners the compensation payable would be far less than the compensation payable if the acquisition is made under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966, discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution was writ large, and in this view of the matter the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs claimed in these writ petitions. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that none of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petitions can be granted to the petitioners. At the very outset, it may be pointed out that the Act has been placed in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution at SI. No. 132 and consequently comes under the protective umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution. In Maharao Sahib Shri Bheem Singh v. Union of India and others, [1985] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. Page 862 it has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court that the Act is constitutionally valid save and except Section 27(1) to the extent mentioned in the judgment. With regard to sub-section (6) of Section 11, it has specifically been held at page 879 of the Report that this sub-section which provides that compensation payable under Section 11 shall in no case exceed two lakhs of rupees is valid. The amount thus payable is not illusory and the provision is not confiscatory. Rupees two lakhs are not like a earthing even if the excess land may be a fortune. In this connection, it may be pointed out that it has not been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of the Act which have been impugned in the present writ petitions in any way damage or destroy a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure. No statutory provision either in the Act or even in the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 has been brought to our notice excluding the operation of the Act with regard to lands reserved for public purpose under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966. On the other hand, there is a specific overriding provision in Section 42 of the Act which provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or any custom usage or agreement or decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. It is in this view of the matter that we are of the opinion that none of the relief prayed for in the present writ petitions can be granted.
What has, however, been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that notwithstanding the specific relief (f) referred to above, the petitioners are really not challenging the validity of Sections 10, 11 & 23 of the Act but they are challenging the action which is being taken with regard to the petitioners’ land on the ground that it is discriminatory. We find no substance in this submission either.
In Union of India etc. v. Valluri Basavaiah Chaucer etc. etc., [1979] 3 S.C.R. Page 802 it was pointed out by a Constitution Bench of this Court that the primary object and the purpose of the Act as the long title and preamble show, is to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good, in furtherance of the Directive Principles of Article 39(b) and (c). That this was the object and the purpose of the Act has been reiterated in a recent decision of this Court in State of Gujarat & others v. Parshottamdas Ramdas Patel & Others, [1988] 1 S.C.R. Page 997.
It is in this background that the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners about discrimination in the matter of implementation or taking action under the Act has to be considered. While elaborating this argument of discrimination it was pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners that if land belonging to ’A’ and ’B’ within an urban agglomeration is reserved for a public purpose under development scheme and ’A’ is holding land within ceiling area whereas ’B’ holds land in excess of such ceiling area, ’A’ will get compensation under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 whereas ’B’ will get compensation under the Ceiling Act and the basis and method of compensation will drastically vary. In support of this submission reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust & Another v. Vithal Rao & Others, [1973] 3 S.C.R. Page 39. In that case land was sought to be acquired under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. 1936. In a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the validity of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act was challenged inter alia on the ground that the said Act was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it empowered the acquisition of lands at prices lower than those which could have been payable if they had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The writ petition was allowed by the High Court and it was held that paragraphs 10(2) and 10(3) in so far as they added a new clause 3(a) to section 23 and a proviso to subsection (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were ultra vires as violating the guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Suffice it to say, so far as this submission is concerned that the land to the extent which falls within the ceiling area stands in a class different from the land which is in excess of the ceiling area and is liable to be declared surplus to give effect to the purpose and object of the Act.’ What is the purpose and object of the Act has already been noticed earlier. Further unlike the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 the validity whereof was ’challenged in the case of Vithal Rao (supra), the Act has been placed in the 9th Schedule. As a result thereof the Act comes within the protective umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution which was not available to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act.
The decision in the case of Vithal Rao (supra) came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court with reference to Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 in Prakash Chand Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat and others, [1986] 1 S.C.C. Page 581. It was held:
"In order to appreciate the contentions of the
appellant it is necessary to look at the
object of the legislation in question as a
whole. The object of the Act is not just
acquiring a bit of land here or a bit of land
there for some public purpose. It consists of
several activities which have as their ulti-
mate object the orderly development of an
urban area. It envisages the preparation of a
development plan, allocation of land for
various private and public uses, preparation
of a Town Planning Scheme and making provi-
sions for future development of the area in
question. The various aspects of a Town Plan-
ning Scheme have already been set out. On the
final Town Planning Scheme coming into force
under Section 53F of the Act there is an
automatic vesting of all lands required by the
local authority. It is not a case where the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
have to be set in motion either by the Collec-
tor or by the Government."
It was further held:
"The provision under consideration in the
above decision corresponds to Section 11 and
to Section 84 of the Act, which we are now
considering. Section 59 of the Nagpur Improve-
ment Trust Act, 1936 provided that the Trust
might, with the previous sanction of the State
Government acquire land under the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as modified
by the provisions of the said Act for carrying
out any of the purposes of the said Act. But
the provisions which are questioned before us
are of a different pattern altogether. They
deal with the preparation of a scheme for the
development of the land. On the final scheme
coming into force the lands affected by the
scheme which are needed for the local authori-
ty for purposes of the scheme automatically
vest in the local authority. There is
no need to set in motion the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 either as it is or
as modified in the case of acquisition under
Section 11 or Section 84 of the Act. Then the
Town Planning Officer is authorised to deter-
mine whether any reconstituted plot can be
given to a person whose land is affected by
the scheme. Under Section 51(3) of the Act the
final scheme as sanctioned by the Government
has the same effect as if it were enacted in
the Act. The scheme has to be read as part of
the Act. Under Section 53 of the Act all
rights of the private owners in the original
plots would determine and certain consequen-
tial rights in favour of the owners would
arise therefrom. If in the scheme, reconsti-
tuted or final plots are allotted to them they
become owners of such final plots subject to
the rights settled by the Town Planning Offi-
cer in the final scheme. In some cases the
original plot of an owner might completely be
allotted to the local authority for a
public purpose. Such private owner may be paid
compensation or a reconstituted plot in some
other place. It may be a smaller or a bigger
plot. It may be that in some cases it may not
be possible to allot a final plot at all.
Sections 67 to 71 of the Act provide for cer-
tain financial adjustments regarding payment
of money to the local authority or to the
owners of the original plots. The development
and planning carried out under the Act is pri-
marily for the benefit of public. The local
authority is under an obligation to function
according to the Act. The local authority has
to bear a part of the expenses of development.
It is in one sense a package deal. The pro-
ceedings relating to the scheme are not like
acquisition proceedings under the Land Acqui-
sition Act, 1894. Nor are the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 made applicable
either without or with modifications as in the
case of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
1936. We do not understand the decision in
Nagpur Improvement Trust case as laying down
generally that wherever land is taken away by
the government under a separate statute com-
pensation should be paid under the Land Acqui-
sition Act, 1894 only and if there is any
difference between the compensation payable
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
compensation payable under the statute con-
cerned the acquisition under the statute would
be discriminatory. That case is distinguisha-
ble from the present case."
In the instant case also the purpose and object of the Act being entirely different from just acquiring a bit of land here or a bit of land there for some public purpose, and the Act being a serf-contained Code having an overriding provision in Section 42, the decision in the case of Vithal Rao (supra) is wholly inapplicable in so far as acquisition of surplus land under the Act is concerned.
It was also urged that if one person holds land in excess of ceiling area and the excess therein is reserved for a public purpose under the development scheme there will still be discriminatory results if the land in excess of ceiling is reserved for different purposes. According to learned counsel if the purpose of reservation is construction of buildings the land will be given compensation under the Ceiling Act whereas when the purpose of reservation is parks, gardens etc. compensation would be given under the Maharashtra Act 37 of 1966. The result, according to learned counsel, is discriminatory. This submission again has apparently no substance inasmuch as the provisions of the Ceiling Act are applicable with regard to vacant land and if for some fortuitous circumstances a particular category of land does not fail within the definition of vacant land the provisions with regard to vacant land can obviously not be applied to such land. Here again, the lands failing under the two categories constitute separate classes and cannot consequently be treated alike.
Learned counsel for the petitioners also referred .to some other cases wherein a similar view, as in the case of Vithal Rao (supra), was taken but we do no consider it necessary to deal with those cases separately for the reasons already stated above. With regard to the submission of learned counsel that the question as to whether a land reserved for public purpose under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 should be acquired under that Act or under Section 10 of the Act has been left to the sweet will of the authority concerned, we are of the opinion that it is not so. Once the land falls beyond the ceiling limit prescribed by the Act and is capable of being acquired as surplus land under Section 10 of the Act it would be wholly inappropriate to acquire the same very land or a portion thereof under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 inasmuch as it would inter alia apparently result in misuse of public funds by granting higher compensation when the purpose of acquisition can be achieved on payment of the lesser amount of compensation prescribed in Section 11 of the Act.
In the case of Parshottamdas Patel (supra), the State Government of Gujarat issued a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stating that the lands of the respondents were likely to be needed for the public purpose of providing housing accommodation for the employees of the Municipal Corporation. Subsequently, a notification under Section 6 of the said Act declaring that the aforesaid lands along with the other lands were needed for the said public purpose, was also made. In the meantime, the Act came into force and the respondents filed writ petitions contending inter alia that the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act should be proceeded with and the acquisition proceedings to the extent it related to the surplus land under the ceiling law should be dropped. The writ petitions were allowed. Reversing the judgment of the High Court, this Court held:
"The declaration made by the High
Court in these cases that the land acquisition
proceedings did not suffer from an infirmity
which indirectly suggests that the proceedings
should go on is again erroneous. It is open to
the State Government to drop the land acquisi-
tion proceedings and to withdraw the lands
from acquisition under section 48 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. We are informed that
the State Government has in fact subsequently
withdrawn these lands from acquisition. The
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 cannot therefore have any beating on the
question whether the lands in question are
vacant lands or not for purposes of the ceil-
ing law contained in the Act. When the lands
in question or bulk of them are likely to be
acquired under the ceiling law by paying
compensation as provided therein, it would not
be proper to compel the Government to acquire
them under the provisions of the Land Acquisi-
tion-Act, 1894. As already stated the Act has
the overriding effect on all other laws."
In view of the foregoings discussion, we find no merit in these writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. G .N. Petitions dismissed.