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Supreme Court of India

THE G.M. EID PARRY (I) LTD vs THE PRESIDING OFFICER on 2 May, 1991

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C.A. No.-001450-001458 - 1990Official PDFBench Ranganath Misra (presiding), Lalit Mohan Sharma, Aziz Mushabber AhmadiAdvocates CHANDAN RAMAMURTHI
PETITIONER:
GENERAL MANAGER, E.I.D. PARRY (INDIA) LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PRESIDING OFFICER, 2ND ADDL. LABOUR COURTMADRAS AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1991
BENCH:
MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ)
BENCH:
MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ)
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
SAHAI, R.M. (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 1544 1991 SCR (2) 637
1991 SCC Supl. (1) 326 JT 1991 (2) 588
1991 SCALE (1)844
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Sections 9-A, 33-C(2)
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
Labour Law--Company--General Office Order No. 26 dated
1.12.1943--Provision for ’Retiring Allowance’ (Pension) and
gratuity--Memorandum of settlement between Company and
workmen--Employees given option under the settlement either
for Gratuity or Retiring allowance--Enforcement of Gratuity
Act, 1972--Workers’ claim for retiring allowance (Pension)
in addition to gratuity--Held settlement had not substituted
gratuity for pension--Employees held entitled to pension
notwithstanding the settlement.
HEADNOTE:
The General Office Order No. 26 dated 1.12.1943 of the
Appellant-Company provided that employees with 30 years’
service or more would be eligible to receive "Retiring
Allowance" (pension). The said office order also provided
service in excess of 30 years...............
(d) Employees in service prior to Ist January, 1947
may opt, at the time of leaving service, either
for:
(i) Gratuity calculated in accordance with
these rules or in accordance with the current
provisions of General Office Order No. 26,
whichever he prefers, or
(ii) in lieu of gratuity, a retiring allowance
calculated in accordance with the current
provisions of General Office Order No. 26."
This settlement as a fact incorporated the relevant part of
the Office Order.
The Payment of Gratuity Act came into force with effect
from September, 1972 and payment of gratuity became
statutory. When that Act came into force, the Employer and
the Employees ’ Union jointly applied to the Government for
exemption from the provisions of the statute. The exemption
was, however, not granted. Payability of gratuity is no
longer in dispute. What is challenged is the claim of the
workmen to retiring allowance (pension) under Office order
No. 26. The stand of the employees has been that the
retiring allowance under General Office Order No. 26 has
not been substituted by the 1956 settlement and they are,
subject to being qualified, entitled to the benefit of
pension and the statutory advantage of gratuity. It is a
fact that the settlement does not provide for payment of
pension except to pre-1947 employees and making the benefit
liable to exercise of option under clause 6(d) above. It is
not in dispute that the retiral benefit (pension) was
payable to all qualified employees as a matter of practice.
If under the settlement that was not done away with, the
benefit arising out of General Office Order No. 26 would
still be available and gratuity contemplated under the
settlement would not be a substitute of the retiral benefit
of pension.
The Appellate Bench of the High Court has found that
gratuity provided under the settlement was not a substitute
of pension. Mr. Narayanaswamy, learned senior counsel
appearing in support of the appeals took us through the
various documents and placed the matter at considerable
length and with lucidity. He even relied on what he
described as the prevailing practice between 1956 and 1972-
the settlement and the Gratuity Act-when no retiral benefit
was either claimed or paid. We have, however, not been able
to see any defect in the reasoning of the Division Bench
decision of the High Court where it has ultimately come to
the conclusion that the settlement had not substituted
gratuity for pension. We find that by way of an interim
measure this Court by an order dated 5th May, 1989 had
directed the employer to pay the pension to the employees in
accordance with the order of the High Court with effect from
Ist May, 1989 and that from the record appears to have been
paid.
A petition had been filed in this Court on 23rd April,
1990 by the employer for modification of the condition
indicated in the order granting special leave and we had
heard counsel for both the sides on the said petition. We
had made it clear at the hearing of the petition for
modification of the order granting special leave that the
question as to payability of retirement benefit after the
1956 settlement would be examined. The total number of
employees involved in this dispute was
about 347. Many of them had not only retired but had also
died and in respect of those who were dead it would be a
question of the benefits up to the date of death of the
respective employees to be paid to their legal
representatives. Mr. Narayanaswamy had emphatically
contended that what was being decided was not a claim of 347
employees but it had its repercussion on the industrial
peace between the employer and the employee at other places.
We would like to make it clear that we have gone into the
question confined to the claim to the employees of the
Ranipet factory and not the liability of the employer
generally, Besides, Mr. Narayanaswamy had also told us at
the hearing that there are special features in the
arrangement in regard to employees elsewhere.
We are satisfied that the Appellate Bench of the High
Court was right in holding that the entitlement to pension
had not been substituted by the settlement of 1956 and,
therefore, the claim to pension subject to qualification
being satisfied was available to be maintained
notwithstanding the settlement of 1956, The High Court
rightly came to the conclusion that the Labour Court had
justifiably worked out the dues and the claim petitions
under section 33-C(2) of the 1947 Act. We uphold the
judgment of the High Court and dismiss these appeals. The
employees had asked for award of interest on their dues.
The challenge of the employer was not groundless and we do
not think in the facts of these cases the employees or their
legal representatives would be entitled to interest. We
hope and trust that the employer would not liquidate its
liability without delay by satisfying the orders of the
Labour Court and the claims of the workmen or their legal
representatives as and when made.
A sum of Rs. 10,000 had been given by the employer to
Sri Pant for the Union to contest these matters and he has
been paid the amount under this Court’s order. No order for
further courts.
T.N.A. Appeals dismissed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 14501458 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.1988 of the Madras High Court in W.A. Nos. 864 to 870 of 1988 and W.P. Nos. 1600 and 1601 of 1986.

Narayanswamy, N. Balasubramaniam and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant.

M. Ramamurthy, Mrs. C. Ramamurthy, M.A. Krishnamoorthy, for the Respondents.

R.C. Paul appeared in person.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA. CJ. These are appeals by special leave and are directed against a common judgment of the Madras High Court delivered in a group of writ appeals and a writ petition.

E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the employer’) has one of its units located at Ranipet in Tamil Nadu State where sanitary-ware, super phosphate and insecticides are manufactured. Some of its retiring employees filed applications under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘1947 Act’ for short) before the Labour Court at Madras claiming pension by alleging that payability of pension was a condition of service and the employer had stopped it without any justification and without giving notice under section 9-A of the 1947 Act. The President Officer of the 2nd Additional Labour Court, Madras, allowed the same by his order dated 30th May, 1983, after computing the amounts. The employer preferred six writ petitions. In the meantime the same dispute had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal and it answered the reference against the employees by award dated 13th February, 1985. The award was assailed before the High Court by the Union by filing of the seventh writ petition. All the seven writ petitions were heard by a learned Single Judge who allowed the writ petitions of the management against the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the writ petition preferred by the labour union challenging the award of the Industrial Tribunal. Writ appeals were carried against the Single Judge’s decision.

The main controversy before the Division Bench was as to whether pension, or as is referred to by the parties, "retiring allowance" was payable to the employees. This dispute has a historical backdrop to which we may now advert. Under General Office Order No. 26 dated Ist December, 1943 "retiring allowances" were provided for. The Office Order provided that normally only employees with thirty years’ service or more would be eligible to receive "Retiring Allowance". The Board reserved the right to alter the scale of "retiring allowance". either generally or in respect of individual employees and had the authority to sanction ‘retiring allowance’ when first granted and subsequent payment became a routine matter subject to annual review.

Gratuities were also provided under the Office Order by saying that all permanent employees (other than workers who qualify for gratuities as per Factory Certified Standing Order) who were in the Company’s service prior to 1.1.1947 and who do not qualify for Retiring Allowance on retirement, will be eligible for gratuity on finally leaving the Company’s service subject to one or other of the prescribed conditions being fulfilled. In all four alternatives were provided. Clause (4) indicated that employees recruited on or after 1.1.1947 would not be entitled to any gratuity.

There was a Memorandum of Settlement between the parties which may be referred to as the settlement of 1956. Clause (6) thereof related to gratuity and provided:

"Gratuity shall in future be payable by the company

in accordance with the following rules:

(a)(i) Where, irrespective of the length of his

past service, an employee dies in service, or is

retired on a medical certificate acceptable to the

company, or is retired by the company on reaching

the age of superannuation, he shall be entitled to

gratuity calculated at the rate of one month’s

basic salary for each completed year of service,

and pro rata for any partly completed year of his

service ,subject to a maximum of 15 months’ basic

salary if his service is less than 30 years,

together with half of one month’s basic salary for

each completed year of service in excess of 30

years and pro rata for any partly completed year of

service in excess of 30 years...............

(d) Employees in service prior to Ist January, 1947

may opt, at the time of leaving service, either

for:

(i) Gratuity calculated in accordance with

these rules or in accordance with the current

provisions of General Office Order No. 26,

whichever he prefers, or

(ii) in lieu of gratuity, a retiring allowance

calculated in accordance with the current

provisions of General Office Order No. 26." This settlement as a fact incorporated the relevant part of the Office Order.

The Payment of Gratuity Act came into force with effect from September, 1972 and payment of gratuity became statutory. When that Act came into force, the Employer and the Employees ’ Union jointly applied to the Government for exemption from the provisions of the statute. The exemption was, however, not granted. Payability of gratuity is no longer in dispute. What is challenged is the claim of the workmen to retiring allowance (pension) under Office order No. 26. The stand of the employees has been that the retiring allowance under General Office Order No. 26 has not been substituted by the 1956 settlement and they are, subject to being qualified, entitled to the benefit of pension and the statutory advantage of gratuity. It is a fact that the settlement does not provide for payment of pension except to pre-1947 employees and making the benefit liable to exercise of option under clause 6(d) above. It is not in dispute that the retiral benefit (pension) was payable to all qualified employees as a matter of practice. If under the settlement that was not done away with, the benefit arising out of General Office Order No. 26 would still be available and gratuity contemplated under the settlement would not be a substitute of the retiral benefit of pension.

The Appellate Bench of the High Court has found that gratuity provided under the settlement was not a substitute of pension. Mr. Narayanaswamy, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeals took us through the various documents and placed the matter at considerable length and with lucidity. He even relied on what he described as the prevailing practice between 1956 and 1972the settlement and the Gratuity Act-when no retiral benefit was either claimed or paid. We have, however, not been able to see any defect in the reasoning of the Division Bench decision of the High Court where it has ultimately come to the conclusion that the settlement had not substituted gratuity for pension. We find that by way of an interim measure this Court by an order dated 5th May, 1989 had directed the employer to pay the pension to the employees in accordance with the order of the High Court with effect from Ist May, 1989 and that from the record appears to have been paid.

A petition had been filed in this Court on 23rd April, 1990 by the employer for modification of the condition indicated in the order granting special leave and we had heard counsel for both the sides on the said petition. We had made it clear at the hearing of the petition for modification of the order granting special leave that the question as to payability of retirement benefit after the 1956 settlement would be examined. The total number of employees involved in this dispute was about 347. Many of them had not only retired but had also died and in respect of those who were dead it would be a question of the benefits up to the date of death of the respective employees to be paid to their legal representatives. Mr. Narayanaswamy had emphatically contended that what was being decided was not a claim of 347 employees but it had its repercussion on the industrial peace between the employer and the employee at other places. We would like to make it clear that we have gone into the question confined to the claim to the employees of the Ranipet factory and not the liability of the employer generally, Besides, Mr. Narayanaswamy had also told us at the hearing that there are special features in the arrangement in regard to employees elsewhere.

We are satisfied that the Appellate Bench of the High Court was right in holding that the entitlement to pension had not been substituted by the settlement of 1956 and, therefore, the claim to pension subject to qualification being satisfied was available to be maintained notwithstanding the settlement of 1956, The High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the Labour Court had justifiably worked out the dues and the claim petitions under section 33-C(2) of the 1947 Act. We uphold the judgment of the High Court and dismiss these appeals. The employees had asked for award of interest on their dues. The challenge of the employer was not groundless and we do not think in the facts of these cases the employees or their legal representatives would be entitled to interest. We hope and trust that the employer would not liquidate its liability without delay by satisfying the orders of the Labour Court and the claims of the workmen or their legal representatives as and when made.

A sum of Rs. 10,000 had been given by the employer to Sri Pant for the Union to contest these matters and he has been paid the amount under this Court’s order. No order for further courts. T.N.A. Appeals dismissed.