LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

EX. NAIK SARDAR SINGH vs UNION OF INDIA on 3 May, 1991

Cites 1 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 6
Crl.A. No.-000067-000067 - 1991Official PDFBench S. Ratnavel Pandian, K. Jayachandra ReddyAdvocates SUSHMA SURI
PETITIONER:
EX. NAIK SARDAR SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1991
BENCH:
REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)
BENCH:
REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 417 1991 SCR (2) 676
1991 SCC (3) 213 JT 1991 (3) 1
1991 SCALE (1)899
ACT:
Army Act, 1950: Sections 63, 71 and 72-Summary Court-
Martial-Punishment-Award of-To be commensurate with nature
and degree of offence-Army Jawan carrying extra liquor
bottles without permit while proceeding on leave-Award of
punishment of 3 months’ R.I. and dismissal from service-
Whether arbitrary and excessive.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, who had put in 10 years of service as
Jawan in the Army, was sentenced to 3 months’ R.I. and
dismissed from service by the Summary Court-Martial, on the
charge that his action in carrying 12 bottles of liquor
while proceeding on leave to his home town was contrary to
the orders on the subject. The appeal preferred by the
appellant, pointing out the irregularities committed in the
summary trial, and pleading that he had unblemished record
of service, was also rejected by the higher authority. The
writ Petition filed by the appellant was also summarily

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1991.

From the Judgement and Order dated 27.11.1987 of the Delhi High Court in Crl. W. No. 527 of 1987.

N.N. Gupta and Rajiv Dutta for the Appellant.

J.D. Jain, Maninder Singh and Ms. Sushma Suri for the Respondents.

The Judgement of the Court was delivered by

K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. This appeal, pursuant to the special leave granted, is directed against the order of the High Court of Delhi dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant summarily.

The appellant was serving as a Jawan in the Indian Army. On 17th September, 1985, he applied for leave and it was granted. He was going to his home town, a village in Rajasthan. He purchased 11 bottles of sealed rum and one bottle of brandy from his Unit Canteen as he required the same to celebrate the marriage of one of his close relations at his home town. Admittedly, the appellant was entitled to carry 4 bottles of rum and one bottle of brandy as per the Unit Regulations/leave certificate when he was proceeding on leave. According to the appellant, the remaining 7 bottles of rum he was able to purchase from the Unit Canteen over and above his entitlement on the orders of its Company Commander and Commanding Officer on compassionate grounds and that there was a written order to that effect which was retained by the Salesman of the Unit Canteen at the time of delivery of the extra 7 bottles of rum. Enroute to his home town he had to pass through Surendra Nagar which was under prohibition. The local Civil Police at Surendra Nagar intercepted him and confiscated the bottles of liquor and handed over the appellant alongwith the liquor bottles to the City Police Station, Surendra Nagar. The City Police in turn handed over him to his Unit authorities for action. The 6th respondent, the Officer Commanding, 98 Field Regiment, ordered a summary court-martial during which the witnesses including the Civil, Police Officer of Surendra Nagar were examined. Ultimately the summary court-martial sentenced the appellant to three months’ R.I. and dismissed him from service with effect from 9th October, 1985 by which time the appellant had already put in 10 years of service. His plea throughout has been that he had purchased the liquor for the marriage of his brother-in-law on the basis of the permit issued to him and the chits issued by his superiors enabling him to draw the extra 7 bottles of rum and that he had no other bad intention in carrying the liquor bottles. He preferred an appeal to the Army Commander mentioning several irregularities in the summary trial. He also pleaded that he was having unblemished record of service in the Army, but his appeal was rejected. Thereafter he filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court which was summarily rejected.

In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that several irregularities have been committed in conducting the summary trial. But from the records we find that the evidence has been duly recorded and further it is an admitted fact that the appellant was carrying extra 7 bottles of rum without the necessary permit. Therefore we are unable to agree with the counsel that the trial is vitiated and we are of the view that no prejudice has been caused. The main submission and perhaps the only submission, if we may say so, in this appeal is that the sentence awarded to the appellant is wholly disproportionate to the offence committed by him. According to the learned counsel the extreme punishment of imprisonment for 3 months and dismissal from the service under the circumstances is uncalled for.

We find considerable force in this submission. Admittedly the appellant was granted leave when he was proceeding to his home town and unfortunately enroute to his home town he had to pass through Surendra Nagar where there was prohibition in force. However, he had a valid permit to carry 5 bottles, the extra 7 bottles of rum, according to the appellant, were purchased from the Army Canteen itself and there is no dispute about the same. Unless he had some permits or chits given by some higher authorities permitting him to purchase these bottles, he could not have purchased the same from the Canteen over and above the bottles for which he had a valid permit. He was taking this liquor to his home town to celebrate his brother-in-law’s marriage, but to his bad luck, the Civil Police of Surendra Nagar checked his baggage and confiscated the bottles as he had no valid permit to carry the extra bottles. Under these circumstances the question is whether such a severe penalty is called for. In the chargesheet it is merely stated that the action of the appellant in carrying 11 bottles of sealed rum and one bottle of sealed brandy when he was proceeding to his home town is "contrary to the existing orders on the subject". In the counteraffidavit it is stated that such an act of the appellant comes within the meaning of Section 63 of Chapter VI of the Army Act, 1950 (‘Act’ for short) which enumerates various types of offences. Section 63 lays down as under:

"63. Violation of good order and discipline-Any

person subject to this Act who is guilty of any act

or omission which, though not specified in this

Act, is prejudicial to good order and military

discipline shall, on conviction by court-martial,

be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which

may extend to seven years or such less punishment

as is in this act mentioned". The Section may cover various types of misconducts committed by a person by way of an act or omission. This Section also provides for awarding any other lesser punishment mentioned in the Act. Therefore such depends on the nature of the act or omission of which the person is found guilty. The provisions in Chapter VII enumerate various punishments that can be awarded. Section 71 of the Act deals with punishments awardable by court-martial and reads as under:

"71. Punishments awardable by courts-martial

Punishments may be inflicted in respect of offences

committed by persons subject to this Act and

convicted by courts-martial, according to the scale

following, that is to say-

(a) death;

(b) transportation for life or for any period not

less than seven years;

(c) imprisonment, either rigorous or simple, for

any period not exceeding fourteen years;

(d) cashiering, in case of officers;

(e) dismissal from the service;

(f) reduction to the ranks or to a lower rank or

grade or place in the list of their rank, in the

case of warrant officers.; and reduction to the

ranks or to a lower rank or grade, in the case of

non-commissioned officers;

Provided that a warrant officer reduced to the

ranks shall not be required to serve in the ranks

as a sepoy;

(g) forfeiture of seniority of rank, in the case of

officers, junior commissioned officers, warrant

officers and non-commissioned officers; and

forfeiture of all or any part of their service for

the purpose of promotion, in the case of any of

them whose promotion depends upon length of

service;

(h) forfeiture of service for the purpose of

increased pay, pension or any other prescribed

purpose;

(i) severe reprimand or reprimand, in the case of

officers, junior commissioned officer, warrant

officers and non commissioned officers;

(j) forfeiture of pay and allowances for a period

not exceedind three months for an offence committed

on active service;

(k) forfeiture in the case of a person sentenced to

cashiering or dismissal from the service of all

arrears of pay and allowances and other public

money due to him at the time of such cashiering or

dismissal;

(l) stoppage of pay and allowances until any proved

loss or damage occasioned by the offence of which

he is convicted is made good." It can be seen that Sections 71(a) to 71(e) and Section 71(k) provide for extreme punishments and are severe in nature. Sections 71(f) to 71(j) and Section 71(l) provide for comparatively lesser punishments. Section 72 of the Act is the next relevant Section which reads as under:

"72. Alternative punishments awardable by court-

martial-Subject to the provisions of this Act, a

Court-Martial may, on convicting a person subject

to this Act to any of the offences specified in

Sections 34 to 68 inclusive, award either the

particular punishment with which the offence is

stated in the said sections to be punishable, or,

in lieu thereof, any one of the punishments lower

in the scale set set out in Section 71, regard

being had to the nature and degree of the Offence."

(emphasis supplied) Section 73 of the Act deals with combination of punishments and it reads as under:

"73. Combination of punishments-A sentence of a

court-martial may award in addition to, or without

any one other punishment, the punishment specified

in clause (d) or clause (e) of Section 71 and any

one or more of the Punishments specified in clauses

(f) to (l) of that section." It can be seen that under Section 73 of the Act, the courtmartial may award more than one punishments as mentioned therein. In the instant case Section 63 also is not mentioned in the chargesheet. Assuming that the offence committed by the appellant is covered by the residuary Section 63 but in awarding the punishment the court-martial has to keep in view the spirit behind Section 72 of the Act and it has to give due regard to the nature and degree of the offence. It can be seen that Section 63 provides for awarding any of the lesser punishments enumerated in Section 71 of the Act. In view of these provisions of law and having regard to the nature and degree of the offence, we are firmly of the view that the punishments awarded to the appellant namely, three months’ R.I. and dismissal from service are severe and are also violative of Section 72.

In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1984] 3 All ER 935, 950 Lord Diplock said:

"Judicial review has I think developed to a stage

today when, without reiterating any analysis of the

steps by which the development has come about, one

can conveniently classify under three heads the

grounds on which administrative action is subject

to control by judicial review. The first ground I

would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationa-

lity’ and the third ’procedural impropriety ! This

is not to say that further development on a case by

case basis may not in course of time add further

grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible

adoption in the future of the principle of

’proportionality’ which is recognised in the

administrative law of several of our fellow members

of the Eurpoean Economic community,....." This principle was followed in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Others, [1987] 4 SCC 611 where this Court considered the question of doctrine of proportionality in the matter of awarding punishment under the Army Act and it was observed thus:

"The question of the choice and quantum of

punishment is within the jurisdiction and

discretion of the court-martial. but the sentence

has to suit the offence and the offender. It

should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It

should not be so disproportionate to the offence as

to shock the conscience and amount in itself to

conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of

proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial

review, would ensure that even on an aspect which

is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the

court-martial, if the decision of the court even as

to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic,

then the sentence would not be immune from

correction. Irrationality and perversity are

recognised grounds of judicial review." In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [1983] 2 SCC 442 this Court held as under:

"It is equally true that the penalty imposed must

be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct,

and that any penalty disproportionate to the

gravity of the misconduct would be violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution." Applying these principles to the instant case, We are also constrained to say that there is an element of arbitrariness in awarding these severe punishments to the appellant.

We have heard both the learned counsel on this aspect elaborately and we are satisfied that an interference is called for and the matter has to be remanded on the question of awarding any of the lesser punishments. Having given our earnest consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of the submissions made by both the counsel, we feel that ends of justice will sufficiently be met if a lesser punishment as provided under Section 71(f) is awarded to the appellant. Accordingly, we set aside the punishments of three months’ R.I. and dismissal from service and remand the matter to the court martial which shall award any of the lesser punishments having due regard to the nature and circumstances of the case and in the light of the above observations made by us. Since we are setting aside the sentence of three months’ R.I. any detention suffered by the appellant after the orders of the court-martial shall not be treated as a disqualification for being reinstated into service which shall, however, be subject to any of the minor punishments to be awarded by the court-martial. Already much time has lapsed, therefore, we hope the court-martial would dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within three months. The appeal is thus disposed of subject to the above directions. N.P.V. Appeal disposed of.