LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

COMMISSLONER OF INCOME TAX,SHILONG vs JAI PRAKASH SINGH on 13 March, 1996

Cites 5 provisionsCites 0 judgmentsCited by 1
C.A. No.-002542-002544 - 1977Official PDFBench Benjaram Pranaya Jeevan Reddy, Shailesh Bhadrayulal Majumdar
PETITIONER:
COMMISSLONER OF INCOME TAX,SHILONG
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
JAI PRAKASH SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/1996
BENCH:
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
BENCH:
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1303 1996 SCC (3) 525
JT 1996 (3) 356 1996 SCALE (2)832
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T

These appeals are preferred against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court answering the following question in favour of the assessee and against the revenue:

"Whether on the facts and in the

circumstances of the case, the

Tribunal was correct in holding

that non-service of notice under

section 143(2) of the Income-tax

Act, 1961, against nine out of the

ten legal representatives of the

deceased Shri B.N.Singh did not

invalidate the assessment orders of

the Income-tax Officer relating to

the assessment years 1965-66, 1966-

67 and 1967-68 and that it was at

best an irregularity for which the

Appellate Assistant Commissioner

was justified in setting aside the

assessments and it was not a case

fit for cancellation of the

assessments"?

One B.N.Singh had extensive business interests. He did not file a return for the Assessment Years 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68. He died on April 16, 1967. He left behind ten legal representatives comprising three widows, four sons and three daughters. The eldest son, Jai Prakash Singh, filed the returns for the said three assessment years on March 17, 1970, November 12, 1970 and October 27, 1971 respectively. The returns were signed by Jai Prakash Singh alone - not by other legal representatives. In these returns, Jai Prakash Singh disclosed the income received by late B.N.Singh from all his business interests and properties. [lt may be emphasized that B.N.Singh died after the close of the accounting year relevant to Assessment Year 1967-68 - in fact, sixteen days after the commencement of the Assessment Year 1967-68]. The returns filed by Jai Prakash Singh were scrutinized by the Income Tax Officer who also issued notices under Sections 142(1) and 143(2) to him to appear and produce documents, accounts and other material. He complied with the same. No objection was raised by Jai Prakash Singh before the Income Tax Officer in the said assessment proceedings that notice must be given to the other legal representatives of late B.N.Singh. Assessment orders were made mentioning the names of all the ten legal representatives against the column "Name of the Assessee". They were described as "legal representatives of late B.N.Singh". Assessment was made in the status of "individual". Appeals were filed by Sri Jai Prakash Singh contending for the first time therein that inasmuch as all the legal representatives of B.N.Singh were not given notice of the assessment proceedings, the assessments made were illegal and void and must be so declared. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the contention. While taking note of the fact that "B.N.Singh’s death and the names of his legal representatives were intimated to the Income Tax Officer shortly after his death", he held that completing the assessment without serving notices upon all the legal representatives was only an irregularity in completing the assessment. Accordingly, he set aside the assessment orders and remitted the matters to the Income Tax Officer for making fresh assessments after Singh filed further appeals before the Tribunal raising the very same contention but to no avail. lt is then that the aforesaid question was referred for the opinion of the High Court.

The High Court referred to the definitions of "assessee" and "legal representatives" in Clauses (7) and (29) of Section 2 as well as to Section 159 of the Act and held that in the absence of service of notice on all the legal representatives, the assessment made upon them is a nullity and not a mere irregularity. It has accordingly set aside the direction of the Appellate Assistant Commission [affirmed by the Tribunal] remitting the matters to the Income Tax Officer for making fresh assessments after notice to all the legal representatives.

The question that arises in these appeals is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the orders of assessment made by the Income Tax Officer Without notice to all the legal representatives of B.N.Singh are null and void in law or merely irregular/defective proceedings which can be set right by remitting the matters to Income Tax Officer for making fresh assessments with notice to all legal representatives.

The expression ‘assessee’ is defined in Clause (7) of Section 2 in the following words:

"assessee’ means a person by whom

any tax or any other sum of money

is payable under this Act, and

includes:

(a) Every person in respect of whom

any proceeding under this Act has

been taken for the assessment of

his income or of the income of any

other person in respect of which he

is assessable, or of the loss

sustained by him or by such other

person, or of the amount of refund

due to him or to such other person:

(b) every person who is deemed to

be an assessee under any provision

of this Act;

(c) every person who is deemed to

be an assessee in default under any

provision of this Act."

Clause (29) in Section 2 defines the expression "legal representative" in the following words:

"2 (29) ’legal representative’ has

the meaning assigned to it in

Clause (11) of Section 2 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of

1908)."

Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the said expression as follows:-

"2.(11) ’legal representative’

means a person who in law

represents the estate of a deceased

person, and includes any person who

intermeddles with the estate of the

deceased and where a party sues or

is sued in a representative

character the person on whom the

estate devolves on the death of the

party so suing or sued." Section 159 of the Income Tax Act, which is relevant in this behalf, reads:

"159, Legal representatives. (1)

where a person dies his legal

representative shall be liable to

pay any sum which the deceased

would have been liable to pay if he

had not died, in the like manner

and to the same extent as the

decease.

(2) For the purpose of making an

assessment (including an

assessment, reassessment or

recomputation under Section 147) of

the income of the deceased and for

the purposes of levying any sum in

the hands of the legal

representative in accordance with

the provisions of subsection (1)-,

(a) any proceeding taken against

the deceased before his death shall

be deemed to have been taken

against the legal representative

and may be continued against the

legal representative from the stage

at which it stood on the date of

the death of the deceased;

(b) any proceeding which could have

been taken against the deceased if

he had survived, may be taken

against the legal representative;

and

(c) all the provisions of this Act

shall apply accordingly.

(3) The legal representative of the

deceased shall, for the purposes as

the Act, be deemed to an assessee.

(4) Every legal representative

shall be personally liable for any

tax payable by him in his capacity

as legal representative if, while

his liability for tax remains

undischarged, he creates a charge

on or disposes of or parts with any

assets of the estate of the

deceased, which are in, or may come

into, his possession, but such

liability shall be limited to the

value of the asset so charged,

disposed of or parted with.

(5) The provisions of sub-section

(2) of Section 161, Section 162 and

Section 167, shall, so far as may

be and to the extent to which they

are not inconsistent with the

provisions of this section, apply

in relation to a legal

representative .

(6) The liability of a legal

representative under this section

shall, subject to the provisions of

sub-section (4) and sub-section

(5), be limited to the extent to

which the estate is capable of

meeting the liability."

Dr.Gauri Shankar, learned counsel for the Revenue. contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case the assessment orders cannot be said to be null and void. At worst, they are irregular orders. This is not a case where no notice was served upon the legal representatives and an assessment made. Even before service of any notice, returns were filed by one of the legal representatives [Jai Prakash Singh] voluntarily. The returns were filed by Jai Prakash Singh taking advantage of the provisions contained in subsection (4) of Section 139; actually the time for filing the returns had expired by the time they were filed. The violation, if any, was not serious enough to declare the entire proceedings a nullity. Sri N.R.Choudhary, learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, submitted that an assessment made on persons without notice to them is a clear case of violation of principles of natural Justice and, hence, the assessments are null and void. Since the proceedings are a nullity in law there was no question of sending the matters back to the Income Tax Officer for making fresh assessments. The learned counsel commended the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court for our acceptance.

Before we proceed to answer the question it is necessary to keep in mind the facts of this case. B.N.Singh died on April 16, 1967. He failed to file a return for the Assessment Years 1965-66 and 1966-67 within the time prescribed. So far as the Assessment Year 1967-68 is concerned hes of courses died before the expiry of the period prescribed for filing the return. No return was filed for the Assessment Year 1967-68 also within the prescribed period. Jai Prakash Singh, however, wanted to take advantage of tho provision contained in Section 139(4) - which enables an assessee to "furnish the return for any previous year at any time before the end of the period specified in clause (b)" provided the assessment is not made by the time of filing the return. (Clause (b) of the said subsection specifies various periods of limitation; in respect of the assessment years concerned herein, it is four years from the end of the relevant assessment year.) The returns were filed voluntarily disclosing the income received by B.N.Singh during the relevant accounting years by one of his legal representatives inviting an assessment. The names of all the legal representatives were already intimated to the Income Tax Officer [as found recorded in the orders of the t Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal though the occasion for giving such information is not evident from the record. It is also not clear who gave the information regarding the death of B.N.Singh and his legal representatives and in what connection.]. It is true that the returns were signed only by Jai Prakash Singh and not by the other nine legal representatives, but it should also be remembered that when notices under Sections 142(1) and 143(2) were issued to Jai Prakash Singh, he appeared through his Authorised Representative and produced the relevant books and accounts on the basis of which assessments were made. Jai Prakash Singh did not raise an objection before the Income Tax Officer that unless and until notices to all the other legal representatives are sent, assessment orders cannot be made. He raised this question for the first time in the appeals preferred by him before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and thereafter before the Tribunal. It appears rather curious that Jai Prakash Singh who had voluntarily filed the returns of income should raise this issue; no other legal representative of B.N.Singh has come forward with such a plea. We do not wish to go into the question whether Jai Prakash Singh should at all have been allowed to so turn round and raise this plea in appeal, for the reason that the said issue is not before us in these appeals.

We are of the opinion that the High Court was not right in holding in the above circumstances that the assessment orders made are null and void. They are not. At the worst, they are defective proceedings or irregular proceedings as has been rightly held by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. In Chatturam and Others v. Commissioner of Income Tax,Bihar [(1947) 15 I.T.R. 302), it has been held by the Federal Court that the liability to pay the tax arises by virtue of Sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 [charging sections] and that Section 22 and other Sections of the said Act are merely machinery provisions to determine the quantum of tax. The following observations are apposite:

"The income-tax assessment

proceedings commence with the issue

of a notice. The issue or receipt

of a notice is not, however, the

foundation of the jurisdiction of

the Income-tax Officer to make the

assessment or of the liability of

the assessee to pay the tax. It may

be urged that the issue and service

of a notice under Section 22 (1) or

(2) may affect the liability under)

the penal clauses which provide for

failure to act as required by the

notice. The jurisdiction to assess

and the liability to pay the

tax,however, are not conditional on

the validity of the notice. Suppose

a person, even before a notice is

published in the papers under

Section 22(1), or before he

receives a notice under Section

22(2) of the Income tax Act, gets a

form of return from the Income-tax

Office and submits his return, it

will be futile to contend that the

Income-tax Officer is not entitled

to assess the party or that the

party is not liable to pay any tax

because a notice had not been

issued to him. The liability to pay

the tax is founded in Sections 3

and 4 of the Income Tax Act, which

are the charging sections. Section

22 etc. are the machinery sections

to determine the amount of tax."

(Emphasis added)

In Maharaja of Patiala v. Commissioner of Income Tax. (Central) Bombay [(1943) 11 I.T.R. 202], a decision rendered by the Bombay High Court, the facts were these: the late Maharaja of Patiala had income from property and business in Gritish India. He died on March 23, 1938. On November 23, 1938, the Income Tax Officer, Bombay sent two notices under Sections 22(2) and 38 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 addressed to the Maharaja cf Patiala requiring him to make a return of his income from all sources for the Assessment Years 1937-38 and 1938-39. They were served upon the successor Maharaja. Returns were filed, signed by the Foreign Minister of patiala. The Income Tax officer passed assessment orders describing the assessee as "His Highness.....late Maharaja of patiala". The succeeding Maharaja appealed against the assessment orders contending that inasmuch as the notices were sent in the name of Maharaja of Patiala and not to him as the legal representative of the Maharaja of Patiala, the assessments made were illegal. The contention was that the notices were really addressed to the late Maharaja, who was not alive when the said notices were issued and that they were wrongly served upon him. The argument was rejected by the authorities under the Act as well as by the High Court on reference. The Division Bench comprising Beaumont, CJ. and Kania,J. held that inasmuch as the present Maharaja,"who raised the contention of nullity) was the legal representative of the late Maharaja of Patiala and because the return of the Late Maharaja’s income was made by the Foreign Minister on his behalf and because he knew perfectly well that what was being assessed was the income of his predecessor, the assessment made, though not complying strictly with Section 24-B (Corresponding to Section 159 of the present Act),is yet valid. The following observations of Beaumont,CJ., are relevant for our purpose:

"In this case the person to be

assessed was the late Maharaja, who

had died before he was served with

any notice under Section 22, and,

therefore, the provisions of

Section 24b(2) apply, and the

Income-Tax officer was entitled to

serve on the executor,

administrator or other legal

representative of the deceased

Maharaja a notice under Section

22(2) or under Section 34 as the

case might be, and then proceed to

assess the total income of the

deceased Maharaja as if such

executor, administrator or other

legal representative were the

assessee.. As observed by the

president of the Tribunal in his

judgments the Income-tax Officer

made no attempt to observe the

provisions of that sub-section. He

served the notice on the present

Maharaja, without showing in what

capacity.But the tribunal have

found, as a fact, that the present

Maharaja is the legal

representative of the deceased

Maharaja, and although it would

obviously have been better so to

describe him in the notice, I am

not prepared to say that the notice

was had, if it was served on the

legal representative, merely

because it omitted to state that it

was served in that capacity. It

should have been stated that it was

served on the legal representative

of the late Maharaja, and that the

return required was of the late

Maharaja’s income. It was not so

stated, and the present Maharaja

himself may have had taxable income

for the years in question but I

think there is a good deal of force

in the contention of the Tribunal

that any irregularities in this

respect were waived by the Maharaja

because returns of the late

Maharaja’s income-were made by the

Foreign Minister on behalf of the

Maharaja, and then subsequently

corrections were made in the

assessment at the instance of the

Maharaja. There is no doubt that

the present Maharaja knew perfectly

well that what was being assessed

was the income of his predecessor."

To the same effect are the observations of Kania,J. in his separate but concurring opinion. The decision, one of the earliest on the subject shows that an assessment made without strictly complying with, Section 24-B [Section 159 in the present Act] is not void or illegal and that any infractions in that behalf can waived by the assessee.In Estate of Late Rengalal Jajodia v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras [(1971) 79 I.T.R. 505), it was held by this Court:

"The lack for a notice does not

amount to the revenue authority

having had no jurisdiction to

assess, but that the assessment was

defective by reason of notice not

having been given to her. An

assessment proceeding does not

cease to be a proceeding under the

Act merely by reason of want of

notice . It will be a proceeding

liable to be challenged and

corrected."

The facts in this case are telling. They are Rangalal Jajodia filed his income tax return for the Assessment Years 1942-43 and 1-943-44 under: the Income Tax Act as well as under the Excess Profits. Tax Act. Before the assessments were completed, he died (on January 11, 1946). Rangalal had a son Shankar Lal, by his pre- deceased wife. He married a second time and had children from the second wife Aruna Devi. Rangalal executed a will totally disinheriting Shankar Lal and appointing Aruna Devi and another as executors of his Will. The income Tax Officers probably unaware of the Will, gave notice to Shankar Lal, who objected that he is not the legal representative of the deceased and that the second wife [Aruna Devi] and the other executor are the proper persons to be notified. The Income Tax Officer called for a copy of the Will but it was not produced. The income Tax Officer thereupon completed the assessment describing the assessee as "the estate of late Sri Rangalal Jajodia by legal heirs and representatives Sri Shankar Lal Jajodia son of Rangalal Jajodia, Smt. Aruna Devi wife of Rangalal Jajodia and her children". Appeals were preferred by the second wife, Aruna Devi, contending inter alia that the assessments having been made without notice to her or the other executor were illegal and invalid. This plea was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal, who remitted the matters to the income Tax Officer to complete the assessments after notice to Aruna Devi. The High Court too rejected the said contention whereupon the matter was brought to this Court, which held that absence of notice to Aruna Devi makes the assessment merely defective but not null and void. It is in this connection that the aforesaid observation was made. This Court sustained the direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the Income Tax Officer to make fresh assessment on Aruna Devi in accordance of the provisions of the Act. This decision, in our opinion, is sufficient to reject the assessee’s contention herein. If an assessment made with notice to Shankar Lal [who was not really the legal representative of the deceased Rangalal] and without serving notice upon the lawful legal representatives Caruna Devi) the other executor or Aruna Devi’s children] - that too, despite the objection of Shankar Lal that he is not the legal representative and that notice must be sent to Aruna Devi etc., who are the legal representatives of the deceased Rangalal - is only "defective" and not null and void, it would be rather odd to contend that assessments made on the basis of returns filed by one of the legal representatives [disclosing the total income received by the deceased] is null and void on the ground that notices were not sent to other legal representatives. The principle that emerges from the above decision is that an omission to serve or any defect in the service of notices provided by procedural provisions does not efface or erase the liability to pay tax where such liability is created by distinct substantive provisions [charging sections]. Any such omission or defect may render the order made irregular - depending upon the nature of the provision not complied with- but certainly not void or illegal. In this view of the matter, we do not think it necessary to refer to certain other decisions of the High Courts cited before us which have turned mainly on the basis of facts in each case. It is equally unnecessary for us to go into the meaning of the expressions "void", "void ab initio", "voidable" or "a nullity" - a fairly complicated exercise.

The appeals are accordingly allowed, the judgment of the High Court set aside and the question referred answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Revenue shall be entitled to its costs which are quantified at Rupees ten thousand consolidated.