The question in these appeals is: whether an erstwhile partner is liable to pay the tax arrears due from the partnership firm pretaning to the period when he was partner. The Madras High Court had held that he is not. The Revenue is disputing the correctness of that holding
The respondent-assessee was a partner in the firm, Sannanna Chettiar and Sons. He retired therefrom on April 19, 1963. On his retirement, the firm was continued by taking in two new partners. The sad firm too was dissolved with effect from April 12, 1972. The assessments for the Assessment Years 1962-63 and 1963-64 were competed on March 25, 1967 and March 29, 1968. [For the two accounting years relevant to the said assessment years, accounts were duly made up by the partners and the share of profits due to the respondent paid to him before him retirements.] On February 23, 1972, the Income Tax Officer sent a communication to the respondent that in respect of the arrears of tax due from the firm for the aforesaid assessment years, he too is jointly and severally liable along with the other partners inasmuch as he was a partner of the firm during the relevant occurring years. The respondent denied his liability on the ground that he ceased to be a partner long ago, that there was a change in the constitution of the firm after his retirement and that such re-constituted partnership alone is responsible for paying the said arrears. The Income Tax Officer did not agree with the respondents contentions. Recovery proceedings were initiated and the respondent’s properties attached, whereupon he approached the Madras High Court by way of two writ petitions. The High Court allowed the writ petitions mainly lying upon and following the decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Income Tax Officer, Assessment-ii, Calicut & Anr. v.C.V.George & Ors. [(1976) 105 I.T.R.144] which dissented from the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath v. Income Tax Officer, Meerut & Anr. [(1964) 54 I.I.R.755]. The reasoning of the High Court, in short, is this: Section 189(3) has no application to the facts of the case inasmuch as the respondent was not a partner of the firm at the time of its dissolution; he ceased to be a partner long prior to the dissolution. Further, because the Income Tax Act, 1961 did not contain a provision corresponding to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 46 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1992, the areas of tax due from the firm cannot be recovered from an erstwhile partner.
Sri B.B.Ahuja, learned counsel for the appellantRevenue assailed the correctness of the judgment under appeal and also that of the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court aforesaid. Learned counsel pointed out that the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath [(1964) 54 I.T.R.755[ (which was dissented from by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court) has actually been affirmed by this Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath v. Income Tax Officer, C-Ward Meerut & Anr. [(1969) 72 I.T.R.617] and that the reasoning and approach of the Allahabad High Court and of this Court is clearly at variance with the reasoning of the judgment under appeal. Since the respondent-assessee was unrepresented, we requested Mrs. Ramachandran to assist us in this matter, to which she has agreed graceful. We are grateful for her valuable assistance. Learned counsel supported the reasoning and conclusion of the Madras and Kerala High Courts. Learned counsel submitted that the decision of this Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath does not in any manner affect the correctness of the reasoning contained in judgment under appeal.
Clause (23) of Section 2 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [1961 Act] says that "’firm’, ’partner’ and ’partnership’ have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932; but the expression ’partner’ shall also include any person who, being a minor, has been admitted to the benefits of partnership". [Since we are concerned with the position obtaining prior to April 1, 1989 (i.e., prior to the introduction of Section 188-A by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989) We shall refer to the relevant provisions as they stood prior to April 1, 1989.] Chapter XVI contains special provisions applicable to firms. Section 182 provides for assessment of registered firms while Section 183 provides for assessment of unregistered firms. Section 184 provides for application for registration and Section 185 proscribes the procedure to be followed on receipt of such application. Section 186 deals with cancelation of registration. Section 187 to 189 deal with changes in the constitution of the firm, succession of one firm by another and with the dissolution of the firm. Subsection (1) of Section 187 provides that "where at the time of making an assessment under section 143 or section 144, it is found that a change has occured in the constitution of a firm, the assessment shall be made on the firm as constituted at the time making the assessment". Subsection (2) of Section 187 specifies what does the expression "change in the constitution of the firm" meaning in the said section.
Section 156 provides for issuance of a notice of demand upon the assessee specifying the sum payable. If the tax is not paid pursuant to the notice of demand, it has to be recovered in accordance with the Rules contained in the second Schedule to the Act.
In the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 [1992 Act], Section 46 provided that the arrears of income tax shall he recovered as arrears of land revenue by the Collector. The proviso to Subsection (2) provided that "without prejudice to any other powers of the Collector in this behalf, he shall, for the purpose of recovering the said amount, have the powers which under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [V of 1908], a Civil court has for the purpose of the recovery of an amount due under a decree......". Sub-Rules (1) and (2) of Rule 50 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribe the mode of execution of a decree obtained against a firm. Rule 50 reads:
"50. Execution of decree against
firm.-- (1) Where a decree has been
passed against a firm, execution
may be granted--
(a) against any property of the
partnership;
(b) against any person who has
appeared in his own name under Rule
6 or Rule 7 or Order XXX or who has
admitted on the pleadings that he
is, or who has been adjudged to be,
a partner;
(c) against any person who has been
individually served as a partner
with a summons and has failed to
appear;
Provided that nothing in this sub-
rule shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect the provisions of
Section 30 of the Indian
Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932).
(2) Where the decree-holder claims
to be entitled to cause the decree
to be executed against any person
other than such a person as is
referred to in sub-rule (1),
clauses (b) and (c), as being a
partner in the firm, he may apply
to the Court which passed the
decree for leave, and where the
liability is not disputed, such
Court may order that the liability
of such person be tried and
determined in any manner in which
any issue in a suit may be tried
and determined.
(3) Where the liability of any
person has been tried and
determined under sub-rule (2), the
order made thereon shall have the
same force and be subject to the
same condition as to appeal or
otherwise as if it were a decree.
(4) Save as against any property of
the partnership, a decree against a
firm shall not release, render
liable or otherwise affect any
partner therein unless he has been
served with a summons to appear and
answer.
(5) Nothing in this rule shall
apply to a decree passed against a
Hindu undivided family by virtue of
the provisions of Rule 10 of Order
XXX."
Sections 25 of the Partnership Act may also be referred to in this connection. "Every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner". says the section.
The question in this case, to repeat, is whether the respondent who was a partner of the aforesaid firm during the accounting years relevant to Assessment Years 1962-63 and 1963-64 is liable to pay the arrears of tax due from the said firm notwithstanding his retirement from the said firm on and with effect from April 19, 1963. Before we answer this question, we may well ask which is the provision in the Act which says liable to pay the tax due from the firm which is continuing. Neither Sri Ahuja, learned counsel for the Revenue, nor Mrs. Ramchandran, learned counsel for the assesee, could point out any provision stating expressly that the partners are liable to pay, whether jointly or severally, the tax due from the firm. It is true that the tax due from the firm will be recovered in the first instance by proceeding against the assets of the firm but it may happen that either the firm has no assets or the assets of the firm are not sufficient to satisfy the demand. In such a case, can the said demand be enforced against the partners, i.e., against persons who were partners during the period to which the demand relates and who are continuing as partners even at the time of the demand and recovery. Because thereis no express provision in the 1961 Act making the partners liable for the tax due from the firm, it is not suggested by Mrs.Ramachandran - nor can it be suggested that they are not liable. But then the question immediately arises, under which provision are they being made liable. The answer obviously is because of the very nature and characteristics of a partnership firm as explained in various decisions of this Court [See Addanki Narayanppa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa (1966 (3) S.C.R.400) and Malabar Fisheries Company v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala [(1979) 120 I.T.R.49] and the provisions of the Partnership Act. In Malabar Fisheries, this Court discussed the nature and character of the Partisanship under the Indian Law and held that "a partnership firm under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is not a distinct legal entity apart from the partners constituting it and equally in law the firm as such has *** separate rights of its own in the partnership assets and when one talks of the firm’s property or firm’s assets all the is meant is property or assets in which all partners have a joint or common interest". In the particular, the court held that Indian law in this respect is akin to English Law - and different from the Scottish law -and quoted several passage from Lindley on Partnership [12th Edn.] to indicate the relationship between the firm and the partners. The following passage from one of the extracts is relevant. It reads:
The firm is not recognised by
English lawyers as distinct from
the members composing it. IN taking
partnership accounts and in
administering partnership assets,
courts have to some extent adopted
the mercantile view, and actions
may now, speaking generally, be
brought by or against partners in
the name of their firm; but,
speaking generally, the firm as
such has no legal recognition. The
law, ignoring the firm, looks to
the partners composing it; any
change amongst them destroys the
identity of the firm; what is
called the property of the firm is
their property, and what are called
the debts and liabilities of what
are called the debts and
liabilities of the firm are their
debts and their liabilities. In
point of law, a partner may be the
debtor or the creditor of his co-
partners, by the cannot be either
debtor or creditor o f the firm of
which he is himself a members, nor
can be employed by his firm, for a
man cannot be his own employer."
Sections 25 of the Partnership Act expressly states that every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners, and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner. It is worthy of note that Section 25 does not make a distinction between a continuing partner and an erstwhile partner. Its principle is clear and specific, viz., that every partner is liable for all the acts of the firm done while he is a partner jointly along with other partners and also severally. If a continuing partner is liable to pay the tax due from the firm relating to the period when he was a partner of the firm, we see no reason, in principle, to hold that the said liability ceases merely because partner has ceased to be a partner subsequent to the said period. We do not think that the absence of a provision corresponding to the proviso to Section 46(2) of the 1922 Act in the present Act [we many remind that we are dealing with the provisions obtaining prior to April 1, 1989, i.e., prior to the introduction of Section 188-A] makes any difference to the position, since the liability of the partners to pay the dues of the firm does not arise by virtue of Order XXI Rule 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is attracted by virtue of the said proviso, but on account of the basic premise mentioned hereinabove. Order XXI Rule 50 merely reiterates the said basic premise; it does not create a new liability.
In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to the reasoning of the Allahabad Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath [(1964) 5 I.T.R.755]. R.S.Pathak, J., speaking for the Bench, observed:
"It is true that under the Income-
tax law a firm is treated as an
entity distinct from its partners,
but that is so only for the
purposes of assessment. The
procedure relating to assessment
concludes when an assessment order
has been made and the tax liability
consequent upon that assessment has
been determined. When a notice of
demand is issued requiring the
payment of the tax liability, the
stage of assessment has been left
behind, and with it the distinction
between the firm and its
partners.....The liability of the
partners of the firm is joint and
several, and it is open to a
creditor of the firm to proceed to
recover a debt the firm from any
one or more of the partners. In
Simon’s Income Tax (2nd edition),
volume I page 337, paragraph 510,
the law is thus stated:
The tax assessed in the firm name
is a partnership debt for which all
who were partners a t the time when
the debt was incurred, or have held
themselves out to the Revenue to be
such, are jointly liable, This
means that any or all of the those
persons may be used for the whole
of the tax due (when the
asssessment become final) without
reference to their respective
shares under the partnership
agreement’: See also Stevens v.
Britten [1954] 3 All. E.R.385]."
In our considered opinion, the aforesaid statement represents the correct understanding of law. In the appeal preferred against the said judgment (Sahu Rajeshwar Nath v. Income Tax Officer), the first contention urged by the appellant-assessee before this Court was that unless a separate notice of attachment is issued in the name of the partner of the firm, the tax arrears due from an unregistered firm cannot be recoverd from the partner. This contention was rejected by this Court. We are, however not concerned with this aspect in this case and, therefore, we need not go into the question whether there is any distinction in this behalf between the 1922 Act and the present Act. No contention was raised in this case that no demand notice was served upon the respondent. We must presume that such a notice was served before attaching his properties. The second contention urged on behalf of the assessee in the said appeal we that since the certificate or recovery mentions only the arrears of tax due from the firm, they cannot be recovered from the partner. This argument was rejected with reference to the proviso to Section 46(2) of the Act which conferred upon the Collector the powers of a civil court in the matter of recovery of the amount due under a decree. The court also referred to Rule 50 of Order XXI in this behalf. And the observed: "In the present case, we see no reason why the Collector should not execute the certificate for demand of income-tax against the appellant who admits that he was a partners of the unregistered firm for the relevant accounting year.....It is manifest that the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 50(2) apply to the present case mutatis mutandis and sine the appellant does not dispute that he was a partner of the unregistered firm for the relevant accounting year, the Collector could lawfully proceed to execute the certificate under section 46(2) of the Act against the appellant and recover the income-tax arrears from him". The above observations cannot be read as holding that but for the proviso to Section 46(2), the arrears of tax due from the partnership cannot be recovered from the partner, for the reasons set out by us in extension hereinabove. The liability of a partner to pay the dues of the partnership does not arise from Order XXI Rule 50 C.P.C. but from the very nature and character of a partnership firm.
We are also of the opinion that the discussion in the judgment of this Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath in the para [beginning on 620 and ending on 621] dealing with the contention based upon Section 29 of the 1922 Act cannot be read as disapproving the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court, quoted by us supra. It is, therefore, not possible for us to agree with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court - which has been adopted in the judgment under appeal - that where an assessment is made on the firm, the firm alone is the assesee and that any default in paying the tax assessed in that of the firm alone. It is also not possible for us to agree that merely because a separate assessment is made on the partner the liability imposed on the firm cannot be treated as the liability of the individual partners by importing the general principles of Partnership Act. In our opinion, this would be making a distinction between the firm and its partners, which is at variance with the accepted notion and, at any rate, does not follow from the decision of this Court in Sahu Rajeshwar Nath. Similarly, the reliance by the Full Bench upon the decision of this Court in Income Tax Officer v. Radha Krishan [66 I.T.R. 590] is equally of not avail. That decisions says that tax due from one partner on his share income cannot be recovered from the other partner. To repeat, the firm is treated as an entity only for certain purposes. It is not a separate juristic entity distinct from its partners. A firm cannot be equated to a corporate body.
In this view of the matter, it makes little difference that Section 189(3) is not attracted in the facts of the case to make the respondent liable.
We may mention that by virtue of introduction of Section 188-a with effect from April 1, 1989, the controversy of the present nature would not arise where the proceedings for recovery are initiated on or after April 1, 1989. Section 188-A reads:
"Joint and several liability of
partners for tax payable by firm.
188A. Every person who was, during
the previous year, a partner of a
firm, and the legal representative
of any such person who is deceased,
shall be jointly and severally
liable along with the firm for the
amount of tax, penalty or other sum
payable by the firm for the
assessment year to which such
previous ear is relevant and all
the provisions of this Act, so far
as may be, shall apply to the
assessment of such tax or
imposition or levy of such penalty
or other sum."
This section explicitly provides what was implicit hitherto.
For the above reasons, these appeal are allowed, The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ petitions filed by the respondent in the High Court shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.