LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

THE STATE OF U.P vs DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION on 8 July, 1996

Cites 2 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 1
C.A. No.-000744-000759 - 1977Official PDFBench Kuldip Singh, Nagendra Prasad Singh, Banwari Lal Hansaria, Shailesh Bhadrayulal MajumdarAdvocates HALIDA KHATUN
PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF U.P.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/07/1996
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
HANSARIA B.L. (J)
MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)
CITATION:
1996 SCC (5) 194 JT 1996 (6) 306
1996 SCALE (5)145
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T

The land in dispute measuring 22.11 acres was notified as reserved forest under Section 20 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (the Act) by the notification dated August 19, 1963. Respondents, in the appeals herein, claimed before the authorities under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 (the Consolidation Act) that they were in possession of the land and had acquired Sirdari rights. They further claimed that the land was illegally subjected to the proceedings under the Act because they had become owners of the land. Since the land was not the property of the Government-according to them-the notification declaring the land as reserved forest was illegal. The Consolidation Authorities accepted the objections of the respondents. The writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the State of U.P. - challenging the orders of the Consolidation Authorities - were dismissed by the High Court. These appeals are against the judgment of the High Court upholding the orders of the Consolidation Authorities. We may briefly notice the facts of the case. The State Government issued a notification dated March 29, 1954 declaring its intention to constitute the land in dispute a reserved forest. After disposal of the objections filed under Section 6 read with Section 9 of the Act and the finalisation of the appeals under Section 17 of the Act, a notification dated August 19, 1963 declaring the land in dispute to be reserved for forest was issued. In the revenue records the respondents were recorded as Sirdari - holders of the land. The land was also recorded as a part of the forest department khata.

Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the respondents did not raise any objection/claim before the Forest Settlement Officer under the Act. There is nothing on the record to show that any objection or claim was ever made by the respondents before the authorities under the Act. Consolidation operations commenced in the area on April 13, 1966. The respondents claimed before the Consolidation Authorities that they had acquired Sirdari rights in the land on the basis of their long possession. It was also claimed that the land in dispute was neither forest land nor waste land and as such in terms of Section 3 of the Act it could not be notified as reserved forest. Before the authorities under the Consolidation Act, the State of U.P. pleaded that the land in dispute stood vested in the State by he notification dated October 11, 1952 issued under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1951 (the Abolition Act). In the writ petition before the High Court the State Government averred as under:

"That in the objections filed by

opposite party No.4 the question

that the land in dispute did not

vest in the State Government, was

not raised: nor was it pleaded that

the State Government had no

authority to issue a notification

under section 4 of the Act as the

land in dispute was not covered by

section 3 of the Act. No issue on

these points was framed by the

Consolidation Officer."

The Consolidation Officer allowed the claim of the respondents and came co the conclusions that the notification under Sections 4 and 20 of the Act did not affect the rights of the respondents in the land in dispute. He, however, dismissed the claim of respondent Husain. The Settlement Officer upheld the claims of the respondents and dismissed the appeals filed by the State. He also dismissed the appeal filed by Husain. The revision petition filed by the State Government were dismissed by the Dy. Director Consolidation. However, the revision petition filed by Husain was allowed and he was also given relief in similar terms as the other respondents were given by the Consolidation Authorities. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the State of U.P. on file following reasonings :

"Para 2 of the writ petition states

that 0.53 acres of land in village

Asauwa, tehsil and district Kheri

was vested in the State at the time

of abolition of the Zamindari

through notification no.617/XIV

dated 11.10.1952. The allegation is

a picture of vagueness. It has not

been stated as to under which

provision of law did this vesting

take place. The U.P.Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act came

into operation on 1st July, 1952.

Apparently the notification

mentioned in this paragraph was not

issued under the U.P. Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act. A

copy of the notification has not

been annexed to the writ petition.

In my opinion no reliance can be

placed on paragraph 2 of the writ

petition to sustain the plea that

the land in dispute was the

property of the Government or that

the Government had proprietary

rights in it. The counter-affidavit

filed on behalf of the respondent

disputes that the plots of which he

was in cultivatory possession had

vested in the State. In the

circumstances the finding that the

land in dispute was not covered by

section 3 Forest Act could not be

characterised as erroneous in law.

The consequential proceedings

emanating on the notification under

section 4 and culminating in the

notification under section 20 were

without jurisdiction and void

because the land did not fall

within the purview of section 3 of

the Act. Section 4 of the Act

authorises the State Government to

constitute a reserved forest only

on land which is covered by section

3 and no other. If in any

particular case the land is not

covered by section 3, the

notification under section 4 and

subsequent provisions would confer

no jurisdiction to validly

constitute it as reserved forest. A

tenure-holder need not waste his

time and money in participating in

such void proceedings. It is not a

case where the consolidation

authorities have gone behind the

orders passed in proceedings

consequent to the issue of

notification under section 4. This

is a case where the consolidation

authorities have examined the title

of tenure-holders. They have

further examined, in my opinion

rightly, whether the title of these

persons was established or

defeated. The State Government

asserted that their title had

extinguished by virtue of section

20 of the Act. In order to test

this the consolidation authorities

could validly go into the question

whether the proceedings under the

Indian Forest Act were totally

without jurisdiction. They were not

testing the correctness of the

order passed disposing of the

objections. They were trying to

find whether the proceedings were

at all recognizable. The

proceedings being totally void, the

consolidation authorities were

bound to hold that the title of the

objectors was not extinguished

thereby."

We are of the view that the High Court felt into patent error in appreciating the provisions of the Act and the Abolition Act. It is not disputed that the Abolition Act applied to the land in dispute and, therefore, the State was the proprietor of the land and the respondents, even if they were Sirdars, would still be tenure holders.

This Court in Mahendra Lal Jaini, Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1019, dealt with an identical question. Mahendra Lal Jaini, in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, contended before this Court that he being a Bhumidar in possession, the provisions of the Act (The Forest Act, 1927) would not apply to the said land. Repelling the contention this Court held that though Bhumidars have higher rights than Sirdars and Asamis, they were still tenure holders under the State which was proprietor of the land in the areas to which the Abolition Act applied. It was further held that, even if it was presumed that the petitioner Mahendra Lal Jaini was a Bhumidar, he could not claim to be the proprietor of the land. It was held that the provisions of the Act would be applicable to the land in dispute. It would be useful to reproduce the relevant part from the judgment of this Court in Mahendra Lal’s case :

"It is, however, urged on behalf of

the petitioner that he claims to be

the proprietor of this land as a

bhumidhar because of certain

provisions in the Act. There was no

such proprietary right as

bhumidhari right before the

Abolition Act. The Abolition Act

did away with all proprietary

rights in the area to which it

applied and created three classes

of tenure by S.129; bhumidhar,

sirdar and asami, which were

unknown before. Thus bhumidhar,

sirdar and asami are all tenure-

holders under the Abolition Act and

they hold their tenure under the

State in which the proprietary

right vested under S.6. It is true

that bhumidhars have certain wider

rights in their tenures as compared

to sirdars; similarly sirdars have

wider rights as compared to asamis,

but nonetheless all the three are

mere tenure-holders - with varying

rights - under the State which is

the proprietor of the entire land

in the State to which the Abolition

Act applied. It is not disputed

that the Abolition Act applies to

the land in dispute and therefore

the State it the proprietor of the

land in dispute and the petitioner

even if he were a bhumidhar would

still be a tenure-holder...... The

petitioner therefore even if he is

presumed to be a bhumidhar cannot

claim to be a proprietor to whom

Chap. II of the Forest Act does not

apply, and therefore Chap. V-A, as

originally enacted, would not apply

: ( see in this connection,

Mst.Govindi v. State of Uttar

Predesh, AIR 1952 All 88.) As we

have already pointed out Ss. 4 and

11 give power for determination of

all rights subordinate to those of

a proprietor, and as the right of

the bhumidhar is that of a tenure-

holder, subordinate to the State,

which is the proprietor of the land

in dispute, it will be open to the

Forest Settlement Officer to

consider the claim made to the land

in dispute by the petitioner, if he

claims to be a bhumidhar."

It is thus obvious that a person who was holding the land as Sirdar was not vested with proprietary rights under the Abolition Act. He was a tenure holder and the proprietary rights vested with the State. The High Court, therefore, fell into patent error in assuming that by virtue of their status as Sirdars the respondents were proprietors of the land. The State being the proprietor of the land under the Abolition Act it was justified in issuing the notification under Section 4 of the Act.

The nature of the land - whether covered by Section 3 of the Act or not - could only be determined on the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act which was issued on March 29, 1954. Neither the Consolidation Authorities nor the High Court have gone into the question as to what was the nature of the land on the relevant date. The Consolidation Authorities recorded their findings in the year 1968-69. They were wholly oblivious of the nature of the land 14-15 years back in the year 1954.

The crucial question for consideration, however, is whether the Consolidation Authorities have the jurisdiction to go behind the notification under Section 20 of the Act and deal with the land which has been declared and notified as a reserve forest under the Act. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the scheme of Chapter II of the Act. Section 3 provides that the State Government may constitute any forest land or waste land which is the property of the Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights or to the whole or any part of the forest produce to which the Government is entitled a reserved forest. Section 4 provides for the issue of a notification declaring the intention of the Government to constitute a reserved forest. Section 5 bars accrual of forest rights in the area covered by the notification under Section 4 after the issue of the notification. Section 6, inter alia, gives power to the Forest Settlement Officer to issue a proclamation fixing a period of not less than three months from the date of such proclamation and requiring every person claiming any right mentioned in Section 4 or Section 5 within such period, either to present to the Forest Settlement Officer a written notice specifying or to appear before him, and state the nature of such right and the amount and particulars of the Compensation (if any) claimed in respect thereof. Section 7 gives power to the Forest Settlement Officer to investigate the objections. Section 8 prescribes that the Forest Settlement Officer shall have the same powers as a civil court has in the trial of a suit. Section 9, inter alia, provides for the extinction of rights where no claim is made under Section 6. Section 11(1) lays down that in the case of a claim to a right in or over any land, other than a right of way or right of pasture, or a right to forest produce or water course, the Forest Settlement Officer shall pass an order admitting or rejecting the same in whole or in part. In the event of admitting the right of any person to the land, the Forest Settlement Officer, under Section 11(2), can either exclude such land from the limits of the proposed forest or come to an agreement with the owner thereof for the surrender of his rights or proceed to acquire such land in the manner provided by the Land Acquisition Act, 1884. Section 17 provides for appeal from various order under the Act and Section 18(4) for revision before the State Government. When all the proceedings provided under Section 3 to 19 are over the State Government has to publish a notification under Section 20 specifying definitely the limits of the forest which is to be reserved and declaring the same to be reserved from the date fixed by the notification.

It is thus obvious that the Forest Settlement Officer has the powers of a civil court and his order is subject to appeal and finally revision before the State Government. The Act is a complete code in itself and contains elaborate procedure for declaring and notifying a reserve forest. Once a notification under Section 20 of the Act declaring a land as reserve forest is published, then all the rights in the said land claimed by any person come to an end and are no longer available. The notification is binding on the Consolidation Authorities in the same way as a decree of the civil court. The respondents could very well file objections and claims including objection regarding the nature of the land before the Forest Settlement Officer. They did not file any objection or claim before the authorities in the proceedings under the Act. After the notification under Section 20 of the Act, the respondents could not have raised any objections qua the said notification before the Consolidation Authorities. The Consolidation Authorities were bound by the notification which had achieved finality.

We, therefore, allow the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and also the orders of the Consolidation Authorities to the extent they are against the interest of the State. We hold that the land in dispute was rightly declared and notified as a reserve forest and the respondents have no rights or claim or any interest in the said land. No costs.