LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

B.S.N.L., JAMMU vs TEJA SINGH on 16 January, 2009

Cites 3 provisionsCites 5 judgmentsCited by 0
C.A. No.-000292-000292 - 2009Official PDFAdvocates KULDIP SINGH | SATISH VIG
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 292 OF 2009
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 7803/2006]
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED, JAMMU ... APPELLANT(S)
:VERSUS:
TEJA SINGH ... RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R

Leave granted.

The respondent was employed with the appellant company as a daily-rated

Mazdoor. He was recruited in the year 1973. He was appointed on regular basis with

effect from 11.8.1986. He attained the age of superannuation on 30th August, 1989.

Thereafter, again while working on daily-wages, his services were terminated in 1993.

He filed a representation for payment of gratuity as also other retiral benefits. He

having been denied the retiral benefits on the premise that he had not completed 10

years' qualifying service as required in terms of the Service Rules, he filed an original

application before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The said application was allowed inter alia on the premise that the appellant

had formulated a regularisation scheme in the year 1989 in terms whereof the

respondent should have been given a permanent status. The High Court has upheld

the said view.

A Constitution Bench of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and

Ors. vs. Umadevi (3) and Ors. [2006 (4) SCC 1], has categorically held that keeping in

view the constitutional scheme of equality, as contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution of India, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary,

contractual, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees in public employment dehors the

constitutional scheme is impermissible in law.

By way of one time concession the Constitution Bench, however, held as

under:

“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where

regular appointments (not illegal appoints) as explained in S.V.

Narayanappa (1967 1 SCR 128), R.N. Nanjundappa (1972 1 SCC 409)

and B.N. Nagarajan (1979 4 SCC 507) and referred to in para 15

above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might

have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten

years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or

of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such

employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the

principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in

the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the

State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to

regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly

appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned

posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and

should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill

those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases

where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed.

The process must be set in motion within six months from this date.

We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub

judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should

be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and

regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per

the constitutional scheme.”

We may notice that the law in this behalf has been laid down by the

Constitution Bench of this Court, stating:

“43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public

employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of

law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled

from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in

ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements

of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore,

consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while

laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the

appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper

competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any

right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the

appointment comes to an end and the end of the contract, if it were an

engagement or appointment on daily wags or casual basis, the same

would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary

employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his

term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a

temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time

beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be

absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the

strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not

made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the

relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular

recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of

employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the

very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High

Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not

ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or

permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made

regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because

an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court,

which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part

of the judgment, he would not be entitle to any right to be absorbed or

made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court

may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if

ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it

may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that

ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim

direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular

procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an

employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in

ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic

arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend

themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the

constitutional and statutory mandates.”

In view of the said decision of the Constitution Bench, there cannot be any

doubt whatsoever that the 1989 regularisation scheme having not been enforced in the

case of the respondent, it did not come within the purview of the exception carved out

by the Court in paragraph 53, of Umadevi as quoted above. The view of the

Constitution Bench in Umadevi (supra) has been reiterated by a three-Judge Bench of

this Court in Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and Ors. [2008 (10) SCC 1], stating

that the High Courts shall give effect thereto, opining:

“90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on

the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases

involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned

Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and

accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger

Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing

so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to

the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on

the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation.

It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an

important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this

country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of

conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable

harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not

be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct

law and which one should be followed.

91. We may add that in our constitutional set-up every citizen is under

a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and

institutions. Those who have been entrusted with the task of

administering the system and operating various constituents of the

State an who take oath to act in accordance with the Constitution and

uphold the same, have to set an example by exhibiting total

commitment to the constitutional ideals. This principle is required to

be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity

who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important

constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the

individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for

effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the courts

command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the

Constitution and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation

of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down

the law.

92. In the light of what has been stated above, we deem it proper to

clarify that the comments and observations made by the two-Judge

Bench in U.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey (2007 11 SCC 92)

should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as

binding by the High Courts, tribunals and other judicial foras nor

they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles

laid down by the Constitution Bench.”

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the view of the

learned Tribunal as also the High Court cannot be sustained. The impugned judgment

is, therefore, set aside and the appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.

(S.B. SINHA)