The appeal is dismissed in terms of the Reportable signed order.
No costs.
(Parveen Kr. Chawla) ( Indu Satija)
Court Master Court Master
[Reportable Signed Order is placed on the File]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5840 OF 2004
M/s. Qazi Noorul H.H.H. Petrol Pump & Another ..Appellants
versus
Dy.Director, ESI Corporation ..Respondent
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
This Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the
Allahabad High Court dated 24th January, 2003 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No.53564 of 2002. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has dismissed the
writ petition filed by the appellant herein.
The appellant is running a petrol pump (public retail outlet) for
dispensing petrol/diesel. He filed the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 53564 of 2002 in
the High Court of Allahabad challenging an order dated 17th October, 2002 issued
by the Deputy Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Regional Office,
Kanpur directing the appellant to make contribution under the Employees' State
Insurance Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act') from August, 1993 to May,
2000 and interest on the aforesaid amount failing which recovery shall be issued
under Sections 45-C and 45-G of the Act.
The short question in this case is whether the appellant is covered by the
Act. Section 1(4) of the Act states that the Act, in the first instance, shall apply to all
factories. Section 2(12) of the Act provides:
“(12) “factory” means any premises including the
precincts thereof--
(a) whereon ten or more persons are employed or were
employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is
being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so
carried on, or
(b) whereon twenty or more persons are employed or
were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve
months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is
being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so
carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation
of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952) or a railway running
shed;)”
The expressions “manufacturing process” as well as “power” used in the
Act have been given the same meaning as in the Factories Act, 1948, vide Sections
2(14-AA) and Section 2(15-C) of the Act.
Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 defines
“manufacturing process” as follows:
“(k) “manufacturing process” means process for--
(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing,
packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up,
demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article
or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery
or disposal, or
(ii)pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance, or
(iii)generating, transforming or transmitting power, or
(iv)composing types for printing, printing by letter press,
lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book
binding;
(v)constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing
or breaking up ships or vessels; or
(vi)preserving or storing any article in cold storage;”
A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that pumping oil is also a
manufacturing process.
In this connection, it may be stated that the words “manufacturing
process” in different statutes have different meanings. For instance, in the Central
Excise Act, 1944, the word “manufacture” means bringing into existence a different
commodity, though this is not the definition of “manufacturing process” in the
Factories Act, 1948. We cannot apply the definition of “manufacturing process” in
one Statute to another Statute.
Section 2(k), sub-clause (ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 states that pumping
oil is a manufacturing process. Admittedly, the appellant does the work of pumping
oil. When we go to a Petrol Pump for getting petrol or diesel, the petrol or diesel is
in a tank and it does not on its own flow from the tank to the pipe and thereafter
into the vehicle, but only by means of a pump by using power.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that we
should see the object and intention of the Statute. It is well settled that once the
Statute is clear, the literal Rule of Interpretation applies, and there is no need to go
into the object and intention of the Statute (vide article entitled 'A Note on Interpretation of Statutes' by Markandey Katju, J., published in the Journal
Section of AIR 2007 SC page 22). In the present case, Section 2(14-AA) of the Act
states that “manufacturing process” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the
Factories Act, 1948. In the Factories Act, 1948, Section 2(k) of the Act includes
pumping oil as a manufacturing process.
In our opinion, the only rule of interpretation which applies to the facts of
the present case is the Literal Rule of Interpretation, which means that we should go
simply by
the wording of the Statute and nothing else and there is no scope for applying any
other Rule of Interpretation. In our opinion, the language used in Section 2(k)(ii) of
the Factories Act, 1948 is clear. Hence, the Act applies to the appellant and the
respondent was right in issuing notice to the appellant for making contribution and
interest thereon for the period in question.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. No costs. However, we reduce the
rate of interest to 10% on the principal amount.