Heard learned counsel for the parties.
This appeal by special leave has been filed against
the order dated 10th July, 2003 of the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (for short 'NCDRC')
whereby the appeal filed by the respondent herein has been
allowed and the order of the Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission Union Territory, Chandigarh has been set aside.
It appears that there was a fire on 13-14th February,
1999 at 10.00 p.m. in the godown of the appellant at Ambala.
For claiming compensation, the appellant filed a claim
petition before the Consumer Commission of the Union
Territory, Chandigarh constituted under Section 17 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter for short 'the
Act'). The said claim petition filed by the appellant
herein was allowed by the Consumer Commission of the Union
Territory, Chandigarh. On appeal, the NCDRC allowed the
appeal of the respondent herein on the ground that the
Consumer Commission at Chandigarh had no jurisdiction to
entertain and adjudicate the complaint. We are in agreement
with the view taken by the NCDRC.
In our opinion, no part of the cause of action arose
at Chandigarh. It is well settled that the expression
'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which gives
rise to a right or liability. In the present case
admittedly the fire broke out in the godown of the appellant
at Ambala. The insurance policy was also taken at Ambala
and the claim for compensation was also made at Ambala.
Thus no part of the cause of action arose in Chandigarh.
One of us (Hon'ble Mr. Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly)
while a Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of IFB
Automotive Seating and System Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of
India AIR 2003 Calcutta, 80 has dealt with the question as
to the meaning of the expression 'cause of action'. Placing
reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Union of
India Vs. Adani Exports Ltd. AIR 2002 SC 126, in para 40 of
the said judgment it has been observed as under :-
“In Adani Exports (AIR 2002 SC 126) (supra) the
learned Judges in para 13 set out the facts
pleaded by the petitioner to give rise to cause of action conferring territorial jurisdiction on the Court at Ahmedabad. One of the facts pleaded is that non-granting and denial utilization of the credit in the pass book will affect the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad. This fact is not pleaded in the case in hand.
Even then the learned Judges held that those facts are not sufficient to furnish a cause of action as they are not connected with the relief sought for by the respondents.
Here also the relief is against the orders of approval and this High Court has no territorial jurisdiction to grant that relief. Therefore, the communication to the effect that the petitioners' representation against orders of approval is rejected is of no consequence.
The Supreme Court, further dealing the concept of Aritcle 226(2) and relying on the decision of ONGC (1994 AIR SCW 3287), explained the concept of cause of action in para 17 at page 130 of the report and the relevant extracts wherefrom are excerpted below : “It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that
is involved in the case. Facts which have no
bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in
the case, do not give rise to a cause of action
so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the
Court concerned.
The learned Judges also held in para 18
as follows :
“The non-granting and denial of credit in
the passbook having an ultimate effect, if any,
on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad
would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any
such cause of action to a Court at Ahmedabad to
adjudicate on the actions complained against the
appellants.”
We respectfully agree with the view taken by the
Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid decision of IFB
Automotive Seating(supra). Hence, in our opinion, no part
of the cause of action in the present case arose at
Chandigarh.
Learned counsel for the appellant then invited our
attention to the amendment brought about in Section 17(2) of
the Act in the year 2003. The Amended Section 17(2) of the
Act reads as under :-
“(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a State
Commission within the limits of whose
jurisdiction,-
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite
parties, where there are more than one, at
the time of the institution of the complaint,
actually and voluntarily resides or carries
on business or has a branch office or
personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are
more than one, at the time of the institution
of the complaint, actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries on business or has a
branch office or personally works for gain,
provided that in such case either the
permission of the State Commission is given
or the opposite parties who do not reside or
carry on business or have a branch office or
personally works for gain, as the case may
be, acquiesce in such institution;
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises.”
The aforesaid amendment came into force w.e.f.
15.3.2003 whereas the complaint in the present case has been
filed in the year 2000 and the cause of action arose in
1999. Hence, in our opinion, the amended section will have
no application to the case at hand.
Moreover, even if it had application, in our
opinion, that will not help the case of the appellant.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
respondent-insurance company has a branch office at
Chandigarh and hence under the amended Section 17(2) the
complaint could have been filed in Chandigarh. We regret,
we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the appellant.
In our opinion, an interpretation has to be given to the
amended Section 17(2) (b) of the Act, which does not lead to
an absurd consequence. If the contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will mean that
even if a cause of action has arisen in Ambala, then too the
complainant can file a claim petition even in Tamil Nadu or
Gauhati or anywhere in India where a branch office of the
insurance company is situated. We cannot agree with this
contention. It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to
bench hunting. In our opinion, the expression 'branch
office' in the amended Section 17(2) would mean the branch
office where the cause of action has arisen. No doubt this
would be departing from the plain and literal words of
Section 17(2)(b) of the Act but such departure is sometimes
necessary (as it is in this case) to avoid absurdity. [vide
G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Ninth
Edition, 2004 P. 79]
In the present case, since the cause of action arose
at Ambala, the State Consumer Redressal Commission, Haryana
alone will have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
For the reasons stated hereinabove, we do not see
any reason to interfere with the impugned order of the
NCDRC. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. No order as
to the costs.
OCTOBER 20, 2009