LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

PUDHU RAJA vs STATE TR.INSP.OF POLICE on 19 September, 2012

Cites 2 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 0
Crl.A. No.-001517-001517 - 2008Official PDFBench Balbir Singh Chauhan, Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim KalifullaAdvocates SUMIT SRIVAASTAVA | B. BALAJI
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1517 OF 2008
Pudhu Raja & Anr. …Appellants
Versus
State, Rep. by Inspector of Police …Respondent
O R D E R

Clotted injuries:

1.A clotted injury on the centre part of the lower lip and its surrounding, measuring 2 x 1 x 0.5 c.m.

2.A clotted injury on the right cheek, on the upper part of the right jaw, measuring 3 x 2 x 0.5 c.m.

3.A clotted injury on the left cheek, on the upper part of the left jaw, measuring 2 x 1 x 0.5 c.m.

4.A clotted injury on the central part to the upper part of the breast, measuring 6 x 5 x 0.5 c.m.

5.A clotted injury on the front side and the outer part of the left leg 3 c.m. above the left heel, measuring 6 x 4 x 0.5 c.m. Injuries by fire: The upper skin, inner skin and two types of fire injuries. The body skin was burnt and the fat and cells under the skin appeared to be red and heated. All over the body, including the upper side of the neck, the lower side of the neck, the upper part of both hands, palms, both legs in entirety, the back portion of the breast, the entire front and back portions of the stomach, and the female organ bore injuries by fire. All these injuries by fire, were suffered by her while she was alive.

7.The law on the issue of interference with an order of acquittal is to the effect that only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of the acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

8.In a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish each instance of incriminating circumstance, by way of reliable and clinching evidence, and the circumstances so proved, must form a complete chain of events, on the basis of which, no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused can be reached. Undoubtedly, suspicion, however grave it may be, can never be treated as a substitute for proof. While dealing with a case of circumstantial evidence, the court must take utmost precaution whilst finding an accused guilty, solely on the basis of the circumstances proved before JUDGMENT it.

9.Furthermore, in such a case, motive assumes great significance and importance, as the absence of motive puts the court on its guard and causes it to scrutinize each piece of evidence very closely in order to ensure that suspicion, emotion or conjecture do not take the place of proof. The evidence regarding existence of motive which operates in the minds of assailants is very often, not known to any other person. The motive may not even be known, under certain circumstances, to the victim of the crime. It may be known only to the accused and to none other. It is therefore, only the perpetrator of the crime alone, who knows as to what circumstances prompted him to adopt a certain course of action, leading to the commission of the crime.

10.It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court must take note of such explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence, in order to decide, as to whether or not, the chain of circumstances is complete. When the attention of the accused is drawn to circumstances that inculpate him in relation to the JUDGMENT commission of the crime, and he fails to offer an appropriate explanation, or gives a false answer with respect to the same, the said act may be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances. (See : The Transport Commissioner, A.P., Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1225; State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471; and Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 748).

11.While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial matters, which do not effect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not be made a ground for rejection of evidence, in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence available, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court in the normal course of action, would not be justified in reviewing the same again, without providing justifiable reasons for the same. (Vide: State v. Saravanan, AIR 2009 SC 152). JUDGMENT

12.Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other witness also makes material improvements before the court, in order to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found not to be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence available or with a statement that has already recorded, then, in such a case it cannot be held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

13.The present case requires to be examined in light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. The trial Court decided in favour of the accused, and acquitted them on ground of material contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses, as Karthikeyan (PW.4) had deposed that he had gone along with Mr. Chandran (PW.2) to inform the police and also the fire service station. On the contrary, Mr. Chandran (PW.2), deposed that at the time of occurrence he did not accompany Karthikeyan (PW.4), to the police station. According to the deposition of Karthikeyan (PW.4), regarding the opening of the door of the house of the deceased, the statements of Mr. Chandran (PW.2), and Karthikeyan (PW.4), were found to be contrary to the statement of Mr. Mahalingam (PW.8), Fire Service Officer as he stated that, he reached the place of occurrence at about 1.45 A.M. and found the house to be locked. Mr. Chandran (PW.2), brought the key, opened the door and it was then that the fire was put out. Mr. Mahalingam (PW.8) has further deposed that the body of the deceased was on the cot and the fire had burnt the said cot also. However, the photographs taken by the police proved to be contrary to the said deposition. The photograph revealed that the body was lying on the floor while the cot was lying upside down. The trial court further relied upon the statement of Devaraj (DW.1) who deposed, that after the said incident, Kodirasu, father of the deceased Jayalakshmi, had fraudulently taken away land from the father of the appellant (A-1) by filing Suit No. 14/2002 in the Civil Court and further that Jayalakshmi had been in love with one Selvam and further that, her marriage to the appellant (A-1), was against her wishes and was the reason for her committing suicide.JUDGMENTMore so, the trial court doubted the time taken for recording FIR, and found the explanation furnished for the delay regarding the same, totally unacceptable. The explanation so furnished by the prosecution was that, Ezhamparuthi (PW.1), was informed by the incident and, thereafter, he went to the place of occurrence and upon seeing the place, he then went to the police station and lodged the said FIR.

14.The High Court noted that it is an admitted fact that, at the time of occurrence of the incident, the appellants were in the said house. Mr. Chandran (PW-2), saw them both standing outside the house of the deceased. Appellant (A-2) even tried to explain the situation by stating that, they were watching TV in an adjoining room and came out to find fumes coming from the next room, and also further stated that the deceased had committed suicide. The High Court did not accept the story of suicide, saying that the same was not plausible, in the given situation. It stated that as the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, they should have been able to give a reasonable answer regarding the manner in which the deceased died, but failed to do so. Instead, they all attempted to screen the offence. JUDGMENT15. The trial court did not take note of the fact that there was sufficient evidence on record, to indicate the possibility and the likelihood of dowry harassment and death, caused due to failure to give dowry, as demanded.

16.The trial court did not consider that, if the deceased had in fact committed suicide, the natural reaction of the co-accused would not have been to rush out of the house, after locking her inside, but to make an attempt to rescue her. Further, when Mr. Chandran (PW-2) asked for the house key, the same was not provided, stating that the appellant (A-2) had thrown it away. Mr. Chandran (PW-2), had to then fetch a duplicate key to enter the house. This is a clear indication of the fact that the accused were trying to lock up the house and leave.

17.The theory of suicide can further be negated by the fact that the doctor who conducted the post-mortem, did not mention the possibility of suicide at all.

18.All the circumstances, therefore, clearly indicate that the deceased did not die a natural death, nor was she the victim of an JUDGMENTaccident and neither did she commit suicide. She was therefore killed and no one except the accused could have committed the said offence.

19.A delay in the registration of the case would not materially affect the case of the prosecution in any way, as PW-1 was first summoned, then he went to the spot of the incident, after which he went to the police station. Such a delay was therefore, natural and acceptable.

20.So far as the discrepancies and contradictions pointed out by the trial court are concerned, the same are not material and none of them can be held to go to the root of the case. Further, even if there has been a transfer of property in favour of Kodirasu, father of Jayalakshmi, the deceased, from the father of the appellant (A-1), as the same is a transaction, subsequent to the incident, it can have no bearing on the case. The trial court unnecessarily gave advantage to the appellants in this regard, even though the vendor himself was not examined. Thus, no motive can be attributed to the complainant on this count. Furthermore, had Jayalakshmi been in love with Selvam, the same could not have been a ground for her to commit suicide 2 ½ years from the date of her marriage, as she would have in all JUDGMENT likelihood, attempted the said act, either at the time of her marriage, or immediately thereafter.

21.In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeal has no merit and is, therefore, accordingly dismissed. The appellant no.2 is on bail. Her bail bonds are cancelled. She is directed to surrender within a period of four weeks from today before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. In case she does not surrender, we direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take her into custody and send her to jail to serve out the remaining sentence. A copy of the order may be sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpet, Tamil Nadu, by the Registry of this Court for compliance. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA) JUDGMENT New Delhi, September 19, 2012