LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

HIRAMAN vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA on 31 January, 2013

Cites 6 provisionsCites 6 judgmentsCited by 0
Crl.A. No.-001288-001288 - 2008Official PDFBench Ananga Kumar Patnaik, Hemant Laxman GokhaleAdvocates JAVED MAHMUD RAO | ASHA GOPALAN NAIR
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 1288 OF 2008
Hiraman ... Appellant (s)
Versus
State of Maharashtra ...
Respondent (s)
J U D G E M E N T

in [AIR 1988 SC 2154], and further this Court observed as follows

in paragraph 13 (per

M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. as he then was):-

“13.…….. Doubts would be called reasonable if

they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law

cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To

constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an

over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and

substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused person

arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as

opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable

doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible

doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and

common-sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the

case……..”

15. In Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh reported in [AIR

1990 SC 209], this Court observed at the end of para 4 as follows:-

“4.……There is a higher standard of proof in

criminal cases than in civil cases, but there is no

absolute standard in either of the cases. See the

observations of Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater, (1950)

2 All ER 458 at p.459, but the doubt must be of a

reasonable man. The standard adopted must be the

standard adopted by a prudent man which, of course,

may vary from case to case, circumstances to

circumstances. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of

benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or

lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social

defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that

it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an

innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice,

according to law.”

JUDGMENT16. These propositions have been consistently followed by

this Court in Gangadhar Behera Vs. State of Orissa reported in

[AIR 2002 SC 3633], Sucha Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported

in [2003 (7) SCC 643] and Lakhan Vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh reported in [2010 (8) SCC 514].

Hence, the Conclusion:

17. Thus as can be seen, by enacting Section 32 (1) in the

Evidence Act, the legislature has accorded a special sanctity to the

statement made by a dying person as to the cause of his own death.

This is by virtue of the solemn occasion when the statement is

made. Besides, when the statement is made at the earliest

opportunity without any influence being brought on the dying

person, there is absolutely no reason to take any other view for the

cause of his or her death. The statement has to be accepted as the

relevant and truthful one, revealing the circumstances which

resulted into his death. Absence of any corroboration can not take

away its relevance. Exaggerated doubts, on account of absence of

corroboration, will only lead to unmerited acquittals, causing grave

harm to the cause of justice and ultimately to the social fabric. With

the incidents of wives being set on fire, very unfortunately JUDGMENT continuing to occur in our society, it is expected from the Courts that

they approach such situations very carefully, giving due respect to

the dying declarations, and not being swayed by fanciful doubts.

18. In the present case there are two dying declarations

recorded at the earliest opportunity. They contained the motive for

the crime, and the reasons as to why the deceased suffered the

burn injuries viz., the greed of the appellant to which the deceased

had refused to succumb. As far as her statements viz., that the

appellant had poured kerosene and set her on fire is concerned,

there is no reason to discard it considering the fact that it was made

at the earliest opportunity and on a solemn occasion. The defence

put up a story which is totally inconsistent with the facts which have

come on record, and is a clear afterthought and therefore

unacceptable. In fact this case clearly shows an attempt to put up a

totally false defence. The prosecution has undoubtedly proved its

case beyond any reasonable doubt.

19. In view of the above legal position and facts on record, we

see no reason to interfere in the judgment and order rendered by

the learned Sessions Judge as modified and confirmed by the High

Court. JUDGMENT 20. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

( A.K. Patnaik )

( H.L. Gokhale )

New Delhi Dated: January 31, 2013