11.This Court in Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366, has observed that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. This Court explained that this maxim has neither received general acceptance nor has it been elevated to attain the status of rule of law but is merely a rule of caution. All what it implies is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded but not discarded. The maxim merely involves the question of importance which the court may apply to the evidence in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called ‘a mandatory rule of evidence’.
12.In Gurcharan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460, this Court has observed that merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted.
13.Before we delve into the merits of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, we intend to place on record the decision of this Court in Balaka Singh case (supra) where this Court has observed: “8...the court must make an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the truth from the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth is separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot be separated from the chaff because the grain and the chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of separation the Court would have to reconstruct an absolutely new JUDGMENT case for the prosecution by divorcing the essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, then this principle will not apply....”
14.This Court in Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277 and Sohrab S/O Beli Nayata & Anr. v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751 has cautioned that if upon operation of the aforesaid doctrine, the whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because the witness was evidently testifying falsehood in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead halt. The witnesses, as is observed generally, do sprinkle a few embellishments and strokes of embroidery in their stories. Therefore, appraisal in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of credence and acceptance has to be done and disbelieve in one respect may not lead to the necessary assumption in law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence, therefore, has to be sifted with utmost care. This Court has further observed that it is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See: Krishna Mochi & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81; Sucha Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643; Syed Ibrahim v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 601; Jakki @ Selvaraj & Anr. v. State represented by the IP, Coimbatore, (2007) 9 SCC 589 and Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2008) 11 SCC 425.)
15.In our considered view, the aforesaid submissions of the learned Counsel do JUDGMENTsound striking but on deeper consideration is devoid of any merit whatsoever. To say so, we have carefully perused the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3, including their examination-in-chief and the cross-examination, alongwith the evidence of doctors. Both the eye-witnesses have spoken in one voice that it is the accused persons, namely, Amar Singh, Charan, Bijender Singh, Manohar Lal and Mahipal who were present at the field on the fateful day and had assaulted the deceased persons and the injured eye-witnesses. The evidence of PW-1 stands unimpeached in his cross examination and the prosecution story insofar as the aforesaid five accused persons stands unaffected. However, the said evidence of eye-witnesses when read in consonance with the medical evidence does raise a reasonable doubt about the presence of the other six accused persons. In our considered view, even if we separate the chaff from the grain, it is difficult to hold that the said five accused persons had not participated in the incident. In view of the above, we agree with the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the High Court while convicting the aforesaid accused persons.
16.Insofar as the discrepancy pointed out by the learned counsel to the initial version of the PW-1 insofar as these accused persons entering into the agricultural field in their tractors is concerned, upon careful perusal of the testimony of PW-1, we are in agreement with the observations of the High Court. However, it assumes significance that the testimony of PW-1 in respect of the manner in which the incident has unfolded and the offence has been committed, including the individual role attributed to the five accused persons, has JUDGMENTbeen believed by the High Court. The factum of recovery of weapons from the said accused persons and the injuries caused by them being corroborated by the medical evidence, leaves no room for doubt that the said accused persons were not only present but had also actively participated in the commission of the offence. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was justified in relying upon the evidence of PW-1 to reach the conclusion of guilt of the five accused persons.
17.Lastly, the learned counsel would submit that since the genesis of the incident has not been believed by the High Court, it was not justified in convicting the five accused persons, and since the accused persons were not aggressors of the assault and in the scuffle might have caused injuries in exercise of their right of private defense, the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court requires to be modified from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In our considered view, this submission of the learned counsel has no merit whatsoever, since the trial court and the High Court, with the available evidence on record, has rejected the plea of self defense while concluding it is the accused persons who were aggressors on the date of the incident and had caused injuries to the opposite party which has resulted in the death of two persons.
18.In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that both the Courts below have not committed any error, insofar as convicting the appellants. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. JUDGMENT
19.If any of the appellants are released on bail during the pendency of these appeals, their bail bonds are cancelled and they are directed to surrender forthwith to undergo their respective sentences.
Ordered accordingly.
(H.L. DATTU)