cannot and should not be permitted to be stonewalled by
browbeating or bullying methodology whether it is by
litigants or by counsel. In the said case the two learned
Judges, after referring to a three-Judge Bench decision in
Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi
Administration)3, has opined thus: -
“It was further reminded that “having accepted the brief, he will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend”.
“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall detract from the dignity of the Court, of which he is himself a sworn officer and assistant. He should at all times pay deferential respect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe the decorum of the Court room.”
(Warevelle’s Legal Ethics at p. 182)
Of course, it is not a unilateral affair. There is a reciprocal duty for the Court also to be courteous to the members of the Bar and to make every endeavour for maintaining and protecting the respect which members of the Bar are entitled to have from their clients as well as from the litigant public. Both the Bench and the Bar are the two inextricable wings of the judicial forum and therefore the aforesaid mutual respect is sine qua non for the efficient functioning of the solemn work carried on in Courts of law. But that does not mean that any advocate or group of them can boycott the courts or any particular Court and ask the Court to desist from discharging judicial functions. At any rate, no advocate can ask the Court to avoid a case on the ground that he does not JUDGMENT want to appear in that Court.”
In In Re: Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New
Delhi, Kailash Vasdev, Advocate and Kitty
Kumaramanglam (Smt.), Advocate4 certain
4 1995 (3) SCC 619
observations were made, though in different context, yet
we think it apt to reproduce the same:-
“The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do, affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both in his professional and in his private and public life. The society has a right to expect of him such ideal behaviour.”
In M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and
Haryana5, it has been opined that “The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation
of the Judge concerned but also to the fair name of the judiciary.”
From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear as
noon day that the judicial proceeding has its own
solemnity and sanctity. No one has any authority to sully
the same. It is the obligation of everyone to behave with
propriety when a judicial proceeding is conducted. Any
kind of deviancy not only affects the system but corrodes
the faith of the collective at large. Neither any counsel
nor a litigant can afford to behave in this manner. This
being the position, it is really shocking that a counsel who
was in his mid fiftees could afford to behave like that.
Hence, we have expressed our displeasure.
The learned counsel for the appellant has
endeavoured had to impress us that when the appellant JUDGMENT
had offered unconditional apology, the same should have
been accepted. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P.6 it has
been observed as follows: -
“We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the
grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a “licence” to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to persuade members of the Bar, who care for their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they are expected to pay such a price for it. And no sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on account of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted by an advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his wishes. If this situation were to be countenanced, advocates who can cow down the Judges, and make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of character assassination and persecution, will be preferred by the litigants to the advocates who are mindful of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of courts.”
In the case at hand, we are absolutely convinced that apology or for that matter the unconditional apology was neither prompt nor genuine. The concept of mercy and
compassion is ordinarily attracted keeping in view the
infirmities of man’s nature and the fragile conduct but in a
court of law a counsel cannot always take shelter under
the canopy of mercy, for the law has to reign supreme.
The sanctity of law which is sustained through dignity of
courts cannot be marred by errant behaviour by any
counsel or litigant. Even a Judge is required to maintain
the decorum and dignity of the court.
In view of the above, we do not find any force in the
appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is
directed to surrender and deposit the fine within a period
of thirty days from today, failing which the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Fatehpur, shall ensure to give effect to the
judgment and order passed by the High Court.
[Dr. B. S. Chauhan]
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;