LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

C.KESHAVAMURTHY vs H.K.ABDUL ZABBAR on 23 July, 2013

Cites 2 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 0
Crl.A. No.-001026-001026 - 2013Official PDFBench Hemant Laxman Gokhale, Jasti ChelameswarAdvocates RAJEEV SINGH | ANJANA CHANDRASHEKAR
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1026 OF 2013
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(Crl) No(s)4628 OF 2009
C.KESHAVAMURTHY Appellant(s)
VERSUS
H.K.ABDUL ZABBAR Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T

1 Heard Mr. R.S. Hegde, learned counsel in

support of this petition and Mr. G.V.

Chandrashekhar, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent.

2 Leave granted. JUDGMENT

3 Both the counsel have made their

submissions.

4 The facts giving rise to this criminal

appeal are as follows _

The respondent had issued four cheques to

the appellant, which had bounced. Out of the five

cheques, a cheque dated 31st July, 2003, was

issued for an amount of ` 1,36,000/-, and

three other cheques dated 10th August, 2003, 15th

August, 2003 and 18th August, 2003, respectively

were for a sum of ` One lakh each. Since those

cheques got bounced, the appellant filed a

Complaint bearing No.2857 of 2003, in the Court of

Judicial Magistrate, First Class-II, Davangere, in

the State of Karnataka, under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The case of the

appellant is that since these cheques were

dishonoured, an appropriate order under the law was

necessary.

5 The defence of the respondent was that

there was an agreement of sale between the parties,

and that the Complainant was a businessman dealing

in lands, and it was in that transaction that the

respondent had issued some cheques earlier, but

since transaction did not fructify, he had issued a

notice dated 28th July, 2003, not to clear those JUDGMENT cheques. However, this defence could not be

accepted for the simple reason that all the

cheques, which had bounced were issued subsequent

to the said Notice dated 28th July, 2003.

Therefore, no more justification was required for

allowing the Complaint. The defence raised by the

respondent could not be accepted and, therefore,

the Learned Magistrate considered the factual, as

well as legal position and allowed the Complaint

filed by the appellant herein.

6 The respondent being aggrieved therefrom

filed a Criminal Appeal bearing No.51 of 2005,

before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track

Court-II, Davangere. The learned Judge framed

necessary points for consideration, namely, whether

the impugned judgment of conviction recorded by

JMFC-II, Davangere, could not be sustained under

law and whether the punishment was in any way

disproportionate. The learned Judge decided both

those points in the negative, but passed an order

whereby he partly allowed the appeal. The

conviction recorded by the learned JMFC-II Court,

Davangere, was confirmed, but the sentence was

modified by him as follows:

“The Accused/Appellant for the

offence punishable under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act shall undergo simple

imprisonment three months and pay

fine of Rs.5,000/-. In default to

pay such fine he shall undergo

simple imprisonment for a further

period of three months.

The Accused/Appellant shall pay to

the Complainant/Respondent a sum

of Rs.4,50,000/-(Four lakhs Fifty

thousand) as compensation to the

Complainant/Respondent. In

default to pay such compensation

he shall undergo simple

imprisonment for a further period

of six months. It was further

directed that the

Accused/Appellant shall pay the

fine amount and also the

compensation amount within 45

(forty five) days from this date

and surrender before the J.M.F.C.-

II Court, Davangere, to undergo

the sentence. In case of failure

to do so, the Learned Magistrate

shall take steps to enforce the

sentence.”

7 This judgment and order rendered by the

Addl. Sessions Judge on 4th May, 2006, was carried

by the respondent further in Criminal Revision

Petition No.1295 of 2006. This time, however, the

respondent was successful, and the plea raised by

the respondent based on the Notice dated 28th July,

2003, was accepted by the learned Single Judge of

the Karnataka High Court. The learned Single

Judge referred to the judgment of a Bench of two

Judges of this Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs.

Dattatraya G.Hegde, reported in [2008(4)SCC 54],

and stated that the burden is always on the

Complainant to establish not only issuance of JUDGMENT cheque, but existence of debt or legal liability.

In the facts of this case, the learned Judge took

the view that the respondent had raised an

acceptable defence. He therefore, allowed the

Revision and set aside the judgment rendered by the

courts below. The accused respondent was

acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1888, and the amount

deposited in court was directed to be refunded.

8 Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High

Court dated 8th December, 2008, the present criminal

appeal has been filed. Mr. R.S. Hegde, learned

counsel for the appellant, submitted that the

approach of the learned Judge was erroneous on

facts, as well as on law. As noted above, though,

the respondent had given some cheques earlier, and

had issued a Notice dated 28th July, 2003 not to

encash those cheques, the respondent had issued

the disputed cheques thereafter. Therefore, the

defence taken by the respondent that he had issued

a Notice not to clear those cheques was not tenable

on facts, and there was no defence as to why those

cheques should not have been put into Bank and

cleared.

9 Secondly, as far as the proposition

canvased on the basis of the judgment in Krishna JUDGMENT Janardhan Bhat (supra) is concerned, it must be

noted that the same has been specifically held to

be not a correct one in paragraph 26 of the

judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench in

Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in [2010(11)SCC

441]. The judgment clearly held that the

presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881, includes the presumption of

the existence at a legally enforceable debt or

liability. That presumption is required to be

honoured, and if it is not so done, the entire

basis of making these provisions will be lost.

Therefore, it has been held that it is for the

accused to explain his case and defend it once the

fact of cheque bouncing is prima facie established.

The burden is on him to disprove the allegations

once a prima facie case is made out by the

Complainant.

10 Mr. G.V. Chandrashekar, learned counsel

for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted

that in the facts of this case, there was an

agreement between the parties. He contended that

although it is true that the agreement was not

produced, but the fact of it was not disputed by

the appellant himself. That being so, since the

agreement was not being acted upon, the cheques JUDGMENT were not expected to be cleared. He, therefore,

submitted that the order of the High Court was

justified on the facts of the particular case.

11 We have noted the submissions of both the

counsel. As noted earlier, it has clearly come on

record that disputed cheques were given subsequent

to the Notice not to clear the earlier cheques.

There was no explanation as to why the subsequent

cheques could not have been cleared. The

agreement on the basis of which the submission was

made was not produced in the courts below. That

being so, on facts there was no error on the part

of the learned Magistrate, as well as the learned

Addl. Sessions Judge, in the view that they have

taken. As far as the legal position is concerned,

in our view, that has been settled adequately in

Rangappa's case(supra), which has specifically

explained the observations in Krishna Janardhan

Bhat (supra).

12 This being the position, we allow this

appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned

Judge of Karnataka High Court and restore the order

passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The

parties will bear their own costs.