LawDistill
Supreme Court of India

STATE OF ORISSA vs KHAGA @ KHAGESWAR NAIK on 23 August, 2013

Cites 5 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 0
Crl.A. No.-001249-001249 - 2013Official PDFBench Rajendra Mal Lodha, Chandramauli Kumar PrasadAdvocates RADHA SHYAM JENA | RACHANA JOSHI ISSAR
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1249 OF 2013
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) No.4928 of 2011)
STATE OF ORISSA … APPELLANT
VERSUS
KHAGA @ KHAGESWAR NAIK & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T

State of Orissa, aggrieved by the judgment

and order dated 1st September, 2009 passed in Criminal

Appeal No.274 of 1997 whereby the Division Bench of

JUDGMENTthe High Court has altered the conviction of the

respondents from Section 302/34 to Section 304 Part

II of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be

referred to as ‘the IPC’), has preferred this Special

Leave Petition.

Leave granted.

In the present appeal, as we are concerned

with the nature of the offence said to have been

committed by the respondents (hereinafter to be

referred to as ‘the convicts’), we shall refer to

only those facts which are necessary for decision on

the said issue. Occurrence in the present case had

taken place in Raghunathpali, a hamlet within the

district of Sambalpur in the State of Orissa. As

usual, on 11th October, 1995 Mohini Naik and her

father, Tikeshwar Naik were sleeping at their home in

separate rooms adjoining each other. When the entire

village was fast asleep, the convicts came to their

house at 11.00 P.M. and knocked the door in which

Mohini, the rustic villager was sleeping. She was

asked to open the door of her room. She could recognize the JUDGMENTconvict Khageswar from his voice and on

enquiry as to who was knocking the door, Khageswar

disclosed his name. She opened the door and saw the

three convicts standing at the door. Two of them

i.e. Khageswar and Kampa entered into her room and

molested her. She raised alarm whereupon her father,

Tikeshwar woke up and arrived at the spot and abused

the convicts in obscene language. All the three

convicts caught hold of her father, assaulted him by

kicks and blows and dragged him towards the orchard.

He was followed by his daughter, Mohini, the

informant of the case. She was threatened that if she

will come out, they will kill her. Mohini saw her

father being assaulted from a distance by Khageswar

and Dusasan. While Tikeswar was abusing the convicts,

Khageswar brought one ‘budia’ from his house and gave

blows to him. Similarly, convict Dusasan brought a

‘lathi’ from his home and assaulted her father.

Ultimately, Mohini could see the dead body of her

father lying in ‘Nala’ at about 3.00 P.M. on 12th

October, 1995.

Police after usual investigation submitted JUDGMENT the charge-sheet and the convicts were ultimately

committed to the Court of Session to face the trial.

The convicts were charged for commission of the

offences under Sections 457,354,506,302 and 201/34 of

the IPC. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be

tried. Their defence is false implication but no

defence witness has been examined.

The trial court on appreciation of evidence came

to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able

to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt against

the convicts and accordingly, it convicted them for

offences under Sections 457,354,506,302, 201/34 of

the IPC. On appeal, the High Court accepted the case

of the prosecution but held that the allegations

proved construed an offence under Section 304Part-II

of the IPC. Accordingly, while maintaining the

conviction of the respondents under Sections

457,354,506 and 201/34 of the IPC, the High Court

altered their conviction from Section 302/34 of the

IPC to that of Section 304 Part II of the IPC and JUDGMENT sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a

period of eight years for offence under Section 304,

Part II of the IPC. While doing so, the High Court

observed as follows:

“ 17. We, however, find

that the prosecution has failed to

establish that the accused persons

had any prior motive or

pre-meditation to kill deceased

Tikeswar and admittedly, the

prosecution has not been able to

establish that there was any

enmity between deceased Tikeswar

or his daughter Mohini (P.W.4)

with the accused persons. It

appears, the accused persons who

had gone to the house of P.W.4 to

commit sexual act, on being abused

by Tikeswar in obscene language,

got provoked and attacked Tikeswar

in a fit of anger and on the spur

of the moment, without any prior

planning or design. The act of the

accused persons appears to be more

by way of sudden retaliation in

the heat of passion, on being

abused by deceased Tikeswar in

obscene language and was not

pre-planned or intentional.

Accordingly, we feel, the interest

of justice would be best served,

if the conviction of the accused

persons under Section 302/34 IPC

is modified and reduced to one

under Section 304 Part II IPC. The

conviction of the accused persons

under Sections 457/354/506/201/34 IPCJUDGMENTneeds no interference.”

This is how the appellant- State of Orissa is

before us and challenges the alteration of conviction

from Section 302/34 to that of Section 304 Part II of

the IPC.

Mr. Radha Shyam Jena, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the

allegations proved clearly make out a case of murder

punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and the High

Court erred in altering the same to Section 304 Part

II of the IPC. Mrs. Rachana Joshi Issar, learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents

supports the judgment of the High Court and contends

that the offence having been committed without pre-

meditation in a heat of passion, Exception 4 to

Section 300 of the IPC is clearly attracted and hence

the allegation proved is culpable homicide not

amounting to murder. Accordingly, she submits that

the order of the High Court does not call for any

interference. JUDGMENT

The rival submission necessitates

examination of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC,

same reads as follows:

“ 300. Murder.-

xx xx xx

Exception 4.- Culpable homicide

is not murder if it is committed

without premeditation in a

sudden fight in the heat of

passion upon a sudden quarrel

and without the offender having

taken undue advantage or acted

in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.- It is immaterial

in such cases which party offers

the provocation or commits the

first assault.”

From a plain reading of the aforesaid exception it is

evident that it shall be attracted only if the death

is caused (i) without premeditation, (ii) in a sudden

fight and (iii) in a heat of passion upon a sudden

quarrel. If all these ingredients are satisfied, the exception will come into play only when the Court

comes to the conclusion that the offender had not

taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual

manner. Above all, this section would be attracted

when the fight had taken place with the person

killed.

The aforesaid view finds support from a judgment

of this Court in Pappu vs. State of M.P. (2006) 7 SCC

391 in which it has been held as follows:

“13…… The help of Exception 4

can be invoked if death is

caused (a) without

premeditation; (b) in a sudden

fight; (c) without the

offender’s having taken undue

advantage or acted in a cruel or

unusual manner; and (d) the

fight must have been with the

person killed. To bring a case

within Exception 4 all the

ingredients mentioned in it must

be found. It is to be noted that

the “fight” occurring in

Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC

is defined in IPC. It takes two

to make a fight. Heat of passion

requires that there must be no

time for the passions to cool

down and in this case, the

parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the

verbal altercation in the

beginning. A fight is a combat

between two and more persons

whether with or without weapons.

It is not possible to enunciate

any general rule as to what

shall be deemed to be a sudden

quarrel. It is a question of

fact and whether a quarrel is

sudden or not must necessarily

depend upon the proved facts of

each case…..“

In this background when we consider the

facts of the present case, we have no manner of doubt

that Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is not at

all attracted. In the case in hand, the convicts had

entered the room of the daughter of the deceased in

midnight, molested her and the poor father, perhaps

because of his age, could not do anything other than

to abuse the convicts. He gave choicest abuses but

did not fight with the convicts. Verbal abuses are

not fight as it is well settled that at least two

persons are needed to fight. Therefore, this

ingredient is not satisfied.

Then, can it be said that the crime has been

committed in a heat of passion? If time is taken to cool down, then the crime cannot be said to have been

committed in a heat of passion. It is the specific

case of the prosecution, which in fact, has also been

accepted by the High Court that “when her father

Tikeswar abused them, the accused Khageswar being

annoyed brought a budia from his house, which is

nearby, and dealt blows to her father and accused

Dusasan brought a lathi and assaulted her father.”

This clearly shows that both the convicts had

sufficient time to cool down and therefore, it cannot

be said that the crime was committed in a heat of

passion.

So far as the convict, Kampa @ Sricharan

Naik is concerned, he is convicted with the aid of

Section 34 of the IPC. All of them have come together

and participated in the crime which goes to show that

these convicts shared the common intention.

In the face of what we have observed above,

it is clear that the High Court erred in holding that

the offence for which the convicts can be held guilty

shall be Section 304 Part II of the IPC. JUDGMENT

In the result, we allow this appeal, set

aside that portion of the judgment of the High Court

whereby it had altered the conviction of the

respondents from Section 302/34 of the IPC to that of

Section 304/34 of the IPC and restore that of the

trial court. The respondents, if have not already

undergone the sentence awarded by the trial court,

shall forthwith be taken into custody to serve out

the remainder of the sentence.

[R.M.LODHA]