13.Chapter XXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the provisions with regard to the enquiries and trials. Section 300 debars the Court from proceeding with the trial in respect of the same offence for which the accused has already been tried and convicted or acquitted. However, a person convicted for any offence may be afterwards tried if such act constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted. This Court elaborately dealt with the provisions contained in Section 300 Cr.P.C. in the case of State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC page 655. Some of the paragraphs are worth to be quoted hereinafter.
“26. Broadly speaking, a protection against a second or multiple punishment for the same offence, technical complexities aside, includes a protection against re-prosecution after acquittal, a protection against re-prosecution after conviction and a protection against double or multiple punishment for the same offence. These protections have since received constitutional guarantee under Article 20(2). But difficulties arise in the application of the principle in the context of what is meant by “same offence”. The principle in American law is stated thus:
“The proliferation of technically different offences encompassed in a single instance of crime behaviour has increased the importance of defining the scope of the offence that controls for purposes of the double jeopardy guarantee.
Distinct statutory provisions will be treated as involving separate offences for double jeopardy purposes only if ‘each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not’ JUDGMENT (Blockburger v. United States). Where the same evidence suffices to prove both crimes, they are the same for double jeopardy purposes, and the clause forbids successive trials and cumulative punishments for the two crimes. The offences must be joined in one indictment and tried together unless the defendant requests that they be tried separately.
27.The expression “the same offence”, “substantially the same offence” “in effect the same offence” or “practically the same”, have not done much to lessen the difficulty in applying the tests to identify the legal common denominators of “same offence”. Friedland in Double Jeopardy (Oxford 1969) says at p. 108:
“The trouble with this approach is that it is vague and hazy and conceals the thought processes of the court. Such an inexact test must depend upon the individual impressions of the judges and can give little guidance for future decisions. A more serious consequence is the fact that a decision in one case that two offences are ‘substantially the same’ may compel the same result in another case involving the same two offences where the circumstances may be such that a second prosecution should be permissible....”
28.In order that the prohibition is attracted the same act must constitute an offence under more than one Act. If there are two distinct and separate offences with different ingredients under two different enactments, a double punishment is not barred. In Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail, the question arose whether a crime and the offence of conspiracy to commit it are different offences. This Court said: (SCR p. 827) “The offence of conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or JUDGMENT completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They are, therefore, quite separate offences.”
14.In the instant case, as noticed above, the nature and manner of offences committed by the accused persons are not identical but are different, for example, in respect of FIR Crime No.130 of 2010 the accused persons in connivance with respondent No.1 delivered 103 trucks of explosives to the Magazines of M/s. Ajay Explosives which belonged to Shiv Charan Heda and 60 trucks of explosives to M/s. B.M. Traders which belonged to Deepa Heda. It was alleged that the Magazines of M/s. Ganesh Explosives and M/s. Sangam Explosives were not operational since many years and with the forged documentation in the name of the said firms the explosives were purchased by M/s. Ajay Explosives and M/s. B.M. Traders and subsequently those explosives were sold to some unknown persons. In respect of those FIRs, one accused, a resident of Nepal, was arrested and from whose custody 498 non electronic detonators were recovered. In respect of another FIR, during investigation, it has come on the record that those explosives were sold for terrorist activities.
15.Offence means any act or omission made punishable by law. The fountain head of all the three cases may be at Dholpur JUDGMENT from where truck loaded with explosives moved to different destinations but from that it cannot be said that the acts and omissions which constitute the offence are the same. Same offence, in our opinion, would mean that acts and omissions which constitute the offence are one and the same. Except the allegation that the explosives were loaded at Dholpur, the mode and manner in which the offence was committed at different places are not the same. As such, in our opinion, the provision of Section 186 of the Code is not attracted in the facts of the present case. Hence, the High court erred in passing the impugned order.
16.In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the High Court is to be set aside. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the State of Rajasthan is allowed and the appeal preferred by the accused stands disposed of.
(Chandramauli Kr. Prasad) (M.Y. Eqbal) New Delhi, December 17, 2013.