Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
State of Punjab aggrieved by the order dated 7th of September,JUDGMENT2005, passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal
Revision No. 320 of 2000 whereby it has set
aside the order of the trial court dated 24th
of January, 2000 summoning the respondent
Gurmit Singh to face trial under Section 319
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has
preferred this special leave petition.
Leave granted.
Facts lie in a very short compass. On the
basis of a report a case under Section 304B of
the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) was
registered at Police Station, Kharar. In the
first information report, the names of various
accused persons figured including Gurmit
Singh, the respondent herein. Police after
usual investigation, submitted the charge-
sheet in which the respondent did not figure as an accused. JUDGMENTHowever, the respondent along
with some other accused persons who were not
charge-sheeted were summoned to face the
trial. They challenged the said order before
the High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 1584-M of
1999 and the High Court by its order dated 25th
of February, 1999 set aside the order
summoning those accused persons including the
respondent but while doing so gave liberty to
take recourse to the provisions of Section 319
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Code’, at an appropriate
stage of the trial. During the course of
trial, evidence of one Shakuntla Rani, PW-1
was recorded, who averred that the respondent
herein was also responsible for the death of
Gurjit Kaur, the wife of Paramjit Singh.
Thereafter, an application was filed by the
prosecution for summoning aforesaid Gurmit
Singh and other accused persons before the
trial court in exercise of the power under
Section 319 of the Code. The trial court by JUDGMENT its order dated 24th of January, 2000, summoned
the respondent besides other accused persons
to face trial, for commission of offence under
Section 304B IPC, inter alia, observing that
the names of those persons figured in the FIR,
statement of the witnesses recorded under
Section 161 of the Code and the evidence of
Shakuntla Rani, PW-1.
Respondent challenged the aforesaid order
in a revision application filed before the
High Court inter alia on the ground that he
cannot be tried for offence under Section 304B
of the Code because he is not a relative of
the husband of the deceased. It was pointed
out that Paramjit Singh happened to be the
husband of the deceased whereas the respondent
is the brother of his aunt (chachi) and,
therefore, cannot be said to be a relative of
the deceased’s husband. Aforesaid submission
found favour with the High Court and, accordingly, it quashed the order summoning
the respondent to face the trial. While
doing so, the High Court observed as follows:
“Even the dictionary meaning of a
relative is one who is related by
blood or marriage. Gurmit Singh
is certainly not related to
Paramjit Singh either by blood or
by marriage. Gurmit Singh would
not fall in the category of
relative of the husband.
Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be
excluded from the array of the
accused. It is not necessary to
try him under Section 304B I.P.C.
for the dowry death of Paramjit
Singh’s wife.
Mr. V. Madhukar, learned Additional
Advocate General appearing on behalf of the
State submits that the High Court erred in
holding that the respondent is not a relative
of the husband of the deceased. He points out
that Balbir Kaur is the wife of Paramjit
Singh’s father’s brother and Gurmit Singh
respondent herein happens to be Balbir Kaur’s
brother, hence, a relative of Paramjit Singh. According to JUDGMENThim, the High Court erred in holding that he is not a relative of the
husband of the deceased. Mr. C.D. Singh,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, however, submits that the
respondent cannot be said to be related to the
husband of the deceased in any manner and,
therefore, cannot be prosecuted for offence
under Section 304B of the IPC. The rival
submission necessitates the examination of
Section 304B of the IPC, same reads as
follows:
”304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the
death of a woman is caused by any
burns or bodily injury or occurs
otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years
of her marriage and it is shown
that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry, such
death shall be called “dowry
death”, and such husband or
relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of
this sub-section, “dowry” shall
have the same meaning as in
section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961JUDGMENT(28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death
shall be punished with imprison-
ment for a term which shall not be
less than seven years but which
may extend to imprisonment for
life.”
(underlining ours)
From a plain reading of the aforesaid
provision it is evident that when a woman dies
by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven
years of the marriage, her husband or any
relative of her husband shall be deemed to
have committed the offence of dowry death if
it is shown that soon before the death the
woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband, or by any relative of her
husband. This section therefore, exposes the
husband of the woman or any relative of her
husband for the commission of offence of the
dowry death. Admittedly, the respondent is
not the husband of the woman who died and, JUDGMENT therefore, the question which falls for
determination is as to whether he comes within
the ambit of “any relative of her husband”.
The expression “relative” has not been defined
in the IPC. The provision with which we are
concerned is a penal provision which deserves
strict construction. It is well settled that
when the words of a statute are not defined,
it has to be understood in their natural,
ordinary or popular sense. For this purpose,
it shall be permissible to refer to
dictionaries to find out the general sense in
which the word is understood in common
parlance. In Ramanatha Aiyar’s, Advance Law
Lexicon (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the word relative
means any person related by blood, marriage or
adoption. A large number of dictionaries give
this word relative, in context, same meaning.
It is relevant here to state that the
expression “relative of the husband” has been used in SectionJUDGMENT498-A of the I.P.C. While
interpreting the said expression, this Court
in the case of U. Suvetha vs. State by
Inspector of Police and Anr.(2009) 6 SCC 787
held it to mean a person related by blood,
marriage or adoption. Relevant portion of the
judgment reads as follows:
“10. In the absence of any
statutory definition, the term
“relative” must be assigned a
meaning as is commonly understood.
Ordinarily it would include
father, mother, husband or wife,
son, daughter, brother, sister,
nephew or niece, grandson or
granddaughter of an individual or
the spouse of any person. The
meaning of the word “relative”
would depend upon the nature of
the statute. It principally
includes a person related by
blood, marriage or adoption.”
The expression relative of the husband
further came up for consideration in the case of
Vijeta Gajra vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2010)11
SCC 618 and while approving the decision of this
Court in U. Suvetha (Supra), it was held that
the word relative would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage.
It is appropriate to reproduce the following
passage from the said judgment:
“12. Relying on the dictionary
meaning of the word “relative” and
further relying on Ramanatha
Aiyar’s, Advance Law Lexicon
(Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the Court went
on to hold that Section 498-A IPC
being a penal provision would
deserve strict construction and
unless a contextual meaning is
required to be given to the
statute, the said statute has to
be construed strictly. On that
behalf the Court relied on the
judgment in T. Ashok Pai vs. CIT
(2007) 7 SCC 162. A reference was
made to the decision in Shivcharan
Lal Verma vs. State of M.P. (2007)
15 SCC 369. After quoting from
various decisions of this Court,
it was held that reference to the
word “relative” in Section 498-A
IPC would be limited only to the
blood relations or the relations
by marriage.”
It is well known rule of construction
that when the Legislature uses same words in
different part of the statute, the presumption
is that those words have been used in the same
sense, unless displaced by the context. We do not find anything in context to deviate from
the general rule of interpretation. Hence, we
have no manner of doubt that the word
“relative of the husband” in Section 304 B of
the IPC would mean such persons, who are
related by blood, marriage or adoption. When
we apply this principle the respondent herein
is not related to the husband of the deceased
either by blood or marriage or adoption.
Hence, in our opinion, the High Court did not
err in passing the impugned order. We hasten
to add that a person, not a relative of the
husband, may not be prosecuted for offence
under Section 304B IPC but this does not mean
that such a person cannot be prosecuted for
any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in
case the allegations constitute offence other
than Section 304B IPC.
In the result, we do not find any merit in
the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly.
NEW DELHI, July 2, 2014.