15. Time-limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution must be strictly adhered to. However, additional time of one
month may be allowed where consultation
is required with the Attorney General (AG) or any other law officer in the AG’s office.”
11.In a recent judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 64, the question for consideration was whether a private citizen has locus to prosecute a public servant and to obtain sanction and how an application for sanction was to be dealt with. It was held that any application for sanction sought even by a private citizen must be lookedJUDGMENTinto expeditiously and decided as per the observations of this Court in Vineet Narain case (supra) and guidelines framed by the CVC which were circulated vide Office Order No. 31/5/05 dated 12.05.2005. The relevant clauses have been quoted in the said judgment. In paragraphs 30, 33, 49, 50 of the leading judgment, it was observed: “30. While dealing with the issue relating to maintainability of a private complaint, the Constitution Bench observed: (A.R. Antulay vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500, para 6) “6. It is a well-recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (i) Section 187-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Section 97 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of JUDGMENTthe Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947
(iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 CrPC. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force … is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to JUDGMENTdeal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straitjacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception. To hold that such an exception exists that a private complaint for offences of corruption committed by public servant is not maintainable, the court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and a tangled web of argument for drawing a far- fetched implication, cannot be a substitute for an express statutory provision.” (emphasis supplied)
33.In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Constitution Bench in Antulay case, it must be held that the appellant has the right to file a complaint for prosecution of Respondent 2 in respect of the offences allegedly committed by him under the 1988 Act.
49.CVC, after taking note of the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, Supt. of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary, framed guidelines which were circulated vide Office Order No. 31/5/05 dated 12-5-2005. The relevant clauses of the guidelines are extracted below: “2 (i) Grant of sanction is an administrative act. The purpose is to protect the public servant from harassment by frivolous orvexatious JUDGMENTprosecution and not to shield the corrupt. The question of giving opportunity to the public servant at that stage does not arise. The sanctioning authority has only to see whether the facts would prima facie constitute the offence.
(ii) The competent authority cannot
embark upon an inquiry to judge the truth of the allegations on the basis of representation which may be filed by the accused person before the sanctioning authority, by asking the IO to offer his comments or to further investigate the matter in the light of representation made by the accused person or by otherwise holding a parallel investigation/enquiry by calling for the record/report of his department. * * *
(vii) However, if in any case, the
sanctioning authority after consideration of the entire material placed before it, entertains any doubt on any point the competent authority may specify the doubt with sufficient particulars and may request the authority who has sought sanction to clear the doubt. But that would be only to clear the doubt in order that the authority may apply its mind properly, and not for the purpose of considering the representations of the accused which may be filed while the matter is pending sanction.
(viii) If the sanctioning authority seeks the
comments of the IO while the matter is pending before it for sanction, it will almost be impossible for the sanctioning authority to adhere to the time-limit allowed by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain case.”
50.The aforementionedJUDGMENTguidelines are in conformity with the law laid down by this Court that while considering the issue regarding grant or refusal of sanction, the only thing which the competent authority is required to see is whether the material placed by the complainant or the investigating agency prima facie discloses commission of an offence. The competent authority cannot undertake a detailed inquiry to decide whether or not the allegations made against the public servant are true.” In concurring judgment, it was further observed:
“68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of the Indian
democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is
incompatible with the concept of a socialist secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our Preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the court is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. That is to say in a situation
where two constructions are eminently
reasonable, the court has to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the
one which seeks to perpetuate it.
70. The learned Attorney General in the course of his submission fairly admitted before us JUDGMENTthat out of the total 319 requests for sanction, in respect of 126 of such requests, sanction is awaited. Therefore, in
more than one-third cases of request for
prosecution in corruption cases against public servants, sanctions have not been accorded. The aforesaid scenario raises very important constitutional issues as well as some questions relating to interpretation of such sanctioning provision and also the role that an independent judiciary has to play in maintaining the Rule of Law and
common man’s faith in the justice-
delivering system. Both the Rule of Law and
equality before law are cardinal questions (sic principles) in our constitutional laws as also in international law and in this context the role of the judiciary is very vital. In his famous treatise on Administrative Law, Prof. Wade while elaborating the concept of the Rule of Law referred to the opinion of Lord Griffiths which runs as follows: “… the judiciary accepts a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law.” [See R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett, AC at p. 62 A.] I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid principle.
74.Keeping those principles in mind, as we must, if we look at Section 19 of the PC Act which bars a court from taking cognizance of cases of corruption against a public servant under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act, unless the Central or the State Government, as the case may be, has accorded JUDGMENTsanction, virtually imposes fetters on private citizens and also on prosecutors from approaching court against corrupt public servants. These protections are not available to other citizens. Public servants are treated as a special class of persons enjoying the said protection so that they can perform their duties without fear and favour and without threats of malicious prosecution. However, the said protection against malicious prosecution which was extended in public interest cannot become a shield to protect corrupt officials. These provisions being exceptions to the equality provision of Article 14 are analogous to the provisions of protective discrimination and these protections must be construed very narrowly. These procedural provisions relating to sanction must be construed in such a manner as to advance the causes of honesty and justice and good governance as opposed to escalation of corruption.
75.Therefore, in every case where an application is made to an appropriate authority for grant of prosecution in connection with an offence under the PC Act it is the bounden duty of such authority to apply its mind urgently to the situation and decide the issue without being influenced by any extraneous consideration. In doing so, the authority must make a conscious effort to ensure the Rule of Law and cause of justice is advanced. In considering the question of granting or refusing such sanction, the authority is answerable to law and law alone. Therefore, the requirement to take the decision with a reasonable dispatch is of the essence in such a situation. Delay in granting sanction proposal thwarts a very valid social purpose, namely, the purpose of a speedy trial with the requirement to bring JUDGMENT the culprit to book. Therefore, in this case the right of the sanctioning authority, while either sanctioning or refusing to grant sanction, is coupled with a duty.
76.The sanctioning authority must bear in mind that what is at stake is the public confidence in the maintenance of the Rule of Law which is fundamental in the administration of justice. Delay in granting such sanction has spoilt many valid prosecutions and is adversely viewed in public mind that in the name of considering a prayer for sanction, a protection is given to a corrupt public official as a quid pro quo for services rendered by the public official in the past or may be in the future and the sanctioning authority and the corrupt officials were or are partners in the same misdeeds. I may hasten to add that this may not be the factual position in this (sic case) but the general demoralising effect of such a popular perception is profound and pernicious.
77.By causing delay in considering the request for sanction, the sanctioning authority stultifies judicial scrutiny and determination of the allegations against corrupt official and thus the legitimacy of the judicial institutions is eroded. It, thus, deprives a citizen of his legitimate and fundamental right to get justice by setting the criminal law in motion and thereby frustrates his right to access judicial remedy which is a constitutionally protected right. In this connection, if we look at Section 19 of the PC Act, we find that no time-limit is mentioned therein. This has virtually armed the sanctioning authority with unbridled power which has often resulted in protecting the guilty and JUDGMENT perpetuating criminality and injustice in society.
79.Article 14 must be construed as a guarantee against uncanalised and arbitrary power. Therefore, the absence of any time-limit in granting sanction in Section 19 of the PC Act is not in consonance with the requirement of the due process of law which has been read into our Constitution by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
80.I may not be understood to have expressed any doubt about the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the PC Act, but in my judgment the power under Section 19 of the PC Act must be reasonably exercised. In my judgment Parliament and the appropriate authority must consider restructuring Section 19 of the PC Act in such a manner as to make it consonant with reason, justice and fair play.
81.In my view, Parliament should consider the constitutional imperative of Article 14 enshrining the Rule of Law wherein “due process of law” has been read into by introducing a time-limit in Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 for its working in a reasonable manner. Parliament may, in my opinion, consider the following guidelines: (a) All proposals for sanction placed before any sanctioning authority empowered to grant sanction for prosecution of a public servant under Section 19 of the PC Act must be decided within a period of three months of the receipt of the proposal by the authorityJUDGMENTconcerned. (b) Where consultation is required with the Attorney General or the Solicitor General or the Advocate General of the State, as the case may be, and the same is not possible within the three months mentioned in clause (a) above, an extension of one month period may be allowed, but the request for consultation is to be sent in writing within the three months mentioned in clause (a) above. A copy of the said request will be sent to the prosecuting agency or the private complainant to
intimate them about the extension of the time-limit. (c) At the end of the extended period of time-limit, if no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed to have been granted to the proposal for prosecution, and the prosecuting agency or the private complainant will proceed to file the charge- sheet/complaint in the court to commence prosecution within 15 days of the expiry of the aforementioned time-limit.”
The above observations fully cover the issue raised in this petition.
12.Thus while it is not possible to hold that the requirement of sanction is unconstitutional, the competent authority has to take a decision on the issue of sanction expeditiously as already observed. A fine balance has to be maintained between need to protect a public servant against mala fide prosecution on the one hand and the object of upholding the probity in JUDGMENT public life in prosecuting the public servant against whom prima facie material in support of allegation of corruption exists, on the other hand.
13.In view of the law laid down by this Court, no further directions are necessary.
14.The writ petition is disposed of.
.............................................J. [ T.S. THAKUR ] .............................................J. [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
New Delhi August 06, 2014 JUDGMENT