1 In this Appeal, counsel for the Appellant has sought to
draw our attention to all the arguments that had been
addressed before the High Court on behalf of the Appellant- JUDGMENT Husband in support of his claim for dissolution of his
marriage to the Respondent by a decree of divorce under
Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. We
have, however, restricted him to the ground of alleged
cruelty on account of the filing of a criminal complaint by
the Respondent against the Appellant and several members of
his family under Sections 498A and 307 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC). We did this for the reason that if this ground
is successfully substantiated by the Petitioner, we need not
delve any further i.e. whether a marriage can be dissolved
by the Trial Court or the High Court on the premise that the
marriage has irretrievably broken down. This nature of
cruelty, in the wake of filing of a false criminal case by
either of the spouses, has been agitated frequently before
this Court, and has been discussed so comprehensively and
thoroughly that yet another Judgment on this well-settled
question of law, would be merely a waste of time. A
complete discourse and analysis on this issue is available
in a well-reasoned judgment in K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A.
Deepa, 2013(5) SCC 226, in which numerous decisions have
been cited and discussed. It is now beyond cavil that if a
false criminal complaint is preferred by either spouse it
would invariably and indubitably constitute matrimonial cruelty, such as would entitle the other spouse to claim a
divorce.
2 The marriage of the parties was celebrated according to
Hindu rites at Hyderabad on 11th February, 1989. A male
child was born to the parties on 8th May, 1991, after which
the Respondent-Wife, as per her pleadings, started suffering
from Sheehan’s syndrome. On the night of 29th/30th June,
1995, the Respondent left the matrimonial house and ever
since then she has been living with her brother, who is a
senior IAS officer. On 14th July, 1995, the Appellant
filed an original petition praying for divorce on the ground
of cruelty as well as of the irretrievable breakdown of
their marriage. The Respondent-Wife retorted by filing a
criminal complaint against the Appellant as well as seven
members of his family for offences under Section 307 read
with Sections 34, 148A, 384, 324 of the IPC, and Sections 4
and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It is pursuant
to this complaint that the Appellant-Husband and seven of
his family members were arrested and incarcerated. The
Respondent-Wife also filed a petition under Section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights.
On 30th June, 2000, the Learned Vth Additional Metropolitan
Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Hyderabad, acquitted the Appellant and his family members, and this Order has
attained finality. Meanwhile, by its Judgment dated 30th
December, 1999, the Family Court at Hyderabad, granted a
divorce to the Appellant on the ground of cruelty as also
irretrievable breakdown of marriage; it rejected the
Respondent’s petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act. The Respondent-Wife successfully appealed against
the said Judgment in the High Court, and it is this Order
dated 7th November, 2005 that is impugned before us.
3 Irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for
divorce has not found statutory acceptance till date. Under
Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
plenary powers “to pass such decree or make such order as is
necessary for doing complete justice in any case or order
pending before it”. This power, however, has not been
bestowed by our Constitution on any other Court. It is
for these reasons that we have confined arguments only to
the aspect of whether the filing of a false criminal
complaint sufficiently proves matrimonial cruelty as would
entitle the injured party to claim dissolution of marriage.
It will be relevant to mention that the Law Commission of
India in its Reports in 1978 as well as in 2009 has
recommended the introduction of irretrievable breakdown of JUDGMENT marriage as a ground for dissolution of marriage; the
Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill of 2013 incorporating the
ground has even received the assent of the Rajya Sabha. It
is, however, highly debatable whether, in the Indian
situation, where there is rampant oppression of women, such
a ground would at all be expedient. But that controversy
will be considered by the Lok Sabha.
4. In the case in hand, learned counsel for the
Respondent-Wife has vehemently contended that it is not
possible to label the wife’s criminal complaint detailed
above as a false or a vindictive action. In other words,
the acquittal of the Appellant and his family members in the
criminal complaint does not by itself, automatically and
justifiably, lead to the conclusion that the complaint was
false; that only one complaint was preferred by the
Respondent-Wife, whereas, in contradistinction, in
K.Srinivas Rao a series of complaints by the wife had been
preferred. The argument was premised on the averment that
the investigation may have been faulty or the prosecution
may have been so careless as to lead to the acquittal, but
the acquittal would not always indicate that the Complainant
had intentionally filed a false case. What should be kept
in perspective, it is reasonably argued, that the JUDGMENT Complainant is not the controlling conductor in this
Orchestra, but only one of the musicians who must deliver
her rendition as and when and how she is called upon to do.
Secondly, according to the learned counsel, the position
would have been appreciably different if a specific finding
regarding the falsity of the criminal complaint was
returned, or if the Complainant or a witness on her behalf
had committed perjury or had recorded a contradictory or
incredible testimony. Learned counsel for the Respondent-
Wife states that neither possibility has manifested itself
here and, therefore, it would be unfair to the Respondent-
Wife to conclude that she had exhibited such cruelty towards
the Appellant and her in-laws that would justify the
dissolution of her marriage.
5 The Respondent-Wife has admitted in her cross-
examination that she did not mention all the incidents on
which her Complaint is predicated, in her statement under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. It is not her case that she had
actually narrated all these facts to the Investigating
Officer, but that he had neglected to mention them. This,
it seems to us, is clearly indicative of the fact that the
criminal complaint was a contrived afterthought. We
affirm the view of the High Court that the criminal JUDGMENT complaint was “ill advised”. Adding thereto is the factor
that the High Court had been informed of the acquittal of
the Appellant-Husband and members of his family. In these
circumstances, the High Court ought to have concluded that
the Respondent-Wife knowingly and intentionally filed a
false complaint, calculated to embarrass and incarcerate the
Appellant and seven members of his family and that such
conduct unquestionably constitutes cruelty as postulated in
Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
6 Another argument which has been articulated on behalf
of the learned counsel for the Respondent is that the filing
of the criminal complaint has not been pleaded in the
petition itself. As we see it, the criminal complaint was
filed by the wife after filing of the husband’s divorce
petition, and being subsequent events could have been looked
into by the Court. In any event, both the parties were
fully aware of this facet of cruelty which was allegedly
suffered by the husband. When evidence was lead, as also
when arguments were addressed, objection had not been raised
on behalf of the Respondent-Wife that this aspect of cruelty
was beyond the pleadings. We are, therefore, not impressed
by this argument raised on her behalf.
7 In these circumstances,JUDGMENTwe find that the Appeal is well
founded and deserves to be allowed. We unequivocally find
that the Respondent-Wife had filed a false criminal
complaint, and even one such complaint is sufficient to
constitute matrimonial cruelty.
8 We, accordingly, dissolve the marriage of the parties
under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The
parties shall bear their respective costs.
[PRAFULLA C. PANT] New Delhi;
19th November, 2014.