3. In these circumstances, the petitioner-applicant had to
spend more than 10 years in prison without getting any
remedy under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000. We have heard the learned
counsel for the petitioner-applicant. We have also considered
the decisions cited by the learned counsel.
4. In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa,
2015 (5) SCALE 634, wherein the appeal of the accused was
allowed granting him the benefit of the provisions of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,
this Court observed:
“The learned counsel for the appellant raises the plea of juvenility under Section 7(A) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000. The plea can be raised before any Court and at any point of time. We feel that the stand taken by the counsel is correct and we will look into the present lis keeping in mind the juvenility of the accused appellant at the time of commission of the crime. As stated earlier, the age of the accused appellant was less than 18 years at the time of the incident. It has been brought to our notice that the appellant has undergone about 8 years in jail. The appellant falls within the definition of “juvenile” under Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of children) Act, 2000. He can raise the plea of JUDGMENT juvenility at any time and before any court as per the mandate of Section 7(a) and has rightly done so. It has been proved before us, as per the procedure given in the Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2007, and the age of the accused appellant has been determined following the correct procedure and there is no doubt regarding it.
On the question of sentencing, we believe that the accused appellant is to be released. In the present matter, in addition to the fact that he was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence, the accused
appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. Therefore, the conviction order passed by the High Court is not sustainable in law. Assuming without conceding, that even if the conviction is upheld, Upendra Pradhan has undergone almost 8 years of sentence, which is more than the maximum period of three years prescribed under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. Thus, giving him the benefit under the Act, we strike down the decision of the High Court. This Court has time and again held in a plethora of judgments on the benefit of the Act of 2000 and on the question of sentencing.”
We have also noticed that in Ajay Kumar v State of
M.P., (2010) 15 SCC 83, this Court observed as follows:
“In the light of the aforesaid provisions, the maximum period for which a juvenile could be kept in a special home is for three years. In the instant case, we are informed that the appellant who is proved to be a juvenile has undergone detention for a period of about approximately 14 years. In that view of the matter, since the appellant herein was a minor offence and hason thealreadydate undergoneof commissionmoreofthanthe the maximum period of detention as provided for under section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, by following the provisions of Rule 98 of Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 read with Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, we allow the appeal with a direction that the appellant be released forthwith.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
The same view was followed in Hakim v. State, (2014)
13 SCC 427, and Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar, (2011) 2
SCC 251.
5. Hence, we think that the petitioner-applicant should get
the benefit under the said Act since he was a juvenile on the
date of commission of the offence. In view of the above, this
appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order
passed by the Trial Court as also the High Court are set aside.
The petitioner-applicant is directed to be released forthwith.
(Pinaki Chandra Ghose) JUDGMENT
(R.K. Agrawal)
New Delhi;
August 07, 2015.