Leave granted.
The present appeals arise from a batch of judgments
dealing with cases which come from Maharashtra and West
Bengal. Insofar as the civil appeals relating to
Digitally signed by Maharashtra are concerned, the subsidy scheme of theSHASHI SAREEN
entertainment duty in Multiplex Theatre Complexes newly
set up, for a period of three years, and thereafter
payment of entertainment duty @ 25% for the subsequent
two years. The object of introducing the necessary
amendments in the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act to
effectuate the aforesaid subsidy scheme was first done
by way of an ordinance before 4th December, 2001, which
ultimately became part of an Amendment Act. The
statement of objects and reasons for introducing the
aforesaid scheme reads as follows:
“1. As a result of the onslaught of Cable
Television and advancement in the field of
Information Technology, the average occupancy in
cinema theatres has fallen considerably and
hardly any new theatres have been started in the
recent past. Public at large these days prefer
to see movies at home. Keeping in view this
scenario, a concept of Complete Family
Entertainment Centre, more popularly known as
“Multiplex Theatre Complex” has emerged. These
Multiplex Theatre Complexes offer various
entertainment facilities for the entire family
under a single roof. However, these complexes
are highly capital intensive, their gestation
period is also quite long, and therefore, need
Government support and incentive in entertainment
duty.
2. Government has, therefore, with a view to
commemorate birth centenary of Chitrapati late
Shri V.Shantaram, decided to grant concession in
entertainment duty to Multiplex Theatre Complexes
to promote construction of new cinema houses in
the State.
3. In accordance with the above decision,
Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 was modified
as required and Bombay Entertainment Duty
(Revised) Act, 2001 (Government Order:
ENT-1099/C.R.765/T-1) was brought into force on
17th August, 2001.”
The said scheme was thereafter set out in the form
of an amendment to the Statute contained in Section
3(13) sub-clause (c) after which a new sub-clause f(1)
was set out which reads as follows:
“(f-1)“Multiplex Theatre Complex” means an
entertainment cum-cultural centre which
provides-
(i) within the limits of Municipal Corporation
of Brihan Mumbai not less than four theatres
in a complex with minimum total seating
capacity of 1,250; and
(ii) any where else in the State, not less
than three theatres in a complex with
minimum total seating capacity of 1,000.
And such other incidental and connected
matters and facilities, and multi entertainment
activities and other facilities as specified by
Government in this behalf, by Notification in
the official Gazette;”
In addition, a new sub-clause (13) was also
inserted after Section 3 which reads as follows:
“13) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other provisions of this Act, but
subject to the terms and conditions specified
in clause (b), on and with effect from the date
of coming into force of the Bombay
Entertainments Duty (Amendment) Act, 2001,
there shall be levied and collected by the
State Government from the proprietor of a
Multiplex Theatre Complex the duty in respect
of any such complex as follows,namely:-
(i) for the first three years from the date of
commencement of the Multiplex Theatre complex,
no duty.
(ii) for the subsequent two years, at the rate
of twenty five percent of the rate of duty
leviable under clause (b) and clause (c) of
sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub
section (3);
(iii) from the sixth year, full amount of duty
leviable at the rate specified in clause (b) and
clause (c) of sub-section (1) or, as the case
may be sub-Section (3).
Provided that, the duty leviable shall also be
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2),
wherever applicable
Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section:
(i) the date on which the Multiplex Theatre
complex is opened to the public for admission
shall be deemed to be the date of commencement of
the Multiplex Theatre Complex;
(ii) the change in the management of Multiplex
Theatre Complex, or the change in the name of the
complex shall not be construed as a fresh
commencement of the Multiplex Theatre Compex.
(b) The concession in duty as provided under
clause (a) shall be available to the proprietor of
the Multiplex Theatre Complex subject to following
terms and conditions, namely;-
(i) The proprietor shall not charge less payment
for admission than the prevailing highest rate
for admission at any given time, in any of the
cinema theatres in the District in which the
complex is situated, till the period of
concession under clause (a) is over;
(ii) one theatre in the complex shall be reserved
for a total period of not less than one month, in
a year, exclusively for Marathi Cinemas;
(iii) the proprietor of a complex shall not levy
the service charge, till the period of concession
under clause (a) is over. After the concession
period is over, the proprietor may levy service
charges as specified in the second proviso to
clause (b) of section 2;
(iv) the Multiplex Theatre Complex shall be
continued continuously for ten years;
(v) no facilities provided in the complex as
specified in the notification issued under clause
(I-a) of Section 2, shall be discontinued or
curtailed, without prior permission of the
Government.
(c) In case of violation of the condition (iv) or
(v) of clause (b), the concession shall be liable
to be withdrawn and the duty shall be levied and
collected from the date of commencement at the
Multiplex Theatre Complex, at the rate specified
in clause (b) and clause (c) of sub-section (1)
or, as the case may be, sub-section (3), along
with the interest leviable at the rate specified
in section 9B.
(d) If any existing cinema theatre is converted
into Multiplex Theatre Complex, by not reducing
its original seating capacity and by complying
with the provisions of clause (f-a) of section 2,
the converted theatre shall also be entitled to
concession in the duty as specified in clause
(a), subject to the terms and conditions
specified in clause (b).”
To take the facts of one of the matters before us,
namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 6513-6514 of 2012, the
assessment order in that case (dated 21.01.2006) found
that the aforesaid scheme was really to support the
on-going activities of the multiplex and not for its
construction. Since the scheme took the form of a
charge on the gross value of the ticket and contributed
towards the day to-day running expenses, the Assessment
Officer held that it was in the nature of a revenue
receipt.
The appeal filed before the Commissioner met with
the same fate and was dismissed substantially on the
same reasoning.
However, the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal by its
judgment dated 30.06.2009, went into the matter in some
detail, and after setting out the object of the
aforesaid scheme went on to hold as follows:
“9.2 One aspect of the scheme in question is
undisputed; after considering the clauses of
the scheme, that the scheme do not provide any
assistance for reimbursement of day to day
revenue expenditure but the scheme is meant to
build up and to promote new multiplex cinema
halls which are nothing but for the
construction purpose hence reimbursement is to
cover-up the capital expenditure.
10. In the light of the above discussion, we
can therefore summarize our conclusion that
broadly speaking the subsidy can be of two
types:
(i) for the purpose of helping the growth
of an industry;
(ii) For the purpose of supplementing the profits of an industry.
10.1 To ascertain whether in a particular
case the subsidy in question fall under the
category (I) or (ii) one has to carefully
examine the form as well as substance of the
impugned scheme. We have done that exercise,
and on close examination undisputedly it was
noticed that the scheme in question had fallen
in the first category i.e. for the purpose of
helping the growth of an industry. Though
the collection was in the form of an
entertainment Duty via sale of tickets for a
limited period but its utilization was
predetermined and granted with an assurance to
cover up the cost of construction. Once it is
demonstrated before us that too undisputedly
that it was not attributed in any manner
towards supplementing of day-to-day
expenditure or in the furtherance of the
profits than it cannot be said to be in the
character of a revenue receipt. Contrary to
this it was in the nature of a capital receipt
being an incentive to supplement the
construction expenditure of new set up of
Multiplexes hence in the nature of capital
receipt. To arrive at this conclusion we draw
support from a plethora of decisions, few of
them already cited above. With the result we
decide the ground in favour of the assessee.”
The appeal before the High Court was dismissed.
The High Court's judgment dated 08.06.2011 referred to
two Supreme Court judgments, namely, Sahney Steel &
Press Works Ltd., Hyderabad Vs. Commissioner of
Income-Tax, A.P.-I, Hyderabad 1997 (7) SCC 765 and
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Ponni Sugars and
Chemicals Limited 2008 (9) SCC 337 and after discussing
these judgments, held:
“Since the object of subsidy was to promote
construction of multiplex theatre complexes,
in our opinion, receipt of subsidy would be on
capital account. The fact that the subsidy
was not meant for repaying the loan taken for
construction of multiplexes cannot be a ground
to hold that subsidy receipt was on revenue
account, because, if the object of the scheme
was to promote cinema houses by constructing
multiplex theatres, then irrespective of the
fact that the multiplexes have been
constructed out of own funds or borrowed
funds, the receipt of subsidy would be on
capital account. In the light of the
aforesaid objects of the Scheme framed by the
State Government, the decision of the Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal that the amount of
subsidy received by the assessee is on capital
account cannot be faulted. Accordingly, both
the appeals are dismissed with no order as to
costs”
Shri P.S.Narasimha, learned ASG appearing on behalf
of the Revenue, assails the judgment passed by the High
Court. According to him, there may be no doubt that the
large object said to be achieved in the grant of subsidy
by way of complete and then partial roll back of
entertainment duty may be in the nature of subsidy
relating to complexes which are highly capital intensive
and require Government support. But according to him,
the fact that the subsidy kicks in only after the
multiplexes started functioning and issued tickets on
which entertainment duty is then waived, would show that
in reality what has already been set up is not the
immediate object of the subsidy but that it is really
in the nature of a helping hand for running of the day
to-day business of the multiplexes. He relied heavily
upon the judgment in Sahney Steel (supra) to buttress
his submission and stated that on facts, this was a case
similar to Sahney Steel. On the other hand, he
distinguished the judgment in Ponni Sugars (supra)
stating that on the facts of that case, in paragraph 10,
in particular, it was very clearly held that the benefit
of the scheme had to be utilised only for re-payment of
loan. Therefore, it was obviously capital in nature,
and not revenue.
On the other hand, Shri Jahangir Mistry, learned
senior counsel appearing for the respondents, and Shri
S.Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing for some of
the respondents, have argued that if Sahney Steel is to
be read in its entirety, the judgment on facts supports
the proposition that it is only the purpose of the
scheme that is the test for finding out whether the
scheme is, in fact, capital or revenue in nature. The
source of funds for the scheme and the form of the
scheme are irrelevant and if it is clear that the
purpose is in order that capital expenses be met out of
the subsidy granted in the scheme, then the object of
the scheme points to receipt of funds being capital in
nature. They both stressed the fact that the statement
of object and reasons specifically state that
multiplexes are truly capital intensive, their period is
long and, therefore, they need government support.
They also relied upon the statement that the grant of
concession to such multiplexes was to promote
construction of new cinema houses in the State.
Having heard learned counsel for both sides, it
becomes necessary to analyze the judgments relied upon.
In Sahney Steel (supra), the notification issued by
the Andhra Pradesh Government was concerned with certain
facilities and incentives which were to be given to all
new industrial undertakings which commenced production
on or after 01.01.1969 with investment capital not
exceeding Rs. 5 crores. The incentives were to be
allowed for a period of five years from the date of
commencement of production. Concession was also
available for subsequent expansion of 50% and above.
The incentives were in the form of, inter alia, refund
of sale tax on raw materials, machinery and finished
goods. This Court held, on the facts of that case, that
as no financial assistance was granted to the assessee
for setting up of the industry, the idea of the subsidy
scheme was to provide a helping hand for five years in
order to enable the industry to be viable and competent.
In doing this, in paragraph 9 of the said judgment, the
test stated by Viscount Simon in Pontypridd and Rhondda
Joint Water Board v. Ostime (1946) 1 ALL ER 668 was
referred to. In paragraph 10, the Court went on to
apply the aforesaid test and stated that, since funds
were made available to the assessee to assist it in
carrying on its trade and business, there can be little
doubt that the object “of various assistances under the
subsidy scheme was to enable the assessee to run the
business more profitably”.
The judgment of the House of Lords in Seaham
Harbour Dock Co. Vs. Crook, 16 TC 333 was then referred
to and distinguished. What is important for our purpose
is the fact that in para 18 of that judgment, the test
of whether the receipt of subsidy is capital or revenue
is stated as follows:-
“If any subsidy is given, the character of the
subsidy in the hands of the recipient - whether
revenue or capital - will have to be determined by
having regard to the purpose for which the subsidy
is given. If it is given by way of assistance to
the assessee in carrying on of his trade or
business, it has to be treated as a trading
receipt. The source of the fund is quite
immaterial.”
The Court went on, thereafter, to give a telling example
in para 19 of the aforesaid judgment, which is set out
herein below:-
“For example, if the scheme was that the
assessee will be given refund of sales tax on
purchase of machinery as well as on raw
materials to enable the assessee to acquire new
plants and machinery for further expansion of
its manufacturing capacity in a backward area,
the entire subsidy must be held to be a capital
receipt in the hands of the assessee. It will
not be open to the Revenue to contend that the
refund of sales tax paid on raw materials or
finished products must be treated as revenue
receipt in the hands of the assessee. In both
the cases, the Government is paying out of
public funds to the assessee for a definite
purpose. If the purpose is to help the assessee
to set up its business or complete a project as
in Seaham Harbour Dock Co. case, the monies must
be treated as to have been received for capital
purpose. But if monies are given to the
assessee for assisting him in carrying out the
business operation and the money is given only
after and conditional upon commencement of
production, such subsidies must be treated as
assistance for the purpose of the trade.”
Thereafter, the Court went on to discuss certain
High Court judgments and, in para 30, specifically
referred to the Bombay High Court judgment in Sadichha
Chitra's case (1991) 189 ITR 774 and approved the view
taken by the Bombay and Kerala High Courts as they
accorded with the principle laid down in Seaham Harbour
Dock Co. case. The facts in Sahney steel were
distinguished from the facts of the Bombay and Kerala
judgments as follows:-
“In the case before us, subsidies have not been
granted for production of or bringing into
existence any new asset. The subsidies were
granted year after year only after setting up of
the new industry and commencement of production.
Such a subsidy could only be treated as assistance
given for the purpose of carrying on of the
business of the assessee. Applying the test of
Viscount Simon in the case of Ostime it must be
held that these subsidies are of revenue character
and will have to be taxed accordingly.
The next important judgment that was referred
to is the judgment in Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Limited
(supra). On the facts in that case, incentives given
under a scheme relating to sugar production were in the
nature of a higher free sale sugar quota, and also
allowing the manufacturer to collect excise duty on the
sale price of free sale sugar in excess of the normal
quota but to pay to the government only the excise duty
payable on the price of levy sugar. Clause 7 of the
aforesaid scheme was set out in para 3 of the judgment as
follows:-
“The beneficiaries of the incentive scheme
shall ensure that the surplus funds generated
through sale of the incentive sugar are
utilised for the repayment of term loans, if
any, outstanding from the Central financial
institutions. The sugar factories should
submit utilisation certificates annually from
Chartered/Cost Accountant, holding certificate
of practice. Utilisation certificate in
respect of each sugar season during the
incentive period should be furnished on or
before 31st December of the succeeding year.
Failure to submit utilisation certificate
within the stipulated time may result not only
in the termination of release of incentive free
sale quota, but also in the recovery of the
incentive free sale releases already made, by
resorting to adjustment from the free sale
releases of future years.”
The Court then referred to the background of the
incentive scheme and to the fact that the Sampat
Committee was set up to examine the question relating to
the economic viability of new sugar factories. The
Court then found in para 9 of the judgment that the
Sampat Committee referred to the fact that the increase
in the cost of new sugar factories was because of
increase in the cost of plant and machinery. The
Committee then stated that five possible incentives for
making a sugar plant economically viable could be
provided. It is two of such incentives referred to that
was the subject-matter for decision before this Court.
In Para 10 this Court found:
“We have examined in this case the 1980 and 1987
Schemes. Essentially all the four Schemes are
similar except in the matter of details. Four
factors exist in the said Schemes, which are as
follows:
(i) Benefit of the incentive subsidy was
available only to new units and to substantially
expanded units, not to supplement the trade
receipts.
(ii) The minimum investment specified was Rs. 4
crores for new units and Rs. 2 crores for
expansion units.
(ii) Increase in the free sale sugar quota
depended upon increase in the production capacity.
In other words, the extent of the increase of free
sale sugar quota depended upon the increase in the
production capacity.
(iv) The benefit of the Scheme had to be utilised
only for repayment of term loans.”
After discussing the judgment in Sahney Steel case,
this Court then held:
“The importance of the judgment of this Court in
Sahney Steel case lies in the fact that it has
discussed and analysed the entire case law and it
has laid down the basic test to the applied in
judging the character of a subsidy. The test is
that the character of the receipt in the hands of
the assessee has to be determined with respect to
the purpose for which the subsidy is given. In
other words, in such cases, one has to apply the
purpose test. The point of time at which the
subsidy is paid is not relevant. The source is
immaterial. The form of subsidy is immaterial.
The main eligibility condition in the Scheme with
which we are concerned in this case is that the
incentive must be utilised for repayment of loans
taken by the assessee to set up new units or for
substantial expansion of existing units. On this
aspect there is no dispute. If the object of the
Subsidy Scheme was to enable the assessee to run
the business more profitably then the receipt is
on revenue account. On the other hand, if the
object of the assistance under the Subsidy Scheme
was to enable the assessee to set up a new unit
or to expand the existing unit then the receipt
of the subsidy was on capital account.
Therefore, it is the object for which the
subsidy/assistance is given which determines the
nature of the incentive subsidy. The form of the
mechanism through which the subsidy is given is
irrelevant.”
Sahney Steel was distinguished, in para 16 by then
stating that this Court found that the assessee was free
to use the money in its business entirely as it liked.
Finally, it was found that, applying the test of
purpose, the Court was satisfied that the payment
received by the assessee under the scheme was not in the
nature of a helping hand to the trade but was capital in
nature.
What is important from the ratio of this judgment is
the fact that Sahney Steel was followed and the test laid
down was the “purpose test”. It was specifically held
that the point of time at which the subsidy is paid is
not relevant; the source of the subsidy is immaterial;
the form of subsidy is equally immaterial.
Applying the aforesaid test contained in both Sahney
Steel as well as Ponni Sugar, we are of the view that the
object, as stated in the statement of objects and
reasons, of the amendment ordinance was that since the
average occupancy in cinema theatres has fallen
considerably and hardly any new theatres have been
started in the recent past, the concept of a Complete
Family Entertainment Centre, more popularly known as
Multiplex Theatre Complex, has emerged. These complexes
offer various entertainment facilities for the entire
family as a whole. It was noticed that these complexes
are highly capital intensive and their gestation period
is quite long and therefore, they need Government support
in the form of incentives qua entertainment duty. It was
also added that government with a view to commemorate the
birth centenary of late Shri V. Shantaram decided to
grant concession in entertainment duty to Multiplex
Theatre Complexes to promote construction of new cinema
houses in the State. The aforesaid object is clear and
unequivocal. The object of the grant of the subsidy was
in order that persons come forward to construct Multiplex
Theatre Complexes, the idea being that exemption from
entertainment duty for a period of three years and
partial remission for a period of two years should go
towards helping the industry to set up such highly
capital intensive entertainment centers. This being the
case, it is difficult to accept Mr. Narasimha's argument
that it is only the immediate object and not the larger
object which must be kept in mind in that the subsidy
scheme kicks in only post construction, that is when
cinema tickets are actually sold. We hasten to add that
the object of the scheme is only one -there is no larger
or immediate object. That the object is carried out in
a particular manner is irrelevant, as has been held in
both Ponni Sugar and Sahney Steel.
Mr. Ganesh, learned Senior Counsel, also sought to
rely upon a judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court
in Shri Balaji Alloys vs. C.I.T. (2011) 333 I.T.R. 335.
While considering the scheme of refund of excise duty and
interest subsidy in that case, it was held that the
scheme was capital in nature, despite the fact that the
incentives were not available unless and until commercial
production has started, and that the incentives in the
form of excise duty or interest subsidy were not given to
the assessee expressly for the purpose of purchasing
capital assets or for the purpose of purchasing
machinery.
After setting out both the Supreme Court judgments
referred to hereinabove, the High Court found that the
concessions were issued in order to achieve the twin
objects of acceleration of industrial development in the
State of Jammu and Kashmir and generation of employment
in the said State. Thus considered, it was obvious that
the incentives would have to be held capital and not
revenue. Mr. Ganesh, learned Senior Counsel, pointed out
that by an order dated 19.04.2016, this Court stated that
the issue raised in those appeals was covered, inter
alia, by the judgment in Ponni Sugars, and the appeals
were, therefore, dismissed.
We have no hesitation in holding that the finding of
the Jammu and Kashmir High Court on the facts of the
incentive subsidy contained in that case is absolutely
correct. In that once the object of the subsidy was to
industrialize the State and to generate employment in the
State, the fact that the subsidy took a particular form
and the fact that it was granted only after commencement
of production would make no difference.
In coming to the West Bengal cases, we find that the
West Bengal Finance Act, 2003 which amended the Bengal
Amusements Tax Act of 1922 also provided:
The Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922.
The provision seeks to provide, in order
to encourage development of multiplex theatre
complex, a very modern and highly
capital-intensive entertainment centre,
financial assistance to the proprietors of
such complex by allowing them to retain, by
way of subsidy, the amount of entertainment
tax collected against the value of ticket for
admission to such multiplex theatre complex
for a period not exceeding four years;
Since the subsidy scheme in the West Bengal case is
similar to the scheme in the Maharashtra case being to
encourage development of Multiplex Theatre Complexes
which are capital intensive in nature, and since the
subsidy scheme in that case is also similar to the
Maharashtra cases, in that the amount of entertainment
tax collected was to be retained by the new Multiplex
Theatre Complexes for a period not exceeding four years,
we are of the view that West Bengal cases must follow the
judgment that has been just delivered in the Maharashtra
case.
Accordingly, the appeals filed by the Department are
dismissed.
New Delhi, Dated: 7th December, 2017.
Civil Appeal No(s). 6513-6514/2012
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-I, KOLHAPUR Appellant(s)
VERSUS
M/S CHAPHALKAR BROTHERS PUNE Respondent(s) (AT TOP )
WITH
SLP(C) No. 6010/2014 (IX) ((As per court order dated 24.02.2014 "tag with civil appeal nos. 6513-14 of 2012.))
C.A. No. 6511/2012 (IX)
C.A. No. 6512/2012 (IX)
(Diary No. 15595/2017 arising out relied upon judgment is similar to present case)
(IA No.62911/2017-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING and IA No.62918/2017-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT)
(FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and IA No.78519/2017-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING)
( IA No.88275/2017-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING and IA No.88282/2017-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT)
Date : 07-12-2017 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
For Appellant(s) Mr. P.S.Narasimha, ASG,
Mr. K.Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Adv.
Mr. Arijit Prasad, Adv.
Mr. Manish Pushkarna, Adv.
Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR
Mr. B. V. Balaram Das, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. S.Ganesh, Sr. Adv.
MS. Vanita Bhargava, Adv.
Mr. Ajay Bhargava, Adv.
Mr. Rony O.John, Adv.
Mr. Abhisaar Bairagi, Adv.
M/S. Khaitan & Co., AOR
Mr. Jahangir Mistry, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Vanita Bhargava, Adv.
Mr. Ajay Bhargava, Adv.
Mr. Rony O.John, Adv.
Mr. Abhisaar Bairagi, Adv.
Ms. Shweta Kabra, Adv.
M/s. Khaitan & CO.
Mr. Jahangir Mistry, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Suhas Deshpande, Adv.
Mr. Rustom B. Hathikhanawala, AOR
Mr. R.P.Bhatt, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Santosh Krishnan, Adv.
Mr. Yadunandan Bansal, Adv.
Mr. Abhijat P. Medh, AOR
Mr. K.V.Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Amrita Panda, Adv.
Mr. Debesh Panda, Adv.
Mr. R.P.Bhatt, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Santosh Krishnan, AOR
Mr. Rituraj Gupta, Adv.
MR. Divyam Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Dhananjay Garg, AOR
Mr. Ramesh Singh, Adv.
Mr. Nikhil Goel, AOR
Mr. Ashutosh Ghade, Adv.
Mr. Annirudh Deshmukh, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Civil Appeal Nos. 6513-6514 of 2012, 6511 of 2012, 6512
of 2012, 3362 of 2015, 10803 of 2013, 3500 of 2016, 4650 of 2016,
9320 of 2017, 11203 of 2017, 11204 of 2017, 12442 of 2017, 15565 of
2017 and SLP(C) Nos. 6010 of 2014:
Delay condoned, if any.
Leave granted.
The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed
reportable judgment.
De-tag:
Civil Appeal Nos. 8886 of 2016, 5506 of 2017, 5505 of
2017, 5504 of 2017
SLP(C) Nos. 30728-30732 of 2017:
Taken on Board.
List along with Civil Appeal No. 6228 of 2013
Civil Appeal Nos. 6228 of 2013, 6227 of 2013, 6226 of
2013,8119 of 2013, 10512 of 2013, 8708 of 2013, 10513 of 2013, 9827
of 2017 and 10450 of 2017:
List these matters in the 2nd week of January, 2018.
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)