(a) the Tamil Nadu Estates Land
(Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947
Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1947 [in so
far as it relates to] matters
other than the reduction rents
and the collection of arrears of
rent and the Tamil Nadu Permanent
Settlement Regulation, 1802 Tamil
Nadu Regulation XXV of 1802, the
Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908
Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1908, and all
other enactments applicable to
the estate as such shall be
deemed to have been repealed in
their application to the estate] (b) the entire estate including all
communal lands; porambokes; other
nonryoti lands; wastelands;
pasture lands; Lanka lands;
forests; mines and minerals;
quarries; rivers and streams;
tanks and ooranies (including
private tanks and ooranies and
irrigation works] fisheries and
ferries, shall stand transferred
to the Government and vest in
them, free of all encumbrances
and the Tamil Nadu Revenue
Recovery Act, 1864, the Tamil
Nadu Irrigation Cess Act, 1965,
and all other enactments
applicable to ryotwari areas
shall apply to the estate; (c) all rights and interests created
in or over the estate before the
notified date by the principal or
any other landholder, shall as
against the Government cease and
determine;
(d) the Government may, after
removing any obstruction that may
be offered forthwith take
possession of the estate, and all
accounts, registers, pattas
muchilikas, maps, plans and other
documents relating to the estate
which the Government may require
for the administration thereof;
Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta-
(i) if such person is a ryot,
pending the decision of the
Settlement Officer as to
whether he is actually entitled
to such patta; (ii) if such person is a landholder
pending the decision of the
Settlement Officer and the
Tribunal on appeal, if any, to
it, as to whether he is
actually entitled to such
patta;
(e) the principal or any other
landholder and any other person,
whose rights stand transferred
under clause (b) or cease and
determine under clause (c), shall
be entitled only to such rights
and privileges as are recognized
or conferred on him by or under
this Act] (f) the relationship of landholder
and ryot, shall, as between them,
be extinguished; (g) any rights and privileges which
may have accrued in the estate to
any person before the notified
date, against the principal or
any other landholder thereof,
shall cease and determine, and
shall not be enforceable against
the Government or such landholder
and every such person shall be
entitled only to such rights and
privileges as are recognized or
conferred on him by or under this
Act.]”
It is also provided in Section 3(c) that all
rights and interests created in or over the estate
before the notified date by the principal or any
other landholder, shall against the Government
cease and determine.
It is apparent that under Section 3 of the Act
of 1948 vesting is automatic by virtue of the
statutory provisions and government is empowered to
take possession as provided under Section 3 (a)
only saving in the proviso to section 3(d) is that
in case any person is prima facie entitled to
ryotwari patta and during pendency of his
application, for the settlement, was not to be
dispossessed. In the case of the landholder, it is
provided that if the decision is pending before the
Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, the
State before taking possession has to prima facie
consider whether landholder is entitled to ryot
patta. Another consequence of vesting as clearly
provided in Section 3(f) of Act of 1948 is that the
relationship between the landholder and Ryot shall
stand extinguished.
Section 3(g) of the Act of 1948 specifically
provides that right which may have accrued in the
estate to any person before the notified date shall
not be enforceable against the government and such
person shall be entitled only to such rights and
privileges as are recognised or conferred on him as
provided under the Act of 1948.
Section 11 deals with rights of a ryot in an
estate to apply for a ryotwari patta in respect of
ryoti land which was properly included or ought to
have been properly included in his holding.
Section 11 is extracted hereunder:
“Lands in which ryot in entitled to
ryotwari patta:
“11. Every ryot in an estate shall,
with effect on and from the notified
date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta
in respect of ;
(a) all ryoti lands which,
immediately before the notified date,
were properly included or ought to
have been properly included in his
holding and which are not either
Lanka lands or lands in respect of
which a landholder or some other
person is entitled to a ryotwari
patta under any other provision of
this act; and
(b) all Lanka lands in his occupation
immediately before the notified date,
such land having been in his
occupation or in that of his
predecessors-in-title continuously
from the 1st day of July 1939.
Provided that no person who has been
admitted into possession of any land
by as landholder on or after the 1st
day of July 1945 shall, except where
the Government, after an examination
of all the circumstances otherwise
direct, be entitled to a ryotwari
patta in respect of such land.
Explanation: No lessee of any Lanka
land and no person to whom a right to
collect the rent of any land has been
leased before the notified date,
including an ijaradar or a farmer of
rent, shall be entitled to a ryotwari
patta in respect of such land under
this section.”
Section 12 deals with the right of the
landholder in zamindari estate and Section 13
deals with the landholder of Inam estate with
which we are not concerned in the present case.
Plaintiff has claimed the right, title and
interest as ryot, not as landholder.
Section 14-A was inserted by amendment Act
49 of 1974. The provisions contained in Section
14-A is extracted hereunder;
“Ryotwari patta not to be granted in
respect of private tank or oorani:
14-A.(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act, no ryotwari
patta shall be granted in respect of
any private tank or oorani.
(2) Any ryotwari patta granted in
respect of any private tank or oorani
under this Act before the date of the
publication of the Tamil Nadu Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1974, in the
Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, shall
stand cancelled, and for purposes of
compensation under this Act the
private tank or oorani shall be
deemed to be land in respect of which
neither the landholder nor any other
person is entitled to ryotwari patta
under this Act.”
Section 14-A(1) makes it clear that
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
no ryotwari patta shall be granted in respect of
any private tank or ooranies. Even if any patta
has been granted the same shall stand cancelled
and the land of the private tank or oorani shall
be deemed to be land of neither the landholder
nor any other person is entitled to ryotwari
patta under the Act.
It is apparent from the conjoint reading of
the provisions contained in Sections 3(15) and 3
(16) of the Act of 1908 and the provisions
contained in Section 3, 11 and 14-A of the Act
of 1948 that the land of the tank is not ‘ryoti
land’ as such no rights of ‘ryot’ could accrue
in the person by holding the land on temporary
arrangement of lease granted for 8 months in a
year when water was not there in the tanks.
Such bodies are protected by virtue of the
aforesaid provisions carved out under the Acts
of 1908 and 1948. The amendment made in 1974 in
Section 14-A makes it clear that even if any
ryot patta has been granted to any incumbent
even with respect to private tank or ooranies
that shall be inoperative and stand cancelled.
In the instant case, it is apparent that
not only S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar the vendor of
plaintiff had applied for a grant of patta under
the provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1948,
but the same very prayer had been unsuccessfully
made four times by the original plaintiff. All
such prayers made in 1953, 1968, 1971, 1982 and
1994 had been rejected. It is not in dispute
that ryotwari patta had not been granted. In
the order passed rejecting review in 1973, there
is categorical finding that land is comprised in
the tank and area was liable for submergence and
formed part of the irrigation tank. Once the
claim of the original plaintiff had been
rejected, it was incumbent upon him to file a
suit for establishing his rights, if any. He
could not have waited till 1984, after initial
rejection of the prayer in 1953. Again, could
not have waited till December 1984 after the
rejection order was passed in 1968 and again on
11.5.1971 and review had been dismissed on
7.5.1973. In the absence of grant of ryotwari
patta and even otherwise in view of the fact
that land formed part of tank reserved for
common use, no right accrued to the plaintiff to
claim ryotwari patta as his predecessor was not
‘ryot’ and the disputed land was not ‘ryoti
Land’. Apart from that, vendor of the plaintiff
did not hold land for 12 continuous years, as
such no right, title or interest accrued to the
vendor of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff.
The Trial Court, as well as the High Court, have
committed patent illegality in ignoring the
aforesaid prohibition contained in the
provisions of the Act of 1908 as well as of the
Act of 1948.
Coming to the question of possession, the
High Court has discarded B-9 proceedings taking
possession on 12.1.1951. Though, there was
absolutely nothing to doubt factum of taking
over the possession. It is also apparent that
the land formed part of tank which used to go in
submergence during the rains from the month of
July to October, it was not capable of being
possessed continuously. No patta was granted to
the vendor of the plaintiff for a complete year
at any point of time, it was from November to
June. The four lease deeds for the period of
four years are for 32 months i.e. 8 months each
year, have been placed on record of 1940, 1942,
1943 and 1946, no other lease has been produced
indicating that he was holding land for 12 years
or any lease of the land as on the date when the
Act of 1948 came into force or on the appointed
day. Even the vendor was not in possession of
the land as the entire estate of the village
stood vested in the state, as per the
notification issued on 12.1.1951, possession had
been taken. Thus, there was absolutely nothing
to hold that possession continued with the
vendor of the plaintiff. After the purchase was
made by Pachiappan in 1952 there is not even
single revenue entry placed on record indicating
that he ever remained in possession at any point
of time or cultivated the land. On the other
hand, various documents to the contrary have
been placed on record by the appellant.
Firstly, there are copies of settlement
register indicating the land comprised in new
survey No. 163 corresponds to 779 old and same
is recorded as Poramboke (common land) for
common use. Entire area 24.62 acre had been
recorded as Poramboke. There is yet another
settlement entry of 1959 which records that
Survey No.163 had been carved out of 779 in an
area 24.62 acre and area has been recorded as
Achuveri i.e., lake and also Porampoke i.e., for
the common use. The document records the fact
that Pachiappan’s application for grant of
ryotwari patta has been rejected on 5.11.1968.
Survey Map of the village also records that the
old survey number 779 has vested in the State.
When we consider Exh B-13, Fasli 1379 = 1969
year (Gregorian) the land has been recorded as
Chinneri (small lake). In the remarks column
possession of several persons is recorded as a
trespasser, but not that of the plaintiff -
Pachiappan. Similar is the position in the
entry of various Fasli 1380 = 1970, 1381 = 1971,
1382 = 1972, 1383 = 1973, 1384 = 1974, 1386 =
1976, 1390 = 1980, 1391 = 1981 till 1405 = 1995.
The entries in remarks column shows neither
ownership nor tenancy as observed by this Court
in Beohar Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. and
others,1970 RN 16 (Supreme Court).
Other documents are also placed on record
indicating that area is Chinneri (lake) of
common use. Thus, there was absolutely no
material or ground available to the High Court
to set aside the finding of possession recorded
by the First Appellate Court and for discarding
the B-9 of taking possession in 1951 as that was
supported by corresponding revenue entries and
statutory presumption of correctness is attached
to such entries though such presumption is
rebuttable. However, there is absolutely no
evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff to
rebut the statutory presumption of correctness
of document of record of rights. Thus, trial
court, as well as the High Court, has acted in a
perverse manner in discarding the overwhelming
evidence merely on the ground that document A-1
to A-4 stands proved. The High Court could not
have inferred in favour of the plaintiff, as no
right accrued to the plaintiff or to his
predecessor-in-interest on the basis of the
aforesaid document A-1 to A-4. The High Court
has unnecessarily drawn adverse inference just
in order to give a finding of the genuineness of
the document A-1 to A-4. We take these
documents as proved and proceed to deal with the
case on that basis.
When we consider the documents A1 to A-4,
taken as proved, not only they fail to advance
the cause espoused by the plaintiff but rather
negates it. Ex.A-2 are the 4 pattas placed on
record by the plaintiff granted in favour of
S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar as predecessor interest
of 1940, 1942, 1943 and 1946. The lease deed
itself records that land was comprised in the
tank and formed part of the tank. Thus, no right
or title or interest could have accrued to the
plaintiff over the said land.
Apart from that, when we consider sale deed
A-1, executed by S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar in
favour of original plaintiff Pachiappa, the
recital in the sale deed is that though patta
was granted in his name he could neither
cultivate nor able to look after the same, as
such, he has decided to sell the land. In
Exh.A-3 rent register of Fasli 1369 = 1959. It
only records the rent not the factum of lease or
possession or cultivation by S.Vijayaranga
Mudaliar. A-4 is document of the year 1949 that
records the name of S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar but
in that, no cultivation is recorded of
S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar. It records only how much
was the cess of land. No case is made out in
favour of vendor of the plaintiff on the basis
of the entry of amount of land cess or land
revenue of the year 1949. Merely recording the
cess or revenue in the year 1949 or even
assuming it was paid by the vendor in 1949, is
not going to confer title in favour of vendor,
particularly when the area was comprised in the
tank. In case any lease had been granted for
the period of 1947 to 1949 ought to have been
placed on record but no such lease deeds except
for four years have been placed on record.
Thus, the finding recorded by the High Court as
to possession is clearly perverse and contrary
to the revenue records and the Gazette
notification of vesting of land in State issued
in 1951.
It is no doubt true that under Section 114
of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption of
continuance of a state of affairs once shown to
have prevailed. It is open to the court under
Section 114 to presume the continuity of any
fact once shown to have prevailed. Such
presumption of continuity can be drawn not only
forward but backward also. Court can presume
that such state of affairs might have existed in
past also unless discontinuity is proved. In
the instant case, it is not shown by any
affirmative evidence on record in the form of
revenue record that the plaintiff’s vendor was
in possession on the date of abolition and
thereafter plaintiff remained in possession at
any point of time. This Court has observed in
Sir Bhimeshwara Swami Varu Temple v. Pedapudi
Krishna Murthi and Ors., AIR 1973 SC 1299 that
by stray entry no such presumption arises. On
the other hand, the successive five attempts
made by the plaintiff and his vendor failed to
obtain ryotwari patta as no right in such land
existed neither accrued. The plaintiff due to
failure to obtain ryotwari patta and even
otherwise as land formed part of tank has failed
to prove entitlement to be treated as Ryot. No
right, title or interest has accrued to the
plaintiff to obtain any ryotwari patta or for
obtaining decree in the suit.
It was urged before us on behalf of the
appellant that suit was barred by limitation by
virtue of provisions contained in Article 58 of
the Limitation Act 1963. The suit was required
to be filed within three years. We need not go
into the question. We have found on merits that
absolutely no case is made out in favour of the
plaintiff. Thus, he was not at all entitled
for any relief.
The High Court has considered another
aspect of the difference in area, it has opined
that earlier it appeared that land was 15.00
acres only later on how the area was increased
to 24.62 acres has not been explained by the
defendants. The aforesaid reasoning recorded by
the High Court is totally based upon the
ignorance of the material aspects and evidence,
as a matter of fact earlier dispute land was
comprised in survey no. 779 and which
corresponding to new s.no. 163 in 24.67 acres,
said area has been continuously recorded in the
revenue papers and register of settlement, right
from the beginning. After 1948 till 1995, no
cogent document indicating the disparity in the
area has been filed by the plaintiff. Even
assuming that the finding recorded by the High
Court is correct, it passes comprehension how
that helps the case of the plaintiff. Plaintiff
has to succeed only on the strength of his case
and when temporary leases had been granted to
his vendor within the area of tank as mentioned
in the lease deeds which was reserved for the
common use, no right could have accrued. The
High Court has ignored and overlooked this
material aspect. In case, the area has
increased from 15 acres to 24.62 acres and has
not been explained how the plaintiff can claim
any right in the land which formed part of water
body is not understandable as the case of the
plaintiff is not at all or buttressed by the
aforesaid discrepancy even if it exists.
Moreover, the entire area of 24.63 acres has
been recorded as Chinneri (tank) and poramboke
i.e., for common use.
Now, we deal with last ground raised by
learned senior counsel on behalf of the
plaintiff based on provisions contained in
section 64 of the Act of 1948. Section 64 deals
with the right of the owner, occupier not to be
affected by temporary
dispossession/discontinuance of possession.
Section 64 is extracted hereunder:
“Rights of owner or occupier not to
be effected by temporary
discontinuance of possession or
occupation:
64. Where a person-
(a) is entitled to the ownership of
to the possession or occupation of
any land or building immediately
before the notified date, but has
transferred his right to the
possession or occupation thereof or
has been temporarily dispossessed or
deprived or his right to the
occupation thereof; and
(b) has not on that date lost his
right to recover the possession or
occupation of such land or building;
He shall, for the purposes of this
Act, and subject to the provisions
thereof be deemed to be the owner, or
to be in possession or occupation, of
such land or building;
Provided that any lawful transferee
of the right to the title to such
land of building shall be entitled to
all the rights this Act of his
transferor.
Section 64 pre-supposes that a person is
entitled to ownership or possession or occupancy
of any land immediately before the notified
date. In case of temporary dispossession or
deprivation of his right to occupation hereafter
and he has not lost the right to recover the
possession of such a land or building shall for
the purpose of the Act be deemed to be the owner
or to be in possession or occupation of such
land or building.
There cannot be any dispute with respect to
legal provisions in Section 64 of the Act of
1948. It is settled proposition of law that in
case of wrongful dispossession or discontinuance
of possession of owner, possession of person who
has wrongfully taken it is deemed to be that of
the true owner, but in the instant case, the
provisions of Section 64 render no help to the
plaintiff for the singular reason that his
vendor is not proved to be the owner of the land
nor has proved his occupation on the date of
abolition or that it had been discontinued in
illegal manner, no such right of vendor to
remain in possession has been established.
Plaintiff’s vendor was not having any right,
title or interest after the lapse of temporary
leases. Consequently, he did not possess any
transferable right in the land. Hence,
Pachiappan did not derive any right, title or
interest from his predecessor in the land as he
had none. Plaintiff was required to prove
derivative title in which he has miserably
failed. It was mentioned in recital in the sale
deed by his vendor that he was not able to
possess land nor could cultivate it.
Apparently, the vendor of the plaintiff was not
in occupation of land. Moreover, possession had
been taken in 1951 of entire estate by the State
Government as apparent from the Gazette
notification, the land of the entire village
stood vested in the State.
The State Government has handed over the
land to Salem Municipality and a major part of
it has been given to the Anna Transport
Corporation for the purpose of the bus stand.
The High Court has observed why entire land was
not given to Transport Corporation by
Municipality and consequently inferred in favour
of the plaintiff, only part of the land has been
given could not have been made the basis by the
High Court to derive a conclusion in favour of
the plaintiff so as to buttress the title. The
High Court has gravely erred in recording such
an inferential finding. There was no scope to
arrive at the same. The approach employed by
the High Court is wholly impermissible,
unsustainable, perverse and illegal.
Thus, we have no hesitation in setting
aside the judgment and decree passed by the High
Court and restoring that of the First Appellate
Court. All the three suits stand dismissed. As
there was multiplication of various proceedings
and three suits were filed, we impose cost of
Rupees One Lakh upon the plaintiff/respondent to
be deposited with the Welfare Fund of Supreme
Court Advocate-on-Record Association within two
months and receipt be filed in the Registry.
The appeals are allowed.