Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 Leave granted.
3 This appeal arises from a judgment and order of a Division Bench of
the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the States of Telangana and
Andhra Pradesh dated 8 February 2018.
4 The Superintendent of Post Offices, Hanamkonda issued a
notification on 4 November 2013 inviting applications for conducting a
departmental examination to the cadre of postman. The result of the
name of G Vijender was declared to be selected and was posted as a
postman. The respondent was second in the order of merit in the Select
List. Upon receiving a complaint that G Vijender had obtained selection by
adopting fraudulent means, the employee was placed under suspension
on 24 January 2014. The respondent moved the Central Administrative
Tribunal1 at Hyderabad seeking a direction for being posted in place of G
Vijender. The Tribunal dismissed the Original Application as premature. G
Vijender was dismissed from service after a departmental enquiry on 29
April 2016. The respondent filed an Original Application before the
Tribunal in which an order was passed on 25 November 2016 to consider
his request in accordance with the rules. Following this order, the
representation of the respondent to appoint him as a postman was
rejected, upon which he moved the Tribunal afresh. The Tribunal, by its
order dated 9 November 2017, came to the conclusion that the respondent
had a right to be appointed to the post of postman and that upon the
dismissal of the candidate who had been duly selected and appointed, the
respondent ought to be appointed. This order of the Tribunal has been
affirmed by the High Court while dismissing a writ petition filed by the
appellants.
5 Mr Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General has relied
upon a decision of a two-judge Bench of this Court in Thrissur District
Co-operative Bank Limited v Delson Davis P2. The Additional Solicitor
General submitted that once the process of selection had been completed
with the appointment of G Vijender, the Select List stood exhausted.
Hence, the subsequent dismissal of the appointed candidate from service
would not result in the revival of the Select List. Hence, it was urged that
1 Tribunal 2 2002 (2) SLR 410
both the Tribunal and the High Court have erred in coming to the
conclusion that the respondent had a vested right to appointment.
6 On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the respondent by
Mr M Venkanna, learned counsel, that the candidate who had been
appointed had secured his appointment through fraudulent means and,
hence, the appointment was void ab initio. Learned counsel submitted that
it was, strictly speaking, not necessary for the Department to hold a
departmental enquiry and a simple order of termination with a notice to
show cause would have sufficed. Hence, it was urged that it was the
respondent, who was second in the order of merit, who should have been
appointed.
7 The facts, as they have emerged on record indicate that the selection
process which was initiated in pursuance of the notification dated 4
November 2013 culminated in the order of appointment of G Vijender.
Subsequently, his services came to be terminated following the order of
dismissal upon the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. Once a
candidate had been selected upon the conclusion of the selection process
and was appointed to the post, the Select List stood exhausted. There
was one vacancy. The subsequent dismissal from service of the appointed
candidate in 2016 would not either revive the Select List or result in the
appointment of the respondent.
8 This principle emerges from the judgment of this Court in Thrissur
District Co-operative Bank Limited where it was held:
“When once the selection process is complete and appointment
had been made, that process comes to an end and if any
vacancy arises on the appointee having joined the post leaves
the same, it must be treated as a fresh vacancy and fresh steps
in accordance with the appropriate rules should be taken. This
view is fortified by the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v.
Raghubir Chand Sharma and Anr. [JT 2001 (9) SC 266]”
9 Adopting the above view, we have come to the conclusion that the
impugned orders of the Tribunal and the High Court cannot be sustained.
We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment
and order of the High Court dated 8 February 2018. In consequence, the
Original Application filed by the respondent seeking appointment to the
post of postman shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to
costs.
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
[Hrishikesh Roy]
New Delhi; January 09, 2020
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).1020/2019
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 08-02-2018 in WP No. 530/2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh)
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
G. RAMESH Respondent(s) (WITH IA No. 182774/2018 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING)
Date : 09-01-2020 This petition was called on for hearing today.
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG
Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, Adv.
Ms. Awantika Manohar, Adv.
Mr. Pranay Sanjana, Adv.
Mr. Siddhartha Sinha, Adv.
Dr. D.V. Rao, Adv.
Mr. Gurmeet Singh Makker, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. M. Venkanna, Adv.
Mr. M.V. Krishna Mohan, Adv.
Mr. K. Maruthi Rao, Adv.
Mrs. K. Radha, Adv.
Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed
reportable judgment. There shall be no order as to
costs.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)