1.This appeal arising out of an order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar, Nawanshahr, under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and confirmed on revision by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, raises an interesting question as to whether a Non-Resident Indian who induction of the tenant, will be entitled to invoke the summary jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B or not.
2.We have heard Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Pardeep Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
3.Admittedly one Shri Padam Nabh, who was the father of the proprietor/partner of the appellant-concern, was inducted as a tenant in respect of a non residential building measuring about 12’ x 12’, situate at the Old Grain Market Nawanshahar. The induction of Shri Padam Nabh as a tenant, was by one Sat Prakash.
4.Claiming (i) that the original owner Sat Prakash sold the premises in question to his father Brij Lal under a sale deed dated 6.2.1989; (ii) that the property devolved upon him and his brother after the demise of his father in the year 1991 through testamentary succession; (iii) that he went to Australia in March-1996 and returned to India on 4.02.2004; and (iv) that he required the tenanted premises for establishing a departmental store, the respondent filed a petition for eviction under Section 13-B of the Act. The petition was allowed by the Rent Controller by an Order dated 19.01.2010.
5.Challenging the order of the eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller, the appellant filed a revision before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The revision having been dismissed by the High Court, the tenant is on appeal before us.
6.The main contention of Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the issue raised by the appellant is no longer res integra, but covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta1. However, the High Court, in the impugned order, chose to follow the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Smt. Bachan Kaur vs. Kabal Singh2, which distinguished the Constitution Bench Judgment in Nathi Devi (supra). Therefore, it is contended by Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel that the impugned order of the High Court requires to be interfered with, by this Court, in the light of the law declared by the Constitution Bench while interpreting an identical provision in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “Delhi Act”). 2 2011(1) RCR (Rent) 368
7.Since Nathi Devi (supra) was concerned with the interpretation of
Section 14-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and since we are
concerned in this case with the interpretation of Section 13-B of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, we think it would be
appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of both the enactments in
a tabular column for better appreciation.
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949
14-B. Right to recover immediate 13-A. Right to recover immediate
possession of premises to accrue possession of residential or
to members of the armed forces, scheduled building to accrue to
etc. certain persons. Where a specified
landlord at any time, within one (1) Where the landlord
year prior to or within one year
(a) is a released or retired person after the date of his retirement or
from any armed forces and the after his retirement but within one
premises let out by him are year of the date of commencement
required for his own residence; of the East Punjab Urban Rent
or Restriction (Amendment) Act,
1985, whichever is later, applies to (b) is a dependent of a member of
the Controller alongwith a any armed forces who had
certificate from the authority been killed in action and the
competent to remove him from premises let out by such member
service indicating the date of his are required for the
retirement and his affidavit to the residence of the family of such
effect that he does not own and member, such person or, as the
possess any other suitable case may be, the dependent may,
accommodation in the local area in within one year from the date of
which he intends to reside to his release or retirement from
recover possession of his such armed forces or, as the
case may be, the date of death of residential building or scheduled such member, or within a period building, as the case may be, for of one year from the date of his own occupation, there shall commencement of the Delhi Rent accrue, on and from the date of Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, such application to such specified whichever is later, apply to the landlord, notwithstanding anything Controller for recovering the contained elsewhere in this Act or immediate possession of such in any other law for the time being premises. in force or in any contract (whether
expressed or implied), custom or(2) Where the landlord is a
usage to the contrary, a right tomember of any of the armed
recover immediately the possessionforces and has a period of less
of such residential building orthan one year preceding the date
scheduled building or any part orof his retirement and the
parts of such building if it is let outpremises let out by him are
in part or parts:required for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at
Provided that in case of death ofany time, within a period of one
the specified landlord, the widow oryear before the date of his
widower of such specified landlordretirement, apply to the
and in the case of death of suchController for recovering the
widow or widower, a child or aimmediate possession of such
grandchild or a widowed daughter-premises.
in-law who was dependent upon (3) Where the landlord referred to such specified landlord at the time in sub-section (1) or sub- section of his death shall be entitled to (2) has let out more than one make an application under this premises, it shall be open to him section to the Controller to make an application under that sub-section in respect of (a) In the case of death of such only one of the premises chosen specified landlord, before the by him. commencement of the East
Punjab Urban Rent RestrictionExplanation - For the purposes of this section, "armed forces" (Amendment) Act, 1985, within means an armed force of the one year of such commencement; Union constituted under an Act (b) In the case of death of such of Parliament and includes a specified landlord after such member of the police force commencement, but before the constituted under Section 3 of date of his retirement, within one
the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (34 of year of the date of his death; 1978). (c) In the case of death of such
specified landlord after such14-C. Right to recover immediate
commencement and the date ofpossession of premises to accrue
his retirement within one year ofto Central Government and Delhi
the date of such retirement:Administration employees- (1) Where the landlord is a retired and on the date of such employee of the Central application the right to recover Government or of the Delhi the possession of the residential Administration, and the building or scheduled building, as premises let out by him are the case may be, which belonged required for his own residence, to such specified landlord at the such employee may, within one time of his death shall accrue to year from the date of his the applicant: retirement or within a period of one year from the date of Provided further that nothing in commencement of the Delhi Rent this section shall be so construed Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, as conferring a right, on any whichever is later, apply to the person to recover possession of Controller for recovering the more than one residential or immediate possession of such scheduled building inclusive of premises. any part or any parts thereof if it
is let out in part or parts:(2) Where the landlord is an employee of the Central
Provided further that theGovernment or of the Delhi
Controller may give the tenant aAdministration and has a period
reasonable period for putting theof less than one year preceding
specified landlord or, as the casethe date of his retirement and
may be , the widow, widower,the premises let out by him are
child, grandchild or widowedrequired by him for his own
daughter-in-law in possession ofresidence after his retirement, he
the residential building ormay, at any time, within a period
scheduled building, as the caseof one year before the date of his
may be, and may extend suchretirement, apply to the
time so as not to exceed threeController for recovering the
months in the aggregate.immediate possession of such premises.
Explanation- For the purpose (3) Where the landlord referred to
in sub-section (1) or sub-section of this section, the expression (2) has let out more than one “retirement” means termination of premises, it shall be open to him service of a specified landlord to make an application under otherwise than by resignation. that sub-section in respect of only one of the premises chosen 13-B. Right to recover immediate by him. possession of residential building
or scheduled building and/or14-D. Right to recover immediate
non-residential building to accruepossession of premises to accrue to a widow. - (1) Where the to non-resident Indian. - (1) landlord is a widow and the Where an owner is a non-resident premises let out by her, or by her Indian and returns to India and husband are required by her for the residential building or sched her own residence, she may uled building and/or non-residen apply to the Controller for
tial building, as the case may be,recovering the immediate
let out by him or her, is requiredpossession of such premises.
for his or her use, or for the use of (2) Where the landlord referred to
anyone ordinarily living with orin sub-section (1) has let out
dependent on him or her, he ormore than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an she, may apply to the Controller application under that sub- for immediate possession of such section in respect of any one of building or buildings, as the case the premises chosen by her. may be : 14 (6) Where a landlord has Provided that a right to apply acquired any premises by
in respect of such a building un-transfer, no application for the
der this section, shall be availablerecovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub- only after a period of five years section (1), on the ground from the date of becoming the specified in clause (e) of the owner of such a building and proviso thereto, unless a period of shall be available only once dur five years have elapsed from the ing the lifetime of such an owner. date of the acquisition."
(2) Where the owner referred to
in sub-section (1) has let out more
than one residential building or
scheduled building and/or non
residential building, it shall be
open to him or her to make an ap
plication under that sub-section
in respect of only one residential
building or one scheduled build
ing and/or one non-residential
building, each chosen by him or
her.
(3) Where an owner recovers
possession of a building under
this section, he or she shall not
transfer it through sale or any
other means or let it out before
the expiry of a period of five years
from the date of taking possession
of the said building, failing which,
the evicted tenant may apply to
the Controller for an order direct
ing that he shall be restored the
possession of the said building
and the Controller shall make an
order accordingly.”
8.In Nathi Devi, eviction was sought under Section 14-D of the Delhi Act by a widow landlady. The Rent Controller allowed the eviction summarily and High Court confirmed the same. In the special leave petition filed by the tenant, the decision of this Court in S. Surjit Singh Kalra vs Union of India & Anr.3 was relied upon in support of the contention that a landlady who acquired the tenanted premises by way of transfer, could not avail the remedy under Section 14-D for the eviction of a pre-existing tenant. However, the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court before whom Nathi Devi (supra) first came up, doubted the correctness of the decision in S. Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) and, hence, directed the special leave petition to be placed before a three Member Bench. The three Member Bench noticed the conflict between the S. Surjit Singh Kalra and Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak4. The conflict was with respect to the interpretation of the words “let out” appearing in the relevant provision. Due to this conflict, Nathi Devi was referred to the Constitution Bench by an order reported in Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta5. The short order of reference reads as follows: “Specifically the issue is in relation to the meaning of the words" let out". Do they mean the creation of a fresh tenancy or do they refer to an existing tenancy? If the former, the section can be resorted to only by the creator of the tenancy (widow or her late husband). If it is the latter, even a transferee (widow) is entitled to invoke it. We find that there is some conflict in the views taken by two Benches of three learned Judges each. An observation in the judgment in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India suggests that the words "let out" refer only to the creation of a tenancy. On the other hand, the judgment in Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak interprets the words "let out" in the context of Section 14-D of the Act to mean that even a transferee landlord can invoke the provision. It is, in these circumstances, necessary that this appeal should be heard by a Bench of five learned Judges. It shall be so placed after obtaining the directions of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India in this regard.”
9.The Constitution Bench, after referring to the provisions of Sections 14B to 14D as well as Section 14(6) of the Delhi Act held (i) that these provisions carve out an exception to the normal procedure for eviction; (ii) that being in the nature of exception, they must be construed strictly and (iii) that the words “let out by him” or “let out by her” clearly signify that the premises let out by any other person will stand excluded from the operation of the summary procedure. Paragraphs 28 and 32 of the Constitution Bench Judgment in Nathi Devi (supra) are extracted as follows, as the entire argument of the petitioners, revolves around the same: “28. The observations in the aforesaid judgments no doubt support the case of the appellant. This Court did clearly lay down that the expression, "the premises let out by him" in Section 14-B of the Act did mean that it is he who has let out alone could evict, and in case the landlord had been killed in action his dependent could seek immediate eviction of the premises let out by such person. It is noticeable that the expression, "premises let out by him" is used in Sections 14-B and14-C, but the expression, in Section 14-D is "premises let out by her, or by her husband." Section 14-B contemplates two situations, firstly, where the landlord is a released or retired person from any armed forces and secondly, where he was killed in action. In case the landlord was killed in action a right has been given to his dependant within one year of the death of the landlord, to apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of the premises. Section 14C confers a right on a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration who requires the premises let out by him for his own residence. Section 14-D confers a right on a widow of the landlord to seek immediate possession of the premises let out "by her, or by her husband". The scheme of these Sections appears to be that where the landlord is alive and the premises have been let out by him, only he can make an application for immediate possession of the premises for his own use. Only in the case of his death his dependant under Section 14-A, and his widow under Section 14-D can seek immediate possession of the premises. The use of the expression, "let out by him" in Sections 14-B and 14-C and the expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" in Section 14-D have significance. If it was unnecessary in the scheme of these Sections as to who had actually let out the premises, the legislature would not have used the term "let out by him" or "let out by her, or by her husband". In interpreting a provision one cannot assume that the words employed by the legislature are redundant. Section 14-D gives a right to file an application under that provision only to a widow who had let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises. Consequently, if the premises had been let out by someone else, Section 14-D will not apply. As pointed out in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) the expression used in Section 14-B is "the premises let out by him", unlike the expression used in Section 14 (1)(e) where the legislature employed the expression "the premises let out for residential purposes". Thus in the case of a landlord belonging to the general category it was immaterial whether the premises was let out by him or by someone else, as long as he was the landlord of the premises at the time of making an application seeking eviction of the tenant. But the expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" conveys a different meaning altogether. The widow's right to recover immediate possession of the premises arises only if the premises were let out by her or by her husband, and not by anyone else. It appears to us that the legislature has purposely employed a different expression in Section 14-D as also in Section 14 B and 14-C. We are here concerned with an application filed under Section 14-D which specifies in clear terms that a widow can invoke the provisions only if she has let out the premises, or if her husband had let out the premises. If, as observed in Kanta Goel (supra), the expression, "the premises let out by him" has been used only to convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, and not that he had himself let out the premises, the legislature would not have then used the expression "let out by her, or by her husband." The very fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one which was let out by the widow or by her husband implies that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by any other person. If the intention of the legislature was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use of the words "the premises let out by her, or by her husband" would have been unnecessary and the Section would have simply read as follows: "Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises." By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband, the legislature has clearly excluded from the purview of the said provision "premises let out by any other person" even if in course of time the widow may have become its landlord. We are obliged to read the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature. The expression, "let out by her, or by her husband" is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose husband had let the premises before his death, and which premises the widow requires for her own use. “32. There is another aspect of the matter. Section 14-D uses the expression, "premises let out by her, or by her husband" which are required by the widow for her own residence. She may apply to the Rent Controller for recovering the immediate possession of "such premises". "Such premises" obviously is relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other person. We, therefore, find substance in the submission urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 14-D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions, "let out by her or by her husband" and "such premises" in Section 14-D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the application of Section 14-D namely, the landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, in our view, Section 14-D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14D to evict a preexisting tenant.”
10.But it is difficult to accept the contention that Nathi Devi which interpreted Section 14-D of the Delhi Act, would apply with equal force to the interpretation of Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. There are several distinguishing features between the Delhi Act and the Punjab Act. Even before we take note of the distinguishing features, we must keep in mind the fact that the shortage of housing and the exploitation of tenants by landlords in the urban areas, in the aftermath of the world wars, led to the enactment of rent control legislations in the country. The problems created by the post war conditions differed from State to State and hence, the solution sought to be offered in the form of legislation also differed from State to State. As a matter of fact the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is an offshoot of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 and the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, both of which are pre-independent and pre-partition legislation. On the contrary, the Delhi Act of 1958 is an offshoot of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The areas to which these acts applied had their own peculiar geographical features and socio-economic conditions. This is why the language employed in these rent control legislations differ, though they may have a common template.
11.Coming to the distinguishing features between the Delhi Act and the East Punjab Act, it may be seen immediately that the Delhi Act covers four categories of persons, namely, (i) a landlord in occupation of a residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority and who is required to vacate such residential accommodation; (ii) a landlord, released or retired from armed forces or a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action, including a member of the armed forces who is due to retire within one year; (iii) a landlord who is a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration; and (iv) a widow. But under the Punjab Act, the right to seek immediate possession is conferred in favour of only two categories of persons, namely, (i) a specified landlord, meaning thereby a person entitled to receive rent in respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in a connection with the affairs of the union or of a State; and (ii) an owner who is a non resident Indian and who returns to India.
12.While Section 13-A of the East Punjab Act was inserted by amending Act 2 of 1985, Section 13-B was inserted by Punjab Act 9 of 2001. Delhi Act does not contain any special provision for the benefit of NRI landlords. It is common knowledge that the major chunk of the NRI diaspora is from three states, namely, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Therefore, the legislature thought fit to exempt buildings owned by NRIs from the rigors of the Rent Restriction Act. Hence, the normal rule of interpretation of a legislation for the welfare of the tenants, will give way while interpreting the provisions as applicable to the exempted categories.
13.It may be of interest to note that while carving out an exception in favour of four categories of persons, under Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D, the Delhi Act used only the word “landlord”. But the Punjab Act uses the word “specified landlord” under Section 13-A and the word “owner” in Section 13-B. It is needless to mention that there is a world of difference between the expression “landlord” and the expression “owner”. While the owner of a premises may also be the landlord of the premises, a landlord, within the meaning of the expression under the Rent Control legislations, need not necessarily be the owner of the said premises. Therefore, while interpreting Section 13-B of the Punjab Act, the Court must keep in mind the distinction between those two expressions.
14.The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B which curtails the right of the owner to invoke this provision for a period of five years from the date of becoming the owner, makes it clear that the words “let out by him” require a different interpretation .
15.If the interpretation suggested by Mr. Nidhesh Gupta on the basis of the decision in Nathi Devi (supra) is accepted, a NRI who is the owner of the building will be required to satisfy two conditions, namely, (i) that the premises was let out by him; and (ii) that a period of five years from the date of becoming the owner has elapsed. The proviso to Sub-section (1) cannot be construed as imposing a condition additional to the one prescribed in Sub-Section (1). The correct method of interpreting Sub section (1) of Section 13-B and the proviso thereunder is to hold that irrespective of the person by whom the tenant was inducted, a NRI owner will have to wait for a period of five years from the date of becoming the owner, to be entitled to invoke Section 13-B.
16.We must also keep in mind the distinction between (i) inception of tenancy or induction of a person as a tenant; and (ii) letting out a premises on lease. Section 13-B(1) does not use the expression “inducted by him or her”. If these words had been used, they would certainly refer to the inception of the tenancy. Section 13(B)(1) uses the expression “let out”.
17.Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 declares that a leasing of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year (in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary). It also says that a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month. Therefore, if a NRI becomes the owner of the building to which the Act applies and the tenancy of a person in occupation is attorned in his favour, the premises would become a premises let out by him, as otherwise the jural relationship of landlord and tenant will not come into existence. Once a NRI acquires a premises which is in the occupation of a tenant inducted by his predecessor in title, he becomes the owner. The moment the tenancy is attorned in his favour, then the jural relationship of tenant landlord is created and the premises become one let out by him. It is perhaps with a view to highlight this aspect that the legislature has carefully used the expression “owner” in Section 13-B, even while using the expression “landlord” in other places.
18.Therefore, the decision of the Constitution Bench in Nathi Devi (supra) as applicable to the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Act cannot be pressed into service for interpreting Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Hence, we find that the order of the High Court impugned in the present appeal is perfectly valid and does not call for any interference. Therefore the appeal is dismissed.
19.However the tenant is granted six months’ time to vacate the premises, provided the usual undertaking is furnished within a period of two weeks. There will be no order as to costs. (Hemant Gupta) (V. Ramasubramanian) NOVEMBER 17, 2021 NEW DELHI.