Leave granted.
The challenge herein is to the judgment and order dated
15.11.2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bengaluru in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 10293 of
2012(WC), whereby the High Court has reversed the judgment
and award dated 19.06.2012 passed in WC-DVGWCA No.76 of
2010 on the file of the Labour Officer and Commissioner for
Workmen’s Compensation, Davanagere(‘the Commissioner’).
By the judgment and award dated 19.06.2012, the
Commissioner had awarded compensation in the sum of Rs.
4,15,960/-(Rupees four lakh fifteen thousand nine hundred
sixty) together with interest @ 12% per annum to the wife
and mother of the deceased workman, said to be employed as
a driver on the auto-rickshaw belonging to the respondent
No. 2. The workman allegedly died while on duty due to
cardiac arrest.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the relevant aspects of
the present case are that the Commissioner, while dealing
with the claim made by the present appellants, framed the
following issues for consideration:-
“1. Whether the petitioners have proved
that, the deceased died due to driving strain
on 07.04.2010 while working as driver in the
autorickshaw bearing No.KA-17-A--6365 owned
by the first respondent?
2. Whether the petitioners prove that, they
are the dependants of the deceased?
3. Whether the petitioners have proved the
monthly salary received by the deceased while
working as driver in the auto rickshaw
bearing No.KA-17-A-6365 owned by the first
respondent and the age of the deceased?
4. What compensation are the petitioners
entitled for and from whom?
5. What order?”
The Commissioner returned the finding on issue No. 1,
after examination of the material placed on record in the
following manner: -
“…On examining the documents viz. Ex-P1 FIR,
Ex-P2-Inquest mahazar, Ex-P3-Spot mahazar,
Ex-P4-statement of the 1st respondent, Ex-P5-
post mortem report, Ex-P8- Charge-sheet, Ex-
P9- FSL report post mortem reports produced
and got marked during examination of his
sworn evidence, the second petitioner, it is
considered that, the said documents are
corroborative to the factors in the petition
and sworn affidavit of the petitioners, it is
confirmed that, the deceased died due to the
driving strain on 07.04.2010 while working as
driver in the auto rickshaw bearing No. KA-
17-A-6365 owned by the first respondent and
decide accordingly.”
In issue No. 2, the Commissioner held that the claimants
were dependents of the deceased; and in issue No. 3, held
that the deceased was 30 years of age and was receiving
monthly wages of Rs.4,000/- and daily allowance of Rs.50/-
from the employer. While quantifying compensation and
deciding liability in issue No. 4, the Commissioner
assessed the amount of compensation at Rs. 4,15,960/-
(Rupees four lakh fifteen thousand nine hundred sixty) with
reference to the monthly wages of the deceased at Rs.
4,000/- (Rupees four thousand). The Commissioner also
examined in detail the submissions made on behalf of the
respondent-insurer and the affidavit filed on its behalf
and ultimately recorded his conclusion on the liability of
the insurer and the entitlement of the claimants in the
following words: -
“…Auto rickshaw baring No. KA-17-A-6365 owned
by the first respondent is insured with the
second respondent and the said insurance
policy is marked as Ex-R2-1 and the insurance
policy was valid as on the date of accident
and the driver of the vehicle is covered
under the said insurance policy and on
examining thoroughly and considering the
factors addressed during arguments of the
learned counsel for both the parties with
regard to payment of compensation due to the
first and second petitioner under law towards
the death of the deceased, it is decided
that, the second respondent is liable to pay
compensation of Rs. 4,15,960-00 to the first
and second petitioners under statute with
regard to the death of the deceased.”
In the insurer’s appeal against the judgment and award
aforesaid, the High Court took note of the facts and
circumstances of the case and the findings of the
Commissioner and then, with reference to the decision of
this Court in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti vs Prabhakar
Maruti Garvali & Anr.: (2007) 11 SCC 668, particularly
paragraph 38 to 42 thereof, found the judgment and award
made by the Commissioner unsustainable for the following
reasons: -
“21. As noticed hereinabove, there is no oral
evidence with regard to admission of the
workman into the hospital. Further, the cause
of death is not forthcoming in the records.
Therefore, in my considered view, the
conclusion arrived at by the W.C.
Commissioner that there exists a nexus
between the cause of death and the occupation
of workman is not supported by any evidence
and therefore, the W.C. Commissioner does not
get jurisdiction to award compensation.”
Assailing the judgment and order so passed by the High
Court, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously
argued that in this case, the fundamental facts stand duly
established by evidence produced on record that the
deceased was 30 years of age; he was engaged as a driver on
the auto-rickshaw; and he expired while on duty because of
cardiac arrest, which he suffered due to the strain and
stress of his job. Learned counsel would submit that on the
basis of relevant material, the Commissioner had recorded
cogent findings of fact and there had not been any
perversity in such findings so as to call for interference
by the High Court. Learned counsel would further submit
that the decision in the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant
Shreshti(supra) is clearly distinguishable because the
deceased therein was engaged on the job of a cleaner on the
vehicle and this Court consciously took note of the fact
that nature of his duty, being of helper, was not such that
it would cause stress or strain. Learned counsel has
further drawn our attention to the observations made in
paragraph 38 of the said decision and has submitted that in
the present case, the basic and foundational facts have
been established by the claimants that it had been a case
of death during the course of employment and having been
caused due to the reasons attributable to the employment.
Learned counsel has also submitted that there was no such
substantial question of law involved in the matter so as to
call for interference by the High Court.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-insurer
has duly supported the judgment and order passed by the
High Court and has emphasised on the contentions that the
appellants have failed to establish that the death occurred
due to employment or due to reasons attributable to the
employment. Learned counsel would rely upon the decision in
Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra). According to the
learned counsel, since the claimants failed to prove the
basic jurisdictional facts, the High Court has rightly
interfered in the matter.
Having given anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and having examined the material placed on
record with reference to the law applicable, we are clearly
of the view that the impugned judgment and order cannot be
sustained as there was no substantial question of law
involved in the matter for which, the High Court could have
interfered with the judgment and award made by the
Commissioner.
As noticed above, the Commissioner had returned the
basic findings of fact with reference to the material
placed on record. It is noticed that the claimants i.e.,
the wife and mother of the deceased, had indeed placed on
record the FIR, inquest mahazar, spot mahazar, charge-sheet
and post mortem report along with FSL report. The
Commissioner, with reference to the said evidence as also
after analysing the rebuttal evidence adduced by the
respondent-insurer, recorded the findings which cannot be
said to be perverse or suffering from any such manifest
illegality so as to give rise to a ‘substantial question of
law’ for consideration of the High Court.
Even in paragraph 42 of the decision in Shakuntala
Chandrakant Shreshti(supra), this Court has made it clear
that a question of law would arise when the same is not
dependent on examination of evidence and which may not
require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law
would arise, of course, when the finding is perverse or
when no legal evidence is adduced to establish the
jurisdictional facts. The observations made by the High
Court in the present case in paragraph 21 appear to be
rather of assumptive nature than of specific conclusion on
perversity. In other words, the view as taken by the
Commissioner was the one based on the material placed on
record, which basically established that the deceased was
indeed employed as a driver on the vehicle; he was 30 years
of age; and he died while on duty and his demise due to
cardiac arrest was attributable to his job of driver. There
had not been shown any other background aspect or any other
clinching feature because of which death of the workman, a
30-year-old person, could be attributed to any other cause.
That being the position, the view taken by the Commissioner
had been a possible view of the matter in the given set of
facts and circumstances; and there was no reason for the
High Court to interfere with the same, particularly when
the case did not involve any substantial question of law
within the meaning of Section 30 of Employees Compensation
Act, 1933.
For what have been discussed and observed hereinabove,
this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment
and order dated 15.11.2018 passed by the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru in MFA No. 10293 of 2012(WC) is set
aside and the judgment and award of the Labour Officer and
Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Davanagere dated
19.06.2012 stands restored. No costs.
New Delhi; March 29, 2022.