These appeals are directed against the judgment and order
dated 11.02.2010, as passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at
Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 766 of 2001, whereby the High
Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the present appellants
while maintaining their conviction of the offence under Section
302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and sentence of life
imprisonment with fine of Rs. 3,000/- each with default
stipulations.
In challenge to the concurrent findings of fact, the learned
counsel for the appellants has essentially put forward the
submissions that in this case, the principal witnesses of the
prosecution, namely, PW-1 Shankerlal and PW-11 Rameshwar Prasad
SignaturecouldNot Verified not have been relied upon for the reasons that PW-1 had not SNEHA DAS
declared hostile whereas PW-11 was introduced in the investigation as an alleged eye-witness after twenty-two days of the lodging of
FIR. In the second limb of submissions, learned counsel has argued
that even taking the prosecution case on its face value, the
offence against the appellants would not travel beyond the offence
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder because, the case
would be squarely covered by Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. He
has also referred to and relied upon the following passage in the
decision of this Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju Alias
Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P.: (2006) 11 SCC 444: -
“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the
pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as
that will decide whether the case falls under Section
302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or
insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of
cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or
even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations
and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives
like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be
totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention.
There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not
even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum,
there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts
to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put
forth a case that there was no intention to cause death.
It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder
punishable under Section 302, are not converted into
offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or
cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are
treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The
intention to cause death can be gathered generally from
a combination of a few or several of the following,
among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon
used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused
or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow
is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of
force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act
was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or
free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by
chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii)
whether there was any prior enmity or whether the
deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any
grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for
such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of
passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury
has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and
unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single
blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances
is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several
other special circumstances with reference to individual
cases which may throw light on the question of
intention. Be that as it may.”
Learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the submissions
so made and has duly supported the judgment and order impugned,
while referring to the statements of witnesses in their totality.
He has also argued that the applicability of Exception 4 to
Section 300 IPC is ruled out in the present case for the reason
that it had not been a matter of sudden fight inasmuch as, per the
version of the witnesses, it had not been an incident where the
parties were engaged in fight with each other; and the version had
been that the appellants assaulted the victim after trying to
pressurize him to refrain from giving evidence in another criminal
case.
So far as the submissions relating to the evidentiary value of
the statements of prosecution witnesses is concerned, particularly
that relating to PW-1 and PW-11, it is noticed that the Trial
Court as also the High Court have thoroughly examined the entire
record including the testimony of these two witnesses, before
arriving at the conclusion of the guilt of the appellants. This
aspect essentially lies within the arena of appreciation of
evidence and we find no reason to take a different view of the
matter. This is more so because having examined the statements of
the said two witnesses, more particularly that of PW-1 Shankerlal,
who had been the first informant of the case and had himself been
injured in this incident, coupled with the other evidence on
record, we are satisfied that the findings as regards involvement
of the appellants in the incident leading to the death of the victim Sanju are cogent findings of fact and no case for
interference in that regard is made out.
So far as the contention based on Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC is concerned, its applicability is directly ruled out in the
present case in view of the nature of incident as stated by the
witnesses and then, with reference to the nature of injuries
sustained by the deceased, like multiple incise wounds including
that on the left frontal region of the skull as also stab wounds
on the left side of the chest.
In view of the aforesaid, these appeals fail and are
therefore, stand dismissed.
All pending applications also stand disposed of.