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Supreme Court of India

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs BEENA GUPTA (D) THROUGH LRS on 16 January, 2023

Cites 2 provisionsCites 1 judgmentsCited by 0
2023 INSC 47C.A. No.-009287-009287 - 2022Official PDFAuthor Mukesh Rasikbhai ShahBench Mukesh Rasikbhai Shah, Chudalayil Thevan RavikumarAdvocates MALVIKA KAPILA
REPORTABLE
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9287 of 2022
(@ SLP (C) No.23798 of 2022)
(@ Diary No.21296 of 2022)
Delhi Development AuthorityAppellant
Versus
Beena Gupta (D) Through LRS. &
Ors.Respondents
J U D G M E N T

1.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 01.11.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (Civil) No.3986 Neetu Sachdeva writ petitioner and has declared that the acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 2013’), the Delhi Development Authority has preferred the present appeal.

2.At the outset, it is required to be noted that vide

Notification dated 17.06.2005 issued under the provisions of

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 large tract of the

land measuring about 200 Bighas falling in Village Mundaka

was sought to be acquired. A declaration under Section 6

of the Act was issued and published thereafter on

31.05.2006. In the present case the dispute is with respect

to the land measuring 1 Bigha and 2 Biswas out of Khasra

No. 65/22/1. That, vide sale deed dated 17.06.2005, the

said land was purchased by one Ashok Kumar and Raj

Kumar Sharma. Thereafter, vide order dated 01.08.2005,

the aforesaid persons came to be mutated in the revenue

records. That thereafter vide GPA, Will, Affidavit, Agreement

to sell and Receipt dated 11.05.2010 the aforesaid Raj

Kumar Sharma sold 275 sq. yrds. land, out of 11 Biswas

owned by him, to respondent no.1 herein – original writ

petitioner. Thus, the respondent no.1 – original writ

petitioner can be said to be subsequent purchaser who

acquired the right, title or interest in the land in question

much after the land acquisition proceedings and the award

was declared, which was declared on 31.05.2007.

2.1 The respondent no.1 herein – original writ petitioner

filed the writ petition before the High Court to declare that

the acquisition with respect to the land in question is

deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013

on the ground that the compensation with respect to the

land in question is not paid.

2.2 Though it was specifically the case on behalf of the

appellant before the High Court so stated in the counter

affidavit that the possession of the land in question was

taken over on 15.12.2007 by drawing the panchnama and

that the original writ petitioner being subsequent purchaser

had no locus to challenge the acquisition, by the impugned

judgment and order the High Court has entertained the writ

petition preferred by respondent no.1 – original writ

petitioner and has declared that the acquisition with respect

to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed under

Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.

2.3. As held by this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar &

Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 10 SCC 229 which

has been subsequently followed by this Court in the case of

Delhi Administration Through Secretary, Land and

Building vs. Pawan Kumar & Ors., Civil Appeal No.3646

of 2022 and Delhi Development Authority versus

Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors, Civil Appeal No.3073 of

2022, the subsequent purchaser had no locus to challenge

the acquisition and/or lapsing of the acquisition under the

Act, 2013. Under the circumstances the High Court has

seriously erred in entertaining the writ petition preferred by

the respondent no.1 – original writ petitioner – subsequent

purchaser who had acquired the right, title or interest in the

land in question subsequent to the acquisition proceedings,

subsequent to passing of the award. Under the

circumstances the impugned judgment and order passed by

the High Court is unsustainable.

2.4 Even otherwise on merits also and in light of the

subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court

in the case of Indore Development Authority versus

Manoharlal and others reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 the

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court

declaring the acquisition with respect to the land in question

is deemed to have lapsed is unsustainable.

2.5 As observed hereinabove it was the specific case on

behalf of the appellant before the High Court and so stated

in the counter before the High Court that the possession of

the land in question was taken over on 15.12.2007.

2.6 In the case of Indore Development Authority (supra)

the Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 366 has

observed and held as under:-

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we

answer the questions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a)

in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the

date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no

lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be

determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed

within the window period of five years excluding the

period covered by an interim order of the court, then

proceedings shall continue as provided under

Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act

as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2)

between possession and compensation has to be

read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of nondeposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the

computation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not

give rise to new cause of action to question the

legality of concluded proceedings of land

acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding

pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act

i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-

barred claims and does not reopen concluded

proceedings nor allow landowners to question the

legality of mode of taking possession to reopen

proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in

the treasury instead of court to invalidate

acquisition.”

2.7 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of

Indore Development Authority (supra), on merits also the

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court

declaring that the acquisition with respect to land in

question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the

Act, 2013 is unsustainable.

3.In view of the above and for the reason stated above the present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court declaring that the acquisition with respect to the land is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is accordingly quashed and set aside. Consequently, the original writ petition filed by respondent no.1 filed before the High Court stands dismissed. Present appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs. [M.R. SHAH] [C.T. RAVIKUMAR] NEW DELHI; JANUARY 16, 2023.