1.Leave granted.
2.These Appeals by special leave are directed against Order dt.14.11.2018 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 612/2004 filed against the judgment and order dt. 18.11.2004 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow RADHA SHARMA [hereinafter “Sessions Court”] whereby the Criminal Appeal No. 88/2004 filed by the Appellant was dismissed and the conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter “IPC” & Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [hereinafter “DP Act, 1961”] vide Judgment dt. 28.08.2004 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow [hereinafter “Magistrate”] was upheld. The Order dt. 28.11.2018 dismissing the recall application against the said Order dt.14.11.2018 is also under challenge before this Court.
3.The captioned Appeal arises out of Case Crime No.
60/1999 lodged by the PS Women Police Station, Lucknow under
Sections 498A, 323, 506 IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act,
1961, on the basis of a Complaint dt. 20.12.1999 filed by the
Complainant wife, against the Appellant husband and her in-laws
alleging mental and physical torture for not bringing enough
dowry. The factual conspectus in brief is as under:
3.1 The marriage of the Appellant with the Complainant, Ms.
Mala Chaddha, had taken place on 12.02.1997. The Appellant
resided separately with the Complainant wife only for a period of
12 days, from 08.09.1998 to 20.09.1998.
3.2 The Complainant who was working as a teacher with St.
Thomas School prior to her marriage had allegedly resigned from
her job on the advice of the Appellant husband; and her family
had spent more than Rs. 5 lakhs towards the wedding. However,
the Appellant, her in-laws, and the brother-in-law (Jeth) were
constantly unhappy & dissatisfied, and subjected her to constant
taunts, and inflicted upon her physical and mental atrocities. It is
alleged that the Appellant husband and her in-laws forced the
Complainant to consume milk mixed with some
narcotic/alcoholic substances, and forced upon her to attend
parties with his friends, where alcohol was served, and if the
Complainant refused, the Appellant and his family would
humiliate her. Allegedly, the parents-in-laws, in conspiracy with
the Appellant, had planned to kill her, and had kept her in a safe
house, separately from the matrimonial home, the keys for which
were with the parents-in-law. On 23.09.1998, when the father of
the Complainant was invited to the matrimonial house, the
Appellant and her in-laws had allegedly assaulted the
Complainant with kicks and punches in front of her father. The
Appellant and his family purportedly expelled the Complainant,
while she was pregnant. Thereafter, on 10.02.1998, the Appellant
and her family again while ousting her out of the house, allegedly
gave her a strong push, and as a result she fell down, and owing
to the injury, had suffered a miscarriage. It is the case of the
Complainant in the FIR that she made several requests for
reconciliation including efforts through Family Counselling
Centre till 16.12.1999, but it has been in vain, and as a
consequence she registered the Complaint dt. 20.12.1999 against
the Appellant and his family.
3.3 In her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “CrPC”), before the Magistrate, the
Complainant reiterated the allegations in the FIR and stated for
the first time that she was forced by the Appellant and his family
to join service in St. Fidelis School, Aliganj, Lucknow and the in-
laws would snatch her entire month’s salary, which was only Rs.
4,000/- at the time. On 23.09.1998, when the Appellant raised a
demand of Rs. 2 Lacs, and her parents were unable to arrange the
money, the Appellant and the in-laws allegedly beat her up. The
Complainant asserts that she only took with her four gold bangles
and one ring, while leaving her matrimonial home in July 1997
and rest all jewellery and list of items were with the Appellant or
his family.
3.4 The Complainant and her father were examined as PW-1
and PW-2, respectively. PW-2, has fully supported the testimony
of PW-1, and in both the statements, the demand of Rs. 2 lakhs as
dowry by the in-laws & the mental and physical atrocities
inflicted on her, is persistent. However, both the witnesses could
not substantiate the allegations of hurt or physical assault. The
Trial Court vide Judgment dt. 28.08.2004, upon duly considering
the testimony of both the witnesses and the material on record,
observed that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt, the commission of offences under Sections 323 and 34
IPC, rendering the following opinion:
“It is evident from perusal of the
evidence available on record that both
the fact witnesses have not made it
clear in their evidence that any simple
hurt was caused to the Complainant as
a result of the physical assault by
accused persons. Even if it is believed
that the accused committed mar-pit
with the Complainant, I think had the
Complainant been subjected to
physical assault by all the accused
persons by kicks and punches, yet she
would have sustained serious injuries
and in such a situation, I am of the
opinion that medical examination of
the Complainant must have been done
so as to prove that she has sustained
injuries due to the assault by accused
persons, but it appears from the
perusal of the record that the
prosecution did not attempted to
adduce any such evidence before the
court as any medical certificate/injury
report with regard to the injuries of the
Complainant has not been filed. In this
context, the evidence of the
complainant is the only strong
evidence regarding the injuries, as she
was subjected to physical assault by
the accused persons but it appears
from perusal of the testimony of the
witness that she has nowhere
mentioned in her statement that she
sustained injuries on such and such
part of her body due to the physical
assault committed by accused persons.
Besides, it is also evident from record
that the prosecution has further stated
that the complainant had miscarriage
due to physical assault committed by
accused persons. In my opinion, if such
an incident had actually taken place,
the complainant was required to get
her medical examination done so as to
prove that the miscarriage took place
due to physical assault committed by
the accused persons as a miscarriage
is not a normal/ordinary course of
events but it is clear from perusal of
record that prosecution has not
adduced any cogent evidence with
regard to the miscarriage. Therefore,
the allegation of miscarriage due to
physical assault proves to be
concocted story. In light of the
foregoing discussion, I reach the
conclusion that the prosecution has
failed to prove the allegation of
physical assault of the complainant
and resultant simple hurt beyond
reasonable doubt.”
3.5 The Trial Court vide Judgment dt. 28.08.2004, observed
that although the prosecution had failed to prove its case against
the Appellant & the co-accused persons, for offences under
Section 323 r/w 34 and Section 506 IPC; it had proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the case under Section 498A IPC and Section 4
of the D.P. Act, 1961 against the Appellant alone. The Trial Court
acquitted the Appellant for offences under Section 323 r/w 34 and
Section 506 IPC and convicted him for offences under Section
498A IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. Accordingly, the
Trial Court sentenced the Appellant as under:
Offence(s) under Period of Fine imposed
Sentence
Section
498A IPC, 1860 2 years RI Rs. 5000/-
4 DP Act, 1961 1 year RI Rs. 2000/-
3.6 The Criminal Appeal No. 88/2024 preferred by the
Appellant against the Judgment dt. 28.08.2024 passed by the
Magistrate, was dismissed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge,
vide its Judgment/Final Order dt. 18.11.2004 and the conviction
under Section 498A of IPC & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 &
the quantum of sentence qua the Appellant was upheld.
3.7 The Appellant had preferred a Criminal Revision No.
612/2004 against the Judgment/Final Order dt. 18.11.2004 before
the High Court, which has been dismissed vide Impugned
Judgement and Final Order dt. 14.11.2018. The High Court within
its powers of revision, upheld the conviction of the Appellant
under Section 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961
with the observation that there was no error of law or perversity
in the orders passed by the lower courts. The said portion is
reproduced as under:
“I have perused the judgment and
orders dated 18.112004 and
28.08.2004, passed by learned courts
below. The learned courts below have
considered all aspects of the matter in
detail and I do not find any error of law
or perversity in the aforesaid
impugned judgment and orders. The
instant revision lacks merit, and
deserves to be dismissed.”
3.8 Further, vide Order dt. 28.11.2018, passed by the High
Court, the Application seeking recall of the Impugned Order
dt.14.11.2018 was also rejected at the threshold, as being
misconceived in law.
4.It has been vehemently argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the Impugned Judgment dt. 14.11.2018 passed by the High Court, suffers from non-application of mind, and nonconsideration of the merits of the case. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the allegations under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, were unsustainable qua the Appellant, as there is no independent evidence on behalf of the prosecution, and the entire case hinges upon the deposition of the father of the Complainant and Complainant herself. It was argued that the Complainant who cohabited with the Appellant only for a period of about a year, had made bald allegations without any specifics of date, time or event, in the FIR in Case Crime No. 60/1999, which has only been registered as a counter-blast to the Divorce Petition preferred by the Appellant. It is brought to our notice that the divorce decree in lieu of their marriage, has already been passed, and the same has never been challenged by the Complainant, and hence has attained finality.
5.It has also been urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, that the High Court passed the Impugned Order in absence of representation of a Counsel on behalf of the Appellant, which is not permissible. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that in the absence of a Counsel for the Appellant, the High Court could have appointed an amicus-curiae to represent the case of the Appellant, rather than passing an adversarial order against him.
6.On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the State that to establish cruelty within the threshold of Section 498A, the evidence of the relatives of the Complainant wife cannot be brushed aside. The deposition of the father of the Complainant does establish that the Complainant was time and again harassed, and beaten her up for not bringing enough dowry. Reliance was placed on Bhagwan Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra1, Arun Vyas & Anr. v. Anita Vyas2, Surendran v. State of Kerala3. ANALYSIS
7.Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the record, the question remains whether the High Court vide Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 whilst exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, was correct in upholding the conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 D.P. Act, 1961. In that respect, it is prudent to examine the statutory provisions, which are as under: “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more. Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,— (a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without any demand having been made in that behalf: Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom without any demand having been made in that behalf: Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act: Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given. 4. Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”
8.At the outset, an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of Section 498A, corresponds to a willful conduct of such nature, that may cause danger to the life, limb and health of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental and physical health and the harassment caused to her, by coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible standards. Further, the demand for dowry in terms of Section 3 and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refers to both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowry made by the husband or his family members. In order to meet the threshold of the offences under Section 498A IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, the allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air.
9.In the present case, the allegations made by the Complainant are vague, omnibus and bereft of any material particulars to substantiate this threshold. Apart from claiming that Appellant husband harassed her for want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. The allegations in the FIR, and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses suggest that on multiple occasions, the Complainant wife was ousted from the matrimonial house, and kicked and punched in the presence of her father, PW-2 herein and she was repeatedly tormented with dowry demands, and when she was unable to honor them, the Appellant and her family physically beat her up; whereas she has not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. It is alleged that the Complainant suffered a miscarriage, as she fell down, when the Appellant and her family who pushed her out of the house; however, no medical document from any medical institution or hospital or nursery was produced to substantiate the allegations.
10.Upon carefully considering the record, we find that apart from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A of IPC, and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. For this reason, we find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, and are of the considered view that there is no material on record to establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, and of hurt and criminal intimidation in terms of Section 323 r/w 34 and Section 506 IPC respectively. The Trial Court has rightly held that evidence of the Complainant is the only strong evidence that she sustained injuries on various parts of her body due to the physical assault by the accused persons, and that there was no medical examination conducted by the Complainant, so as to prove that the miscarriage was a consequence of the physical assault.
11.The Trial Court has indeed applied its judicial mind to the material on record whilst acquitting the Appellant and the coaccused parents-in-law for offences under Section 323 r/w 34 & Section 506 IPC. However, it appears that the Trial Court had passed the order of conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, merely on the possibility that the allegations and the depositions of the PW-1 corroborated by PW2, are true and correct. Although one cannot deny the emotional or mental torture that the Complainant may have undergone in the marriage, however a cursory or plausible view cannot be conclusive proof to determine the guilt of an individual under Section 498A & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, especially to obviate malicious criminal prosecution of family members in matrimonial disputes. In this respect, we also cannot ignore that the FIR dt. 20.12.1999 was registered after the Appellant had filed the Divorce Petition under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 06.02.1999. In consideration thereof and that the Complainant had cohabited with the Appellant only for a period of about a year, it appears that the FIR registered by the Complainant was not genuine.
12.In respect thereof, the High Court while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction ought to have examined the correctness of decision of the Trial Court in light of the material on record, which reveals nothing incriminatory against the Appellant to sustain a conviction under Section 498A IPC or Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. Although we do not agree with the submission on behalf of the Appellant that the Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 was passed in absentia, however the High Court was well within its revisionary powers to discern whether an FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom were sustainable. In all certainty, it could have saved 6 years’ worth of time for the Appellant, who has endured litigation for over 20 years as of today.
13.Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are distressed with the manner, the offences under Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband, casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant wife or her family members, and vitiates the very objective of a protective legislation. The observations made by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.4 appropriately encapsulates this essence as under: “25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a wellrecognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.”
14.The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse by the parties, and cannot be established simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least. The tendency of roping these sections, without mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case of the prosecutions, and casts serious suspicion on the viability of the version of a Complainant. We cannot ignore the missing specifics in a criminal complaint, which is the premise of invoking criminal machinery of the State. Be that as it may, we are informed that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce decree has attained finality, hence any further prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of process of law.
15.We accordingly allow the Appeals and the Order dt.14.11.2018 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 612/2004 convicting the Appellant under Section 498A of IPC & Section 4 of D.P. Act, 1961, is set aside and the Appellant is acquitted of all the charges.
16.Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. [B. V. NAGARATHNA] [SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA] New Delhi May 13, 2025.