Table of Contents
S. No. Heading Paras Page
1.Factual background 1-3 2-10
2.Arguments of the Appellant 4 10-12
3.Arguments of the Respondents 5-6 12-14
4.Arguments by the learned Attorney 7-8 14-20 General for India and learned Amicus
5.Scheme of the Consumer Protection 9-10 20-34 Act,1986
6.The 1986 Act is a self-contained 11 34-36
7.Historical background of certain 12 36-39 by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002
8.Discussion regarding provisions for 13 39-42 enforcement of orders
9.Scheme of the Consumer Protection 14 42-47 Act, 2019
10.Comparative position of the 15 48-53 provisions pertaining to enforcement of orders during different periods
11.Issues 16-17 54
12.Issue No.1 12.1 Position of law with respect to 18-24 54-66 interpretation of statutes 12.2 Conclusion 25-27 67-68
13.Remedies to challenge orders 28 68-69 passed by different fora in execution proceedings
14.Directions to the NCDRC 29-30 70
15.Issue No.2 31-37 70-72
16.Relief 38-41 73-74
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The present appeals have been filed by the appellant
society assailing the order1 of the National Commission2. The
appellant society was aggrieved by the order3 passed by the State
Commission4 which allowed the revision petitions filed by the
respondents and set-aside the order dated 20.11.2007 passed by
the District Forum5 in Execution Petition No.E-22/2007 directing
respondent/builder to execute a deed of conveyance as prepared
1 Dated 16.07.2019 in Execution Revision Petition Nos.52/2014, 53/2014 & 56/2014. 2 National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at New Delhi. 3 Dated 21.04.2014 in Revision Petition Nos. RP/07/156, RP/07/157 & RP/07/158. 4 State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra, Mumbai. 5 Disrict Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum, Pune.
by the court commissioner in favour of the appellant society. The
execution petition was filed by the present appellant seeking
execution of the order6 passed by the District Forum.
1.1. M/s Magar Girme & Gaikwad Associates (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Respondent builder’) acquired the development
rights in 1995 for development of a housing project named "Palm
Groves". The respondent builder secured the necessary approvals
from the local authority in 1997 and a comprehensive brochure was
issued, advertising the sale of flats in the "Palm Groves" housing
project. Based on the promises made in the brochure, several
prospective flat-buyers entered into individual agreements with
the respondent builder.
1.2. The appellant society, comprising of flat purchasers,
was formed by the respondent builder on 19.05.2003 under
provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and
rules framed thereunder. The appellant society filed a consumer
complaint7 before the District Forum, against the respondent
builder8 and opposite party no.II9 (original land owners), alleging
6 Dated 16.03.2007 in Complaint No.PDF/35/2005 7 Complaint No.PDF/35/2005 8 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Builder/Developer’ 9 Original land owners
defects in construction and deficiency of service in not providing
amenities and seeking direction against the builder/developer to
execute the Deed of Conveyance in its favour and consequential
relief of compensation and costs.
1.3. During pendency of the complaint, respondent nos.1 to
310 (hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent bungalow owners’) filed
an application before district forum seeking impleadment in the
complaint as necessary parties, as they were also owners of the
bungalows and plots in the said scheme. They claimed that the
appellant society refused to admit purchasers of bungalows/plots
as members of the appellant society and denied them enjoyment
of common facilities. They were impleaded as opposite party No.
96 to 102 vide order dated 01.03.2005. They had formed a Palm
Groves Bungalow Society, comprising of opposite parties 96 to
102, which was registered on 31.10.2005.
1.4. Vide order dated 16.03.2007, the District Forum partly
allowed the complaint filed by the appellant society and held that
the unit-holders of different unit, Apartment, Duplex Houses and
Bungalows have right to use & enjoy these common amenities and
10 In Civil Appeal No. 5537 of 2025
facilities, subject to payment of fees or subscriptions, monthly or
periodical. The District Forum directed respondent builder to
execute conveyance deed in favour of the appellant society and
also directed respondent builder to pay compensation of
₹5,00,000/- to the appellant society. Further, respondent bungalow
owners were directed to pay compensation of ₹2,00,000/- to the
appellant society. Relevant para thereof is extracted thereof:
“The complaint is partly allowed.
The Opposite Party No. 1 is directed to execute the
conveyance deed in favour of the Complainant Society,
in terms of agreement dt.28/6/1999. In executing the
Conveyance Deed, the Opposite Party No.1 should take
into consideration the observations of the Forum made
in the body of the judgment regarding common facilities
and amenities. The Opposite Party No.1 is also directed
to hand over relevant papers regarding formation of
society and lift plants, drainage, plumbing etc.
The Opposite Party No. 1 is further directed to pay
compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the Complainant
Society.
The Opposite Party No. 96 to 102, contributing in equal
proportion, are directed to pay compensation of
Rs.2,00,000/- to the Complainant Society.
It is declared that all the unit holders Apartment, Duplex
Houses and Bungalows owners have equal right of
enjoyment in the common facilities & amenities, as
indicated above. But it is made clear that these facilities
& amenities can be used only on payment of fees or
regular subscriptions as may be fixed by the
Complainant Society. The management of the facilities &
amenities shall remain with the Complainant Society and
the said society has an authority to levy and recover such
fees or periodical subscriptions.
Each of the Opposite Party is directed to pay cost of
Rs.500/- to the Complainant Society.
The directions given above shall be implemented within
a period of two months from the date of receipt of this
order.
All the interim applications stand rejected. Similarly,
rest of the claims stand rejected.”
1.5. Aggrieved by the said order, three appeals bearing
F.A. Nos. 421 of 2007, 422 of 2007 and 423 of 2007 came to be filed
before the State Commission. F.A. No.422/2007, filed by
respondent No.111 in his capacity as Chairman of Palm Groves
Bungalow Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., was dismissed at the
stage of admission itself. The State Commission vide order dated
11 In Civil Appeal No.5537 of 2025
02.04.2014 partly allowed the other two appeals, namely, F.A.
No.421/2007 filed by respondent builder and F.A. No.423/2007
filed by respondent bungalow owners. The State Commission
modified the order dated 16.03.2007, by setting-aside the order of
District Forum directing the respondent builder to pay
compensation of ₹5,00,000/- by holding the same to be
unwarranted. The remaining portion of the order dated 16.03.2007
was upheld by the State Commission.
1.6. Aggrieved by the same, appellant society preferred
revision12 before the National Commission. The National
Commission vide order dated 05.05.2016 set aside the order of the
State Commission, recording that it failed to consider the
additional documents placed before it, and remanded the matter
back to the State Commission.
1.7 During pendency of appeals, the appellant society filed
execution petition13 under section 25 of the 1986 Act seeking
execution of conveyance deed in favour of the appellant society.
1.8. Vide order dated 05.09.2007, the District Forum
appointed Commissioner for preparation of draft conveyance
12 Revision Petition No.3121 of 2014 13 EP No. 22 of 2007
deed in compliance of the order under execution and in terms of
the agreement dated 28.06.1999. The said draft conveyance deed
was submitted before the District Forum to which objections were
raised by the respondents.
1.9. The district forum vide order dated 20.11.2007
approved the conveyance deed and rejected objections filed by
the respondents. The district forum held that the main concern of
the respondent bungalow owners to enjoy the common facilities
had been taken care of by the order dated 16.03.2007. Directions
were issued to respondent builder for execution of the sale deed.
1.10. Respondent builder challenged the aforesaid order by
filing revision petition14 before the State Commission under
Section 17(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 198615. The order
dated 20.11.2007 was also challenged by respondent bungalow
owners by filing separate revision petition16. Another revision
petition17 was filed by respondent Nos.1 & 2 in Civil Appeal
No.5538 of 2025, impugning the same order before the State
14 Revision Petition No. RP/07/156 by respondent No.1 in Civil Appeal No.5536 of 2019 15 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1986 Act’ 16 Revision Petition No. RP/07/157 by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 5537 of 2019 17 Revision Petition No. RP/07/158 by respondent Nos.1 & 2 in Civil Appeal No. 5538 of 2019
1.11. Vide order dated 21.04.2014, the State Commission
allowed all the aforesaid revision petitions and set aside the order
dated 20.11.2007 passed by the District Forum.
2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 21.04.2014, the
appellant society filed Execution Revision Petition No. 52 of 2014
against respondent builder, Execution Revision Petition No. 53 of
2014 against respondent bungalow owners and Execution Revision
Petition No. 56 of 2014 against respondent No. 1 & 2 in C.A. No.5538
of 2025.
3. The National Commission vide order dated 16.07.2019
dismissed all the aforesaid Execution Revision Petitions, recording
the same to be "not maintainable". It was held that though the
respondents herein had filed revision petitions before the State
Commission against the order passed by the District Forum in the
execution proceedings, they nonetheless had the right to file an
appeal under Section 27-A of the 1986 Act. Merely mentioning
wrong jurisdiction or filing a revision petition will not take away
the appellate jurisdiction of the State Commission impugning the
order passed by the District Forum. Hence, the order dated
21.04.2014 passed by the State Commission should be deemed to
have been passed in exercise of powers conferred under Section
27-A of the 1986 Act. It was for the aforesaid reason that the
revision petitions filed before the National Commission were held
to be not maintainable. The order passed by the National
Commission is impugned before this Court.
ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT
4 Learned Counsel for the appellant society submitted
that the National Commission erroneously held that the Revision
Petitions filed by the respondents before the State Commission
against the order passed by the District Forum in execution
proceedings, should be treated as appeals since the respondents
had a right to file an appeal under Section 27A of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986.
4.1 The National Commission failed to appreciate that in
view of the decision of this court in Karnataka Housing Board v.
K.A. Nagamani18, a Revision Petition was not maintainable before
the State Commission under Section 17(1)(b) of the 1986 Act
against an order passed by the District Forum in Execution
proceedings.
4.2 After the amendment of the 1986 Act by Consumer
Protection (Amendment) Act, 200219,which came into force w.e.f.
15.03.2003, till the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act,
201920, there was no specific provision under Section 25 of the 1986
Act to execute or enforce a final order, which is not in the nature of
a ‘money decree’, as was the case prior to the 2002 Amendment
Act where ‘every order’ was enforceable as if it was a decree or an
order made by a Civil Court.
4.3 Absence of any provision to enforce final orders, is not
merely a lacuna but a huge absurdity and an injudicious blunder.
If it is allowed to remain so, then the consumer forums will be
rendered toothless.
4.4 After enactment of the 2019 Act, the Parliament has
removed the anomaly by providing for enforcement of ‘every
order’ passed by the District/State/National Commission, as if it is
a decree passed by the Civil Court and the provisions of Order XXI
of Code of Civil Procedure, 190821 have been made applicable.
19 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2002 Amendment Act’ 20 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2019 Act’ 21 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’
4.5 The counsel for appellant placed reliance on the
judgment of this Court in Kamlesh Aggarwal v Narain Singh
Dabbas and Anr22 (paras 18 and 19) wherein it was held that there
was a right available under the 1986 Act to execute the order of the
District Forum by invoking provisions of Order XXI of CPC.
4.6 Lastly, it was submitted that the 1986 Act was a social
benefit-oriented legislation and, therefore, the Court has to adopt
a constructive liberal approach while construing the provisions of
the Act.
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent
No.1 submitted that in view of the judgment of this Court in
Karnataka Housing Board (supra) Revision Petition before
National Commission against an appellate order passed by the
State Commission in execution proceeding, was not maintainable.
5.1 Referring to judgment of this Court in Ibrat Faizan vs.
Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited23 it was argued that a party
can approach the ‘concerned’ High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, against the order passed by the National
Commission in its appellate jurisdiction. Similar view was
expressed in the case of M/s Universal Sompo General
Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Suresh Chand Jain & Anr24 wherein it was
held that against the order of the National Commission, remedy is
to file a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the
jurisdictional High Court.
5.2 It was further submitted that the appellant society have
concealed the fact that vide order dated 05.05.2016 passed in R.P.
No.3121 of 2014, the National Commission remanded the matter to
the State Commission to consider additional documents sought to
be filed by the appellant society.
5.3 Further vide order dated 10.10.2017 the State
Commission remanded the matter to the District Forum, Pune
rendering the entire execution proceedings including the present
proceedings infructuous. Both these orders were not placed on
record by the respondent No.1.
5.4 That the Conveyance Deed for utilization of common
area and facilities has already been executed in favour of ‘Palm
Groves Bungalow Cooperative Housing Society’ in the year 2006,
as such the complaint filed by the appellant society has been
rendered infructuous.
6. Vide impugned order the National Commission had
opined that the revision petitions filed by the appellant society
against the order passed in execution proceedings were not
maintainable as no consumer complaint was pending. It was
further observed in that order that though the
respondent/judgment-debtor did not have right to file revision
petition before the State Commission, yet it had a right to file
appeal under Section 27A of the 1986 Act. Merely giving the
nomenclature of revision petition will not oust the jurisdiction of
the State Commission and the order passed by the State
Commission should be treated to have been passed in exercise of
powers under Section 27A of the 1986 Act.
ARGUMENTS BY THE LEARNED ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDIA AND THE AMICUS
7. During the course of arguments, it was noticed that the
issue in these petitions involved interpretation of the 1986 Act, as
amended by the 2002 Amendment Act, which now stands replaced
by the 2019 Act. Vide order dated 23.07.2024, we requested Shri
Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel, to assist the Court as
amicus.
7.1 As the issue pertained to interpretation of a central
statute, we deemed it appropriate to seek assistance of the
Attorney General for India as well.
7.2 We have been ably assisted by Shri R. Venkatramani,
Attorney General for India & Shri Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate, who was appointed as amicus to assist this Court, in view
of the anomalies noticed in the 1986 Act, regarding execution of
the final orders, after its amendment by the 2002 Amendment Act.
8. Shri R. Venkatramani, Attorney General for India and
Shri Jaideep Gupta, Senior Advocate, are in unison regarding
interpretation of provision of the 1986 Act with reference to
execution of the final orders. It was submitted that the position as
existed prior to the changes by 2002 Amendment Act in the 1986
Act and after the 1986 Act was replaced by 2019 Act, all orders
passed by the different fora were/are executable. It was only after
the 2002 Amendment Act whereby Section 25 of the 1986 Act was
substituted, that the words ‘every order’ were replaced by ‘interim
order’. It was only during the interregnum, from 15.03.2003 (the
date on which the 2002 Amendment Act came into force) till
20.07.2020 (date on which the 2019 Act came into force w.r.t.
Chapter IV dealing with the Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission), that there is certain anomalous position. The
argument raised is that the same being in the nature of casus
omissus, keeping in view the spirit and object of the Act, which is a
beneficial piece of legislation, the gap can very well be filled by
the Court by applying tools of interpretation of statutes. The
Consumer Protection Act, either of 1986 or of 2019 are complete
Code providing for different remedies. If proper remedy under
the statute is not provided for execution/enforcement of orders,
the same may be ineffective. It may be an error in drafting. If this
Court fills in the aforesaid lacunae, the same will not go beyond the
overall scheme of the Act. It would rather be in the best interest of
the consumers, keeping in mind the principles of purposive
construction. The following judgments have also been referred in
support of the arguments, Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank
vs PFC25; Corporation Bank vs Saraswati26; MSR Leathers vs S
Palaniappan27; Poonam Devi vs Oriental Insurance28; Sailesh
vs Dhariwal29; Bank of Baroda vs MBL30; Chitra Sharma vs
UOI31; Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Another vs Union of
India and Others32.
8.1 The executions were being filed and entertained even
after the 2002 Amendment Act came into force by which Section 25
of the 1986 Act was substituted. Any interpretation given
differently, at this stage, may affect large number of consumers,
especially whose execution petitions are pending. The same may
generate unnecessary avoidable litigation as the party in whose
favour any order has been passed cannot be left remediless for
execution thereof.
8.2 As per data submitted by learned Attorney General for
India, even now thousands of such petitions are pending before
District Forum and the State/National Commission pertaining to
different years and the details thereof are as under:
before the District Forums
1992 5
1993 29
1994 32
1995 27
1996 42
1997 89
1998 152
1999 201
2000 196
2001 267
2002 430
2003 480
2004 400
2005 464
2006 694
2007 1030
2008 1597
2009 1267
2010 1449
2011 1872
2012 1764
2013 1813
2014 2786
2015 3008
2016 4037
2017 5320
2018 6405
2019 7732
2020 4443
2021 5424
2022 10924
2023 15785
2024 20002
2025 106
before the State Commissions
2004 1
2005 1
2006 5
2007 12
2008 7
2009 5
2010 6
2011 8
2012 19
2013 21
2014 54
2015 48
2016 134
2017 306
2018 583
2019 810
2020 470
2021 773
2022 792
2023 1035
2024 1014
before the National Commission
2011 2
2012 2
2013 3
2014 4
2015 9
2016 91
2017 130
2018 132
2019 125
2020 80
2021 71
2022 299
2023 611
2024 386
2025 8
8.3 The aforesaid data is pertaining to pending execution
applications as on 21.01.2025.
9. Before we proceed to discuss the issues raised in the
appeals on merits of the controversy, we wish to deal with the issue
regarding remedy available for execution of the final order under
the 1986 Act.
Relevant Provisions
“Section 2(b) "complainant" means-
(i) a consumer; or
(ii) any voluntary consumer association registered
under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or under
any other law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the Central Government or any State
Government,
(iv) one or more consumers, where there are
numerous consumers having the same interest; who
or which makes a complaint;
Section 2(c) "complaint" means any allegation in writing
made by a complainant that-
(i) an unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade
practice has been adopted by any trader;
(ii) the goods bought by him or agreed to be
bought by him suffer from one or more defect;
(iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any respect;
(iv) a trader or the service provider, as the case may be, has charged for the goods or for the services mentioned in the complaint, a price in excess of the price –
(a) Fixed by or under any law for the time
being in force;
(b) Displayed on the goods or any package
containing such goods;
(c) Displayed on the price list exhibited by
him by or under any law for the time being
in force;
(d) Agreed between the parties;
(v) goods which will be hazardous to life and safety when used are being offered for sale to he public,-
(a) in contravention of any standards relating to
safety of such goods as required to be complied
with, by or under any law for the time being in
force;
(b) if the trader could have known with due
diligence that the goods so offered are unsafe to
the public;
(vi) services which are hazardous or likely to be hazardous to life and safety of the public when used, are being offered by the service provider which such person could have known with due diligence to be injurious to life and safety;
with a view to obtaining any relief provided by or under this Act;
Section 2(e) “consumer dispute” means a dispute where the person against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint;
Section 11. Jurisdiction of the District Forum -
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the District Forum, the District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs.
(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite
parties, where there are more than one, at the time of
the institution of the complaint, actually and
voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a
branch office or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are
more than one, at the time of the institution of the
complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries
on business or has a branch office, or personally
works for gain, provided that in such case either the
permission of the District Forum is given, or the
opposite parties who do not reside, or carry on
business or have a branch office, or personally work
for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such
institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
Section 13 Procedure on admission of complaint.-
(1) to (3A) xxx xxx xxx
(3B) Where during the pendency of any proceeding before the District Forum, it appears to it necessary, it may pass such interim order as is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely,-
(i) the summoning and enforcing attendance of
any defendant or witness and examining the witness
on oath;
(ii) the discovery and production of any
document or other material object producible as
evidence;
(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;
(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the
concerned analysis or test from the appropriate
laboratory or from any other relevant source;
(v) issuing of any commission for the
examination of any witness; and
(vi) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(5) Every proceeding before the District Forum shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and the District Forum shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6) Where the complainant is a consumer referred to in sub-clause (iv) of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 2, the provisions of Rule 8 of Order I of Schedule I to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply subject to the modification that every reference therein to
a suit or decree shall be construed as a reference to a complaint or the order of the District Forum thereon.
(7) In the event of death of a complainant who is a consumer or of the opposite party against whom the complaint has been filed, the provisions of Order XXII of the First Scheduled to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply subject to the modification that every reference therein to the plaintiff and the defendant shall be construed as reference to a complainant or the opposite party, as the case may be.
Section 14. Finding of the District Forum.-
(1) If, after the proceeding conducted under section 13, the District Forum is satisfied that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects specified in the complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the complaint about the services are proved, it shall issue an order to the opposite party directing him to do one or more of the following things, namely,-
(a) to remove the defect pointed out by the
appropriate laboratory from the goods in question;
(b) to replace the goods with new goods of
similar description which shall be free from any
defect;
(c) to return to the complainant the price, or, as
the case may be, the charges paid by the
complainant;
(d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by
it as compensation to the consumer for any loss or
injury suffered by the consumer due to the
negligence of the opposite party:
Provided that the District Forum shall have the
power to grant punitive damages in such
circumstances as it deems fit;
(e) to remove the defects or deficiencies in the
services in question;
(f) to discontinue the unfair trade practice or
the restrictive trade practice or not to repeat them;
(g) not to offer the hazardous goods for sale;
(h) to withdraw the hazardous goods from
being offered for sale;
(ha) to cease manufacture of hazardous goods
and to desist from offering services which are
hazardous in nature;
(hb) to pay such sum as may be determined by
it, if it is of the opinion that loss or injury has been
suffered by a large number of consumers who are not
identifiable conveniently;
Provided that the minimum amount of
sum so payable shall not be less than five per
cent of the value of such defective goods sold or
services provided, as the case may be, to such
consumers:
Provided further that the amount so
obtained shall be credited in favour of such
person and utilized in such manner as may be
prescribed;
(hc) to issue corrective advertisement to
neutralize the effect of misleading advertisement at
the cost of the opposite party responsible for issuing
such misleading advertisement;
(i) to provide for adequate costs to parties.
Section 15. Appeal.
Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the
date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not finding it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent of that amount or twentyfive thousand rupees, whichever is less.
Section 17. Jurisdiction of the State Commission
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction-
(a) to entertain-
(i) complaints where the value of the goods
or services and compensation, if any,
claimed exceeds rupees five lakhs but
does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs;
and
(ii) appeals against the orders of any District
Forum within the State; and
(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate
orders in any consumer dispute which is
pending before or has been decided by any
District Forum within the State where it
appears to the State Commission that such
District Forum has exercised a jurisdiction not
vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested or has acted in exercise
on its jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity.
Section 18. Procedure applicable to State Commission
The provisions of sections 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder for the disposal of complaint by the Districts Forum shall, with such modification as may be necessary, be applicable to the disposal of disputes by the State Commission:
Section 19. Appeals.
Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by subclause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the National Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less.
Section 21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission.
Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction-
(a) to entertain-
(i) complaints where the value of the goods or
services and compensation, if any, claimed
exceeds rupees one crore; and
(ii) appeals against the orders of any State
Commission; and
(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders
in any consumer dispute which is pending before
or has been decided by any State Commission
where it appears to the National Commission that
such State Commission has exercised a
jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to
exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in
the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with
material irregularity.
Section 22. Power and procedure applicable to the National Commission.
(1) The provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder for the disposal of complaints by the District Forum shall, with such modifications as may be considered necessary by the Commission, by applicable to the disposal of disputes by the National Commission.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the National Commission shall have the power to review any order made by it, when there is an error apparent on the face of record.
Section 25. Enforcement of orders of the District
(1) Where an interim order made under this Act is not complied with, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, may
order the property of the person, not complying with such order to be attached.
(2) No attachment made under sub-section (1) shall remain in force for more than three months at the end of which, if the non-compliance continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds thereof, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission may award such damages as it thinks fit to the complainant and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.
(3) Where any amount is due from any person under an order made by a District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, the person entitled to the amount may make an application to the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, and such District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission may issue a certificate for the said amount to the Collector of the district (by whatever name called) and the Collector shall proceed to recover the amount in the same manner as arrears of land revenue.
Section 27. Penalties.
(1) Where a trader or a person against whom a complaint is made or the complainant fails or omits to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, such trader or person or complainant shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both:
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, shall have the power of a judicial magistrate of the first class for the trial of offences under this Act, and on such conferment of powers, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the as may be, on whom the powers are so conferred, shall be deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the first class for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(3) All offences under this Act may be tried summarily by the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be.
Section 27A. Appeal against order passed under Section 27.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal under Section 27, both on facts and on law, shall lie from-
(a) the order made by the District Forum to the State
Commission;
(b) the order made by the State Commission to the
National Commission; and
(c) the order made by the National Commission to the
Supreme Court.
(2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal shall lie to any court from any order of a District Forum or a State Commission or the National Commission.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of an order of a District Forum or a State Commission or, as the case may be, the National Commission:
Provided that the State Commission or the
National Commission or the Supreme Court, as the case
may be, may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the
said period of thirty days, if, it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient case for not preferring the appeal
within the period of thirty days.”
10. To begin with, it would be relevant to refer to the kinds
of reliefs which can be granted by the District Forum under section
14 of the 1986 Act. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision shows
that-
● monetary compensation,
● replacement,
● removal of defects in the goods,
● removal of defects or discrepancy in the services
and/or
● discontinuance of unfair trade practice
are few of the reliefs which can be granted by the District Forum.
10.1 A perusal of Section 15 of the 1986 Act shows that any
person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may
prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission. The
section is in wider terms as it does not limit filing of an appeal from
an order passed by the District Forum to the State Commission only
in case there is a ‘consumer dispute’.
10.2 The State Commission, in terms of Section 17 of the 1986
Act, can entertain complaints with reference to the original
jurisdiction vested in it and hear appeals against the orders passed
by the District Forum. In addition to that Section 17(1)(b) of the
1986 Act provides suo motu jurisdiction to the State Commission to
call for records and pass appropriate orders in any ‘consumer
dispute’ which is pending before or has been decided by any
consumer Forum. The scope of jurisdiction is to examine as to
whether the District Forum had exercised jurisdiction not vested in
it or had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it or it acted in
exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
The term used in this sub-section is with reference to order passed
in any ‘consumer dispute’, which has been defined in Section 2(e)
of the 1986 Act to mean dispute where the person against whom a
‘complaint’ has been made, denies or disputes the allegations
contained in the complaint.
10.3 The term ‘complaint’ used herein has been defined in
Section 2(c) of the 1986 Act to mean allegations in writing made by
a ‘complainant’ regarding unfair trade practice or a restrictive
trade practice adopted by the trader or service provider
regarding defects in the goods purchased or the services hired,
charging of price in excess than the seller is entitled to etc.
Meaning thereby revisional jurisdiction vested with the State
Commission is with reference to a complaint filed in a ‘consumer
dispute’, which does not include an execution petition, as section
does not talk about execution of an order.
10.4 Under Section 19 of the 1986 Act, any person aggrieved
by an order passed by the State Commission in exercise of powers
conferred by Section 17(1)(a)(i) can prefer appeal before the
National Commission. It is an order passed by State Commission in
a complaint filed before it.
10.5 Section 21 of the 1986 Act defines the jurisdiction of the
National Commission. Section 21(a)(ii) provides for entertaining
appeals against the orders of the State Commission. This has to be
read in conjunction with Section 19 of the 1986 Act, which limits
filing of an appeal against specific orders. As is the jurisdiction
vested in the State Commission for suo motu exercise of power,
Clause (b) of Section 21 thereof provides suo motu power to the
National Commission to call for records and pass appropriate
orders in ‘any consumer dispute’ which is pending or decided by
the State Commission.
10.6 Section 25 of the 1986 Act provides for remedy for
enforcement of the orders passed by different fora under the Act.
10.7 Section 27 of the aforesaid Act provides for penalties
for non-compliance of the order passed by any of the fora. Section
27-A of the 1986 Act provides for remedy of appeal in respect to an
order passed under Section 27 of the 1986 Act.
11. From a perusal of various provisions of the 1986 Act, as
amended from time to time, till such time the same was replaced
by the 2019 Act making it more comprehensive, it is evident that
the same is a self-contained code. It provides for the disputes
which can be adjudicated upon under the Act, the pecuniary
jurisdiction, procedure for filing of complaints, appeals and
revisions, execution of the orders, limitation, filing of criminal
complaints against the person not complying with orders of
different Fora, conferment of the power of Judicial Magistrate First
Class and even the appeal against the aforesaid conviction. The
issue as to whether the 1986 Act is a self-contained Code came up
for consideration before this Court in State of Karnataka v
Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society33 and it was
opined as under:
“60 It is also well settled that a statutory tribunal
which has been conferred with the power to adjudicate
a dispute and pass necessary order has also the power
to implement its order. Further, the Act which is a self-
contained code, even if it has not been specifically
spelt out, must be deemed to have conferred upon the
Tribunal all powers in order to make its order effective.”
11.1 The same view was expressed in Ethiopian Airlines v
Ganesh Narain Saboo34 where it referred to Vishwabharathi
House Building Society (supra) and observed that:
“74. This Court in Vishwabharathi House Building
Coop. Society [(2003) 2 SCC 412] dealt with the object
of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986: to provide
expeditious adjudication of consumers' complaints by
adopting summary procedure. The Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 is a comprehensive and self-
contained piece of legislation, and its object is to
decide consumers' complaints expeditiously, via
summary procedure. The Consumer Protection Act,
1986 also permits authorised agents to appear on behalf
of the complainants in order to ensure that they are not
burdened with the heavy professional fees of lawyers.”
11.2 For that matter, even the 2019 Act is a complete code.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CERTAIN AMENDMENTS MADE IN THE 1986 ACT BY THE CONSUMER PROTECTION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2002
12. Section 12 of the 1986 Act provides for the manner in
which a complaint can be made. Section 13 provides for
procedure on admission of complaint. Whereas Section 14
provides for the reliefs, which can be granted by the District
Forum.
12.1 An issue came up for consideration before this Court in
Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v Kartick Das35, as to whether the
District Forum was competent to grant interim relief. It was opined
that under the provisions of the 1986 Act the District Forum is not
competent to grant any interim or ad-interim relief (See para 44).
The same view was expressed by this Court in Gulzari Lal
Agarwal v Accounts Officer36 (See para 21).
12.2 To make the provisions of the 1986 Act more inclusive
and effective, and with a view to empower different fora under the
1986 Act to grant interim relief as well, by the 2002 Amendment
Act, sub-section 3B was added in Section 13 of the Act.
12.3 As Section 13 deals with the procedure on admission of
complaints before the District Forum, and there being no
independent provision as such providing the procedure before the
State Commission and the National Commission, vide Sections 18
and 22, the provisions of Section 12 to 14 as applicable for the
District Forum have been made applicable for the State
Commission and the National Commission as well. As a result of
this all the Fora under the 1986 Act were empowered to grant
interim relief as well.
12.4 Substantive amendments were made in the 1986 Act by
the 2002 Amendment Act in Sections 2, 4, 7, 8, 10 to 23, 25 and 27
to 31. Certain new provisions were also added, besides deletion
of some of them. Pecuniary jurisdiction of different fora was
enhanced. Section 13(3A) was added providing for timeline for
disposal of complaints by the District Forum. Sections 17-A and 17-
B were added providing jurisdiction to the State Commission to
transfer any proceeding pending before the District Forum to any
other forum and also for holding a Circuit Bench, respectively.
Section 19-A was added providing for timelines for disposal of
appeals by the State/National Commission and the period of 90
days from admission was fixed. On failure, reasons are to be
recorded. After Section 22 in the Act, certain new provisions were
added, namely, Section 22-A providing National Commission with
the power to set aside ex-parte order, Section 22-B empowering
the National Commission to transfer cases and Section 22-C
providing for the establishment of Circuit Bench.
12.5 Section 27 of the 1986 Act provides for filing of a
complaint in case of non-compliance of any order passed by the
District Forum or the State/National Commission. Sub-section (2)
was added therein providing the powers of Judicial Magistrate
First Class to deal with the complaints as mentioned in sub-section
(1) thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of Cr.P.C. Newly
added sub-section (3) provided that such complaints shall be tried
summarily by the District Forum or the State/National Commission,
as the case may be.
12.6 As different Fora under the 1986 Act had been given
powers of a Judicial Magistrate First Class, for dealing with the
complaints and award punishment of imprisonment and/or fine,
Section 27-A was added providing for appeals against the orders
passed by the District Forum to the State Commission, from State
Commission to National Commission and from National
Commission to this Court. The aforesaid amendments and newly
inserted section by way of the 2002 Amendment Act resulted in
empowerment of the consumers.
DISCUSSION REGARDING PROVISIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS
13. Section 25 of the 1986 Act, as amended by the 2002
Amendment Act, provided that where interim order made under
the Act is not complied with, the District Forum or the State
Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, may
order the property of the person not complying with such an order
to be attached.
13.1 Sub-section (2) thereof provides that no attachment
shall remain in force for more than three months. If by the end of
three months non-compliance still continues, the concerned Fora
may sell the property attached and out of the sale proceeds may
award damages to the complainant and pay the balance, if any, to
the party entitled thereto.
13.2 Sub-section (3) thereof provides that where any amount
is due from any person under an order made by a District Forum,
the State or the National Commission, the person entitled to the
amount can make an application to the concerned Fora to issue a
certificate for the said amount to the Collector of the district
concerned to enable him to proceed to recover the amount as
arrears of land revenue.
13.3 To put the record straight, in our opinion, it would not
be out of place to refer to Section 25 as was existing prior to the
2002 Amendment. The same is extracted below:
“25. Enforcement of orders by the Forum, the
State Commission or the National Commission.
Every order made by the District Forum, the State
Commission or the National Commission may be
enforced by the District Forum, the State Commission
or the National Commission, as the case may be, in
the same manner as if it were decree or order made
by a court in a suit pending therein and it shall be
lawful for the District Forum, the State Commission or
the National Commission to send, in the event of its
inability to execute it, such order to the court within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction,-
(a) in the case of an order against a company,
the registered office of the company is
situated, or
(b) in the case of an order against any other
person, the place where the person
concerned voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain, is
situated,
and thereupon, the court to which the order is so sent,
shall execute the order as if it were a decree or order
sent to it for execution.”
13.4 A perusal of Section 25 providing for enforcement of
the orders as was existing prior to the 2002 Amendment shows that
for execution of an order passed by any Fora at different levels
under the 1986 Act, the provisions of C.P.C. had been made
applicable. After the substitution of Section 25 vide 2002
Amendment Act, as per the scheme of Section 25 till the 1986 Act
was replaced by the 2019 Act effective from 15.07.2020, there was
no provision for enforcement of a final order in the sense execution
thereof in case the relief granted to a complainant is other than the
monetary compensation. Section 25, as existed after the 2002
Amendment, has already been extracted in para ‘9’ of the
judgment.
13.5 May be at the cost of repetition stricto sensu no
provision under the 1986 Act, as existed after the 2002 Amendment
Act, has been pointed out, in terms of which a complainant in
whose favour an order has been passed with certain directions
except in monetary terms, under which it can be enforced.
13.6 Section 27 of the 1986 Act provided that where a trader
or a person against whom a complaint is made or the complainant
fails to comply with the order made by any of the Fora at different
levels, such person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term provided therein.
13.7 Section 27A of the 1986 Act provides for an appeal
against an order passed under Section 27 thereof. In terms of the
aforesaid provision, an appeal from District Forum lies to the State
Commission. From an order passed by the State Commission the
appeal was maintainable before the National Commission and
from an order passed by the National Commission an appeal lies
to this Court.
13.8 On a combined reading of Section 27 and 27A of the
1986 Act as well it could not be pointed out by the learned counsel
that the same can be read to mean a provision providing for
enforcement of the orders as the provision only fixed criminal
liability on the defaulter for the non-compliance of the order, which
ultimately may not result in execution of the order as defaulter may
only be punished with either imprisonment and/or fine.
14. The 2019 Act replaced the earlier 1986 Act dealing
more comprehensively with the consumer disputes. Section 34
thereof provides for jurisdiction of the District Commission.
Section 47 provides for jurisdiction of the State Commission and
Section 58 deals with jurisdiction of the National Commission.
14.1 As we are concerned in the present case regarding
execution/enforcement of the orders passed by the Commission at
different levels with reference to consumer disputes, Section 71 of
the 2019 Act is the relevant provision. The same is extracted
below:
“71. Enforcement of orders of District
Commission, State Commission and National
Every order made by a District Commission, State
Commission or the National Commission shall be
enforced by it in the same manner as if it were a
decree made by a Court in a suit before it and the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, as far
as may be, applicable, subject to the modification that
every reference therein to the decree shall be
construed as reference to the order made under this
Act.”
14.2 A perusal of the aforesaid Section shows that every
order made by the District, the State or the National Commission
shall be enforced by it in the same manner as if it is a decree of the
civil court. The provision of Order XXI of CPC as far as possible,
may be applicable. Meaning thereby that specific provision with
regard to enforcement/execution of the orders passed under the
2019 Act has been provided. The provision is similar to one
existing in the 1986 Act before the 2002 Amendment Act.
14.3 In addition to Section 71 of the 2019 Act, which provides
for enforcement of the order passed under the 2019 Act, Sections
72 and 73 are also relevant. These are similar to Section 27 and
27A of the 1986 Act. The same are extracted below:
“72. Penalty for non-compliance of order.
(1) Whoever fails to comply with any order
made by the District Commission or the State
may be, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than one month, but
which may extend to three years, or with fine, which
shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees,
but which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with
both.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the
District Commission, the State Commission or the
National Commission, as the case may be, shall have
the power of a Judicial Magistrate of first class for the
trial of offences under sub-section (1), and on
conferment of such powers, the District Commission
or the State Commission or the National Commission,
as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a Judicial
Magistrate of first class for the purposes of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(3) Save as otherwise provided, the offences under sub-section (1) shall be tried summarily by the District Commission or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be.
73. Appeal against order passed under Section 72.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), where an order is passed under sub-section (1) of section 72, an appeal shall lie, both on facts and on law from—
(a) the order made by the District Commission to
the State Commission;
(b) the order made by the State Commission to
the National Commission; and
(c) the order made by the National Commission
to the Supreme Court.
(2) Except as provided in sub-section (1), no appeal shall lie before any court, from any order of a District Commission or a State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of order of a District Commission or a State may be:
Provided that the State Commission or the National Commission or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the said period of thirty days.”
14.4 Section 72, as referred above, provides that whosoever
fails to comply with any order made by the District, State or the
National Commission shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than one month, but which may extend
to three years and/or with fine. For trial of the offence as
enumerated under Section 72(1), powers of Judicial Magistrate of
First Class have been conferred on the District, State or the
National Commission as the case may be, notwithstanding
anything contained in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which
now stands replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023. The order passed under Section 72 is appealable under
Section 73 of the 2019 Act.
14.5 The scheme of the aforesaid Sections 71 to 73 of the
2019 Act clearly shows that more teeth have been provided to the
District, State and the National Commission for enforcement of the
orders passed by them. The words used in Section 71 provides for
enforcement of ‘every order’. Similarly, Section 72 uses the words
‘any order’. Beside civil proceedings for enforcement of orders,
for non-compliance thereof, criminal liability has also been
provided. The words, as used in the aforesaid sections, clearly
include ‘interim orders’ and the ‘final orders’.
14.6 Sections 72 and 73 of the 2019 Act are pari materia to
Sections 27 and 27-A of the 1986 Act, which provided for penalties
for non-compliance of ‘any order’ passed by the District Forum or
the State/National Commission and the appeals against any order
under Section 27.
14.7 As far as enforcement of the order passed by the
District Forum, the State or the National Commission is concerned,
Section 25 of the 1986 Act, after amendment by the 2002
Amendment Act, only talked about non-compliance of an ‘interim
order’. This position was in existence from 15.03.2003 till the 2019
Act was enacted, replacing the 1986 Act w.e.f. 20.07.2020. Nothing
as such has been provided for enforcement of a ‘final order’ in
terms of Section 25 as was existing after substitution of the
aforesaid section vide 2002 Amendment Act. As has already been
discussed in the previous part of the judgment, Section 25 of the
1986 Act, as was existing prior to the aforesaid amendment, clearly
provided for enforcement of every order as a decree of the court
or to even transfer of such proceedings to the court concerned for
execution.
COMPARATIVE POSITION OF THE PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS DURING DIFFERENT PERIODS
15. To appreciate the import of Section 25 as was existing
in the 1986 Act prior to the 2002 Amendment Act w.e.f. 15.03.2003
and thereafter, and Section 71 of the 2019 Act, which is pari
materia, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the same in a
comparative manner:
1986 Act 1986 Act 2019 Act
[Prior to 2002 [Post 2002
Amendment] Amendment] w.e.f. 20.07.2020
w.e.f. 15.03.2003
Section 25. Section 25. Section 71.
Enforcement of Enforcement of Enforcement of
orders by the orders of the orders of District Forum, the State District Forum, Commission, State Commission or
the State Commission and the National
Commission or National Commission.
the National Commission.
Every order (1) Where an Every order made made by the interim order made by a District
under this Act is not District Forum, Commission, State
complied with, the the State Commission or the
District Forum or
Commission or National the State
the National Commission shall Commission or the
Commission may National be enforced by it in
be enforced by Commission, as the the same manner as
the District case may be, may if it were a decree
order the property Forum, the State made by a Court in
of the person, not Commission or a suit before it and
complying with
the National such order to be the provisions of Commission, as attached. Order XXI of the the case may be, First Schedule to the (2) No attachment in the same Code of Civil made under submanner as if it Procedure, 1908 (5 section (1) shall were decree or of 1908) shall, as far remain in force for order made by a as may be, more than three court in a suit applicable, subject months at the end pending therein to the modification of which, if the nonand it shall be that every compliance lawful for the reference therein to continues, the District Forum, the decree shall be property attached the State construed as may be sold and Commission or reference to the out of the proceeds the National order made under thereof, the District Commission to this Act.” Forum or the State send, in the event Commission or the of its inability to National execute it, such Commission may order to the court award such within the local damages as it limits of whose thinks fit to the jurisdiction,- complainant and
shall pay the(a) in the case
balance, if any, toof an order
the party entitledagainst a
thereto.company, the registered office (3) Where any of the company is amount is due from situated, or any person under an
order made by a (b) in the case District Forum, of an order State Commission against any other or the National person, the place Commission, as the where the person
concerned case may be, the
voluntarily person entitled to
resides or carries the amount may
on business or make an
personally works application to the
for gain, is District Forum, the
situated, State Commission
and thereupon, or the National
the court to Commission, as the
which the order case may be, and
is so sent, shall such District Forum
execute the or the State
order as if it were Commission or the
a decree or National
order sent to it Commission may
for execution.” issue a certificate for
the said amount to
the Collector of the
district (by
whatever name
called) and the
Collector shall
proceed to recover
the amount in the
same manner as
arrears of land
revenue.
15.1 Section 25 which talks about enforcement of ‘orders’ by
the District Forum, the State or the National Commission provided
that every order passed by different fora may be enforced in the
same manner as if it was a decree or order made by the court. In
case of inability, the same can be sent to the court of competent
jurisdiction for execution. In the aforesaid provision there was no
distinction of any kind, namely, as to the kind of relief granted or
to the order being executed, be it interim or final.
15.2 Section 25 of the 1986 Act, having been substituted
w.e.f. 15.03.2003 vide 2002 Amendment Act, provided in its title
‘Enforcement of orders of the District Forum, the State or the
National Commission’. The aforesaid section was further divided
into three parts.
● Sub-section (1), apparently on account of an
error, used the term ‘interim order’. It provided
that in case an interim order is not complied with,
the property of the person in default may be
attached.
● Sub-section (2) provided that no attachment of
property under sub-section (1) shall remain in
force for more than three months. If the non-
compliance continues, the property may be sold
and out of the sale proceeds, damages may be
granted to the complainant and balance amount,
if any, shall be payable to the party entitled
thereto.
● Sub-section (3) talked about ‘an order’ without
there being any distinction between interim or
final and provided that where any amount is due
in terms of an order passed by any of the fora
under the Act, a certificate for the said amount can
be issued to the Collector for recovery thereof as
arrears of land revenue.
As a result of the substitution of Section 25 of the 1986 Act, as
discussed above, there was no provision for execution of an order
other than interim order except where it provided for any amount.
15.3 The 1986 Act was replaced by the 2019 Act. Section 71
of the 2019 Act, in pith and substance, is in tune with Section 25 of
the 1986 Act as was existing prior to the 2002 Amendment Act. This
provides for enforcement of every order passed by the District
Forum, the State or the National Commission, as if it was a decree
or order made by a court in a suit. Provisions of Order XXI of CPC
have been made applicable, as far as possible.
15.4 The position as emerges on a perusal of the provisions
of the 1986 Act and the 2019 Act, with regard to enforcement of the
orders passed by different fora, is that in the 1986 Act, prior to the
2002 Amendment Act, every order could be enforced. The
position also remained the same when the 2019 Act was enacted,
replacing the 1986 Act. Some anomalous situation remained only
post the 2002 Amendment Act till the enactment of the 2019 Act i.e.
from 15.03.2003 to 20.07.2020. It is because Section 25(1) uses the
word ‘interim order’ as against ‘every order’ mentioned in Section
25 prior to the 2002 Amendment Act and post the 2019 Act.
15.5 The fact remains, as emerged during the course of
arguments, from the information furnished by the learned Attorney
General for India, that even post 2002 Amendment Act, the
provisions of Section 25 were being understood to mean that
‘every order’ passed by different Fora under the 1986 Act were
enforceable. Execution petitions were being filed and
entertained. During the interregnum, many were disposed of
against which the aggrieved parties invoked jurisdiction of the
higher forum. Some of petitions filed for enforcement of the orders
are still pending.
15.6 By using the term ‘interim order’ in Section 25 of the
1986 Act, post 2002 Amendment Act, for enforcement therefor,
limited option was given i.e. attachment and sale of property. Prior
to 2002 amendment in the 1986 Act and post enactment of 2019 Act,
provisions of CPC were made applicable, as far as possible.
ISSUES
16 The issues which are required to be considered by this
Court are:
I. Whether there is any drafting error in Section 25
of the 1986 Act, as existed post 2002 Amendment, in so
far it relates to enforcement of final orders, if yes,
whether the tools available for interpretation of
statutes can be used to clarify the position, to bring the
same in line with the spirit of the 1986 Act?
II. Whether a revision petition filed against an order
passed in execution proceeding can be construed as
an appeal?
17.The fact remains that the title of Section 25 of the 1986 Act, before and after the 2002 Amendment, remained the same which mentioned enforcement of ‘orders’. ISSUE NO.1 POSITION OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
18.Normal principle of statutory interpretation is that when the words used in the statute are clear and unambiguous, the same should be given their normal meaning without adding or rejecting any word. However, there is an exception to this general rule. In case, the Court finds that the provision is vague and ambiguous or the normal meaning may lead to confusion, absurdity or repugnancy with other provisions, the court may by using the interpretative tools, set right the situation by adding or omitting or substituting words in the statute.
19.This Court in Surjit Singh Kalra vs Union of India37
while interpreting the rule of casus omissus i.e. “what has not been
provided in the statute cannot be supplied by the courts”, held that
there are certain exceptions to it. Para 19 of the same is relevant
and is extracted below:
“19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute
which are not there, but “where the alternative lies
between either supplying by implication words which
appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting
a construction which deprives certain existing words of
all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words”
(Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 109). Similar are the
observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan
Lal Sowcar [(1988) 2 SCC 513, 524-25] where it was
observed that the court construing a provision should
not easily read into it words which have not been
expressly enacted but having regard to the context in
which a provision appears and the object of the statute
in which the said provision is enacted the court should
construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful.
An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the
relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended
by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central
Board of Waqf [1959 SCR 1287, 1299: AIR 1959 SC
198].)” (emphasis supplied)
19.1 The issue was again considered by this Court in Rajbir
Singh Dalal vs Chaudhari Devi Lal University38. The issue
under consideration in this case was regarding requisite academic
qualification for appointment to the post of Reader in the University
in Public Administration. The Court after considering the
traditional principles of interpretation known as ‘Mimansa rules of
interpretation held that the “relevant subject” should be added in
the qualification required for the post of Reader after words “at the
Master’s degree level” to give the rules a purposive interpretation
by filling in the gap. Relevant paras therefrom are extracted
below:
“13. No doubt, the ordinary principle of
interpretation is that words should neither be added
nor deleted from a statutory provision. However, there
are some exceptions to the rule where the alternative
lies between either supplying by implication words
which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or
adopting a strict construction which leads to absurdity or deprives certain existing words of all meaning, and
in this situation it is permissible to supply the words (vide Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice
G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., pp. 71-76).
14. Thus, in Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf [AIR 1959 SC 198], the Supreme Court
interpreted the words “any person interested in a waqf” in Section 5(2) of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1936
as meaning “any person interested in what is held to be a waqf”.
15. Similarly, in State Bank of Travancore v.
Mohd. M. Khan [(1981) 4 SCC 82: AIR 1981 SC 1744], while construing Section 4(1) of the Kerala
Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 1970 the Supreme Court interpreted the words “any debt due before the
commencement of this Act to any banking company” as meaning “any debt due at and before the
commencement of this Act”.
16. Similarly, in Gujarat Composite Ltd. v. Ranip
Nagarpalika [(1999) 8 SCC 675: AIR 2000 SC 135] the Supreme Court interpreted the words “grog minerals”
to mean “grog and minerals”. In Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellappan [(1976) 3 SCC 190: 1976 SCC (L&S) 398:
AIR 1975 SC 2216] the Supreme Court interpreted the
words “any party to an arbitration agreement”
occurring in Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to
mean “a person who is alleged to be a party to an
arbitration agreement”.” (emphasis supplied)
19.2 The law on the issue was further summed up by this
Court in Afcons Infrastructure Limited and Another v Cherian
Varkey Construction Company Private Limited and Others39.
It was a case pertaining to interpretation of Section 89 of the CPC.
Relevant para 21 thereof is extracted below:
“21. There is however an exception to this
general rule. Where the words used in the statutory
provision are vague and ambiguous or where the
plain and normal meaning of its words or
grammatical construction thereof would lead to
confusion, absurdity, repugnancy with other
provisions, the courts may, instead of adopting the
plain and grammatical construction, use the
interpretative tools to set right the situation, by
adding or omitting or substituting the words in the
statute. When faced with an apparently defective
provision in a statute, courts prefer to assume that
the draftsman had committed a mistake rather than
concluding that the legislature has deliberately
introduced an absurd or irrational statutory
provision. Departure from the literal rule of plain
39 (2010) 8 SCR 1053 : (2010) 8 SCC 24
and straight reading can however be only in
exceptional cases, where the anomalies make the literal compliance with a provision impossible, or
absurd or so impractical as to defeat the very object of the provision. We may also mention
purposive interpretation to avoid absurdity and irrationality is more readily and easily employed in
relation to procedural provisions than with reference to substantive provisions.
21.1. Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes (12th Edn., p. 228), under the caption “modification of the language to meet the
intention” in the chapter dealing with “Exceptional
Construction” states the position succinctly:
“Where the language of a statute, in its
ordinary meaning and grammatical
construction, leads to a manifest
contradiction of the apparent purpose of the
enactment, or to some inconvenience or
absurdity, hardship or injustice, which can
hardly have been intended, a construction
may be put upon it which modifies the
meaning of the words, and even the structure
of the sentence. This may be done by
departing from the rules of grammar, by
giving an unusual meaning to particular
words, or by rejecting them altogether, on
the ground that the legislature could not
possibly have intended what its words
signify, and that the modifications made are
mere corrections of careless language and
really give the true meaning. Where the main
object and intention of a statute are clear, it
must not be reduced to a nullity by the
draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the
law, except in a case of necessity, or the
absolute intractability of the language used.”
This Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1955 SC 830] approved and adopted the said approach.
21.2. In Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District
Magistrate, Thana [(1952) 2 SCC 1: AIR 1952 SC 324: 1952 Cri LJ 1503] this Court reiterated the
principle from Maxwell: (AIR p. 327, para 12)
“12. … if one construction will lead to an
absurdity while another will give effect to what
common sense would show was obviously
intended, the construction which would defeat
the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the
same words used in the same section, and
even the same sentence, have to be construed
differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to
require the courts sometimes even to modify
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words if by doing so absurdity and
inconsistency can be avoided.”
21.3. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P)
Ltd. [(2000) 4 SCC 285] this Court while reiterating that courts will have to follow the rule of literal
construction, which enjoins the court to take the words as used by the legislature and to give it the
meaning which naturally implies, held that there is
an exception to that rule. This Court observed:
(SCC p. 295, para 12)
“12. … That exception comes into play when
application of literal construction of the words
in the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency
or when it is shown that the legal context in
which the words are used or by reading the
statute as a whole, it requires a different
meaning.”
21.4. In Mangin v. IRC [1971 AC 739: (1971) 2
WLR 39: (1971) 1 All ER 179 (PC)] the Privy Council held: (AC p. 746 E)
“… the object of the construction of a statute
being to ascertain the will of the legislature it
may be presumed that neither injustice nor
absurdity was intended. If therefore a literal
interpretation would produce such a result,
and the language admits of an interpretation
which would avoid it, then such an
interpretation may be adopted.”
21.5. A classic example of correcting an error committed by the draftsman in legislative drafting
is the substitution of the words “defendant's witnesses” by this Court for the words “plaintiff's
witnesses” occurring in Order 7 Rule 14(4) of the Code, in Salem Bar (II) [(2005) 6 SCC 344]. We
extract below the relevant portion of the said
decision: (SCC pp. 368-69, para 35)
“35. Order 7 relates to the production of
documents by the plaintiff whereas Order 8
relates to production of documents by the
defendant. Under Order 8 Rule 1-A(4) a
document not produced by the defendant can
be confronted to the plaintiff's witness during
cross-examination. Similarly, the plaintiff can
also confront the defendant's witness with a
document during cross-examination. By
mistake, instead of ‘defendant's witnesses’, the
words ‘plaintiff's witnesses’ have been
mentioned in Order 7 Rule 14(4). To avoid any
confusion, we direct that till the legislature
corrects the mistake, the words ‘plaintiff's
witnesses’, would be read as ‘defendant's
witnesses’ in Order 7 Rule 14(4). We, however,
hope that the mistake would be expeditiously
corrected by the legislature.”
21.6. Justice G.P. Singh extracts four conditions that should be present to justify departure from the
plain words of the statute, in his treatise Principles of Statutory Interpretation (12th Edn., 2010, Lexis
Nexis, p. 144) from the decision of the House of Lords in Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [(1978) 1
“… a court would only be justified in departing
from the plain words of the statute when it is
satisfied that: (1) there is clear and gross
balance of anomaly; (2) Parliament, the
legislative promoters and the draftsman could
not have envisaged such anomaly, could not
have been prepared to accept it in the interest
of a supervening legislative objective; (3) the
anomaly can be obviated without detriment to
such legislative objective; (4) the language of
the statute is susceptible of the modification
required to obviate the anomaly.”
19.3 An issue regarding interpretation of various provisions
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 201540
came up for consideration before this Court in Child in Conflict
with Law through his Mother vs State of Karnataka and
Another41 wherein this Court, while interpreting the provisions of
Section 14 of the J.J. Act, took guidance from proviso to Section
14(4) and extended its application to sub-section (3) thereof. The
Court placed reliance on the decisions in Surjit Singh Kalra and
Rajbir Singh Dalal (supra). This Court examined the normal rule
that the court cannot add words to the statutes and even the
exceptions thereto while referring to earlier judgment on the issue
and held as under:
“41. In our opinion, the guidance as is evident from
sub-section (4) of Section 14 of the Act enabling the Chief
Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to
extend the period of inquiry as envisaged under Section
14(1), shall apply for extension of period as envisaged in
40 Hereinafter referred to as “J.J. Act”. 41 (2024) 8 SCC 473: 2024 INSC 387
sub-section (3) also. Such an extension can be granted for
a limited period for the reasons to be recorded in writing.
While considering the prayer for extension of time, the
delay in receipt of opinion of the experts shall be a
relevant factor. This shall be in the spirit of the Act and
giving the same a purposive meaning.”
20.The solution to the problem can be in three ways as the object is to provide remedy for enforcement of orders passed by different fora under the 1986 Act, post-2002 Amendment Act: (i) Treat the word ‘interim’ as used in Section 25(1) as surplus; or (ii) To add the words ‘or final’ after the word ‘interim’ as used in sub-section thereof; or (iii) To add the words ‘any order’ in place of ‘interim order’ in the sub-section and make provisions of Order XXI of the 1st schedule of CPC applicable.
21.If we talk about the enforcement of orders passed by different Fora, Section 25 of the 1986 Act, as existed prior to the 2002 Amendment Act, provided that ‘every order’ can be enforced as if it is a decree of the court. Section 27 of the 1986 Act even made a person, against whom an order is passed, criminally liable, in case of non-compliance thereof. Under the aforesaid Section a complaint can be filed for non-compliance of ‘any order’.
22.Though comprehensive amendments were made by the 2002 Amendment Act empowering consumers more and in that line, conferring more power to the Fora under the aforesaid Act. While substituting Section 25 of the 1986 Act, which provides for enforcement of orders, the same has been divided into three parts. The apparent error is in sub-section (1) thereof which does not go in line with the spirit and object of the 1986 Act. The reason may be that earlier different Fora under the Act could not grant interim relief and by the 2002 Amendment Act they were empowered to do so. Sub-section (1) erroneously uses the expression ‘interim order’ as against ‘any order’. As is evident from Section 14 of the 1986 Act, different types of reliefs can be granted under the Act and one of them is in the form of compensation. For enforcement of any order passed providing for payment of compensation in monetary terms, sub-section (3) of Section 25 provides that ‘an order’ providing for any monetary compensation can be enforced as per the procedure prescribed. Meaning therefor any other order passed except providing for monetary compensation and being a final order, after the 2002 Amendment Act, there is no provision under the 1986 Act for enforcement thereof.
23.At the cost of repetition, we may add that even prior to the 2002 Amendment Act and after the 1986 Act was replaced by the 2019 Act, different Fora have been empowered to enforce any order passed and not limiting the same to interim order only. Further, it is evident from the fact that remedy on civil side for enforcement of final order is not available under Section 25 whereas a complaint providing for criminal liability of the person not complying with the order was available.
24.For execution of any order except where monetary compensation has been awarded, if provisions of the 1986 Act are considered, post the 2002 Amendment Act, there is no provision providing for enforcement of orders. Even though the 1986 Act is a self-contained code, apparently, there being remedy, and earlier provisions providing for execution of order as a decree of civil court, the person in whose favor such an order is passed may have to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. This does not go with the spirit of the 1986 Act where informal procedure had been provided to make it more user friendly. CONCLUSION
25.From the aforesaid discussion, keeping in view the object in mind for which the 1986 Act and the 2019 Act have been enacted, in our view, using different tools available for interpretation of statutes, in Sub-section (1) of Section 25 the words where ‘an interim order’ should be read as where ‘any order’. Towards the end of sub-section (1) and before words ‘may order the property…’, following line shall be deemed to be added ‘enforce the same in the manner as if it were a decree or order made by the Court in a suit and the provisions of Order XXI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, as far as may be, applicable and’. This interpretation goes in line with what was being understood and applied by different fora even post 2002 Amendment in 1986 Act. This is evident from number of execution petitions filed, entertained and disposed of. Many are still pending.
26.The sub-section (1) of Section 25 shall now read as under: “Section 25. Enforcement of orders of the District (1) Where any order made under this Act is not complied with, the District Forum or the State may be, enforce the same in the manner as if it were a decree or order made by the Court in a suit and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, as far as may be, applicable and may order the property of the person, not complying with such order to be attached.”
27.As there was anomalous situation in the language of Section 25(1) of the 1986 Act for the period 15.03.2003 to 20.07.2020, the provision as we have suggested above shall be considered as applicable in all the pending execution petitions or proceedings arising therefrom at any stage. REMEDIES TO CHALLENGE ORDERS PASSED BY DIFFERENT FORA IN EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS
28.We may add here that there is another apparent anomaly which existed in the 1986 Act and continues to exist in the 2019 Act. In case an order is passed by the District Forum in an execution petition, the remedy of appeal lies before the State Commission42. 28.1 In case an order is passed by the State Commission in execution petition, there is no remedy of appeal to the National Commission. An appeal lies to the National Commission from an order of the State Commission only if the order is passed with reference to a complaint on the original side43. 28.2 Similar is the position, where an order is passed by the National Commission in execution proceedings, the remedy of appeal to this Court is not available. Against an order of the National Commission, the appeal lies to this Court only if such order is passed in a complaint by the National Commission and not against an order passed in execution petition44. 28.3 The fact cannot be lost sight of that in an execution petition certain factual aspects may have to be gone into. In some cases, calculations may be required. In the absence of even single appellate remedy, the aggrieved parties may have to invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. We have not considered this aspect of the matter, as the issue was not raised. However, we leave it open to the authorities to examine the matter in the aforesaid light. DIRECTIONS TO THE NCDRC
29.As has been seen, post the amendment carried out by the 2002 Amendment Act, timelines have been provided for decision of complaints and appeals. From the information, as furnished by the learned Attorney General for India in the Court, there are many execution petitions pending before different Fora from the year 1992 onwards. We request the Chairman, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to examine the issue and take appropriate steps for expeditious disposal of the execution petitions pending at different stages, in exercise of its powers under Section 70(1)(d) of the 2019 Act.
30.An order passed by any court, or any forum is merely a kind of paper decree unless effective relief is granted to the party entitled thereto. The consumers of justice should feel that they have received justice in reality and not merely on papers. ISSUE NO.2
31.The factual position of the case, in order to adjudicate upon merits, has already been discussed in detail in paras 1.1 to 3.
32.The scheme of the 1986 Act has been discussed in paras 10.1 to 10.7. In the present case, the order dated 20.11.2007 was passed by the District Forum in Execution Petition No. E-22 of 2007 filed by the appellant-society. In case any person was aggrieved thereof, the proper remedy was to file appeal against that order before the State Commission as provided under Section 15 of the Act. Thereafter, no remedy of appeal or revision therefrom is provided.
33.In case an order is passed by the State Commission in execution petition, no appeal will be maintainable before National Commission as Section 19 of the 1986 Act provides for limited remedy of appeal against an order passed by the State Commission to the National Commission.
34.Since the execution of an order passed by different fora under the 1986 Act will not be a matter of consumer dispute, even the suo motu exercise of revisionary powers is impermissible.
35.In the case in hand, order passed in execution was challenged by the aggrieved parties by filing revision petitions before the State Commission, whereas the appropriate remedy was to file an appeal. As the issues were considered in detail by the State Commission, the revision petitions so filed would be considered to be appeals against the order passed by the District Forum.
36.Insofar as the conclusion of the order passed by the National Commission regarding non-maintainability of revision petition against the order passed by the State Commission is concerned, there is no dispute. However, we do not agree with the reasoning given. The order passed by the State Commission impugned before the National Commission could not be considered to have been passed under Section 27-A of the 1986 Act, as it limited filing of appeals against an order passed under Section 27 of the Act. The order passed by the District Forum in the case in hand was under Section 25 of the 1986 Act and not under Section 27. Neither an appeal nor a revision against an order passed by the State Commission in an appeal filed against the order of the District Forum in execution proceedings shall be maintainable before the National Commission.
37.As no remedy will be available against the first appellate order passed by the State Commission in execution proceedings filed before the District Forum, the aggrieved party will be at liberty to avail of the appropriate remedy in accordance with law. RELIEF
38.Section 25(1) of the 1986 Act shall be read as enumerated below for the period from 15.03.2003 to 20.07.2020 with reference to all pending proceedings at any stage for execution of any order passed under the 1986 Act. “Section 25. Enforcement of orders of the District (1) Where any order made under this Act is not complied with, the District Forum or the State may be, enforce the same in the manner as if it were a decree or order made by the Court in a suit and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, as far as may be, applicable and may order the property of the person, not complying with such order to be attached.” 38.1 Against an order passed by the District Forum in execution petition, an appeal shall lie to the State Commission under Section 15 of the 1986 Act with no further remedy of appeal or revision. 38.2 Against an order passed by the State Commission in the execution petition, no further appeal or revision shall lie.
39.In view of the above, all the civil appeals are disposed of accordingly.
40.Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
41.We place on record our sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India and Shri Jai Deep Gupta, learned senior counsel, and their team of lawyers, including Ms. Jharna and Mr. Shubham Singh Bhadouriya, Law Clerks-cum-Research Associate, for assisting this Court to arrive at a conclusion which may resolve the anomalous situation in Section 25(1) of the 1986 Act. [ J.K. MAHESHWARI ] [ RAJESH BINDAL ] New Delhi August 22, 2025.