1.N.V. ANJARIA, J. Leave granted.
2.These two Appeals preferred by the appellant-original petitioner, arise out of the judgment and order dated 12.07.2023 in Writ Appeal No.534 of 2023 and order dated 13.09.2025 in Review RASHI GUPTA High Court dismissed both the writ appeal and review petition, confirming the dismissal of the Writ Petition. 2.1. In the Writ Petition, the appellantpetitioner prayed to direct respondent No.1-Cochin University of Science and Technology, Kalamassery and its Registrar-respondent No. 2, to appoint the appellant as Associate Professor, Inorganic Chemistry (Scheduled Caste) in the Department of Applied Chemistry. It was next prayed to declare as illegal communication dated 16.09.2022 of the University rejecting the case of the petitioner for being appointed against the vacancy, which had arisen upon resignation of appointee candidate- one Dr. Anitha C. Kumar. 2.2. The appellant-petitioner staked her claim to be appointed on the basis that the appellant was ranked second in the Rank List/Wait List prepared pursuant to the recruitment process, and that the appointee Dr. Anitha at rank No.1 had resigned. While the wait list was in operation in view of Section 31(10) of the Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the University Act’). The request of the appellant came to be rejected on the ground that the university would be applying the rule of rotation under Section 31(11) of the University Act and in that view the vacancy was to be given to the candidate from Latin Catholic/Anglo Indian category.
3.The petitioner, who belongs to Scheduled Caste, applied for the post of Associate Professor pursuant to recruitment notification dated 22.10.2019. The post of Associate Professor, Inorganic Chemistry was a single vacancy notified to be filled in, which carried the scale of pay of ₹37,400-₹67,000/- plus Academic Grade Pay of ₹9000/- (Prerevised). The appellant fared successfully in the selection process and placed at merit No. 2 in the Rank List published by the University authorities. The rank list came into force with effect from 15.02.2021 to remain valid for a period of two years from the date of notification, as contemplated under Section 31(10) of the University Act. 3.1 The post in question was previously notified in the year 2005 and again in the year 2015, reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate. On both the occasions it remained unfilled for want of SC candidate. The University notified the same once again on 22.10.2019, reserving it for the Scheduled Caste category. As stated above, while the appellant was listed at rank No. 2 in the wait list, Dr. Anitha C. Kumar placed at No. 1 came to be appointed. Dr. Anitha however resigned and left the post on 30.03.2022 as she obtained appointment as Professor in the School of Chemical Sciences, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. 3.2 On 20.04.2022, respondent No.1 rejected the request of the petitioner. The ground stated was that Dr. Anitha C. Kumar had a lien on the said post and therefore the post could not be offered to the petitioner. This decision of the respondents came to be challenged by the appellant by filing Writ Petition (C) No. 15183 of 2022 before the High Court, which petition came to be allowed, and the High Court directed the University to consider the claim of the petitioner for appointment, subject to her rank and eligibility as per the rules of communal rotation. 3.3 The appellant again submitted a request for her consideration for appointment. Respondents once again rejected the request by communication dated 16.09.2022, this time stating a different reason that pursuant to the resignation of the Dr. Anitha C. Kumar, a fresh vacancy has arisen which was needed to be filled in only by way of communal rotation by offering the same to a Latin Catholic candidate. 3.4 The appellant filed the Writ Petition (C) No. 38986 of 2022 challenging the aforementioned decision dated 16.09.2022 of the University. Learned Single Judge dismissed the petition by order dated 03.02.2023 accepting the contention of the University that as per Section 31(11) of the University Act communal rotation was to be applied for filling up the vacancy, by undertaking fresh recruitment process and issuing the necessary notification. Against the dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant filed W.A. No. 534 of 2023 which came to be dismissed on 12.07.2023. The review petition was also dismissed, giving rise to the present Appeal before this Court, as stated above. 3.5 Respondent-University is governed by the provisions of the Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986. While the relevant provisions are delineated and discussed in the subsequent paragraphs, it may be mentioned briefly at this stage that sub-section (9) of Section 31 of the University Act provides for preparation of Rank List and as per sub-section (10), the validity period of the Rank List is two years from the date of its publication. It is further provided that all vacancies arising during the period of validity of the Rank List shall be filled up from the list. Sub-section (11) of Section 31 says that communal rotation shall be followed category wise treating all departments as one unit. 3.6. As per Section 7(2) of the University Act, in making appointments to all the posts as determined by the Syndicate in any service, class or category under the University, the University shall mutatis mutandis adhere to the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 14 and the provisions of Rules 15, 16, 17 and 17A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958, as amended from time to time.
4.Assailing the impugned judgment and orders, Learned Senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Mohan Gopal submitted that since the appellant was ranked at Serial No.2, she was entitled to be offered appointment upon departure of the candidate at rank No. 1 and appointed initially in that capacity. He submitted that the appellant could exercise her right to claim the appointment when in the operative Rank List, she was the next meritorious candidate. It was further submitted on behalf of the appellant that the vacancy was meant for Scheduled Caste category, therefore, in any view, in order to maintain the reservation, as contemplated in the recruitment notification, it ought to have been offered to the appellant who was Scheduled Caste candidate in line in the Rank List. 4.1. Referring to Section 31 of the University Act, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that when the Rank List was treated as valid, the provision in sub-section (11) regarding communal rotation cannot be invoked to interject the currency of Rank List and that the appellant’s entitlement to be appointed could not have been disregarded. It was submitted that both sub section (10) and sub section (11) of Section 31 of the University Act should be allowed to simultaneously operate and till two year’s validity period presented for the Rank List the application of rule of communal rotation has to wait to remain in abeyance till the validity period of Rank List. It was submitted that the rule of rotation may come into play upon expiry of Rank List to make for the two provisions cohesive operation and application. He in other words submitted interpreting both harmoniously. 4.1.1 For the proposition that candidate in the valid Wait List can claim his or her right to be appointed, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of this Court in Gujarat State Dy. Engineers’ Assn. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.1. A decision of the Kerala High Court in Narayanan v. State of Kerala2, was also pressed into service to emphasize that the due representation to the Scheduled Caste could not be discounted when vacancy belonged to that category and the Rank List was operative. 1 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 2 1981 SCC Online Ker 14: (1981) 2 SLR 340 4.2 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Pranjal Kishore would submit that no candidate in the Wait List has any indefeasible right to seek appointment. It was submitted that the appellant did not have vested right for being appointed from the Rank List even though the vacancy had arisen upon departure of Dr. Anitha. According to his submission, the University was justified in taking a stance that it was a fresh vacancy to be filled in by applying the communal rotation under Section 31(11) of the University Act. 4.2.1 In order to substantiate the proposition canvassed that placement in the wait list would not give a right to the candidate to be appointed, learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decisions of this Court in Surender Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.3, in Rakhi Ray & Ors. v. High Court of Delhi & Ors.4. and in Vivek Kaisth & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.5 Yet another decision of this Court in Raj Rishi Mehra & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.6 was pressed into service, more particularly for its paragraphs 16 and 17 in which the observations from Surender Singh (supra) and Rakhi Ray (supra) were reiterated.
5.The moot question falling for
consideration is whether in view of provisions of
Section 31(10) versus Section 31(11) of the University Act, when the Rank List is provided to be valid for two
years, whether during such validity period when a vacancy arises, next candidate in the Rank List/Wait
List can legitimately put forward his or her right to be appointed, or the University would justified in
adverting to resort to rule of communal rotation during the currency of operative Rank List.
5.1 Before proceeding further, an incidental aspect may be dealt with. As noted, when
the appellant initially put forward her claim to the appointment, her request was rejected on the ground
that Dr. Anitha C. Kumar had her lien on the post. Although the said ground was disapproved and
rejected by this Court while allowing Writ Petition (C) No.15183 of 2022 directing the University to
reconsider the claim of the petitioner, in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents in the present
proceedings, in paragraph 6 in particular, the same ground is raised to deny the appointment to the
appellant.
5.1.1 The concept of lien in service
jurisprudence implies a right of an employee or civil servant to hold the post substantively to which he or
she is appointed. In Ramlal Khurana (Dead) by Lrs.
v. State of Punjab & Ors.7 this Court stated,
“Lien is not a word of art. It just connotes the
right of a civil servant to hold the post
substantively to which he is appointed.
Generally when a person with a lien against a
post is appointed substantively to another post,
he acquires a lien against the latter post. Then
the lien against his previous post automatically
disappears.” (Para 8)
5.1.2 The lien of an employee stands
automatically terminated without requiring any
formal order, once the employee gets appointed on
other post. This was reiterated by this Court in State
of Rajasthan & Anr. v. S.N. Tiwari & Ors.8 In the
present case, Dr. Anitha Kumar resigned from the
post and secured substantive appointment in another
University. It terminated her lien on the post of
Assistant Professor in the respondent University. It
was entirely erroneous in law to reason that Dr. Anita
had a lien on the post and to deny the appellant the
appointment on that ground.
5.2 The respondent Cochin University is
governed, including for the recruitment processes
for the various post, under the Cochin University of
Science and Technology Act, 1986, The relevant
provisions of Section 31 of the University Act which
deals with selections are sub-section (9) and (10) of Section 31 and it reads as under,
‘(9) The rank of lists prepared by the Selection
Committees shall be published in the notice board
of the University and also in the Gazette.
(10) A rank list published under sub section (9)
shall remain in force for a period of two years from
the date of such publication and all vacancies
arising during the period shall be filled up from
the list so published’
5.2.1 Sub-section (11) and (12) of Section 31
contemplates communal rotation to be applied and reservation of seats which are produced herein,
“(11) Communal rotation shall be followed
category-wise treating all the departments as one
unit.
(12) The Registrar shall maintain a register
containing the list of appointments made
indicating the vacancies filled up by open
competition and by reservation to Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward
Classes, vacancies remaining to be filled up for
want of qualified hands from Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes,
and vacancies carried forward for want of
qualified hands under reservation quota for being
filled up in future vacancies and such other details
as may be specified in the Statutes.”
5.2.2 Section 31(10) contemplates that the Rank List published under Section 9 “shall remain in
force for a period of two years from the date of such publication”. It further mandates that all the
vacancies arising during the said validity period of two years shall be filled up from the list so published.
This statutory provision in the University Act enjoins that the Rank List shall remain alive and operative for
two years from the date of publication. Sub section (11) of Section 31 at the same time provides that the
communal rotation shall be valid category-wise and that all the departments are to be treated as one unit.
Under sub section (12), the Registrar is required to maintain a register containing the list of appointments
made indicating the vacancies filled up by open competition and by reservation.
5.3 It would also be relevant to briefly
notice the provisions of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 which are
mentioned in Section 7 of the University Act and are to be taken into account for rotational reservation.
Rule 14 is in respect of reservation of appointments. Sub-rule (a) mandates about the need of appointment
for the purpose of the reserved categories. Sub-rule
(b) is about the claim of the members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the
appointments to be filled up on the basis of merits. Sub-rule (c) states about the appointments under the
rule to be made in the order of rotation as specified for every cycle of 20 vacancies.
5.3.1 Rule 15 is about combining rotation in clause (c) of rule 14 in the integrated cycle. It further
provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of these rules, if a suitable
candidate is not available for selection from any particular community or group of communities
specified, the said vacancy shall be kept unfilled to be notified separately for that community or group of
communities for that selection year and shall be filled by direct recruitment. In the explanation below Rule
15(a), the ‘selection year’ is explained. The 'selection year' for the purpose of this rule shall be the period
from the date on which the Rank List of candidates comes into force upto the date on which it expires.
5.4 It is a salutary principle of statutory interpretation, and the courts are obliged to follow
the same, namely that two provisions of a statute seemingly in conflict or the two separate limbs in a
particular provision have to be interpreted so as to avoid conflict in their operation, what is known as the
doctrine of harmonious construction. It is trite that a
construction which reduces any provision in the
statute to a futility has to be eschewed. The maxim is
that ut res magis valeat quam pereat which means that
it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be
made void.
5.4.1 In CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers9,
this Court,
“The provisions of one section of the statute
cannot be used to defeat those of another unless
it is impossible to effect reconciliation between
them. Thus, a construction that reduces one of
the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead
letter” is not a harmonised construction. To
harmonise is not to destroy.” (Para 21)
5.4.2 This Court proceeded to highlight
certain basic principles known to the concept of
harmonious construction, which can be summarized
a under:
‘(a) A construction which reduces the statute to
a futility has to be avoided. A statute of any
enacting provision therein has to be so construed
as to make it effective and operative.
(b) A statute is designed to be workable and
the interpretation thereof by a court should be to
secure the object unless crucial omission or clear
direction makes that end unattainable.
(c) The courts will have to reject that
construction which will defeat the plain intention
of the legislature even though there may be some
inexactitude in the language used.
(d) If the choice is between two
interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to
achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, has to be avoided which would reduce the
legislation to futility, and rather bolder
construction should be accepted based on the
view that Parliament would legislate only for the
purpose of bringing about an effective result. The
statute must be read as a whole, and one provision of the act should be construed with reference to
other provision in the same act so as to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute.
(e) The court must ascertain the intention of
the legislature by directing its attention not
merely to the clauses to be construed but to the
entire statute.
(f) It should not be lightly assumed that the Parliament had given with one hand what it took
away with other.
(g) The provisions of one Section of the statute
cannot be used to defeat those of the another
unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation
between them. Thus, a direction that reduces one
of the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead
letter” is not a harmonised construction.’
(Paras 14,15,16,17,18,19,20 and 21)
5.4.3 Again, in State of Gujarat vs. R.A.
Mehta10, this Court applying the maxim ut res magis
valeat quam pereat observed that in the process of
statutory construction, the court must interpret the
Act keeping in view the aforesaid legal maxim and
that a statute must be construed in such a manner so
as to make it workable.
5.4.4 Therefore, whether it is a question of
construing and applying a particular provision in a
statute vis-à-vis the other provision or it is a question
of interpreting two sub-provisions in a parent
provision, which may become conflicting or
contradicting in their applicability, the creases are
required to be ironed out by adverting to the rule of
harmonious interpretation. When two sub-sections in
a particular section, as the situation is obtained in the
case on hand, are to be applied and their purport is
apparently irreconcilable, the attempt should be
made while applying them that neither is rendered
otiose and none becomes ineffective. In application
of one sub-provision, it should not happen that the
teeth and the applicability of the other sub-provision
is taken away or that the other sub-provision is
obliterated for its effect.
5.4.5. The court has to avoid a head-on clash of seemingly irreconcilable provisions. They have to
be harmonised in their effect and implementation. One provision may not be operated in a manner to
defeat the other. When two provisions are not possible to be completely harmonised, they should
be operated and given effect to, up to the point of reconciliation.
5.4.6 In applying and implementing provision of Section 31(10) versus Section 31(11) of
the University Act based on above principle of interpretation, the any of the provisions of Kerala
State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 will have to be taken note of by virtue of sub-section (2) of
section 7 of the University Act, which mandates application of these rules mutatis mutandis while
making appointments for all posts under the University Act.
5.5. In light of above discussion, a conjoint reading of the Section 31(10) and 31(11) of the
University Act indicates that both sub-sections operate in distinct spheres, yet they are not mutually
exclusive. The provision declaring that the Rank List shall remain in force for a period of two years, merely
prescribes the life span of the select list, whereas the
mandate to follow communal rotation governs the
method and manner of appointment to vacancies
arising during this period.
5.5.1 An interpretation that communal rotation could be applied only after expiry of
currency of rank list would result in rendering the reservation/rotation requirement prescribed under
sub-section (11) entirely otiose during the operational period of the said list, which would defeat
the legislative intent behind framing the rotation rule. Such an interpretation is impermissible in view of the
doctrine of harmonious construction, which requires courts to give effect to all provisions and avoid
rendering any part superfluous. Asking sub section (11) to wait during two years period mentioned in sub
section (10) would mean obliterating entirely the operation of said subsection of Section 31 for that
period.
5.5.2 At the cost of repetition, this Court deems it appropriate to mention again when two
provisions are capable of simultaneous operation without conflict, the Court must adopt an
interpretation that allows each to have full play rather than subordinating one to the other. Applying this
principle, the correct construction is that the Rank List continues to be valid for a period of two years as per
section 31(10), and within this period, every
appointment made therefrom must adhere to the
communal rotation mandated by section 31(11) of the
University Act provided that the said vacancy stood satisfied in form and substance by the candidate for
whom the said vacancy was reserved.
5.5.3 In the instant case, a scheduled caste
candidate who being initially appointed and after declaration of her probation period resigned from
service. The interpretation that communal rotation clause will come to operation only after expiration of
Rank list after two years period as per section 31(10) upon which the vacancy arose would make the
mandate of section 31(11) redundant and dead letter.
5.5.4 It is apt and appropriate to mention that courts in exercise of its powers cannot prolong
the operation of provision to have effect after certain period unless the said provision itself mandate
certain conditions for its operation. Hence, this interpretation preserves the intended effect of both
provisions, ensures continuity of reservation norms during the validity of the list, and avoids an outcome
where the roster requirement becomes illusory or effective only after the list itself has expired. Hence,
both sub-sections must be read as simultaneously operative.
6.At this stage, in above context a reference to the decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Narayanan2 relied on by the appellant is being noticed. The controversy before the High Court was about the appointment to the post of Section Officer in the Legislature Secretariat to be done in accordance with the Special Recruitment scheme under Rule 17A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958. Two vacancies to be filled in from Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe were reported to the Public Service Commission. The petitioner who belonged to Scheduled Tribe, applied for the post. A rank list was prepared at the end of the examination process, in which one K.M. Mary was placed at Serial No.1 whereas the petitioner was ranked at Serial No.2. The Rule provided that if no qualified candidate from the Scheduled Tribes are available for recruitment, the vacancies reserved for them will be filled up by Scheduled Caste. 6.1 The first rank-holder K.M. Mary did not accept the appointment as she obtained the job elsewhere. The petitioner before the Kerala High Court put forth his case stating that the post should have gone to him, he being the next in the rank in the Scheduled Tribe list. However, instead of offering that post to the petitioner upon declining to accept the same, the Public Service Commission took the view that it must then be treated as a vacancy available to be filled up afresh to which all Scheduled Castes may be able to compete. 6.1.1 The Kerala High Court addressed the question whether the rules of reservation would be adequately met by merely advising a candidate of a particular class to a post reserved for their class and whether where such candidate fails to join that post, the right of that class to that post will be lost. 6.1.2 The High Court posed a question ‘Could it be said that when, in the list of eligible candidates, there are candidates available for advice for vacancies to be filled up by Scheduled Tribes the right to a particular turn in the matter of appointment to a post earmarked for Scheduled Tribe will be lost if the candidate advised is unable to take up that post even though the next in rank is available and is willing to take up the post’. 6.1.3 It was observed by the High Court in paragraph 5, ‘At what stage does a class or community lose its right on the assumption that the reservation for that community is satisfied? Is it on appointment to that post or is it merely on advice for appointment? De hors any rules it appears to us that the rule of reservation would be effective only if to a post reserved for a community a person is actually appointed. It is more so when, as the facts of this case show, there may be quite often cases where a candidate advised for appointment may not be available for appointment. In the scramble to get an appointment to one post or other candidates may have applied for appointments to several posts at the same time.’ 6.1.4 The High Court proceeded further to state in the very paragraph, ‘The mere fact that the candidate advised is not available for appointment should not result in the class to which the person advised belongs losing such right when eligible candidates are available for appointment to such posts. Otherwise, it would be a reservation in form only and not in substance. When once a person advised is appointed whether subsequently he continues or not in that post is another matter. But in the matter of appointment to the posts the principle of reservation would have to be adhered to in such a case. To treat the reservation as applicable at the stage of advice and not at the stage of appointment may not, in circumstances where many of the people advised may not be able to join because they are already appointed, satisfy the rule of reservation in its true form and spirit as envisaged” [emphasis supplied] 6.2. The proposition laid down in Narayana’s case would not come to the rescue of the appellant in the instant case, for reasons more than one, firstly, that was a case where the selected candidate KM Mary did not accept the appointment; secondly, the post to which the application was called for was not filled up; thirdly, no vacancy arose to the said post; and, fourthly, as observed therein itself if the person is appointed, subsequently he continues or not in that post would be another matter. 6.3 In the instant case, the list was announced on 15.02.2021 and Dr. C Anitha who stood in the list at Serial No.1 was offered appointment; pursuant to which she reported and subsequently her probation was also declared. Thereafter on 30.03.2022, she resigned, due to which the vacancy arose. At this stage, section 31(11) gets attracted, and it had to be operated harmoniously in conjunction with section 31(10). Had the petitioner belonged to Latin Catholic/Anglo Indian Category her claim for being appointed to the post would have been justified. As the vacancy had arisen and the list being in operation, necessarily communal rotation prescribed under sub-section (11) of section 31 would start operating immediately on vacancy arising. 6.4 Thus, the principles laid in Narayana’s case would not assist the petitioner and the caveat made in the judgement to the effect ‘when once a person advised is appointed whether subsequently he continues or not in that post is another matter’ is a complete answer to the proposition that post to which Dr. Anitha was appointed and later her probation being declared, the tendering of her resignation thereafter, is a corollary to the fact that post which was reserved for the Scheduled Caste candidate stood satisfied in form and substance and on her resignation vacancy arose. As the vacancy arise upon Dr. Anitha’s resignation, same had to be necessarily filled up on communal rotation basis. It would be the tenet of harmonious construction.
7.Proceeding now to consider the
decisions relied on and referred by both the sides, to on the aspect of operation of Wait List or Rank List, in
Surender Singh3, the facts were that the State Government had advertised 2461 vacancies of
teachers on 19.08.1992. The process of interview was completed only on 22.06.1994. By the time, new 7737
posts of the various categories of the teachers
became available. The State Government proceeded
to fill up these posts out of the applicants who had applied against 2461 posts advertised on 19.08.1992.
This Court held that making appointments over and above the number of posts advertised was an
improper exercise and that no exceptional circumstance existed or emergent situation which
may justify the State Government to deviate from the principle of limiting the number of appointments to
what was advertised initially. The filling up of vacancy from the existing Wait List, beyond and
above the post advertised was disapproved.
7.1 In Rakhi Ray & Ors.4 the question was
about the filling up of the judicial vacancies. It was similarly held by this Court that the High Court was
not justified in filling up the post from the existing select list since the vacancies which are filled up, had
arisen subsequent of issuance of the advertisement. It was stated by this Court that the wait list could not
have been used as a reservoir to fill up the vacancies which came into existence after the notification of
advertisement, the same being beyond the vacancies initially notified at the time of advertisement.
7.2 Vivek Kaisth & Anr.5 laid down the proposition that the appointments in excess of
vacancies as advertised, would be arbitrary and it
would amount to depriving the candidates of
appointment who were not eligible at the time when
advertisement process was started, but acquired eligibility at subsequent point of time. In the decision
in Raj Rishi Mehra10, while the Court stated the general proposition that the Select List or Reserve List
or Wait List or Rank List does not entitle a person as of right to be appointed against unfilled post. The
Rules in that case did not provide any time frame about the validity of the Wait List.
7.2.1 It was held that in absence of any
stipulation in the recruitment rules imposing duty on the appointing authority to make appointments from
the Wait List, the decision taken by the High Court on administrative side rejecting the petitioner- the wait
listed candidates’ claim for appointment against the reserved post cannot be faulted. The State
Government had initially already approved the fresh recruitment, and the State Public Service Commission
had issued fresh advertisement for 71 posts including the reserved category posts. Since the rules
regulating the recruitment did not impose any duty on the appointing authority to make appointment
from the Wait List, the refusal was held justified.
7.3 The decision in the Gujarat State Dy.
Executive Engineers’ Assn. was pressed into service by both the sides to bring home their respective case
about right to the wait-listed candidate to be
appointed. The said decision may, therefore, be
considered in its breath.
7.3.1 The examination for selection of Class
I and Class II Engineers under the relevant Rules comprising out written and viva voce test were held in
the year 1980 and 1982, for which the results were declared in the year 1981 and 1983 respectively. The
High Court directed the merit list and the wait list to be redrawn by ignoring the minimum qualifying
marks for the viva voce test prescribed for selection. Subsequently, those candidates who were included
in the wait list filed Writ Petitions before the High Court for a direction to the Government to work out
the vacancies in accordance therewith and appoint candidates from wating list of the two examinations.
7.3.2 What High Court did was that it directed the Government to make six more appointments by
direct selection from the revised waiting list of the year 1980 examination out of the vacancies filled in
the year 1981-1982. It was further directed that those not getting appointments should be considered for
vacancies arising in the year 1982-1983 and between 01.04.1983 and 21.09.1983.
7.3.3 As regards how and in what manner a Waiting List should operate and what is its nature the
aspects which would be governed by the rules. It was
explained thus,
‘Usually it is linked with the selection or
examination for which it is prepared. For
instance, if an examination is held say for
selecting 10 candidates for 1990 and the
competent authority prepares a waiting list then
it is in respect of those 10 seats only for which
selection or competition was held. Reason for it
is that whenever selection is held, except where
it is for single post, it is normally held by taking
into account not only the number of vacancies
existing on the date when advertisement is
issued or applications are invited but even
those which are likely to arise in future within
one year or so due to retirement etc.’ (Para 8)
7.3.4 Observed this Court further that such list
prepared either under the rules or even otherwise is mainly to ensure that the working in the office does
not suffer if the selected candidates do not join for one or the other reason,
“A candidate in the waiting list in the order of
merit has a right to claim that he may be
appointed if one or the other selected candidate
does not join. But once the selected candidates
join and no vacancy arises due to resignation
etc. or for any other reason within the period the
list is to operate under the rules or within
reasonable period where no specific period is
provided then candidate from the waiting list
has no right to claim appointment to any future
vacancy which may arise unless the selection
was held for it. He has no vested right except to
the limited extent, indicated above, or when the
appointing authority acts arbitrarily and makes
appointment from the waiting list by picking
and choosing for extraneous reasons.” (Para 8)
7.3.5 Holding that it was not a correct
approach on part of the High Court to permit to fill up vacancies from current wait list on the ground that
subsequent vacancies were not property worked out, it was next observed in Gujarat State Dy. Executive
Engineers’ Association1,
“It is operative only for the contingency that if
any of the selected candidates does not join
then the person from the waiting list may be
pushed up and be appointed in the vacancy so
caused or if there is some extreme exigency the
Government may as a matter of policy decision
pick up persons merit from the waiting list. But
the view taken by the High Court that since the
vacancies have not been worked out properly,
therefore, the candidates from the waiting list
were liable to be appointed does not appear to
be sound.” (Para 9)
(Emphasis supplied)
7.4 It is correct that a waiting list is not a
ready reservoir for the recruitment, but it is equally true that when it is made operative for a particular
period under any provision, rule or circular, it has to be acted upon for the contingency when any of the
selected candidate does not join or the appointee resigns. The waiting list is intended to pave way for
the next ranked candidate to be appointed in such situation provided the vacancy occurs. In the present
case, however the above dictum and the principles would have to be applied harmoniously with the rule
9 of rotation envisaged in Section 31(11) of the Act.
7.5 The rules of recruitment may provide
the time stipulation about the validity and operation of the wait list. When the wait list or rank list kept alive
for the purpose of making appointment therefrom by virtue of provision or stipulation, such mandate will
have to be adhered to and a candidate placed next on merit in the Wait List or Rank List would be entitled to
lodge his or her claim for appointment successfully to the vacancy created by virtue of none being
appointed. From the survey of the decisions on the subject of operation of Wait List Or Rank List and the
corresponding rights of the candidates enlisted therein, the law could be summarised to state that the
wait list by itself is not a source of recruitment, and that generally a candidate placed in the wait list has
no vested right to invariably claim appointment
therefrom, however when the wait list is made valid
for a stipulated period, it would operate for such period.
8.Again, in the present set of facts, the above proposition would hold true subject to operation of rule and policy of rotation as per Section 31(11).
9.In the teeth of the aforesaid principles of law enunciated by this court when facts on hand are examined, it would not detain us for long to brush aside the contention raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, though at first blush it looked attractive. At the cost of repetition, it is apt to note that the post called for was filled up but Dr. Anitha a Scheduled Caste candidate who worked for a period of more than one year viz., till she resigned on 30.03.2022, and on her resignation the vacancy of the said post having arisen, the mandate of sub-section (10) of section 31 prescribing that the waiting list would be in operation for a period of two years and simultaneously sub-section (11) of section 31 would be attracted and both these provisions have to be read harmoniously.
10.For the above precise reason, the respondent university has applied the communal rotation and assigned the vacancy to the turn of 8-LC/AI that is, Latin Catholic/Anglo Indian Category and as the petitioner did not belong to the said category she has not been selected or for that matter none from the wait list belonged to the said category.
11.As a result, the appeals are dismissed and the impugned judgment and order dated 12.07.2023 passed by the High Court in Writ Appeal No.534 of 2023 as well as the order dated 13.09.2025 passed in Review Petition No.1202 of 2023 are hereby affirmed. Costs made easy. In view of disposal of the appeals as above, all pending interlocutory applications would not survive and stand accordingly disposed of. (ARAVIND KUMAR) (N.V. ANJARIA) NEW DELHI DECEMBER 18, 2025. (VK)