Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 5108 of 2023, Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 5093 of 2023 and Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 12238 of 2023
1.Leave granted. NEETU KHAJURIA
2.The present appeals call into question the common judgment dated 22nd February, 2023, passed by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu1 in a batch of intra-court appeals2 along with connected writ petitions3, whereby the learned Division Bench dismissed the said intracourt appeals and writ petitions and affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge rejecting the appellants’ claim for regularisation of their services. FACTS OF PRESENT CASES: -
3.The brief facts, in a nutshell, insofar as they are relevant for the disposal of the present appeals, are stated hereinafter: -3.1. The respondent-State, vide order dated 14th December, 2009, issued SRO No. 3844 titled “Jammu and Kashmir Medical and Dental Education (Appointment on Academic Arrangement Basis) Rules, 2009”5. The said SRO envisaged the 1 Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”. 2 Letter Patent Appeal Nos. 30, 33, 34, 40, 80, 81, 192, 193 of 2018, LPA No. 76 of 2019, LPA No. 10 of 2020, LPA Nos. 80 and 81 of 2022. 3 SWP No. 886 of 2018, Writ Petition (C) Nos. 4286 and 4364 of 2019. 4 Hereinafter, referred to as “impugned SRO”. 5 Hereinafter, referred to as “2009 Rules”. appointment of personnels to posts relating to teaching staff, medical officers, nurses, para-medical, para-dental and technical staff in the Government Medical Colleges on academic arrangement basis. 3.2. In the interregnum, the respondent-State, on 29th April, 2010 enacted Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Special Provisions) Act, 2010,6 which provided for the regularisation of employees appointed on an ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis. It is pertinent to note that appointments made under the impugned SRO were expressly excluded from the categories eligible to seek regularisation of service under the said enactment. 3.3. Pursuant to the 2009 Rules, the present appellants were appointed thereunder to the posts of Junior Staff Nurse/Female Multipurpose Health Worker during the period between 2011 and 2013. 3.4. On 17th August, 2015 respondent No. 2, namely the Government Medical College, addressed a communication to the respondent-State, requesting that the posts occupied by the appellants be referred 6 Hereinafter, referred to as “2010 Act”. to the Service Selection Board for undertaking the regular selection process. 3.5. In this backdrop, the paramedical staff, including the present appellants who had been appointed under the 2009 Rules, submitted a joint representation to respondent No. 2, i.e. the Government Medical College, seeking regularisation of their services and further requesting that their posts not be referred to the Service Selection Board. 3.6. Ultimately, an advertisement dated 1st September, 2015, was issued inviting applications for appointment on a regular basis to 1088 posts, which included the posts occupied by the present appellants. 3.7. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court by filing writ petitions seeking the benefit of regularisation under the 2010 Act. The learned Single Judge, by a common judgment dated 4th May, 2018, dismissed the writ petitions and declined the appellants’ claim for regularisation in terms of the said Act. 3.8. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants preferred intra-court appeals before the High Court assailing the decision of the learned Single Judge. The learned Division Bench, by a common judgment dated 22nd February, 2023, dismissed the intra-court appeals along with the connected writ petitions, holding that the appellants were not entitled to regularisation under the 2010 Act.
4.It is in these circumstances that the appellants have approached this Court. ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT: -
5.The issue that, therefore, arises for our consideration is whether the respondent-State was justified in law in classifying the present appellants, who were engaged on an academic arrangement basis under the impugned SRO No. 384 of 2009, as a distinct class under Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Special Provisions) Act, 2010, and thereby excluding them from the benefit of regularisation contemplated under the said enactment. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:
6.Dr. Rajiv Nanda and Mrs. V. Mohana, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, vehemently assailed the impugned judgment of the High Court, contending, inter alia, as follows: -6.1. That Section 9(b) of the 2010 Act expressly excludes persons appointed on an “academic arrangement” basis from its purview, thereby creating an arbitrary and unjustified classification between the appellants and other similarly situated employees engaged on an ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis. It was contended that there exists no intelligible differentia distinguishing the appellants from such categories, nor any rational nexus between the said classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 6.2. That the very object of the 2010 Act was to cure and regularise long-standing irregular appointments and to extend legal protection to employees who had been rendering service for considerable periods against substantive and essential posts. 6.3. That the appellants were appointed during the period 2011-2012 against clear and sanctioned vacancies, pursuant to a duly conducted, transparent selection process undertaken after verification of their eligibility, qualifications and experience in accordance with the applicable recruitment rules. It was further contended that the appellants have continuously discharged perennial and essential functions for a period exceeding a decade. 6.4. That the appellants have been discharging duties identical in nature, responsibility and continuity to those performed by regular employees, and that their functions are indispensable to the efficient functioning of the institutions under the respondent-State. 6.5. That the issuance of a fresh advertisement for the very posts presently occupied by the appellants was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India7. It was contended that the respondentState, having extracted perennial services from 7 Hereinafter, referred to as “Constitution”. the appellants over several years, could not, without any justifiable basis, seek to displace them through a fresh selection process. On these premises, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants urged that the present appeals merit acceptance and that the impugned judgment of the High Court be set aside. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE: -
7.Per contra, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the respondent-State, stoutly opposed the submissions advanced by the appellants and advanced the following submissions: -7.1. That Section 3 of the 2010 Act was applicable only to specified categories of appointees who fulfilled the statutory cut-off conditions, and since the appellants were engaged on an academic arrangement basis, they did not fall within the ambit of the said provision so as to claim regularisation thereunder. 7.2. That the proviso to Rule 4 of the impugned SRO unequivocally stipulates that candidates appointed thereunder shall not have any preferential claim to regular appointment through the normal process of recruitment. 7.3. That the appellants had furnished affidavits undertaking to abide by the terms and conditions of the impugned SRO, and thus, prior to joining service on an academic arrangement basis, they had voluntarily accepted the conditions governing their engagement. Having consciously assented to the said Rules, the appellants, it was contended, are estopped from questioning the consequences flowing therefrom. 7.4. That any regularisation of the appellants’ services would operate to the prejudice of other eligible candidates, who may have refrained from applying on the legitimate expectation that the appointments were purely temporary and would subsist only until the regular recruitment process was undertaken. 7.5. That it is a settled position of law that temporary, contractual or ad hoc engagement does not confer any vested right to regularisation, and that regularisation cannot be claimed in derogation of, or contrary to, the governing statutory rules. On these grounds, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent-State submitted that the present appeals preferred by the appellants are devoid of merit and, accordingly, deserve to be dismissed. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: -
8.We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of both parties and have carefully perused the material placed on record.
9.While dismissing the intra-court appeals preferred by the present appellants and affirming the order of the learned Single Judge, the learned Division Bench recorded the following findings: -i. That the learned Single Judge rejected the appellants’ claim for regularization under the 2010 Act on the ground that the said statute applied only to appointments made up to 29th April, 2010, being the appointed date under the Act. ii. That the Rules under which the appellants were appointed were framed with the object of ensuring that the functioning of the Medical and Dental Colleges did not suffer on account of delays in the regular recruitment process. iii. That the appellants were fully conscious of the condition that they would not be entitled to any preferential claim for regular appointment through the normal process of selection, and therefore could not subsequently seek regularization. iv. That even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the appellants could be treated as contractual employees, their engagement was for a limited duration and it could not be said that the respondent-State had utilized their services for an unduly prolonged period.
10.At the very threshold, we find ourselves unable
to concur with the reasoning adopted by both the
courts below. The High Court failed to advert to the
correct position of law. Once a specific challenge was
mounted by the present appellants to the vires of the 2010 Act, on the ground that the same infringed the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution, it was incumbent upon the High Court
to undertake a substantive examination as to
whether the impugned provisions satisfied the
constitutional threshold. Instead, the provisions were
upheld as they stood, without any meaningful
scrutiny or analysis as to their compatibility with the
constitutional scheme. It is this perfunctory and
truncated approach adopted by the courts below that
has necessitated our examination of the validity of
the challenge raised before us.
10.1. This Court, vide order dated 23rd June, 2023, passed in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C)
No. 12238 of 2023, directed that status quo be maintained with respect to the appellants and all
other similarly placed employees. Consequently,
the appellants have continued in the service of the
respondent-State throughout the pendency of the
present lis.
10.2. The appellants were appointed during the
period between 2011 and 2013 under SRO No.
384. The respondent-State enacted the 2010 Act,
which provided for the regularisation of employees
appointed on an ad hoc, contractual or
consolidated basis. The relevant provisions of the
said enactment, insofar as they bear upon the
controversy in question, are extracted
hereinbelow: -
“. . .
3. Application of the Act.
The provisions of this Act shall
apply to such posts under the
Government as are held by any
person having been appointed on
ad hoc or contractual basis
including those appointed on
consolidated pay provided that
such appointments have been made
against the clear vacancies, but
shall not apply to: –
(a) . . .
(b) persons appointed on tenure
posts co-terminus with the life of
the project or Scheme of the State
or Central Government, as the
case may be, and those appointed
on academic arrangement for a
fixed term in any Government
Department ;
. . .
5. Regularization of ad hoc or
contractual or consolidated
appointees. –
Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any law for the
time being in force or any judgment or
order of any court or tribunal, the ad
hoc or contractual or consolidated
appointees referred to in section 3
shall be regularized on fulfilment of
the following conditions, namely: –
(i) that he has been appointed
against a clear vacancy or post;
(ii) that he continues as such on
the appointed day;
(iii) that he possessed the requisite
qualification and eligibility for the
post on the date of his initial
appointment on ad hoc or
contractual or consolidated basis
as prescribed under the
recruitment rules governing the
service or post;
(iv) that no disciplinary or criminal
proceedings are pending against
him on the appointed day; and
(v) that he has completed seven
years of service as such on the
appointed day:
Provided that the regularization
of the eligible ad hoc or contractual or
consolidated appointees under this
Act shall have effect only from the
date of such regularization,
irrespective of the fact that such
appointees have completed more than
seven years of service on the
appointed day or thereafter but before
such regularization:
Provided further that any ad
hoc or contractual or consolidated
appointee who has not completed
seven years’ service on the
appointed day shall continue as
such till completion of seven years
and shall thereafter be entitled to
regularization under this Act.
. . .”
(emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, Section 3 of the 2010 Act
expressly excludes from its ambit persons
appointed on an academic arrangement for a fixed
tenure in any Government Department. By
operation of Section 3(b) of the said Act, the
respondent-State has sought to justify its policy
decision of treating the present appellants as a
separate category and denying them the benefit of
regularisation under the 2010 Act.
10.3. The said provision was assailed by the
present appellants by filing writ petitions before
the High Court, wherein a specific prayer was
made for issuance of a writ of mandamus declaring Section 3(b) of the 2010 Act, insofar as
it excluded persons appointed on an academic
arrangement for a fixed term in any Government
Department, as ultra vires the Constitution. The reliefs sought by the appellants in the writ
petitions before the High Court were, accordingly,
as follows: -
“a) Certiorari so as to set aside and
quash letter No. AHJ/ 2015/2014
dated 17-08-2015 to the extent it
refers the posts held by the
petitioners to SSRB with a
consequential direction to quash the
resultant advertisement Notice issued
by SSRB bearing No.05 of 2015 dated
0109-2015 issued by respondent
No.6 upto the extent of advertising the
posts of FMPHW/Junior Grade Nurse
(Item No.264 and Item No.267).
b) Certiorari/Mandamus declaring
part of Section 3(b) of Civil Services
Special Provision Act, 2010 to the
extent of providing those appointed
on academic arrangement for a fixed
term in any Government Department
as ultra-vires the constitution and
violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India and quashing
the same.
c) Further writ of mandamus directing
and commanding the respondents to
allow the petitioners to continue
within the Proviso 2 of Section 5 of the
Civil Services Special Provision Act,
2010 to complete seven years of their
service and submit their cases to
Empowered Committee for
regularization within the provision of
said Act after completion of seven
years.
d) Writ of prohibition restraining the
respondents 1, 2, 5 and 6 from filling
up the posts held by the petitioners
and particularly restraining
respondent No.5 and 6 from Initiating
any further selection process in
respect of the posts advertised at item
No.264 and Item No-267.
e) Issue writ in the nature of
mandamus declaring the provision of
SRO 384 of 2009 dated 14-12-2009 is
so far as it excludes the petitioners
from seeking regularization as Female
Multipurpose Health Worker, Junior/
Senior Staff Nurse be declared as
unconstitutional and in violation to
the mandate of Article 39 -D of the
Constitution of India.” 10.4. The parameters on which the validity of a
legislative enactment may be assailed have been
consistently reiterated by this Court. A 3-Judge
Bench of this Court, in Anjum Kadari and
another v. Union of India and others,8 has
authoritatively held that a law enacted by
Parliament or a State Legislature can be
invalidated by courts on two grounds alone,
namely: (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii)
infringement of any of the fundamental rights
8 (2025) 5 SCC 53
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution or
violation of any other constitutional provision.
10.5. Accordingly, Section 3(b) of the 2010 Act is
required to be tested on the anvil of the principles
laid down by this Court to determine its
constitutional validity. It is not in dispute that the
appellants do not assail the 2010 Act on the
ground of lack of legislative competence of the
respondent-State. Consequently, the sole issue
that survives for consideration is whether the
classification engrafted under Section 3(b) of the
2010 Act offends the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
10.6. According to the appellants, the impugned
provision expressly excludes persons appointed
under an “academic arrangement”, such as the
present appellants, from its ambit. It is contended
that this exclusion creates an artificial and
arbitrary classification, resulting in an unjustified
distinction between the appellants and other
similarly situated employees engaged on an ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis.
10.7. The 2010 Act, thus, creates two distinct
classes of appointees, namely: those appointed on
an ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis, and those engaged on an academic arrangement.
10.8. More recently, a 7-Judge Bench of this
Court, in State of Punjab and others v.
Davinder Singh and others,9 had occasion to
consider the permissibility of sub-classification
within the framework of affirmative action, in the
context of the equality mandate under Article 14
of the Constitution. While delineating the
parameters governing the creation of
classifications without transgressing the principle
of equality before the law, this Court observed as
follows: -
“84. Article 14 employs two
expressions — equality before the law
and equal protection of the laws. Both
different in content and sweep.
“Equality before the law”, an
expression derived from the English
Common law, entails absence of
special privileges for any individual
within the territory. It does not mean
that the same law should apply to
everyone, but that the same law
should apply to those who are
similarly situated. The expression
9 (2025) 1 SCC 1
“equal protection of the laws”
means that among equals, laws
must be equally administered. It
enjoins the State with the power to
reasonably classify those who are
differently placed. The mandate of
“equal protection of laws” casts a
positive obligation on the State to
ensure that everyone may enjoy equal
protection of the laws, and no one is
unfairly denied this protection. In
essence, the guarantee of equality
entails that all persons in like
circumstances must be treated
alike. That there must be a parity
of treatment under parity of
conditions. Equality does not entail
sameness. The State is allowed to
classify in a manner that is not
discriminatory. The doctrine of
classification gives content to the
guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. Under this approach, the focus
is on the equality of results or
opportunities over equality of
treatment.
85. The Constitution permits valid
classification if two conditions are
fulfilled. First, there must be an
intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons grouped
together from others left out of the
group. The phrase “intelligible
differentia” means difference
capable of being understood. The
difference is capable of being
understood when there is a
yardstick to differentiate the class
included and others excluded from
the group. In the absence of the
yardstick, the differentiation would
be without a basis and hence,
unreasonable. The basis of
classification must be deducible
from the provisions of the statute;
surrounding circumstances or
matters of common knowledge. In
making the classification, the State is
free to recognise degrees of harm.
Though the classification need not
be mathematical in precision, there
must be some difference between
the persons grouped and the
persons left out, and the difference
must be real and pertinent. The
classification is unreasonable if
there is “little or no
difference”. Second, the differentia
must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the
law, that is, the basis of
classification must have a nexus
with the object of the
classification.”
(emphasis supplied) Article 14 of the Constitution, therefore, does not
fetter the power of the State to frame
classifications, for equals alone are entitled to
equal treatment. Persons who are not similarly
situated cannot claim parity. However, the said
principle does not confer upon the State an
unfettered licence to carve out artificial
distinctions within a class of persons who are
otherwise similarly situated. Any such artificial or
unreasonable classification would strike at the
very core of the right to equality and violate the
mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.
10.9. Thus, for a classification to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, two conditions are
required to be satisfied. First, there must exist an intelligible differentia, namely, a rational and discernible basis which distinguishes one group of
persons from another, founded on a real and
relevant criterion. As observed in Davinder Singh
(supra), in the absence of such a yardstick, the differentiation would be bereft of any rational
foundation and would, therefore, be
unreasonable. Second, the differentia so adopted, being the basis of the classification, must bear a
rational nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the classification.
10.10. In the present case, the 2010 Act extends
the benefit of regularisation to appointees engaged
on an ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis, whereas those appointed on an academic
arrangement, such as the present appellants, are
placed in a separate category and rendered
ineligible for the benefit of regularisation under
the said enactment.
10.11. Appointments of a contractual nature were
regulated by SRO No. 255 issued by the
respondent-State on 5th August, 2003 titled
“Jammu and Kashmir Contractual Appointment
Rules, 2003”. A comparative examination of the
said 2003 Contractual Rules and the impugned
SRO of 2009 governing appointments on an
academic arrangement basis reveal that a
substantial number of provisions contained
therein are identical or closely similar in nature.
10.12. Rule 4 of both the sets of Rules pertains to
appointments made thereunder. Rule 4(1) of SRO
No. 384 of 2009 (the impugned SRO) and Rule 4(1)
of SRO No. 255 of 2003 (the 2003 Contractual
Rules) are identically worded. For the sake of
clarity, the relevant extract is reproduced
hereinbelow: -
SRO No. 384 of 2009 SRO No. 255 of 2003 (impugned SRO, governing (2003 Contractual Rules) appointment on academic basis)
4. Appointment under these 4. Appointment under rules. – these rules. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything (1) Notwithstanding to the contrary contained in anything to the contrary any rule or order for the time contained in any rule or being in force relating to the order for the time being in method of recruitment and force relating to the conditions of service for method of recruitment and recruitment in any service, or conditions of service for to any post under the recruitment in any service, Government, the appointing or to any post, under the authority may appoint persons Government, the to the posts mentioned under appointing authority may rule 3 on academic appoint persons to the arrangement basis initially for posts notified under Rule 3 a period of one year extendable on contract basis initially upto maximum of six years for a period of one year or (one year at a time and subject till regular selection is to good performance and made in accordance with conduct) or till the rules of recruitment selection/promotion is made in governing the respective accordance with the rules of posts, whichever is earlier. recruitment governing the
Provided that the respective posts, whichever is
appointment under these earlier:
rules shall not entitle the Provided that the appointment appointee to any under these rules shall not preferential claim for entitle the appointee to any regular appointment preferential claim for regular under normal process of appointment under normal selection. process of
(2) the services of an selection/appointment.
appointee under these . . . rules shall be terminable
before the expiry of the (2) The services of an appointee contractual period with under these rules shall be one month’s notice, form terminate before the expiry of either side, or on payment the tenure appointment with of one month’s salary in one month’s notice, from either lieu of notice by the side, or on payment of one appointing authority. month’s salary in lieu of notice by the appointing authority. (3) The appointee under
these rules shall have to (3) The appointee under these execute an agreement with rules shall have to execute an the Government on the agreement with the prescribed from appended Government on the prescribed as Form ‘A’ to these rules. form appended as Form ‘A’ to these rules.
(4) The appointment on academic arrangement basis against a post shall be made only when in filling up the post according to relevant recruitment rules is likely to be time consuming.
10.13. A conjoint reading of the provisions of both
the SROs reveals a striking degree of similarity.
The first proviso to the impugned SRO as well as to the 2003 Contractual Rules is pari materia, inasmuch as both stipulate that appointments
made thereunder shall not confer any preferential
claim for regular appointment through the normal
process of selection. Rule 2 of both the SROs
further provides that the services of an appointee
may be terminated prior to the expiry of the tenure
or contractual period, as the case may be, upon
issuance of one month’s notice or on payment of
one month’s salary in lieu thereof. Significantly,
Rule 3 of both the SROs prescribes the execution
of a formal agreement between the respondent-
State and the appointee, and the language
employed in the agreements under both the SROs
is identical.
10.14. The sole distinction between the two sets
of provisions lies in the tenure of engagement. The
impugned SRO of 2009, governing appointments
on an academic arrangement basis, prescribes a
ceiling on the term of service, providing that such
appointments shall be made for a period of one
year, extendable up to a maximum of six years. In
contrast, the 2003 Contractual Rules contemplate
appointments for a period of one year or until a
regular selection is made in accordance with the
applicable recruitment rules, whichever is earlier.
10.15. In the present case, the appellants have
already exceeded the six-year ceiling prescribed
under Rule 4(1) of the impugned SRO, by reason
of the interim orders directing maintenance of
status quo, initially passed by the High Court on 7th June, 2018, in the intra-court appeals and
thereafter by this Court vide order dated 17th April, 2023. Had the respondent-State simply
terminated the services of the appellants upon
completion of six years, as contemplated under
Rule 4(1), the appellants would have been
rendered ineligible to claim the benefit of
regularisation upon completion of seven years of
service under the 2010 Act.
10.16. The question that, therefore, arises for our
consideration is whether the criterion adopted by
the respondent-State to treat the present
appellants differently withstands scrutiny in the
eyes of law, or whether the differentia sought to be carved out offends the equality principles
enshrined in the Constitution.
10.17. We are unable to accede to the submission
of the respondent-State that the criterion adopted
to deny parity of treatment to the appellants is
valid and legally sustainable. The exception
carved out under Section 3(b) of the 2010 Act
could have been justified only if appointees
engaged on an academic arrangement basis were
inherently incapable of satisfying the conditions
stipulated under the Act. However, once those
conditions stand fulfilled, we find no cogent basis
to deny such appointees the benefit of
regularisation.
10.18. More so, such benefit would necessarily
have to be extended by the respondent-State
where the nature of duties discharged by
appointees engaged on an academic arrangement
basis is identical to the duties performed by those
falling within the other categories rendered eligible
for the benefit of regularisation.
10.19. Section 5(v) of the 2010 Act stipulates, as
a necessary condition for regularisation, that an
employee must have completed seven years of
service as on the appointed day, namely 28th April,
2010. However, the second proviso to the said provision expressly acknowledges the possibility
of subsequent fulfilment of the minimum
requirement of seven years of service.
10.20. The second proviso further provides that an appointee who had not completed seven years
of service on the appointed day shall continue in
service until the completion of the requisite period
of seven years and shall thereafter become entitled
to regularisation under the Act. The beneficial
tenor of the said provision manifests the intent of
the respondent-State to avoid the enactment of
measures that would have otherwise operated
harshly against employees who, though short of
the prescribed tenure on the appointed day, would
subsequently fulfil the minimum requirement of
seven years of service for availing the benefit of
regularisation.
10.21. Accordingly, once the conditions
stipulated under Section 5(i) to (v) of the 2010 Act
stand satisfied, the appointee becomes entitled to
seek regularisation of service at the hands of the
State. In such circumstances, the nature of the
initial engagement, whether on an academic
arrangement, ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis, would cease to be of determinative
relevance.
10.22. Additionally, the very object underlying
the enactment of the 2010 Act was to cure and
regularise long-standing irregular appointments
and to extend legal protection to employees who
had been rendering service for prolonged periods
against substantive and essential posts. The Act,
therefore, cannot be construed or applied in a
manner that arbitrarily excludes a class of
employees, such as the present appellants, who
are discharging identical duties under comparable
conditions. Acceptance of the exclusion sought to
be enforced by the respondent-State would not
only defeat the legislative intent but would also
result in invidious discrimination against a
homogeneous class of workers.
10.23. The State is expected to act as a model
employer and not as a hard-bargaining or
avaricious negotiator. We deem it appropriate to
record our serious disapproval of the manner in
which the respondent-State proceeded to issue
the impugned SRO of 2009. It is an undisputed
position that SRO of 2003 was already in force,
providing for appointments on a contractual basis
under the respondent-State. In that backdrop, the
subsequent decision of the respondent-State to
promulgate the impugned SRO of 2009 cannot be
regarded as a benign or innocuous exercise. What
was sought to be done was merely to repackage a
substantially similar mode of engagement under a
new nomenclature, namely “appointment on
academic arrangement”, while simultaneously
imposing an artificial ceiling of six years on the
tenure of such appointments.
10.24. To compound the matter, when the
respondent-State did eventually act in the manner
expected of a responsible employer by enacting
the 2010 Act providing for regularisation of
services, it once again carved out an exclusion by
wholly denying appointees engaged on an
academic arrangement basis the benefit of
regularisation. Such a classification rests on
considerations alien to settled constitutional
jurisprudence and the equality mandate. By
creating two categories, one comprising
appointees on an academic arrangement basis
and the other consisting of those engaged on a
contractual, ad hoc or consolidated basis, the respondent-State has failed to establish any
reasonable nexus between the classification and
the object sought to be achieved by extending the
benefit of regularisation to the latter category
alone.
10.25. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in
holding that the respondent-State has not only
failed to demonstrate any distinction in the nature
of duties discharged by the appellants, but has,
by engrafting the impugned exception in the 2010
Act, subjected the present appellants to invidious
discrimination, thereby infringing their
fundamental right to equality.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 2477 of 2025
11.Leave granted. 11.1. The present appeal assails judgment dated 27th December, 2024, passed by the High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 2535 of 2023, whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-employees and upheld the order dated 4th September, 2023 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Bench, Srinagar in TA No. 204 of 2021. 11.2. The appellants in the present case are aggrieved by the same differential treatment being accorded by virtue of their appointment being on academic arrangement basis and thus, the case of the present appellants is entirely covered by the reasoning and discussion made by us earlier in this judgment. Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 5108 of 2023, Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 5093 of 2023, Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 12238 of 2023 and Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 2477 of 2025. OUR CONCLUSIONS: -
12.In light of the foregoing analysis and discussion, we summarise our conclusions as under: -I. Nomenclature is not determinative of constitutional entitlement. Where employees appointed on an “academic arrangement” basis are similarly situated to those engaged on ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis in terms of duties, tenure, conditions of service and mode of appointment, denial of equal treatment solely on the basis of nomenclature is impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. II. The exclusion under Section 3(b) of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Special Provisions) Act, 2010 does not satisfy the test of reasonable classification. The said provision lacks an intelligible differentia and bears no rational nexus with the object of the Act, which is to regularize long-standing irregular appointments, and therefore results in invidious discrimination qua appointments on academic arrangement basis. III. Fulfilment of statutory conditions under Section 5(i) to (v) of the 2010 Act is determinative of eligibility for regularization. Once such conditions are satisfied, the nature of the initial engagement, whether academic arrangement, ad hoc, contractual or consolidated, ceases to have any legal relevance. IV. The second proviso to Section 5 of the 2010 Act is a beneficial provision and must receive purposive interpretation. Any construction which defeats the legislative intent of protecting employees who subsequently complete the qualifying service period is constitutionally unsustainable. V. The State, as a model employer, cannot adopt artificial classifications to deny statutory benefits. Repackaging contractual engagements under a different nomenclature, while denying regularization, violates the equality mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. FINAL DIRECTIONS: -
13.Accordingly, the judgments dated 22nd February, 2023 and 27th December, 2024, passed by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu in Letter Patent Appeal No. 81 of 2018 (alongwith other connected and analogous appeals) and in Writ Petition (C) No. 2535 of 2023, respectively, are hereby set aside. 13.1. It is declared that Section 3(b) of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Special Provisions) Act, 2010, insofar as it excludes employees appointed on an academic arrangement basis from consideration for regularisation despite fulfilment of conditions under Section 5 of the Act, is unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 13.2. The respondent-State is directed to consider the cases of the appellants for regularisation in accordance with Section 5 of the 2010 Act, without reference to the nomenclature of their initial appointment, within a period of 4 weeks from the date of this judgment. 13.3. The benefit of this judgment shall extend to all similarly situated employees appointed on an academic arrangement basis who satisfy the statutory requirements under the 2010 Act.
14.Consequently, the present appeals stand allowed in aforesaid terms.
15.Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of. [VIKRAM NATH] [SANDEEP MEHTA] NEW DELHI; MARCH 09, 2026