For clarity of exposition and to facilitate structured
consideration of the issues arising in the present
matter, this judgment has been organised under the
following heads: -
Table of Contents
A. Facts leading to the registration of FIR: .... 10
B. Investigation conducted by the State Police: B.1. Expansion of Investigation and Alleged B.2. Investigation Concerning the Alleged B.3. Investigation Relating to Dr. Abdul Hameed
C. Details of the Chargesheet: ........................ 27
A. All the accused persons except Accused No. 12-
B. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim ................... 39
IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT ... 43
V. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed ................ 52
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim ................... 81
VI. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF
A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed ................ 88
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim ................. 109
VII. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
ARISING FOR DETERMINATION .......................... 115
A. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused Whether the trial culminating in the conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was conducted in a manner consistent with the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and the requirements of
B. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and the Ancillary Issues
C. Challenge to the Acquittal of Accused No. 1Javed Khan, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain and
1.Heard.
2.Leave granted. I. THE PROLOGUE
3.The history of civilization is, in many aspects, a history of conflict, of order emerging from disorder and of laws fashioned to restrain the chaos that often lurks beneath human ambition. Throughout history wherever human life has thrived, discord and dissension have followed. Wherever human societies have flourished, there have inevitably arisen forces seeking to disturb the delicate balance upon which collective existence depends. The advancement of civilization has therefore been accompanied by a parallel evolution of legal institutions designed to regulate human conduct, resolve disputes, and safeguard the social order from those who threaten its stability. At the heart of every organized legal system lies the recognition that while liberty is indispensable to human progress, it must coexist with responsibility, discipline, and respect for the rights and security of others. 3.1. Throughout history, societies have been confronted by individuals and groups who, driven by motives ranging from personal gain to ideological fanaticism, have sought to undermine public peace and security. The law has evolved not merely as an instrument of punishment but as a civilizational response to such threats. Its purpose extends beyond the imposition of sanctions, it seeks to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice, maintain societal equilibrium, and ensure that the response to crime remains governed by reason rather than emotion. In a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system is measured not by the severity of its punishments but by the fairness of the processes through which guilt is determined. 3.2. The true measure of justice does not lie in the swiftness of retribution, but in the discipline of restraint. It is a canonical maxim of criminal jurisprudence that it is better for a hundred guilty persons to escape than for one innocent person to be condemned and punished. This principle is neither a concession to crime nor a sign of institutional weakness, rather, it reflects the profound value that the law places upon individual liberty and human dignity. The criminal process is therefore structured around safeguards intended to minimize the possibility of wrongful conviction. Even where suspicion appears strong, public sentiment runs high, or the allegations are of the gravest character, the law insists that guilt must be established through legally admissible, reliable, and convincing evidence. 3.3. It is for this reason that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial occupies a position of paramount importance in our legal system. The right to effective legal representation, the presumption of innocence, the burden upon the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the requirement that evidence be scrutinized with objectivity and caution are not mere procedural formalities. They are substantive guarantees that distinguish the rule of law from the rule of public opinion. Justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. The legitimacy of a judicial verdict rests not merely upon the outcome reached, but equally upon the fairness, transparency, and integrity of the process by which that outcome is achieved. 3.4. These principles assume even greater significance when Courts are confronted with offences that shock the collective conscience of society. Acts of violence directed against innocent civilians, particularly those involving the use of explosives in public spaces, strike at the very foundations of social order and generate understandable feelings of fear, grief, and outrage. Yet, it is precisely in such cases that Courts must remain steadfast in their adherence to constitutional values. The gravity of the allegation cannot be permitted to dilute the standard of proof, nor can the enormity of the crime justify a departure from the settled principles governing criminal adjudication. The greater the public outcry, the greater becomes the responsibility of the Court to ensure that the determination of guilt is based solely upon law and evidence. 3.5. The factual matrix of the present case, challenges the above principles to the hilt. The allegations pertain to a devastating bomb blast that occurred inside a Rajasthan Roadways bus near Samleti village while it was travelling from Agra towards Bikaner. The explosion claimed the lives of fourteen innocent persons and left numerous others seriously injured, causing immeasurable human suffering and widespread public anguish. The incident was not merely a crime against individual victims but an assault upon public peace and security itself, thereby warranting the most careful and rigorous judicial scrutiny. 3.6. The appeals before us arise from a complex and protracted prosecution spanning nearly three decades in which the Courts below returned differing conclusions regarding the culpability of the accused persons. While two accused persons came to be convicted and were awarded the sentence of death and imprisonment for life respectively, as many as seven other accused persons were ultimately acquitted for want of sufficient evidence connecting them with the crime. It is pertinent to note that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed has remained incarcerated for almost twenty-nine years, whereas, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim stands released on parole after having served more than twenty-three years of imprisonment. In these circumstances, the task before this Court is not merely to examine the gravity of the occurrence, which is undeniable, but to determine, upon a meticulous appraisal of the voluminous record, whether the findings of guilt recorded against the convicted accused withstand the rigorous standards of proof mandated by criminal law and whether the acquittals recorded in favour of the remaining accused call for any interference. II. PROSECUTION’S STORY
4.The prosecution case emerging from the record, as also set out by the Courts below in the impugned judgments, is as under: -A. Facts leading to the registration of FIR: 4.1. On 22nd May, 1996, at about 4:00 PM, the complainant, i.e., Ashok Kumar (PW-46)1 the conductor on duty in the public transport bus, bearing registration number RJ-07-P-1038, en-route from Agra to Bikaner gave a parcha statement2 to Sub-Inspector Bhawar Singh, Station House Officer, Police Station Mahwa alleging, inter alia, that the bus which was being driven by Ramji Lal left Agra at 11:00 AM with about 49-50 passengers. Two passengers had boarded the bus from Agra and purchased tickets up to Jaipur. However, they got down at Mahwa and returned the tickets to the conductor (PW-46) asking him to use the said tickets by issuing them to help some other needy passengers. The conductor (PW-46) further stated that both the aforesaid passengers appeared to be approximately 27-28 years of age and were conversing in Hindi. 4.2. As the bus continued its journey from Mahwa, the conductor (PW-46) in order to issue tickets to the 1 Hereinafter, referred to as the “conductor (PW-46)”. three police constables including a lady constable went towards the rear end of the bus to the seats which these persons had occupied. After the bus had travelled about 3-4 kilometers from Mahwa towards Dausa, and had reached near village Samleti, a powerful explosion went off inside the bus. The impact of the explosion was devastating. The roof, windows and gate of the bus were blown apart; passengers were hurled from their seats and luggage was scattered over a considerable distance. The conductor (PW-46) himself sustained injuries and reported impairment of hearing owing to the intensity of the blast. Several passengers died on the spot, while many others suffered grievous injuries. 4.3. It was further alleged in the complaint that the explosion had been caused by a powerful bomb or other explosive substance and appeared to be the outcome of a pre-planned conspiracy intended to cause large-scale loss of life and destruction of property. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR bearing Crime No. 148 of 1996 came to be registered on 22nd May, 1996 at Police Station Mahwa, District Dausa against unknown persons for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 18603; Sections 4 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act, 19084; and Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.5 4.4. Pursuant to the registration of the aforesaid FIR, the high-ranking police officials of District Dausa; CID (Crime Branch); and a team of experts from the Forensic Science Laboratory rushed to the place of occurrence and commenced the proceedings. The investigation of the case was entrusted to Liyakat Ali Khan, Additional Police Commissioner, Dausa (PW-75)6. B. Investigation conducted by the State Police:
5.The crime scene was immediately secured. A
specialised forensic team carried out a
comprehensive examination of the site, collected
physical evidence and undertook scientific analysis
to find out the precise cause of the explosion.
Preliminary expert assessments suggested the use of
a high-grade explosive, most likely RDX, though
certain opinions also pointed towards the possible
3 Hereinafter, referred to as the “IPC”.
4 Hereinafter, referred to as the “Explosive Substances Act”. 5 Hereinafter, referred to as the “PDPP Act”. 6 Hereinafter, referred to as the “Investigation Officer (PW-75)”.
use of dynamite. The said opinion was founded upon
the pattern of destruction observed on the seats and
the bus floor directly beneath them.
5.1. During the investigation, it emerged that the
explosion had claimed the lives of fourteen
passengers and left thirty-seven others injured, with
some of them suffering serious injuries.
Panchayatnamas were prepared and thereafter, the dead bodies were sent for post-mortem examination.
The injured passengers were initially shifted to
nearby hospitals at Todabheem, Dausa and Mahwa
and were thereafter referred to Jaipur for specialised
treatment. The site plan was prepared, the damaged
bus was seized, and all relevant material evidence
was collected. The loss caused to public property was
assessed at Rs.5,49,614.22/- (Rupees Five Lakh
Forty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Fourteen and
Twenty-Two Paise Only) on the basis of the report
received from the General Manager (Accidents &
Training), RSRTC7, Jaipur. Post-mortem reports of
the deceased persons and injury reports of the
injured persons were obtained.
7 Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation.
5.2. The conductor (PW-46) produced the two
returned tickets bearing seat Nos. 22 and 23, on their
back-side, that were issued by him to the two
suspected individuals who were travelling from Agra
to Jaipur. According to him the said suspected
passengers had gotten down in Mahwa, one stop
before the bomb blast occurred instead of their final
destination for which they had bought the tickets i.e.,
Jaipur. The investigating agency treated these tickets
as an important lead, particularly because the two
passengers had abandoned their onward journey
shortly before the explosion raising grave doubts
about their role in the incident.
5.3. Acting upon the lead provided by the conductor
(PW-46), and duly corroborated by the statements of
several surviving passengers, the investigating
agency identified the aforesaid passengers as persons
of interest. Witness accounts, including those of
passengers seated in close proximity to the suspects,
revealed that the two individuals had initially
occupied seats 22 and 23, with one of them
subsequently shifting to seat 41. It is the case of the
prosecution that in view of these consistent accounts
and detailed descriptions, rough sketches of the
suspects were prepared and circulated widely
through newspapers and law-enforcement agencies
across multiple States, particularly Punjab, Delhi,
and Jammu & Kashmir. The seriousness of the
incident, coupled with indications of the involvement
of organized extremist groups, also prompted the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Rajasthan,
to undertake a parallel and intensive investigation.
B.1. Expansion of Investigation and Alleged
Conspiracy
5.4. The investigation acquired a wider dimension
when Farooq Ahmed Engineer (Vice Chairman,
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front8) took the
responsibility for carrying out the explosion at Dausa
by making calls to news agencies like NDTV, Zee
News and BBC, Delhi. This development assumed
significance during investigation as he had also
allegedly claimed responsibility for the Lajpat Nagar
bomb blast in Delhi. The ensuing inquiry was
expanded to examine the involvement of extremist
organisations and the possibility of a broader
conspiracy. During interrogation in connection with
8 For short, “JKIF”.
the Lajpat Nagar bomb blast case, Farooq Ahmed
Engineer disclosed that both the Samleti and Delhi
blasts had been conceived under the leadership of
Bilal Ahmed Baeg, Chairman of JKIF, with the
objective of creating an atmosphere of terror,
instability, and fear, and thereby disrupting the
electoral process in Kashmir.
5.5. On 24th May, 1996, the file was transferred to
the Crime Branch for further investigation. Pursuant
thereto, a team was formed under the supervision of
Police Commissioner-I, CID (CB), Jaipur and further
investigation was assigned to the Additional Police
Commissioner. Thereafter, several specialised teams
were constituted to investigate different angles of the
conspiracy, including identification of suspects,
tracing their movements, collection of intelligence
inputs, and coordinating with law-enforcement
agencies in Delhi, Jammu & Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh,
Gujarat and Nepal.
5.6. On 25th May, 1996 the Investigation Team
headed by the Additional Police Commissioner
prepared the seating plan of the bus with the help of
the surviving injured passengers. Meanwhile, on 26th
May, 1996 the Superintendent of Police (Operation),
Srinagar informed the Rajasthan state police that
they had arrested Farukh Ahmad Khan (Accused No.
3-Farukh Ahmed Khan @ Swaroop Baba @ Anwar)
and Smt. Farida.
5.7. The State Forensic Science Laboratory
Rajasthan, Nehru Nagar, Jaipur9 submitted its
report10 on 28th May, 1996. It was opined therein that
a very powerful explosive substance was used in the
bomb blast and the device containing the bomb was
planted under seat Nos. 17 and 18 which were in the
row ahead of seat Nos. 22 and 23. The reason for the
said opinion was the extent of damage that was
caused to these seats and the bus floor beneath
them. The FSL experts also opined that there was a
possibility that the explosive device was timer-
operated and had detonated while the bus was in
motion. In another FSL report dated 9th September,
199611, it was opined that the amount of explosive
substance (RDX) that was used in the present bus
explosion was approximately 2.5 Kilograms.
9 Hereinafter, being referred to as “FSL”.
B.2. Investigation Concerning the Alleged
Operational Network
5.8. According to the police, the breakthrough came
with the arrest of Farooq Ahmed Engineer in
connection with the Lajpat Nagar bomb blast case.
Upon interrogation, it was revealed that the bomb
blasts at Delhi and Dausa were planned and carried
out under the leadership of Bilal Ahmed Baeg
(Chairman, JKIF) with the objective of spreading
violence in the country in response to the delay in
conducting the elections in Kashmir, which were
scheduled to take place in May, 1996. The accused
persons who played an important role in the
aforesaid conspiracy inter alia included, Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior12 and Accused No. 2-
Abdul Goni @ Asadulla @ Nasaruddin @ Nikka @
Umer @ Majeed Khan @ Raja13, who were arrested
from Ahmedabad on 15th June, 1996 and 17th June,
1996 respectively. Later, the police also apprehended
Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan @ Swaroop Baba
@ Anwar14; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja15;
12 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 1-Javed Khan”. 13 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni”. 14 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan”. 15 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja”.
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood
Keeley16; and Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja17, from Delhi on 25th June, 1996; 4th July,
1996, 19th July, 1996 and 27th July, 1996
respectively.
5.9. Based on the extensive interrogation of the
aforesaid accused persons, it came to light that Bilal
Ahmed Baeg, former chief of JKIF and Khurshid Baeg
@ Naeem had gathered a few terrorists hailing from
Punjab and carried out bomb blasts in certain areas
of Delhi and nearby places. In this regard, Accused
No. 7-Kulwinderjit Singh @ Happy18, was also
arrested on 3rd August, 1996 on the ground that he
was operating the Khalistan Liberation Tiger Force, a
proscribed organization. The prosecution further
alleged that the conspiracy had been conceived
outside India and executed through operatives
functioning in different States. During investigation,
material was collected regarding the movements of
several accused persons/suspects between Pakistan,
Nepal, Delhi, Ahmedabad and other locations.
16 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt”. 17 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain”. 18 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 7-Kulwinderjit Singh”.
Reliance was placed upon travel records, statements
of co-accused, telephone records, diaries allegedly
recovered during investigation, and intelligence
inputs gathered by various agencies.
5.10. On 16th March, 1997, Accused No. 8-Riaz
Ahmad Sheikh @ Maulvi19 came to be arrested on the
suspicion that he had manufactured the bomb which
was used to cause the explosion in the present case.
Upon his interrogation and based on the information
from other sources, it was found that Shahji Group
of Harkat-ul-Ansar and Bilal Ahmed Baeg (Chairman,
JKIF) had conspired to carry out explosions in
different cities of the country. According to the
prosecution, members of these banned organisations
constituted a network that facilitated the
procurement of explosives, movement of operatives,
communication between conspirators and execution
of the planned acts of violence. The prosecution
further alleged that the Samleti bus explosion formed
one component of a broader campaign intended to
spread fear and disrupt public order in the country.
19 Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 8-Riaz Ahmad Sheikh”.
B.3. Investigation Relating to Dr. Abdul Hameed
and Other Accused
5.11. The prosecution’s case further rests on a
letter purportedly received by the CID (Crime Branch)
on 4th June, 1997, in which the involvement of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, Accused No. 10-
Raees Baeg and Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim in
the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case20 which took
place on 26th January, 1996 was indicated. However,
notably, the said letter was never brought on record
of the case. The prosecution further claims that the
aforesaid accused persons were related to Harkat-ul-
Ansar. Based on the interrogation notes of an
accused named Abdul Mateen @ Iqbal involved in the
Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case, Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg were
arrested in the said case from Firozabad and Agra
respectively. It was found that the facial features of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed matched the
description of one of the suspects who was sitting on
seat No. 23 of the bus involved in the Samleti Bus
bomb blast case. The prosecution heavily relied upon
20 FIR No. 39 of 1996.
the Test Identification Proceedings conducted
subsequently and the similarity between the facial
sketches prepared during investigation and the
appearance of Dr. Abdul Hameed, who was arrested
in the instant bomb blast case on 26th June, 1997.
The prosecution further claimed that Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed suffered a disclosure statement in
which he admitted that he along with Abdullah had
purchased one biscuit packet from Shirdiwale Sai
Baba Tea-stall at Bharatpur Bus stand while they
were travelling to Jaipur. The said accused further
admitted that he had also purchased a Bal Hans book from Ashok Book Stall situated at the same bus
stand.
5.12. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was arrested
in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case on 28th July,
1997 and his statement under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 187221 was recorded. In the said
statement, the name of Accused No. 11-Chandra
Prakash Agarwal surfaced and his premises were
identified, pursuant to which a search was conducted
21 For short, “IEA”.
and an alleged recovery of explosive material, namely
dynamite, was effected.
5.13. Thereafter, the confessional statement of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim came to be recorded
under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
197322 on 9th September, 1997 in the Jaipur Stadium
bomb blast case. According to the prosecution, the
said statement provided a detailed first-hand account
of the activities of one Salaar, who was alleged to be
closely associated with operatives linked to Harkat-
ul-Ansar and other extremist organizations. In his
statement, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim narrated
that Salaar had initially established contact with
residents of Village Fareh under the guise of religious
and charitable activities connected with a local
seminary. Over a period of time, Salaar allegedly
developed close links with the management of the
seminary and used the premises for meetings with
various individuals who were subsequently identified
during investigation as persons involved in the
conspiracy. The statement further disclosed that
several persons, including Accused No. 8-Riaz
22 For short, “CrPC”.
Ahmad Sheikh, Abdullah, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, Zilani, Iqbal and Yusuf, were frequent
visitors to the seminary and participated in activities
which, according to the prosecution, were connected
with the larger conspiracy and the nefarious plan to
cause the bomb blasts at various locations in India.
5.14. The prosecution further relied upon the
confessional statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim to trace the procurement and movement of
explosive substances. According to the said
statement, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had
accompanied Salaar and his associates on several
occasions to Roopwas in Rajasthan, where meetings
were held with Accused No. 11-Chandra Prakash
Agarwal. During these visits, cartons purportedly
containing ordinary commercial goods were allegedly
procured and transported to the seminary at Fareh.
The prosecution case is that Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim subsequently came to know that the
contents of these cartons comprised explosive
substances. The statement further described the
storage of such material at the seminary, its transfer
into iron drums, and its subsequent transportation
through different channels to other locations. The
prosecution also relied on this statement to explain
the roles allegedly played by various conspirators in
arranging finances, transportation, accommodation
and other logistical support for the movement of the
explosive material.
5.15. According to the prosecution, the
statement further furnished details regarding a series
of meetings allegedly held at a seminary situated at
Village Fareh where different participants discussed
the execution of proposed explosions at various
locations. The statement referred to the presence of
several persons, including Salaar, Abdul Samad,
Iqbal, Yusuf, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and
others, at such meetings. The prosecution further
alleged that the statement disclosed about the
movement of explosive material from Fareh village to
Firozabad and the use of certain premises there for
storing and assembling explosive devices.
Significantly, the prosecution relied upon Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim’s statement to contend that,
after the Samleti bus explosion, Salaar informed him
that the timer used in the device had been procured
through Accused No. 8-Riaz Ahmad Sheikh and that
the explosive device had been placed in the bus by
Abdullah Dabran and Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, both of whom allegedly disembarked at
Mahwa before the explosion occurred. According to
the prosecution, the disclosures made by Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim enabled the investigating
agency to identify additional suspects, trace various
locations connected with the conspiracy, effect
recoveries of explosive substances and reconstruct
the sequence of events leading to the occurrence in
question. On the basis of the material gathered
during investigation, including the aforesaid
disclosures and recoveries, Accused No. 11-Chandra
Prakash Agarwal came to be arrested on 15th
September, 1997.
5.16. The prosecution claimed that the cumulative
effect of the aforesaid arrests and interrogation of
accused persons and the consequent disclosures and
recoveries, was the unearthing of the entire
conspiracy. It was found that the instant bomb blast
case was a joint conspiracy of two terrorist
organizations i.e., JKIF and Harkat-ul-Ansar which
was hatched in Pakistan by Bilal Ahmed Baeg
(Chairman, JKIF) and Shahji (associated with
Harkat-ul-Ansar). This plan was allegedly the
brainchild of Colonel Farooq of the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan and Tiger Memon (main
accused of the Bombay Bomb blast case), whose
primary objective was to spread violence and terror
in India before the May, 1996 elections which were to
be held in Kashmir.
C. Details of the Chargesheet:
6.On the basis of the aforesaid investigation, including the statements recorded, the recoveries effected, the material collected from various locations, and the alleged links established between the accused persons, the investigating agency proceeded against the persons allegedly found to be involved in the offences under investigation. Accordingly, in relation to the present FIR dated 22nd May, 1996, which came to be registered in connection with Samleti Bus bomb blast case, the police submitted chargesheet against the accused persons alleged to be involved in the commission of the offences in question. As the investigation progressed and additional material was gathered, supplementary chargesheets were filed from time to time, incorporating further evidence and the alleged involvement of other accused persons. 6.1. The particulars of all the accused persons and the offences for which they were charged are furnished hereunder in tabular form: -Chargesheet Accused Details Sections Charged Details Chargesheet No. Accused No. 1- Sections 115, 117, 133 of 1996 Javed Khan @ 118, 176, 302, 307 submitted on 12th Javed Junior & 120B of IPC; September, 1996. Sections 4 & 5, Accused No. 2-Explosive Abdul Goni @ Substances Act; Asadulla @ and Section 3 of Nasaruddin @ PDPP Act. Nikka @ Umer @ Majeed Khan @ Raja Farukh Ahmed Khan @ Swaroop Baba @ Anwar Lateef Ahmad Baja Supplementary-1: Accused No. 5- -doChargesheet No. Mohammad Ali 133A of 1996 Bhatt @ submitted on 16th Mehamood Keeley October, 1996. Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja Chargesheet not filed against Kulwinderjit Singh @ Happy. However, on 6th November, 1996, the trial Court took cognizance against the said accused. Supplementary-2: Accused No. 8- -doChargesheet No. Riaz Ahmad 133B of 1996 Sheikh @ Maulvi submitted on 18th June, 1997. Supplementary-3: Accused No. 9-Dr. -doChargesheet No. Abdul Hameed 133C of 1996 Accused No. 10-submitted on 23rd Raees Baeg September, 1997. Chandra Prakash Agarwal Supplementary-4: Accused No. 12- Sections 115, 117, Chargesheet No. Pappu @ Salim 118, 193, 302, 307 133D of 1996 & 120B of IPC; submitted on 12th Sections 4 & 5, September, 2014. Explosive Substances Act; and Section 3 & 4 of PDPP Act. III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL A. All the accused persons except Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
7.Pursuant to the chargesheet being filed, the
Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dausa
vide order dated 23rd April, 1997 committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, Dausa. During the
pendency of trial, Accused No. 8-Riaz Ahmad Sheikh
died and therefore, the criminal proceedings initiated
against him were dropped on 24th August, 1999.
Subsequently, Additional Sessions Judge, Bandikui
vide order dated 15th February, 2003, discharged Accused No. 7-Kulwinderjit Singh of the charges
levelled against him. Ultimately, trial of the case23
against the remaining accused persons was
commenced before the Court of Additional Sessions
Judge, Bandikui Camp-Mahawa, District Dausa.24
7.1. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur25 vide order dated 9th November, 2013, allowed the quashing petition26 filed by
23 Sessions Case No. 35 of 2011. 24 Hereinafter, referred to as the “trial Court”. 25 Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”. 26 S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2890 of 2013.
Accused No. 11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal and
quashed the proceedings of the case, in respect of the
said accused person. In compliance of the aforesaid
order, the trial Court vide order dated 9th January, 2014, dropped the proceedings against Accused No.
11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal. The trial therefore
proceeded only against the remaining 8 accused
persons. It may be noted that, owing to the non-
production of certain accused from different prisons,
the proceedings against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg, and Accused
No. 11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal were initially
conducted separately, during which the prosecution
examined as many as 81 witnesses between 28th
March, 2003 to 7th August, 2008. Subsequently,
upon charges being framed against the remaining
accused persons in the year 2012, they adopted the
testimonies of the said 81 witnesses already recorded
in the case, and the trial proceeded on that basis. The
prosecution examined 99 witnesses and exhibited
197 documents and 8 articles in order to bring home
the charges against the accused persons.
7.2. Thereafter, the statements of the accused
persons were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC,
wherein they denied all incriminating circumstances
put to them, asserted their innocence, and claimed
false implication. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
specifically stated that he had been falsely implicated
in the present case after his arrest in connection with
another criminal case and denied having furnished
any disclosure statement or having participated in
any identification or site verification proceedings
attributed to him by the prosecution. In support of
his defence, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
examined himself under Section 315 of CrPC and
exhibited 15 documents, including statements of
prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 of
CrPC, records pertaining to the arrest and pardon
proceedings of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, and
the subsequent statements made by the latter in the
year 2011.
7.3. The trial Court vide judgment dated 29th
September, 2014, concluded that based on the
evidence on record, the prosecution was successful
in proving the charges against Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed, Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused
No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja,
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6-
Mirza Nisar Hussain and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg.
7.4. The trial Court upon holistic appreciation of the
evidence available on record, including the accounts
of eye witnesses (surviving passengers of the bus
bomb blast) and scientific evidence, concluded that
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and his associate
Abdullah were the passengers who occupied seat
Nos. 22 and 23 on the ill-fated bus. They
clandestinely placed their luggage, in which they had
carried the explosive substance, under seat Nos. 17
and 18 which were in front of their seats. The
scientific evidence corroborated this aspect
elaborating that the maximum impact of the bomb
blast occurred at seat Nos. 17 and 18.
7.5. On the strength of this cumulative analysis of
evidence, the trial Court returned a finding of guilt
against the Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and
others for their involvement in the bomb blast that
occurred on 22nd May, 1996 aboard the Rajasthan
Roadways bus near Samleti village. The conviction of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was primarily
founded on the testimony of the conductor (PW-46),
who identified the said accused as one of the two
young men who alighted from the bus at Mahwa and,
notably, returned their unused tickets with a peculiar
and notable remark that they may be used to help a
poor person, which act left a lasting impression upon
the said witness. Additional corroboration came from
PW-29 (Murari Lal), who described the accused as
sitting on seat No. 41, continuously smoking,
wearing a cap and dark glasses, and behaving in an
anxious manner; and PW-30 (Rajesh Kumar Yadav),
who too identified the accused as one of the persons
who alighted from the bus at Mahwa. These
identifications, though challenged by the defence,
were found to be credible by the trial Court in light of
the distinctive features evincing from the accused’s
appearance and conduct.
7.6. The trial Court further placed considerable
reliance on the expert reports27, which concluded
that a powerful Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
containing approximately 2.5 Kilograms of RDX had
been planted beneath seat Nos. 17 and 18, and was
detonated while the bus was in motion. The
27 Exhibits P-176 and P-182.
prosecution’s case was further bolstered by travel
records, hotel registers, and border crossing logs,
which demonstrated the movement of several
accused in a coordinated manner across states and
international borders. The confessional statement of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, recorded under
Section 164 CrPC by the Magistrate, was also heavily
relied upon by the trial Court, wherein he narrated
the detailed role played by various co-accused,
including the procurement of explosives and the
planning of the attack.
7.7. However, the trial Court acquitted Accused No.
3-Farukh Ahmed Khan, on the ground that the
evidence against him did not meet the threshold of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court noted
that none of the witnesses had attributed any specific
role to Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan in either
the planning or execution of the blast, nor was there
any direct or reliable circumstantial evidence linking
him to the incident. In the absence of incriminating
material of the requisite legal standard, the benefit of
doubt was extended in his favour.
7.8. The particulars of all the accused, other than
Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan; the offences for
which they were convicted and the sentences
awarded to them by the trial Court are tabulated
hereunder: -
Name of the In relation to Punishment
Accused Person crime under awarded
Accused No. 9-Dr. IPC: Abdul Hameed Section 302 Death Sentence
Section 307 Life Imprisonment
+ Fine = Rs.
1,00,000/- (in
Fine = 50,000/- (in
Fine = Rs.
25,000/- (in
1-year rigorous
Fine = Rs.
15,000/- (in
6 months rigorous
Accused No. 1- IPC: Javed Khan @ Section 302 r/w Life Imprisonment Javed Junior Section 120-B + Fine = Rs.
1,00,000 (in Accused No. 2- 3 years rigorous Abdul Goni @ imprisonment). Asadulla @ Nasaruddin @ Section 307 r/w Life Imprisonment Nikka @ Umer @ Section 120-B + Fine = Rs. Majeed Khan @ 1,00,000 (in Raja default to undergo Accused No. 4- imprisonment). Lateef Ahmad Baja
Accused No. 5- PDPP Act: Mohammad Ali Section 4 r/w 10 years rigorous Bhatt @ Section 120-B imprisonment + Mehamood Keeley Fine = Rs. 50,000 Accused No. 6- undergo 2 years Mirza Nisar rigorous Hussain @ Naja imprisonment).
Accused No.10-
ExplosiveRayees Beg.
Section 4 r/w 10 years rigorous
Section 120-B imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 25,000
undergo 1-year
rigorous
Section 5 r/w 7 years rigorous
Section 120-B imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 15,000
undergo 6 months
rigorous
7.9. The trial Court forwarded D.B. Criminal Death
Reference No. 1 of 2014 under Section 366 of CrPC,
for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed to the High Court.
Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 29th September, 2014, Accused No. 1-
Javed Khan28, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni29, Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed30 and Accused No. 10-Raees
Baeg31 preferred separate criminal appeals; and
Mohammad Ali Bhatt and Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar
Hussain preferred a joint criminal appeal32 before the
High Court.
7.10. Aggrieved by the acquittal of Accused No.
3-Farukh Ahmed Khan, the State of Rajasthan
preferred a criminal appeal33 praying for reversal of
his acquittal and another criminal appeal34 seeking
enhancement of sentence in respect of the accused
persons who were only awarded life imprisonment by
the trial Court.
B. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
8.The confessional statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, in the present case was recorded on 21st October, 2002 (Exhibit P-189). However, upon a challenge by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed regarding the legality of its recording, the trial Court, by order dated 30th November, 2010, directed that the statement be recorded afresh. Pursuant thereto, a fresh statement was recorded on 4th January, 2011. As doubts regarding compliance with the order dated 30th November, 2010 persisted, the statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was again recorded in open Court on 19th February, 2011 before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dausa, where he categorically disowned his earlier statements, denied having acted as an approver in any case, and asserted that no statement had ever been recorded by him before a Magistrate in the manner alleged by the prosecution. 8.1. Vide judgment dated 29th September, 2014, the trial Court while observing that Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim has not satisfied the conditions of tendering pardon under Section 306 of CrPC, ordered a separate trial of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. Based on the same, police filed Chargesheet No. 133D of 1996 on 12th September, 2014 (supra) before the trial Court. The cognizance of the same was taken on 8th June, 2016 and the case was registered as Sessions Case No. 12 of 2016. On 10th June, 2016, the trial Court framed charges against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim for offences punishable under Sections 302 r/w 120B, 307 r/w 120B and 193 of IPC; Sections 3 and 4 of PDPP Act and Sections 4 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act. 8.2. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim denied the charges and claimed to be tried. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 25 witnesses and exhibited 63 documents. Thereafter, the statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him, asserted that he had been falsely implicated in the case, and contended that the statements attributed to him had been recorded without proper knowledge and were incorrectly relied upon by the prosecution. He maintained that he had never been involved in any such criminal activity and claimed innocence. The accused did not lead any evidence in defence. 8.3. The trial Court vide judgment dated 7th March, 2017, concluded that based on the evidence, the prosecution was successful in proving the charges against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim beyond reasonable doubt and convicted him of all the offences for which he was charged except for the offence punishable under Section 3 of PDPP Act. The details of the conviction and sentences awarded to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim are provided Accused Name In relation to Punishment crime under awarded Accused No. IPC: -12-Pappu @ Section 302 r/w Life Imprisonment + Salim 120B Fine = Rs. 1,00,000/-Section 307 r/w Life Imprisonment + 120B Fine = Rs. 1,00,000/-Section 120B Life Imprisonment + = 50,000/- (in years rigorous default to undergo 1-year rigorous 8.4. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29th September, 2014, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim filed criminal appeal35 before HC. IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH
9.The High Court vide order dated 30th April, 2015, remanded the case of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed to the trial Court for passing a fresh order of sentence within 3 months on the ground of nonconsideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances by the trial Court, observing that the sentence of death had been imposed on the very same day on which the conviction was recorded and that, at the stage of hearing on sentence, no counsel representing Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was present before the trial Court. In pursuance of the said direction, the trial Court passed a fresh order of sentence dated 17th December, 2015, again awarding death sentence to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The details of the said order of sentences are provided Accused Name In relation to Punishment crime under awarded Accused No. 9- IPC: -Dr. Abdul Section 302 Death Sentence Hameed Section 307 Life Imprisonment + Section 120B Life Imprisonment + = 50,000/- (in years rigorous default to undergo 1-year rigorous 9.1. The trial Court again forwarded D.B. Criminal Death Reference No. 1 of 2016 for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and aforesaid order of sentence awarded by the trial Court Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed also preferred criminal appeal36 before the High Court. 9.2. The High Court vide common judgment and order dated 22nd July, 2019,37 disposed of the death 37 Impugned Judgment in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1827-1829 of 2019; Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 621 of 2020; Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 571 of 2020; Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 681 of 2020; and Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 143 of 2020. reference forwarded by the trial Court for confirmation of death sentence awarded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed; criminal appeals preferred by the accused persons against conviction and the criminal appeals preferred by the State of Rajasthan against the acquittal of Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan and for enhancement of sentence in respect of the accused persons who were awarded Life Imprisonment. 9.3. The Division Bench of the High Court, vide the impugned common judgment rendered in D.B. Criminal Death Reference No. 1 of 2016 and connected matters, affirmed the conviction and death Hameed by the trial Court, while acquitting several co-accused persons including Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg, Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain, and Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla @ Nikka. The High Court, upon the scrutiny of the evidence on record, found that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing beyond reasonable doubt the involvement of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, in planting the bomb in the Rajasthan Roadways bus on 22nd May, 1996, which resulted in the death of fourteen persons and injuries to thirty-seven others. 9.4. According to the High Court, the conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was fit to be confirmed primarily based upon the testimony of the conductor (PW-46) and other injured eyewitnesses, who had consistently identified him as one of the two passengers who alighted from the bus at Mahwa shortly before the blast, coupled with his unusual act of returning the bus ticket, a crucial detail that was found to be both striking and incriminating. The High Court also relied on the forensic evidence establishing that approximately 2.5 Kilograms of RDX was used in the explosion. Additionally, the High Court drew support from the confessional statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim recorded under Section 164 of CrPC, which, though retracted, was found to be corroborated in material particulars by the ocular and forensic evidence. Considering the grave and calculated nature of the act, its terror motivation, and the prior conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case, the High Court held that the imposition of the death penalty was justified and proportionate to the enormity of the crime committed by him. 9.5. At the same time, the High Court acquitted the co-accused persons on the ground that the evidence against them was either derivative in nature or insufficient to meet the standard of proof required in a criminal trial. It held that the conviction of the other accused persons by the trial Court was largely based on the confessional statement of a co-accused recorded in a different case (the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case), without adequate and independent corroboration. In respect of these accused, including Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg and Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, the High Court noted that no direct evidence linked them to the present bomb blast, and that their prior involvement or arraignment in other bomb blast cases, in which they subsequently stood acquitted, could not be treated as trustworthy substantive evidence in the instant case. The High Court particularly noted the absence of recovery, identification, or corroborative evidence against these accused persons, and held that their conviction violated settled evidentiary standards and principles of criminal jurisprudence. 9.6. As regards the State’s appeal against the acquittal of Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan, the High Court found no error in the trial Court’s view, holding that there was no admissible or credible evidence connecting him to the conspiracy or the execution of the crime, and therefore, upheld his acquittal as well. 9.7. The High Court accordingly, vide common judgment and order dated 22nd July, 2019: -A. Answered the death reference forwarded by the trial Court in the affirmative and confirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence awarding death penalty to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed passed by the trial Court. Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal preferred by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was dismissed. B. Allowed the criminal appeals preferred by Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior; Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla @ Nasaruddin @ Nikka @ Umer @ Majeed Khan @ Raja; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja; Accused No. 5-Mohammed Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood Keeley; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja; and Accused No.10-Raees Baeg. C. Dismissed the criminal appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan against the acquittal of Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan and for enhancement of sentence in respect of the accused persons who were awarded Life Imprisonment. 9.8. The High Court vide separate judgment and order dated 22nd July, 2019,38 dismissed the criminal appeal preferred by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court. 9.9. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had thereafter filed writ petition39 seeking quashing and setting aside of order dated 27th January, 2020, by which his parole application was rejected based on the recommendation made by the Permanent Parole Committee and the consequential grant of permanent parole. The High Court vide judgment and order 38 Impugned in Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019. 39 D.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 102 of 2020. dated 29th September, 202040 allowed the writ petition filed by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. The Division Bench directed the District Authority to release Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim on permanent parole, subject to his furnishing a personal bond of the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with two sureties of Rs. 50,000/- each to the satisfaction of the concerned District Magistrate. It was further stipulated that in case, during period of his permanent parole, if the said accused commits any undesirable activity, he can be called upon to serve out his remaining sentence and at the same time he shall also maintain peace and tranquility during the parole period and will abide by any other condition imposed by the authority concerned.
10.The aforesaid judgments passed by the High Court are under challenge in this batch of appeals by special leave preferred at the instance of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed41; State of Rajasthan42 against 40 Impugned in SLP(Crl.) No. 3531 of 2021. 41 Criminal Appeal No. 1827-1829 of 2019. 42 Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP(Crl) No. 621 of 2020; SLP(Crl) No. 571 of 2020; SLP(Crl) No. 681 of 2020; SLP(Crl) No. 143 of 2020; and SLP(Crl) No. 3531 of 2021. acquittal of various co-accused; and Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim.43 V. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED PERSONS A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
11.Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing
for Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, vehemently
and fervently contended that the entire prosecution
case is founded upon conjectures, surmises and
legally inadmissible material and that the Courts
below gravely erred in recording and sustaining the
conviction of the said accused. It was urged that the
case rests substantially upon circumstantial
evidence and alleged confessional statements, and
that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish
a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances
leading only to the hypothesis of guilt of the said
accused. Learned counsel submitted that the well-
settled principles governing conviction on
circumstantial evidence, as enunciated by this Court
in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
43 Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019.
Maharashtra44, have been wholly disregarded and
that none of the indispensable conditions
constituting the “panchsheel” of circumstantial evidence has been satisfied. According to the learned
counsel, the circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution are neither fully established nor of such
a convincing nature as to exclude every hypothesis
consistent with the innocence of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed. On the contrary, the prosecution
case is riddled with material inconsistencies,
unexplained gaps, and conjectural inferences,
rendering the conviction wholly unsustainable.
the Courts below erred in placing reliance upon the
alleged disclosure statements attributed to Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed without properly
appreciating the scope and ambit of Section 27 of
IEA. It was submitted that, in light of the law laid
down in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor45, only
such portion of information which distinctly relates
to the fact discovered is admissible and that the
prosecution and the Courts below impermissibly
45 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47.
relied upon material beyond the limited scope of
Section 27 of IEA. It was urged that the alleged
discoveries do not satisfy the legal requirements
under the IEA and, therefore, cannot constitute
incriminating circumstances against the said
accused. The Courts below, however, erroneously
treated inadmissible portions of the disclosure
statements as substantive evidence against Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, thereby causing serious
prejudice to him and tainting the impugned
judgments with gross illegality.
11.2. Learned counsel next assailed the reliance
placed by the prosecution and the Courts below upon
the alleged confessional statements of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim. It was contended that the
conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed has
been substantially influenced by a retracted
confession46 of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
recorded in the present case as well as another
confessional statement recorded in an entirely
different case, i.e., the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast
case.47 Learned counsel submitted that both these
statements were treated by the Courts below as
having significant evidentiary value against Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, despite the well-settled
legal restrictions governing the use of such material
in criminal trials. According to learned counsel, the
law is well-settled that the confession of a co-accused
is not substantive evidence and can, at best, be taken
into consideration only to lend assurance to other
independent evidence already found reliable. It was
emphasized that the confession of a co-accused
cannot form the foundation of conviction and may be
looked into only by way of corroboration after the
prosecution has, by independent and legally
admissible evidence, established the guilt of the
accused concerned. Learned counsel submitted that
the High Court committed a grave error in relying
upon the confessional statements of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim as substantive evidence against
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and in treating
such statements as having independent probative
value sufficient to sustain the conviction.
11.3. Learned counsel further urged that the
High Court as well as the trial Court failed to
appreciate the principles laid down by this Court in
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh48
and Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar.49 It was
submitted that this Court has consistently held that
the confession of a co-accused is not evidence within
the meaning of Section 3 of IEA and cannot form the
sole basis or foundation of a conviction. Such
material may be considered only as a supplementary
circumstance after the prosecution has, through
independent and legally admissible evidence,
established the guilt of the accused concerned. In the
present case, however, the High Court sustained the
conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed by
placing heavy reliance upon the confessional
statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim,
thereby departing from the settled legal position
governing the evidentiary value of the confession
made by a co-accused. It was submitted that the use
of such inadmissible material as a primary basis for
conviction has caused grave prejudice to Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and renders the impugned
judgments unsustainable in law.
49 1964 SCC OnLine SC 28; (1964) 6 SCR 623.
11.4. Learned counsel also contended that the
Courts below erred in overlooking the serious
infirmities surrounding the statement of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim recorded as an approver. It was
submitted that the said witness was not jointly tried
with Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and therefore
could not legally be treated as an approver in the trial
of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. Learned counsel
emphasized that the very foundation for treating
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim as an approver stood
vitiated in the absence of a joint trial, thereby
rendering the alleged confession legally suspect and
incapable of being relied upon against Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed. Furthermore, the procedure
adopted in recording the confessional statements of
Accused No.12-Pappu @ Salim suffered from serious
irregularities, resulting in repeated challenges before
the trial Court and multiple directions for fresh
recording of his statement. It was argued that these
recurring procedural lapses were substantive in
nature and not only cast a serious doubt on the
voluntariness and authenticity of the statements
allegedly made by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim but
also undermine the overall credibility of the
prosecution’s reliance on such evidence.
11.5. Learned counsel further submitted that in
the trial pertaining to the present incident, Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim implicitly retracted from his
earlier versions and denied having made the
statements attributed to him. The retraction,
according to learned counsel, seriously undermines
the prosecution case insofar as it sought to implicate
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed through approver
testimony. As a sequel to the retraction, the approver
status of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was
rescinded and he was subsequently tried and
convicted in a separate trial arising out of the same
incident. According to learned counsel, the
evidentiary value of such vacillating and retracted
testimony is incapable of sustaining a conviction,
particularly in the absence of independent evidence
and reliable corroboration connecting Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed with the alleged offence.
11.6. Learned counsel further elaborated upon
the procedural irregularities vitiating the
prosecution’s reliance on the alleged confessional
statements made by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim.
In particular, it was submitted that the statement of
the approver recorded on 21st October, 2002 (Exhibit
P-189) in the present case was not recorded in
accordance with law, resulting in a challenge to its
sanctity by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed through
an application dated 28th September, 2007.
Significantly, the trial Court, by order dated 30th
November, 2010, found merit in the objection and
directed that the statement be recorded afresh.
Pursuant thereto, a fresh statement was recorded on
4th January, 2011.50 However, doubts regarding
compliance with the order dated 30th November, 2010
persisted, compelling Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed to seek recording of the statement in open
Court. Consequently, the statement of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim was again recorded on 19th
February, 201151 before the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Dausa, wherein he categorically
disowned his earlier statements and asserted that he
had never acted as an approver in any case and that
no statement had been made by him before a
Magistrate in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
50 Exhibit D-13.
51 Exhibit D-14.
the subsequent proceedings only reinforced the
unreliability of the purported confessional
statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. In view
of these categorical retractions made by him, neither
the alleged confessional statement (Exhibit P-174),
recorded in connection with another case relating to
the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast, nor the
subsequently retracted statement (Exhibit P-189)
recorded in the present case, could legally be treated
as either substantive or corroborative evidence
against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, much less
constitute the foundation of his conviction. According
to learned counsel, once the maker of the statements
had expressly disowned them, the evidentiary value
of such material stood substantially diluted and
could not be relied upon in the absence of strong
independent corroboration.
11.8. Learned counsel next contended that the
prosecution failed to adduce any independent
evidence whatsoever to corroborate the alleged
Salim. It was submitted that substantial portions of
the statements were hearsay in nature and remained
unverified during investigation. No incriminating
circumstance, discovery, or other independent
evidence was unearthed pursuant to the information
allegedly furnished by him. In such circumstances,
the statements remained wholly uncorroborated and
lacked the degree of assurance required in law for
placing reliance upon approver or accomplice
evidence.
the investigating agency failed to pursue several
material leads emerging from the alleged confessional
statements. In particular, despite references to one
Salar and to meetings purportedly held at a hotel
after the incident, neither was the said individual
traced nor were the owner or staff of the hotel
meaningfully examined. It was also urged that the
prosecution’s suggestion that Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim retracted his statements under the influence
or pressure of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed is
wholly untenable. In this regard, learned counsel
pointed out that Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had
remained lodged in Central Jail, Jaipur only between
12th August, 1997 and 26th January, 2000 and was
housed separately at the time when the subsequent
statements were recorded and retractions were made.
These circumstances, according to learned counsel,
demonstrate that the prosecution’s imputation
against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed for the
retraction is speculative and unsupported by credible
evidence. Consequently, the High Court gravely erred
in placing reliance upon such unverified and
unsupported material to sustain the conviction of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed.
11.10. Assailing the prosecution case insofar as it
rests on the identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, learned counsel vehemently contended that
the entire process of identification is vitiated by
serious infirmities and is therefore wholly unreliable.
It was urged that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
had consistently and unequivocally maintained that
he had been exposed and shown to the witnesses
prior to the conduct of the Test Identification
Parade52, thereby compromising the fairness and
sanctity of the identification process. Learned
counsel pointed out that this specific objection was
not only raised by the accused at the relevant time
52 For short, “TIP”.
but was also duly recorded by the Munsif Magistrate,
Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98) who conducted the TIP
proceedings, lending credence to the grievance raised
by the Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed’s regarding
prior exposure. It was further argued that the very
purpose of a TIP is to test the memory and
observational capacity of witnesses under conditions
free from external influence, and once there exists a
reasonable possibility that the accused had been
shown to the witnesses before the TIP, the exercise
loses much of its probative value. In such
circumstances, it was submitted that the evidentiary
value ordinarily attached to a TIP stands
substantially diluted, if not entirely eroded, and that
the prosecution could derive little, if any,
corroborative support therefrom, particularly when
the identification process itself was shrouded in grave
suspicion, thereby creating grave doubt on the
involvement of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, in
the alleged offence.
the evidence tendered by the prosecution witnesses
regarding the identification of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed is wholly unreliable and incapable of
sustaining his conviction. It was contended that
serious doubts arise regarding the sanctity of the
investigation, particularly in view of the list of
witnesses bearing their signatures that was filed
along with the application seeking preponement of
the TIP. Learned counsel further pointed out that
Jagan Ram (PW-28), a constable, deposed that he
had boarded the bus at Mahwa and could identify
certain passengers who had alighted there on the
date of the occurrence. Although the witness
purported to identify Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed before the trial Court, he admittedly did not
participate in the TIP conducted on 29th June, 1997.
This omission substantially undermines the
prosecution case, as it would be highly improbable if
not impossible for a person to accurately retain the
facial image of a casual co-passenger in a public
transport bus for a prolonged period of more than 7
years. It was, therefore, argued that the purported
dock identification after an inordinate lapse of time,
coupled with the witness’s failure to participate in the
TIP, renders the identification evidence inherently
doubtful, unsafe, and unworthy of reliance for the
purpose of recording conviction.
11.12. Learned counsel further contended that
the prosecution case suffered from significant
investigative lapses. It was pointed out that an
important witness had earlier identified an entirely
different individual during TIP, who was
subsequently discharged from the case. This
circumstance, according to learned counsel,
demonstrates the inherent unreliability of the
identification process and raises serious doubts
regarding the sanctity of the prosecution case against
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed.
11.13. Learned counsel contended that the
testimony of the independent witnesses associated
with the identification and site verification
proceedings in respect of the events at Tea Stall and
Book Shop substantially demolishes the prosecution
case. It was submitted that Lala Ram (PW-74), the
panch witness to the identification proceedings conducted at Bharatpur Bus Stand, categorically
deposed that his signatures were obtained on blank
papers, and that the police officials did not conduct
any inquiry whatsoever from Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed in his presence. He further stated that
the accused was never brought before him during the
alleged identification proceedings and that he was
merely asked to append his signatures on documents
prepared by the investigating officer. Lala Ram (PW-
74) further stated that identification memos bearing
Exhibit P-121 and P-122 were prepared while the
officials were sitting in the office and not at the place
where the proceedings were purportedly conducted.
According to learned counsel, this admission strikes
at the authenticity of the entire identification exercise
and raises serious doubts regarding the manner in
which the proceedings were allegedly carried out.
This version was further corroborated by Kartar
Singh (PW-76), who also admitted that identification
memos bearing Exhibit P-121 and P-122 were
prepared in the office rather than at the place of
identification, thereby lending further support to the
defence contention that the proceedings were not
conducted faithfully and, in the manner, projected by
the prosecution.
Kartar Singh (PW-76), while deposing about the spot
verification proceedings, stated that a person with a
muffled face accompanied the police when the alleged
site verification was undertaken and that the relevant
exhibits were prepared in his presence. However, no
one had seen the face of the said person and the
witness (PW-76) was, therefore, unable to ascertain
or verify the identity of the individual accompanying
the police party. Significantly, despite having been
associated with the proceedings, Kartar Singh (PW-
76) neither identified Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed as the person who allegedly pointed out and
identified the shops, nor furnished any physical
description or other particulars capable of linking the
accused to the alleged verification exercise. Learned
counsel argued that the total absence of
identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed by
an independent witness renders the alleged recovery
and verification proceedings devoid of evidentiary
value. These circumstances, according to learned
counsel, cast a serious shadow of doubt over the
prosecution case and render the identification and
verification proceedings purportedly made pursuant
to the disclosure statement suffered by the said
accused wholly unreliable.
11.15. Learned counsel next questioned the
prosecution theory regarding the alleged recovery
and seizure of two bus tickets purportedly connecting
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed with the crime in
question. It was submitted that the prosecution failed
to establish any nexus between the recovered tickets
and the ticket books allegedly issued to the conductor
(PW-46) on the date of the incident. The serial
numbers of the two recovered tickets, namely,
091440 and 079718, did not correspond with the
serial numbers 83025346 and 83025350 of the ticket
books allegedly issued to the conductor (PW-46) for
issuance of tickets to passengers on the relevant day.
Learned counsel further contended that the
prosecution advanced mutually destructive versions
concerning the source and recovery of the tickets.
While Om Prakash (PW-32), one of the panch witness to the seizure memo, deposed that the tickets were
brought to the police station by one Manucha and
that the seizure memo was prepared there in his
presence, the prosecution simultaneously sought to
project a different case that the said tickets had been
re-issued by the conductor (PW-46) to Bal Krishan
(PW-6), an injured witness, and were subsequently
recovered from him while he was undergoing
treatment at SMS Hospital, Jaipur. These
irreconcilable contradictions, coupled with the
unexplained circumstance as to why two tickets
would have been issued to a person allegedly
travelling alone, render the alleged recoveries wholly
unreliable.
the prosecution failed to examine material witnesses
connected with the alleged recovery of the tickets.
One Manucha, who allegedly produced the tickets
before the police, was neither examined during
investigation under Section 161 of CrPC nor cited as
a prosecution witness. Significantly, his name
surfaced for the first time only during the deposition
of Om Prakash (PW-32) before the trial Court.
According to learned counsel, such material
omissions erode the credibility of the prosecution
case and cast serious doubt on the authenticity of the
alleged seizure. In view of the inconsistent versions
regarding the source of the tickets and the failure to
examine the very person who allegedly produced
them, it was urged that the prosecution has failed to
prove the recovery beyond reasonable doubt, thereby
entitling Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, to the
benefit of doubt.
11.17. Learned counsel further contended that
there exist discrepancies and infirmities casting
grave doubt upon the testimony of the prosecution’s
star witness, namely, the conductor (PW-46), who
was heavily relied upon by the prosecution for the
identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. It
was submitted that the prosecution sought to portray
the alleged return of two tickets by Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed as a unique and unusual feature
which enabled the conductor (PW-46) to distinctly
remember his face and subsequently identify him.
However, once the very recovery and provenance of
the alleged tickets become doubtful owing to the
contradictory versions advanced by the prosecution
and its failure to establish a credible chain of
custody, the foundational circumstance on which the
identification rests stand seriously undermined. In
such circumstances, learned counsel urged that the
alleged theory of return of two tickets ceases to have
any evidentiary value as a distinguishing feature
capable of aiding identification. Consequently, the
identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed by
the conductor (PW-46) becomes unsafe and
unworthy of reliance.
11.18. Learned counsel also questioned the
authenticity and evidentiary value of certain
documentary material relied upon by the
prosecution. Referring to Exhibit P-123, a purported
bill evidencing the purchase of Bal Hans book, it was submitted that a bare perusal of the document itself
gives rise to serious doubts regarding its genuineness
and probative value. Learned counsel pointed out
that the document purportedly emanated from
Poonam Book Stall, which was situated at Bharatpur
Railway Station and not at the Bharatpur Bus Stand,
thereby rendering it inconsistent with the
prosecution narrative regarding the movements and
activities allegedly attributed to Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed. It was further contended that the
prosecution failed to satisfactorily explain this stark
discrepancy or establish how a document originating
from a location different from that projected by the
prosecution could lend support to its case.
11.19. It was further contended that the date
appearing on Exhibit P-123 appeared to have been
altered from 31st May, 1997 to 31st May, 1996,
ostensibly to bring it in conformity with the
prosecution case and thereby implicate Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. According to learned counsel,
the apparent alteration of the date mentioned in the
document, coupled with the discrepancy regarding
the place of issuance, casts a serious shadow on its
authenticity and reliability. It was argued that no
satisfactory evidence was adduced by the prosecution
to dispel the suspicion of tampering or to establish
the document’s provenance through legally
admissible and credible evidence. Likewise, the
sanctity and genuineness of the letter allegedly
received by the Superintendent of Police purportedly
implicating Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in the
crime in question was never established through
legally admissible evidence. The letter though
referred to in the chargesheet was never brought on
record and proved as per law thereby warranting
adverse inference against the prosecution. In the
absence of proper proof regarding its authorship,
source, and receipt, the said letter could not have
been treated as corroborative material. It was
fervently urged that the Courts below erroneously
relied upon these doubtful documents as
corroborative circumstances against Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed, despite the serious infirmities
surrounding their authenticity, thereby causing
grave prejudice to his defence.
the investigation conducted in the present case was
marked by serious irregularities, omissions, and
inconsistencies, rendering it fundamentally tainted
and wholly unreliable. It was urged that the
investigating agency, instead of undertaking a fair,
objective, and scientifically driven inquiry, proceeded
on preconceived assumptions and sought to build a
case around selected individuals by collecting
material suited to a predetermined narrative.
According to learned counsel, several vital leads were
either left unexplored or abandoned without
justification; material witnesses were not examined;
crucial documents were neither proved nor brought
on record in accordance with law; and contradictory
versions regarding recoveries, identification
proceedings, and the arrest of the accused remained
unresolved. The investigation also suffered from
unexplained gaps in the chain of circumstances,
stark procedural lapses in the recording of
confessional and approver statements, and utter
failure to secure reliable corroborative evidence
despite the gravity of the allegations. Learned counsel
submitted that these deficiencies were not isolated
irregularities but reflected a pattern of investigative
impropriety/apathy that substantially undermined
the credibility of the prosecution case. In such
circumstances, it was contended that the Courts
below ought to have approached the prosecution
evidence with heightened caution, for a conviction,
particularly in a case involving allegations of
terrorism and carrying the possibility of the gravest
penal consequences, cannot rest upon an
investigation that is demonstrably casual, deficient,
and tainted by serious procedural infirmities.
11.21. Learned counsel lastly and most fervently
assailed the fundamental procedural flaw in the trial
of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and the manner
in which the trial was conducted, contending that the
said accused remained effectively unrepresented
throughout substantial stages of the proceedings. It
was submitted that despite facing charges of the
utmost gravity, carrying the possibility of capital
punishment, no effective legal assistance was ever
offered or provided to him by the trial Court. Learned
counsel urged that the right to legal representation
constitutes an integral facet of the guarantee of a fair,
just and reasonable procedure and forms an
indispensable component of the constitutional
protection of life and personal liberty. According to
learned counsel, the trial Court was under a
constitutional obligation to ensure that Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed be provided competent legal
assistance and not left undefended during the
proceedings. However, no such meaningful
assistance was ensured in the present case. The trial
Court never offered the services of a legal aid counsel
or an amicus curiae to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed who was under these circumstances, left to
fend for himself and was compelled to cross examine
the witnesses on his own and also to address
arguments at various crucial stages of trial.
the absence of effective legal representation caused
serious and irremediable prejudice to Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed in defending himself against the
charges levelled against him. It was contended that
the accused was clearly deprived of a fair opportunity
to effectively challenge the prosecution evidence,
cross-examine material witnesses, raise appropriate
legal objections, and present his defence in
accordance with law. The failure of the trial Court to
secure effective legal representation for Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, it was urged, strikes at the very
root of a fair criminal trial and renders the
proceedings fundamentally unfair and
constitutionally vitiated. In such circumstances,
learned counsel submitted that the conviction and
sentence recorded against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed stand vitiated for violation of the
constitutional guarantees of a fair trial and effective
access to justice.
11.23. On these grounds, learned counsel
submitted that the impugned judgments suffer from
serious errors in appreciation of law and evidence. It
was urged that the conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed rests upon inadmissible and
uncorroborated confessional statements, unreliable
identification evidence, doubtful recoveries,
unexplained contradictions, serious investigative
deficiencies and a tainted and fundamentally flawed
investigation that failed to inspire confidence or meet
the standards of fairness expected in a criminal
prosecution of such gravity. The prosecution has
failed to establish the guilt of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed beyond reasonable doubt and has
fallen far short of the exacting standard required in a
case involving capital punishment. It was, therefore,
prayed that the impugned judgment and order be set
aside and Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed be
acquitted of all charges by extending to him the
benefit of doubt.
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10Raees Baeg
the High Court rightly acquitted Accused No. 1-Javed
Khan; Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-
Lateef Ahmad Baja; Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali
Bhatt; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain; and
Accused No.10-Raees Baeg, as the prosecution had
failed to adduce any cogent evidence connecting them
with the crime in question. It was submitted that the
High Court, upon a careful appraisal of the material
on record, correctly concluded that the evidence
relied upon by the prosecution related either to other
bomb blast cases or, at best, disclosed association
amongst certain accused persons without
establishing their participation in the Samleti Bus
bomb blast case. Learned counsel emphasized that
mere suspicion, prior association, or involvement in
other criminal proceedings could not act as a
substitute for proof of participation in the present
offence.
11.25. Insofar as Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @
Javed Junior was concerned, learned counsel
submitted that his confessional statement recorded
under Section 164 of CrPC53 primarily referred to the
transportation of explosive substances and the
movements of various individuals in connection with
distinct incidents at Kathmandu, Delhi, Patna,
Mumbai, and Ahmedabad. Significantly, the
confessional statement neither contained any
reference regarding the Samleti Bus bomb blast nor
did it disclose any role played by him in the
commission of the present offence. Learned counsel
pointed out that the High Court rightly noted that, if
at all, the statement pertained to the alleged
transportation of explosives to Delhi, which formed
the basis of proceedings in the Lajpat Nagar bomb
blast case. The statement did not furnish any
material connecting Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @
Javed Junior with the present crime.
the case of prosecution against Accused No. 2-Abdul
Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja; Accused No.
5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar
Hussain stood on an even weaker footing. These
accused were sought to be implicated principally on
the basis of the confessional statement of Accused
No. 1-Javed Khan. However, even a plain reading of
the said statement revealed no allegation regarding
their involvement in the Samleti Bus bomb blast
case. At the highest, the statement referred to their
presence or movements alongside other persons at
different points of time. Learned counsel submitted
that such vague references, in the confession of a co-
accused without any evidence connecting them to the
planning, execution, or facilitation of the present
offence, were wholly insufficient to sustain
conviction.
the acquittal of Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg was
equally justified. Although his name figured in the
confessional statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim recorded in Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case,
there was no reference therein to any involvement of
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg in the Samleti Bus bomb
blast case. The prosecution failed to produce any
independent evidence linking him with the incident
in question. Learned counsel emphasized that the
mere fact that Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg had been
convicted in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case
could not constitute evidence of his involvement in
the present case. In the absence of any material
establishing participation of the said accused in the
incident under consideration, the High Court
correctly held that the prosecution had failed to prove
its case against him.
11.28. On these grounds, learned counsel
submitted that the High Court rightly acquitted
Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No. 2-Abdul
Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja; Accused No.
5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar
Hussain; and Accused No.10-Raees Baeg. It was
urged that the prosecution failed to produce cogent,
reliable, or independent evidence connecting the
aforesaid accused with the Samleti Bus bomb blast
case. The material relied upon by the prosecution
neither established their participation in the
planning or execution of the offence nor disclosed any
circumstance incriminating them in the present case.
In these circumstances, learned counsel submitted
that the High Court correctly extended the benefit of
doubt to the aforesaid accused persons and their
acquittal calls for no interference.
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
11.29. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim assailed the findings
recorded by the Courts below and submitted that the
conviction of the said accused is wholly
unsustainable as there is not even an iota of evidence
connecting him with the alleged offence. It was urged
that neither any explosive substance, incriminating
article, weapon, or any other material object was
recovered at the instance of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim during investigation nor was the accused
charged for possession of any incriminating article
connected to the case at hand. Learned counsel drew
attention to the testimony of prosecution witnesses,
including the officers associated with the
investigation, who admitted that no recovery
whatsoever had been effected from Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim. According to learned counsel, the
absence of any recovery linking Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim to the alleged conspiracy or
commission of the offence constitutes a fundamental
lacuna in the prosecution case and completely undermines the theory of his involvement in the case
at hand.
the entire prosecution case against Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim rests solely upon circumstantial
evidence, there being no direct evidence whatsoever
implicating him in the alleged crime. It was urged
that the prosecution has failed to establish a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstances
leading exclusively to the guilt of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim. Several material links remain
unproved, while other circumstances relied upon by
the prosecution are based upon assumptions and
inferences rather than on legally admissible evidence.
In such circumstances, it was submitted that the
Courts below gravely erred in recording a finding of
guilt despite the prosecution having failed to
establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
11.31. Learned counsel next contended that the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses suffers from
serious inconsistencies, contradictions and inherent
improbabilities which strike at the very root of the
prosecution case. It was submitted that material
witnesses gave divergent versions on crucial aspects
of the case and several prosecution witnesses failed
to support and rather contradicted the prosecution
narrative in material particulars. According to
learned counsel, the Courts below ignored these
glaring discrepancies and proceeded to convict
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim on the basis of
evidence which was neither consistent nor reliable. It
was urged that since the prosecution evidence itself
is riddled with material contradictions, Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
the prosecution failed to establish any motive
whatsoever for Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim to
participate in the alleged offence. It was urged that
no evidence was led to demonstrate any association
of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim with the principal
accused persons or any circumstance even
suggestive of his involvement in the alleged
conspiracy. On the contrary, evidence on record
indicated that Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was a
driver by profession, belonging to a modest
background and earning his livelihood by lawful
means. Learned counsel further pointed out that a
prosecution witness, namely, Pramod Kumar (PW-7),
who was acquainted with Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim for a considerable period, specifically stated in
his deposition that he was not involved in any anti-
national activity and was known to be a peace-loving
and patriotic individual. These circumstances,
according to learned counsel, completely belie the
prosecution’s attempt to portray Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim as a participant in the alleged offence.
11.33. Learned counsel also questioned the
reliance placed by the Courts below upon the alleged
confessional statement attributed to Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim under Section 164 of CrPC. It was
submitted that Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
himself, while deposing as a witness (PW-95) in
connected proceedings, i.e., Sessions Case No. 35 of
2011, categorically asserted that the statement had
not been made voluntarily and that it had been
recorded under pressure exerted by the investigating
authorities. According to learned counsel, once the
voluntary nature of the alleged statement stood
seriously disputed, the Courts below ought to have
scrutinized such material with great caution.
Instead, the statement was implicitly relied upon
ignoring the suspicious circumstances in which it
came to be recorded and Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim’s subsequent explanation regarding the same.
11.34. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the
cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances
unmistakably demonstrates that the prosecution has
failed to establish the guilt of Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim beyond reasonable doubt. It was urged that
there exists no recovery, no direct evidence, no
proved motive, no reliable chain of circumstances
and no credible material connecting Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim with the alleged crime. The findings
recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High
Court are based purely on conjectures and surmises
rather than legally admissible evidence. In these
circumstances, learned counsel submitted that
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is entitled to the
benefit of doubt and that the conviction and sentence
recorded against him deserve to be set aside.
11.35. Learned counsel further opposed the
challenge laid by the State of Rajasthan [Criminal
Appeal @ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3531
of 2021] to the judgment and order dated 29th
September, 2020 granting permanent parole to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. It was submitted
that the said order does not suffer from any legal or
factual infirmity warranting interference by this
Court. Learned counsel pointed out that Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim was convicted on 7th March, 2017
and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and
had remained in custody even prior to his conviction.
Consequently, he has undergone more than twenty-
three years of actual incarceration. It was urged that
the High Court, while granting permanent parole,
rightly took into consideration the prolonged period
of imprisonment undergone by Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim, his satisfactory conduct in prison,
and the object underlying the parole framework,
namely, the reformation and social reintegration of
prisoners.
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had earlier been
released on first and second paroles and had
faithfully complied with all conditions imposed by the
competent authorities. He never misused the liberty
granted to him and, upon completion of each parole
period, surrendered before the concerned authorities
within the stipulated time. It was contended that his
conduct and behaviour both during incarceration
and while on parole remained satisfactory
throughout. In view of his long incarceration,
unblemished conduct, successful availing of earlier
paroles without any breach of conditions, and
fulfilment of the requirements prescribed under the
Rajasthan Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, 1958,
the High Court was fully justified in directing his
release on permanent parole. Accordingly, it was
submitted that the challenge laid by the State of
Rajasthan to the order dated 29th September, 2020 is
devoid of merit and deserves to be rejected.
VI. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
12.Per contra, Mr. Raja Thakare, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of
Rajasthan submitted that the trial Court and the
High Court have concurrently recorded findings of
guilt against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed upon
a comprehensive appreciation of oral, documentary
and forensic evidence. It was contended that such
concurrent findings, having been arrived at upon a
proper evaluation of the evidence and in accordance
with settled principles of criminal jurisprudence,
carry substantial persuasive value and do not
warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. It was further urged that the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing beyond
reasonable doubt that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed was not merely associated with the events in
question but was one of the principal conspirators
who played a significant and active role in the
planning and execution of the conspiracy
culminating in the Samleti Bus bomb blast of 22nd
May, 1996. The said incident constituted a dastardly
and heinous terrorist act, resulting in widespread
public harm, leading to the death of fourteen
innocent passengers, causing injuries to several
others, and occasioning the destruction of public
property, while spreading terror in the society at
large.
12.1. According to learned senior counsel, the
evidence on record establishes a complete and
unbroken chain of circumstances pointing towards
the guilt of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed,
demonstrating not merely his presence at the scene
but also his active involvement in the formulation,
coordination, and execution of the conspiracy. It was
submitted that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, read together with the documentary and
forensic evidence, clearly corroborate the prosecution
case and conclusively establish the complicity of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, leaving no room
for doubt as to his guilt.
identity and presence of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed in the ill-fated Rajasthan Roadways bus
immediately prior to the explosion stand firmly
established through the testimony of multiple
independent witnesses. In this regard, reliance was
heavily placed on the evidence of Ashok Kumar (PW-
46), the conductor of the bus, who consistently
identified Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed during
the TIP as well as in the dock during his deposition
before the trial Court. The conductor (PW-46)
specifically deposed that two young men, one of
whom was Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, got
down at Mahwa and returned their tickets requesting
that they be given to a poor person. Learned senior
counsel submitted that the peculiar and uncommon
nature of this action made a lasting impression on
the witness (PW-46), thereby enabling him to
distinctly remember the said accused and to identify
him with confidence and consistency at the stages of
investigation and trial. Such identification, it was
argued, constitutes unimpeachable evidence
connecting Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed with
the events immediately preceding the explosion.
12.3. It was further submitted that on the
crucial aspect of identification, the testimony of the
conductor (PW-46) receives substantial corroboration
from Guman Singh (PW-3), Jhabbu (PW-19),
Dashrath Singh (PW-23), Constable Jagan Ram (PW-
28), Murari Lal (PW-29), and Constable Rajesh
Kumar (PW-30). Each of these witnesses, while
deposing independently, furnished materially
consistent accounts regarding the physical
appearance and conduct of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, describing features such as his unshaven
beard, spectacles, cap, clothing, and generally
suspicious demeanour during the journey. Their
testimonies further converge on the crucial
circumstance that the said accused was one of the
passengers who disembarked from the bus shortly
before the explosion took place. Although the
statements of these witnesses were recorded after a
considerable lapse of time, the consistency
maintained by them on the material particulars of
identification and highlighted conduct of Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed assumes seminal evidentiary
value. The thread of consistency running through the
testimonies of these witnesses, despite being
recorded years after the incident, therefore lends
considerable assurance to the prosecution case and
reinforces the reliability of the conductor’s account
on the material aspects of the incident.
challenge to the TIP is wholly misconceived. The
evidence of Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98), the Munsiff
Magistrate who conducted the TIP, clearly establishes
that all material witnesses correctly identified
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed during the
identification proceedings. The identification memos
prepared consistently bear the signatures of the
witnesses and form part of the record, thereby
providing contemporaneous documentary
corroboration of the identification process and the
participation of the witnesses therein. Significantly,
the evidence of Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98) remained
unshaken during cross-examination, and no material
contradiction, inconsistency, or procedural
irregularity could be elicited so as to cast any doubt
on the manner in which the proceedings were
conducted. His testimony, read together with the
identification memos and the direct evidence of the
identifying witnesses, unequivocally demonstrates
that the TIP was conducted in a fair, transparent, and
legally compliant manner, and conclusively
establishes the fairness and reliability of the
identification proceedings.
12.5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the
State vehemently refuted the contention advanced on
behalf of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed that he
had been shown to the witnesses prior to the conduct
of the TIP as being wholly misconceived and
unsupported by the record. On the contrary, it was
urged that the evidence on record affirmatively
demonstrates that all necessary precautions were
taken to ensure the fairness and sanctity of the
identification proceedings. The testimony of Nand Lal
Sharma (PW-98), the Munsiff Magistrate who
conducted the TIP, clearly establishes that Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was kept properly
segregated and that the TIP was conducted strictly in
accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Significantly, no credible material was brought on
record during cross-examination to substantiate the
allegation that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed had
been exposed to the witnesses before the conduct of
TIP. The defence theory that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed was previously shown to the identifying
witnesses remains a bald assertion, unsupported by
any credible evidence whatsoever, and stands
squarely contradicted by the contemporaneous
record and the unimpeached testimony of Nand Lal
Sharma (PW-98). In these circumstances, the
allegation deserves to be rejected outright as an
afterthought raised solely to undermine an otherwise
reliable identification process conducted with due
diligence.
that the inability of certain witnesses to identify
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in Court after a
considerable lapse of time does not dilute the
evidentiary value of TIP. It was contended that the
law has consistently recognized the fallibility of
human memory and the natural fading of recollection
with the passage of time, particularly in cases where
witnesses are required to identify individuals whom
they had seen only briefly and several years or
decades earlier. What assumes significance is that
such witnesses had correctly identified Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed during the TIP conducted at a
much earlier stage, when the events were relatively
fresh in their memory and the possibility of mistaken
recollection was substantially lower. The subsequent
inability to identify the accused in Court, therefore,
cannot dilute or undermine the reliability of the
identification made during the TIP, which was
conducted within a reasonable period after the
incident. The evidence of Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98),
read with Exhibit Nos. P-1, P-8 and P-9, therefore
conclusively establishes the identity of Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed for the purposes of the present
case.
12.7. Learned counsel next submitted that the
conduct of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
immediately before the explosion constitutes a highly
incriminating circumstance that cannot be viewed in
isolation but must be assessed in light of the
surrounding facts and attendant circumstances.
Despite purchasing tickets valid up to Jaipur, he
unexpectedly and without any apparent reason
disembarked at Mahwa shortly before the blast.
Several witnesses consistently deposed that his
demeanour during the journey was unusual and
conspicuously anxious. He appeared visibly nervous,
continuously smoked cigarettes, and displayed signs
of restlessness that attracted the attention of fellow
passengers. He firmly objected when another
passenger attempted to move a suitcase believed to
belong to him, yet ultimately left the bus without that
suitcase, a circumstance that is both unnatural and
difficult to reconcile with normal human conduct.
According to learned counsel, the cumulative effect of
these circumstances, namely, the sudden
disembarking from the bus, his nervous behaviour,
his unusual concern for the suitcase, and his
decision to leave it behind, forms a coherent chain of
incriminating facts that is wholly inconsistent with
innocent conduct and strongly indicates prior
knowledge of the impending explosion.
12.8. It was further submitted that the returned
bus tickets constituted a crucial link in the chain of
circumstances connecting Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed to the events immediately preceding the
occurrence. The prosecution proved this
circumstance through the testimony of Bal Krishan
(PW-6), who boarded the bus at Mahwa and was
handed over the very tickets earlier returned by the
two passengers who had alighted. The testimony of
Bal Krishan (PW-6) corroborates the version put forth
by the conductor (PW-46) regarding the return of the
tickets and establishes the suspicious movements of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed immediately before
the occurrence. This circumstance assumes great
significance because it independently corroborates
the identification evidence led by the prosecution.
prosecution has conclusively established the
procurement, recovery and planting of explosive
substances in the bus through unimpeachable
scientific and documentary evidence. Bhoop Singh
(PW-91) proved the recoveries of substantial
quantities of ammonium nitrate, detonators and fuse
wires at the instance of one of the co-accused
persons. Chetan Das Ravatani (PW-93), the FSL
expert, categorically confirmed that the recovered
materials were not innocuous substances but
essential components capable of being used in the
manufacture and detonation of explosive devices,
thereby lending strong scientific support to the
prosecution case. Prem Sagar Manocha (PW-96)
further deposed that approximately 2.5 kilograms of
RDX, a highly potent military-grade explosive, had
been used in the blast and that the explosive
substance had been strategically concealed beneath
a seat inside the bus with the intention of causing
maximum destruction and loss of life. The forensic
findings regarding the nature, quantity, and
placement of the explosive material are wholly
consistent with the eyewitness account and other
prosecution evidence and leave no room for doubt as
to the manner in which the offence was planned and
executed. The scientific evidence, therefore, fully
corroborates and materially strengthens the
prosecution case regarding the commission of the
offence and the means employed for carrying out the
same.
that the evidence of Guman Singh (PW-3) regarding
the large suitcase with an army-coloured cover
assumes considerable significance when read
alongside the forensic evidence. Guman Singh (PW-3)
specifically deposed that a passenger matching the
description of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed not
only objected when an attempt was made to move the
suitcase but also subsequently disembarked from the
bus leaving the suitcase behind. This conduct
assumes particular significance in light of the
forensic evidence establishing that the explosive
device was concealed beneath a seat in the bus. The
testimony of Guman Singh (PW-3), when read
conjointly with the forensic findings, lends tangible
support to the prosecution case that the suitcase
contained the explosive material and was
clandestinely used to transport and place the device
in the bus, thereby forming a crucial link in the chain
of incriminating circumstances against the accused.
12.11. Learned counsel also emphasized that the
prosecution evidence does not merely establish
isolated circumstances but consistently proves the
participation of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in
a wider terrorist conspiracy. The evidence on record
demonstrates his association with persons connected
to organised terrorist networks and his involvement
in activities extending beyond the present incident,
thereby indicating a continuing nexus with
individuals and groups engaged in terrorist
operations. It was further submitted that the material
brought on record, when viewed cumulatively,
reflects not only the knowledge of the said accused
about such unlawful activities but also his conscious
participation in a broader conspiracy aimed at
proliferating terrorist objectives. The fact that
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed has also been
convicted in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case,
which judgment has attained finality, assumes
considerable significance and provides additional
corroboration regarding his role and association with
terrorist activities, strengthening the prosecution’s
case as to his sustained involvement in terrorist
networks and related unlawful acts.
12.12. It is further submitted that the
Salim, which, according to the prosecution, stands
duly proved in accordance with law through the
testimony of the approver (PW-95) himself as well as
the evidence of the Magistrates, namely, Suresh
Chand Sharma (PW-97) and K.P. Saxsena (PW-99),
who recorded the confessions, assumes considerable
significance in establishing the existence of the larger
conspiracy underlying the terrorist activities in
question. A perusal of the said confession clearly
reveals the involvement of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed along with other accused persons in the
conspiracy and discloses their association with the
terrorist networks responsible for orchestrating and
facilitating the commission of various terrorist acts.
The confession not only identifies Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed as a participant in the conspiracy but
also demonstrates the interconnectivity of the
accused persons in furtherance of the common
unlawful design. The disclosures made therein
constitute a vital link in the chain of evidence proving
the larger conspiracy and lend substantial
corroboration to the prosecution case regarding the
coordinated role played by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed and the other accused in advancing the
objectives of the terrorist organisation. In view of the
fact that the confessional statements stand duly
proved and their voluntariness and authenticity have
been established through legally admissible evidence,
the contents thereof constitute a relevant and reliable
piece of evidence for establishing the role of the
accused persons in the larger conspiracy.
12.13. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the
prosecution has successfully established a complete,
coherent and unbroken chain of clinching
incriminating circumstances which unequivocally
points towards the guilt of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, and excludes every reasonable hypothesis
consistent with his innocence. It was contended that
the presence of the said accused in the bus at the
relevant time, his identification by several
independent witnesses, his suspicious conduct
immediately preceding the blast, his premature
disembarkation at Mahwa, the return of the bus
tickets, his continuous connection with the suitcase
containing the explosive device, the forensic evidence
confirming the use of RDX, and his links with the
larger conspiracy are all circumstances which stand
firmly proved and mutually reinforce one another.
According to learned counsel, when these
circumstances are considered cumulatively and in
their proper perspective, they form a complete chain
that leaves no gap in the prosecution case and leads
to the only irresistible conclusion of his guilt. It was,
therefore, submitted that both the trial Court and the
High Court rightly appreciated the evidence on record
and correctly recorded findings of guilt, and
consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed
upon Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, warrant no
interference by this Court.
that, assuming the conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed is upheld, the present case squarely
falls within the category of the “rarest of rare” cases
warranting confirmation of the death sentence
imposed by the trial Court. It was urged that the
offence was not an act of individual vendetta or a
crime committed in the heat of passion, but a cold-
blooded and meticulously planned terrorist attack
directed against unsuspecting civilians travelling in a
public transport bus. The explosive device,
comprising highly destructive material including
RDX, was planted in a State Roadways bus pursuant
to a calculated design to cause maximum casualties
and spread terror amongst the public at large. The
consequences of the act were catastrophic, resulting
in the loss of fourteen innocent lives, grievous
injuries to numerous others, and widespread fear
and insecurity within society. Learned counsel
submitted that the enormity of the crime, the
vulnerability of the victims, the ghastly nature of the
attack, and the profound impact of the incident upon
public order and national security constitute
aggravating circumstances of the highest order.
12.15. It was further contended that offences of
this nature strike at the very foundations of civilised
society and represent an assault not merely upon
individual victims but upon the collective conscience
of the nation. Learned counsel submitted that the
principles governing the imposition of capital
punishment, as authoritatively enunciated by this
Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab54,
require the death penalty to be reserved for the
“rarest of rare” cases where the alternative option of
life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
According to learned counsel, the present case
satisfies that exacting standard. The magnitude of
the crime, the number of lives lost, the severe injuries
inflicted upon numerous victims, the use of
sophisticated explosive material, and the wider
impact of the incident on public order and societal
security constitute aggravating circumstances of the
highest degree. In these circumstances, learned
counsel urged that the balance between aggravating
and mitigating factors overwhelmingly tilts in favour
of the extreme penalty and that no punishment short
of death would adequately reflect the gravity of the
offence, satisfy the demands of justice, or serve the
legitimate societal interest in deterring acts of
terrorism. It was, therefore, prayed that the death
Hameed be affirmed.
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused
No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10-
Raees Baeg
12.16. Learned senior counsel assailed the
acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No.
2-Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10-Raees Baeg
by the High Court, contending that the impugned
judgment is vitiated by a manifest misappreciation
and erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
It was submitted that the trial Court, upon a
comprehensive and meticulous evaluation of the oral,
documentary, and circumstantial evidence, had
rightly recorded findings of conviction against the
aforesaid accused for offences arising out of the
larger criminal conspiracy culminating in the Samleti
Bus bomb blast. According to the learned senior
counsel, the High Court fell into grave error in
discarding crucial incriminating material, including
evidence demonstrating the accused persons’
association with and active participation in the
conspiracy, despite the existence of a consistent,
cogent, and interlinked chain of circumstances which
unmistakably connected them with the terrorist
network responsible for the commission of the offence
and established their culpability beyond reasonable
doubt.
prosecution case demonstrates that the aforesaid
accused persons were not isolated actors but
members of a coordinated terrorist conspiracy linked
with organisations such as JKIF and Harkat-ul-
Ansar. The evidence on record reveals their
participation in activities extending beyond the
present incident and forming part of a broader design
to carry out terrorist attacks in different parts of the
country. Learned counsel for the State emphasized
that several of the accused persons have also been
convicted in other bomb blast cases, including the
Lajpat Nagar bomb blast and Jaipur Stadium bomb
blast cases, thereby providing significant insight and
corroboration regarding their association with
terrorist organisations and the conspiracy in
question. It was further contended that these
convictions are not merely indicative of prior criminal
involvement but constitute strong circumstantial
evidence demonstrating a continuing nexus between
the accused persons and organised terrorist
networks operating across different regions and even
abroad. According to the prosecution, the pattern of
conduct emerging from the evidence establishes that
the present offence formed part of a larger and well-
defined conspiracy aimed at destabilising public
order and creating widespread fear among the civilian
population.
12.18. It was further submitted that the
Salim, though requiring corroboration, furnish a
comprehensive and detailed account of the broader
criminal conspiracy, including the planning,
coordination, and execution of the acts culminating
in the explosion, and specifically implicate the
acquitted accused in various stages of the
conspiracy. It was contended that material aspects
set out in the confessional narratives stand
independently corroborated by evidence relating to
the transportation of explosives, recovery of
incriminating articles, identification of conspirators,
and the chain of events leading to the explosion.
According to the learned counsel for the State, the
High Court adopted an unduly hyper-technical
approach in evaluating this evidence and failed to
appreciate the cumulative effect of the circumstances
established by the prosecution, which, taken
together, pointed towards the involvement of the
acquitted accused in the conspiracy.
12.19. Learned senior counsel lastly submitted
that the trial Court had rightly recorded findings of
guilt upon a comprehensive appreciation of the entire
evidentiary record, including the testimony of
prosecution witnesses, recoveries effected and
discoveries made during investigation, forensic and
scientific evidence, as well as the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of
the offence. It was submitted that the High Court,
while acquitting Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused
No. 2-Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Baeg, failed to accord due weight to the overall
probative worth of the incriminating circumstances
established on record and clearly erred in upsetting
well-reasoned findings of conviction rendered by the
trial Court. According to the learned senior counsel,
such acquittal has resulted in a serious and manifest
miscarriage of justice, particularly in the context of a
large-scale terrorist attack of exceptional gravity that
led to the loss of numerous innocent civilian lives and
breached public order and threatened national
security. It was, therefore, prayed that the impugned
judgment of the High Court, insofar as it acquits the
aforesaid accused, be set aside as legally
unsustainable and that the convictions and
sentences recorded by the trial Court be restored in
the interests of justice.
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
12.20. Learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the State submitted that the conviction of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is fully justified and
firmly supported by overwhelming oral,
documentary, and circumstantial evidence available
on record. It was contended that he had initially been
granted pardon on the specific condition that he
would make a full, complete, and truthful disclosure
of all facts within his knowledge concerning the larger
criminal conspiracy, including the Samleti Bus bomb
blast and related incidents. In compliance with the
terms of the pardon, he made detailed confessional
statements in both the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast
case and the Samleti Bus bomb blast case, wherein
he disclosed the genesis of the conspiracy, identified
the various conspirators, described their respective
roles, and explained the manner in which explosives
and other incriminating materials were procured,
transported, and utilised. However, pursuant to
obtaining the benefit of pardon, he subsequently
resiled from his earlier statements, failed to adhere to
the conditions subject to which the pardon had been
granted, and deliberately withheld the truth behind
the larger conspiracy. Consequently, the protection
afforded to him under the pardon stood forfeited,
leading to his lawful prosecution and eventual
conviction.
12.21. Learned counsel submitted that the
offence punishable under Section 193 of IPC stood
fully and independently established the moment
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim chose to retract from
and materially contradict the confessional
statements voluntarily made by him earlier. It was
contended that the confessions had been duly proved
in accordance with law, formally exhibited before the
Court, and were found to be consistent on material
particulars, thereby lending assurance to their
reliability and evidentiary worth. The statements,
according to the prosecution, not only disclosed and
established the existence of the larger criminal
conspiracy but also provided a detailed and coherent
account of the procurement, transportation, storage,
and eventual use of explosives in furtherance of the
conspiracy. In these circumstances, it was argued
that the trial Court as well as the High Court were
fully justified in placing reliance upon the said
confessional statements, treating them as
substantive and corroborative evidence, and
consequently recording the conviction of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim on that basis.
12.22. It was further submitted that substantial
independent corroboration exists for the confessional
statements. The testimony of Bhoop Singh (PW-91)
not only corroborates the recovery of fuse wires,
detonators, and ammonium nitrate from one of the
conspirators, but also provides an important link
connecting the accused with the procurement and
possession of materials capable of being used in the
commission of the offence. The evidence of the FSL
expert further strengthens the prosecution case by
scientifically establishing that the recovered
materials were of the nature and composition
commonly used for the manufacture of explosive
substances, thereby confirming the incriminating
character of the recovery. Likewise, the evidence
relating to the transportation of explosives through
different transport companies stands duly
corroborated by the testimony of Phool Bahadur (PW-
9), Ashok Rajkapoor (PW-10), and Ramesh Chand
Tyagi (PW-13), whose depositions collectively verify
the movement, booking, and delivery of
consignments connected to the conspiracy. The
recovery of an identity card from the possession of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim bearing an address
in Anantnag, Kashmir, constitutes an additional
incriminating circumstance, corroborating the
prosecution case regarding his association with the
wider conspiracy, his connections with co-
conspirators operating from Kashmir, and the
movement and concealment of explosives as part of
the larger unlawful design.
evidence on record unequivocally demonstrates that
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was not merely
associated with, but was an active and knowing
participant in the criminal conspiracy that
culminated in a series of coordinated explosions at
multiple locations, including Rajasthan and Delhi. It
was contended that these acts were carried out
pursuant to a well-orchestrated plan and resulted in
extensive loss of human life, serious injuries to
numerous individuals, and widespread destruction of
public and private property, thereby posing a grave
threat to public order and national security. In view
of the cogent and reliable evidence establishing the
involvement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim in the
crime in question, learned senior counsel argued that
the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed
by the High Court are fully justified and supported by
the material on record. Consequently, it was
submitted that the conviction of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim for the offence of criminal conspiracy,
along with the allied offences arising therefrom,
suffers from no legal or factual infirmity warranting
interference.
12.24. Insofar as the judgment and order dated
29th September, 2020 granting permanent parole to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is concerned, learned
senior counsel submitted that the High Court
committed a serious error in extending such relief
while proceedings arising out of the conviction and
sentence were still pending consideration before this
Court, and without assigning due weight to the
exceptionally grave and sensitive nature of the
offences involved. It was contended that the High
Court failed to undertake a proper assessment of the
findings concurrently recorded by the Courts below
regarding Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim’s active
participation in a terrorist conspiracy and activities
prejudicial to national security, and further
overlooked the statutory limitations and eligibility
conditions prescribed under the Rajasthan Prisoners
Release on Parole Rules, 1958, which govern the
grant of parole in such cases. According to the
learned senior counsel for the State, the impugned
order suffers from a manifest error of law and an
improper exercise of judicial discretion, rendering the
grant of permanent parole legally untenable.
Consequently, it was urged that the judgment and
order dated 29th September, 2020 granting
permanent parole to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
is liable to be set aside and the parole granted
thereunder deserves to be rescinded.
VII. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES ARISING FOR DETERMINATION
13.We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at the Bar and have undertaken a meticulous examination of the impugned judgments together with the entirety of the material placed on record. Upon a comprehensive appraisal of the rival contentions and the evidence available on record, we proceed to analyse the issues arising for determination in the present matter.
14.At the outset, it may be noted that the present batch of appeals gives rise to distinct issues concerning different sets of accused persons, each resting on separate evidentiary tranches requiring independent consideration. In order to ensure a structured and coherent analysis of the voluminous record and the rival submissions advanced before us, we deem it appropriate to divide our discussion into three broad parts. The first part concerns the challenge to the conviction and sentence awarded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. The second part relates to the conviction and sentence awarded to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, as well as the ancillary issues arising therefrom. The third part pertains to the challenge mounted by the State of Rajasthan against the acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg. We shall accordingly examine the evidence, the findings recorded by the Courts below and the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties under each of the aforesaid heads in seriatim. A. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
15.Before examining the appeal of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed on merits, it is necessary to first address a foundational issue that strikes at the very root of the criminal proceedings, namely, whether the said accused was afforded a fair, just and constitutionally compliant trial. The challenge raised on his behalf is not confined merely to the appreciation of evidence or the correctness of the findings recorded by the Courts below, but extends to the legality of the very process through which his conviction came to be recorded. It is the specific case of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed that he remained effectively unrepresented throughout the trial and that no meaningful legal assistance was provided to him despite the grave nature of the charges and the possibility of capital punishment. Since this issue concerns the validity of the trial procedure itself, it necessarily warrants consideration at the threshold.
16.The determination of the aforesaid issue is of pivotal significance. If the trial is found to have been conducted in breach of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial, the very foundation of the conviction would stand vitiated. In that event, it would neither be necessary nor appropriate for this Court to undertake an examination of the evidentiary issues arising in the appeals preferred by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. Conversely, it is only upon being satisfied that the trial was conducted in conformity with the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing criminal prosecutions, or after determining the legal consequences flowing from any infraction thereof, that it would become necessary to examine the evidentiary issues relating to identification, confessional statements, forensic evidence and the other incriminating circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to first consider and determine whether the trial of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed satisfied the constitutional requirement of a fair trial before embarking upon an examination of the merits of the conviction recorded against him. Whether the trial culminating in the conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was conducted in a manner consistent with the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and the requirements of due process of law?
17.The issue of paramount importance which falls for our consideration is whether Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was afforded a fair and constitutionally compliant trial. The significance of this issue cannot be overstated, for the right to a fair trial lies at the heart of criminal jurisprudence and forms an inseparable component of the guarantee of life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The legitimacy of a conviction depends not merely upon the establishment of guilt but equally upon the fairness of the process through which such guilt is determined. The concern raised before us is not a minor procedural objection; rather, it strikes at the very foundation of the criminal justice process and the validity of the conviction and sentence imposed upon the accused. Where the allegation is that an accused facing charges of the gravest nature remained undefended throughout the trial, the Court is under a duty to closely scrutinize the record and satisfy itself that the constitutional guarantees available to the accused were not bypassed or reduced to a mere ritualistic or illusory compliance.
18.It is a settled principle that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial encompasses the right of an accused to be effectively represented by a counsel of his/her choice and, where necessary, to receive competent legal aid at the expense of the State. These safeguards are not mere formalities but essential protections intended to ensure that an accused is afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. If an accused is left undefended in proceedings carrying grave penal consequences, the fairness of the trial itself may stand seriously compromised. In such circumstances, the Court must satisfy itself that the safeguards guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India and criminal law were observed not only in form but also in substance. The question before us, therefore, goes to the very legitimacy of the procedure adopted by the trial Court and must be examined threadbare before proceeding to consider the appeal of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed on merits.
19.The denial of a fair and constitutionally compliant procedure to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, is clearly manifest from the proceedings before the High Court. It needs to be noted that the High Court, vide order dated 30th April, 2015, declined the initial D.B. Criminal Death Reference No. 1 of 2014 on the ground that the sentence of death had been imposed on the very same day on which the conviction was recorded and that, at the stage of hearing on sentence, no counsel representing Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was present before the trial Court. The High Court further found that no meaningful opportunity had been afforded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed to place on record mitigating circumstances relevant to the question of sentence. Recognising that such omissions struck at the heart of the sentencing process in a capital sentence case, the High Court remanded the matter to the trial Court for passing a fresh order on sentence after ensuring compliance with the requirements of a fair hearing.
20.Significantly, while remanding the matter, the High Court specifically directed that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed be provided legal representation either through legal aid or by the appointment of an amicus curiae. It was only pursuant to these directions that the trial Court appointed an amicus curiae to represent the said accused for the first time pursuant to his arraignment in the present case. Thereafter, upon conducting fresh proceedings on the question of sentence, the trial Court passed a fresh order dated 17th December, 2015, once again awarding the sentence of death to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The aforesaid circumstances assume considerable significance, for they demonstrate that even the High Court had found the original sentencing proceedings to be vitiated by the absence of legal representation and the denial of an effective opportunity to present mitigating circumstances, thereby lending substantial weight to the grievance raised by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed that the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing and a fair trial was not adequately observed by the trial Court during the entirety of trial.
21.Although the issue concerning the absence of legal representation was noticed by the High Court limited to the sentencing aspect, the broader contention now urged is that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed remained effectively unrepresented throughout the trial and that no assistance by way of legal aid was extended to him during the conduct of the trial proceedings. This contention came to be specifically raised before us during the course of hearing of the instant appeals. Learned counsel, Ms. Jaiswal fervently submitted that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed had faced the trial without the assistance of counsel and that the constitutional mandate of providing legal aid had not been complied with. Having regard to the gravamen of the plea and its direct implication on the fairness and validity of the trial, this Court deemed it appropriate to verify the factual position from Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed himself and so also from the record.
22.Consequently, by order dated 20th February, 2025, this Court directed that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, who was lodged in Central Jail, Jaipur, be connected through video conferencing. Pursuant thereto, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed appeared before us through video conferencing on 6th March, 2025. This Court considered it appropriate to interact with him in order to ascertain whether the grievance now sought to be raised had any factual basis and whether he had, at any stage, been represented by a counsel of his choice or through legal aid.
23.During the course of the interaction, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed unequivocally stated that no advocate had represented him during the trial proceedings. He further informed the Court that he had not engaged any private counsel and that no legal aid counsel was ever provided to him by the trial Court. His response was categorical and left little scope for ambiguity. The statement made by the accused assumes considerable significance, particularly in the context of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and the obligation of the Court to ensure effective legal representation to an accused facing criminal prosecution. The State counsel did not dispute that any counsel was ever appointed to represent Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed through the legal services authority, nor has any material been brought to our notice indicating that the trial Court undertook any exercise to ensure that the said accused was represented by an amicus curiae before proceeding with the trial.
24.Likewise, there is nothing on record to suggest that the consequences of facing a criminal trial without legal assistance were explained to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed or that he had consciously and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by counsel. In the absence of any such material, the assertion made by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed assumes greater importance and raises a serious concern as to whether the minimum safeguards of a fair criminal process were duly observed.
25.A careful examination of the record reveals that the proceedings against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed continued over an extended period and involved the examination of a large number of witnesses as well as the consideration of voluminous documentary and forensic evidence. The prosecution case was founded upon multiple complex circumstances, including identification evidence, alleged confessional statements, recoveries, and scientific material. These were not matters of a simple or straightforward nature. The complexity of the issues involved, coupled with the grave consequences flowing from the prosecution case, demanded competent and effective legal assistance to ensure that the accused was in a position to adequately understand, challenge, and respond to the evidence led against him. Yet, the record does not disclose that any meaningful legal assistance was ever made available to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed to enable him to effectively defend himself throughout the course of the trial.
26.A closer scrutiny of the trial record unequivocally fortifies this conclusion. The proceeding sheets of the trial Court do not reflect that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was represented by a legal counsel at any stage of the proceedings. Equally, the depositions of the prosecution witnesses demonstrate that the cross-examination of witnesses was undertaken by the accused himself. The record is bereft of any indication that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was either represented by a counsel of his choice or was ever provided the benefit of free legal aid, legal assistance, or the services of an amicus curiae. In a prosecution for offences carrying capital punishment and resting upon complex questions of fact and law, involving extensive oral, documentary, and scientific evidence, the absence of representation by an efficient and experienced legal practitioner assumes critical significance. The material on record thus affirms and fortify the defense argument that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was left to fend for himself and conduct the trial on his own in a case of exceptional seriousness and complexity, a circumstance that raises substantial concerns regarding the fairness of the trial and the effective protection of his fundamental right to a fair and meaningful defence.
27.The right of an accused to be defended by a legal practitioner is not an empty ritual or a mere procedural embellishment, rather, it is a substantive safeguard that lies at the heart of a fair criminal justice system and serves as an essential guarantee against the risk of prejudice, arbitrariness, and miscarriage of justice. Equally, the constitutional obligation of the Court does not stand discharged merely because an accused is physically present before it. The requirement is one of real and meaningful representation, ensuring that the accused is able to understand the proceedings, exercise available legal rights, and adequately present a defence. This obligation becomes particularly onerous where the accused is facing charges carrying severe punishments, including capital punishment. In such cases, the Court is expected to remain vigilant and proactive in safeguarding the rights of the accused, ensuring that the accused is not left to navigate the complexities of a criminal trial completely unaided.
28.This Court has, time and again, underscored the fundamental importance of providing effective legal assistance to an accused person and has consistently held that the denial thereof strikes at the very heart of a fair trial. In several cases, such denial has resulted in the proceedings being declared vitiated, leading either to the acquittal of the accused55 or, where the interest of justice so required, to a remand for a de-novo trial.56 In the present case, the statement made by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, before this Court, read in conjunction with the total absence of any material demonstrating either the appointment of legal aid counsel or the provision of meaningful legal assistance during the trial, raises a grave and unsettling concern regarding the fairness of the proceedings conducted against him. The issue is not one of mere procedural irregularity; it goes to the very legitimacy of the trial and the resultant conviction and sentence recorded by the Courts below, thereby casting a serious doubt on their constitutional validity and necessitating a close scrutiny by this Court of whether the trial satisfied the minimum requirements of fairness guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. 55 Suk Das v. UT of Arunachal Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 401. 56 Tyron Nazareth v. State of Goa, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 321.
29.The question as to the course to be adopted where a conviction is found to be constitutionally infirm on account of the denial of effective legal representation is no longer res integra. This Court has, on more than one occasion, considered the consequences of such a fundamental infraction of the guarantee of a fair trial and the nature of the relief that ought to follow. In particular, in Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)57, this Court exhaustively examined the interplay between the constitutional right to a fair trial, the power of the appellate Court to order a de-novo trial under Section 386(b) of CrPC, and the competing considerations that must govern the exercise of such power. While recognizing that the denial of legal representation strikes at the very root of a fair criminal process, this Court also emphasised that the relief to be granted must ultimately be fashioned in a manner that subserves the ends of justice. The relevant observations from the said judgment are reproduced “40. “Speedy trial” and “fair trial” to a person accused of a crime are integral part of Article 21. There is, however, qualitative difference between the right to speedy trial and the accused's right of fair trial. Unlike the accused’s right of fair trial, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused in defending himself. The right to speedy trial is in its very nature relative. It depends upon diverse circumstances. Each case of delay in conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen in the facts and circumstances of such case. Mere lapse of several years since the commencement of prosecution by itself may not justify the discontinuance of prosecution or dismissal of indictment. The factors concerning the accused's right to speedy trial have to be weighed vis-à-vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence of the people in judicial system. Speedy trial secures rights to an accused but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. The nature and gravity of crime, persons involved, social impact and societal needs must be weighed along with the right of the accused to speedy trial and if the balance tilts in favour of the former the long delay in conclusion of criminal trial should not operate against the continuation of prosecution and if the right of the accused in the facts and circumstances of the case and exigencies of situation tilts the balance in his favour, the prosecution may be brought to an end. These principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the question whether or not retrial of an accused should be ordered. 41. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when in the opinion of the appellate court such course becomes indispensable to avert failure of justice. Surely this power cannot be used to allow the prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up the lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is continuation of the same trial and same prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial must always be demand of justice. Obviously, the exercise of power of retrial under Section 386(b) of the Code, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no straitjacket formula can be formulated but the appeal court must closely keep in view that while protecting the right of an accused to fair trial and due process, the people who seek protection of law do not lose hope in legal system and the interests of the society are not altogether overlooked. 42. Insofar as the present case is concerned, it has been concurrently held by the two Judges [Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 2 SCC 584 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 919] who heard the criminal appeal that the appellant was denied due process of law and the trial held against him was contrary to the procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Code since he was denied right of representation by counsel in the trial. The Judges differed on the course to be followed after holding that the trial against the appellant was flawed. 43. We have to consider now, whether the matter requires to be remanded for a de novo trial in the facts and the circumstances of the present case. The incident is of 1997. It occurred in a public transport bus when that bus was carrying passengers and stopped at a bus-stand. The moment the bus stopped an explosion took place inside the bus that ultimately resulted in death of four persons and injury to twenty-four persons. The nature of the incident and the circumstances in which it occurred speak volume about the very grave nature of offence. As a matter of fact, the appellant has been charged for the offences under Sections 302/307 IPC and Section 3 and, in the alternative, Section 4(b) of the ES Act. It is true that the appellant has been in jail since 9-3-1998 and it is more than 14 years since he was arrested and he has passed through mental agony of death sentence and the retrial at this distance of time shall prolong the culmination of the criminal case but the question is whether these factors are sufficient for the appellant's acquittal and dismissal of indictment. We think not. 44. It cannot be ignored that the offences with which the appellant has been charged are of very serious nature and if the prosecution succeeds and the appellant is convicted under Section 302 IPC on retrial, the sentence could be death or life imprisonment. Section 302 IPC authorises the court to punish the offender of murder with death or life imprisonment. Gravity of the offences and the criminality with which the appellant is charged are important factors that need to be kept in mind, though it is a fact that in the first instance the accused has been denied due process. While having due consideration to the appellant's right, the nature of the offence and its gravity, the impact of crime on the society, more particularly the crime that has shaken the public and resulted in death of four persons in a public transport bus cannot be ignored and overlooked. It is desirable that punishment should follow offence as closely as possible. In an extremely serious criminal case of the exceptional nature like the present one, it would occasion in failure of justice if the prosecution is not taken to the logical conclusion. Justice is supreme. The retrial of the appellant, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances, is indispensable. It is imperative that justice is secured after providing the appellant with the legal practitioner if he does not engage a lawyer of his choice.”
30.The aforesaid decision unequivocally lays down that the denial of legal representation does not invariably result in the acquittal of the accused. The appellate Court is required to balance the accused’s constitutional entitlement to a fair trial with the nature and gravity of the offence, its impact on society and the larger interests of justice. It was accordingly held that, although a de-novo trial is an exceptional course to be adopted only where the interests of justice so demand, it becomes indispensable where the constitutional infirmity is so fundamental that the conviction cannot be sustained, while, at the same time, the interests of justice require that the prosecution be carried to its logical conclusion through a trial conducted strictly in accordance with law.
31.More recently, in Naveen v. State of M.P.58, this Court reiterated the content and scope of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. It was emphasised that the concept of a fair trial cannot be confined to a rigid or technical formulation but must be understood as requiring a real, meaningful and impartial opportunity to defend. This Court further observed that fairness in a criminal trial protects not only the rights of the accused but also the interests of the victim and society, and that a trial which is reduced to a mere formality or a stage-managed exercise cannot command the confidence of the justice delivery system. The relevant observations from the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-“20. It was further observed that there can be no analytical, all-comprehensive or exhaustive definition of the concept of a fair trial, and it may have to be determined in seemingly infinite variety of actual situations with the ultimate object in mind viz. whether something that was done or said either before or at the trial deprived the quality of fairness to a degree where a miscarriage of justice has resulted. Each one has an inbuilt right to be dealt with fairly in a criminal trial. Denial of a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused as is to the victim and the society. Fair trial obviously would mean a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor, and the atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which bias or prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause which is being tried is eliminated. It is inherent in the concept of due process of law, that condemnation should be rendered only after the trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a mere farce and pretence. Since fair hearing requires an opportunity to preserve the process, it may be vitiated and violated by an overhasty, stage-managed, tailored and partisan trial. It is thus settled that a hasty trial in which proper and sufficient opportunity has not been provided to the accused to defend himself/herself would vitiate the trial as being meaningless and stagemanaged. It is in violation of the principle of judicial calm. 21. The principle of “judicial calm” in the context of a fair trial needs to be elaborated for its observance in letter and spirit. In our view, in the hallowed halls of justice, the essence of a fair and impartial trial lies in the steadfast embrace of judicial calm. It is incumbent upon a Judge to exude an aura of tranquillity, offering a sanctuary of reason and measured deliberation. In the halls of justice, the gavel strikes not in haste, but in a deliberate cadence ensuring every voice, every piece of evidence, is accorded its due weight. The expanse of judicial calm serves not only as a pillar of constitutional integrity, but as the very bedrock upon which trust in a legal system is forged. It is a beacon that illuminates the path towards a verdict untainted by haste or prejudice, thus upholding the sanctity of justice for all.”
32.The principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions furnish the governing framework for determining the appropriate relief in the present case. It is in the backdrop of these settled principles that we must examine which of the available courses would best uphold the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial while ensuring that the administration of criminal justice is neither rendered ineffective nor divorced from the demands of justice. In undertaking this exercise, the Court is required to strike a careful balance between the constitutional imperative of protecting the rights of the accused and the equally compelling societal interest in ensuring that allegations of a crime of such exceptional gravity are adjudicated in accordance with law. The remedy to be fashioned must, therefore, not only redress the constitutional infirmity that has vitiated the proceedings but also ensure that the administration of criminal justice is not brought into disrepute by either permitting a constitutionally flawed conviction to stand or terminating the prosecution where the interests of justice warrant a fresh adjudication. It is this delicate balance that must inform the choice of the appropriate course in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.
33.Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find that broadly, three alternatives present themselves. The first would be to set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit the accused outright, having regard to the serious prejudice occasioned by the denial of legal representation and the fact that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed has remained incarcerated for nearly twenty-nine years with the sword of death penalty hanging over his head for nearly twelve years. The second would be to set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter to the trial Court for a de-novo trial after ensuring effective legal representation, thereby affording the accused a real and meaningful opportunity to defend himself by testing the prosecution evidence on the anvil of effective crossexamination and presenting his defence in accordance with law. The third would be to undertake an independent reappreciation of the evidence already on record to determine whether, notwithstanding the absence of legal representation and the lack of effective cross-examination of the witnesses, the conviction can still be sustained on the basis of the evidence on record, including the limited cross-examination conducted by the accused himself.
34.In our considered opinion, the third course has to be excluded at the outset. If, upon such reappreciation, this Court were to affirm the conviction, the probable consequence would be the confirmation of the sentence of death notwithstanding the fact that the trial itself stood vitiated by the denial of effective legal representation. The constitutional infirmity which has been found to exist does not relate merely to the appreciation of evidence but goes to the very fairness of the process by which the evidence came to be recorded. To sustain the conviction on the basis of a record created in the absence of effective legal assistance would render illusory the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and amount to perpetuating, rather than remedying, the fundamental defect which has crept into the proceedings. Such a course would be inconsistent with the constitutional obligation cast upon the Courts to ensure that a conviction, particularly one carrying the sentence of death, rests upon a trial conducted in strict conformity with the guarantees of due process and fairness.
35.Equally, we are not persuaded that the first course of acquitting the accused solely on the ground of denial of legal representation would be appropriate in the stark facts of the present case, particularly having regard to the gravity and heinousness of the crime. The denial of a fair trial undoubtedly constitutes a grave constitutional violation; however, the consequence thereof cannot invariably be an order of acquittal irrespective of the nature and gravity of the offence alleged. The allegations in the present case concern a meticulously planned bomb explosion in a public transport bus resulting in the death of fourteen innocent persons, injuries to thirtyseven others, and the complete destruction of public property. The offence alleged is not merely one against individual victims but one which strikes at public order and the sense of security of society at large. In these circumstances, to terminate the prosecution without permitting the charges to be tested in a constitutionally compliant trial would neither advance the cause of justice nor appropriately balance the competing interests involved.
36.The only course, therefore, which adequately balances the fundamental rights of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed with the legitimate societal interest in ensuring that serious criminal allegations are adjudicated in accordance with law, would be to set aside the impugned judgment and remit the matter to the trial Court for a de-novo trial. Such a course alone remedies the constitutional defect, restores procedural fairness, and at the same time preserves the opportunity to the prosecution to establish its case through a trial conducted in conformity with the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing criminal proceedings.
37.We are not oblivious to the practical difficulties that such a course may entail. Nearly three decades have elapsed since the occurrence in question, and the possibility that some witnesses may have passed away; suffered fading memories; or may no longer be available to depose cannot be ruled out. These are, however, consequences that inevitably accompany the delay in the criminal process and cannot, by themselves, justify the affirmation of a conviction recorded in proceedings found to be constitutionally non-compliant, more so when the fundamental procedural defect was writ large on the face of the record and was raised by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed before the High Court. Otherwise also, the obligation to ensure that the accused is provided appropriate legal aid is upon the Court and the accused cannot be faulted for the Court’s failure to discharge its constitutional obligation of ensuring a fair trial. The constitutional guarantee of a fair trial is absolutely non-negotiable and cannot be sacrificed at the altar of practical convenience. The administration of criminal justice is founded not merely upon the objective of securing convictions but equally upon the assurance that every conviction is preceded by a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. Consequently, notwithstanding the practical impediments that may confront the prosecution or the defence, the constitutional imperative of ensuring a fair trial must prevail.
38.We may also clarify and emphasize that the present conclusion is confined exclusively to the case of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. The direction for a de-novo trial is founded entirely upon the peculiar facts obtaining in his case, particularly the denial of effective legal representation throughout the trial proceedings, and should not be construed as reflecting upon the validity of the proceedings against the remaining accused.
39.Having carefully examined the record in minute detail, we are duly satisfied that the de-novo trial to be conducted qua Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed would have no bearing on the fate of the remaining appeals, which, though arising from the same case but are founded on distinct factual and evidentiary foundations and can be adjudged separately. The remaining accused, including those acquitted by the High Court and Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, were represented by counsel throughout the trial and no comparable challenge affecting the fairness or constitutional validity of their trial has been raised before us. Their appeals, therefore, fall to be considered independently on the basis of the evidence and legal issues peculiar to each of them. We, accordingly, proceed to examine the merits of those appeals in the succeeding part of this judgment. B. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and the Ancillary Issues Arising Therefrom
40.We shall now consider the challenge laid by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7th March, 2017 passed by the trial Court which came to be affirmed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 22nd July, 2019. The record reveals that the prosecution case against the said accused stands on an entirely different footing from that of the other accused persons including Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. A careful scrutiny of the material placed on record indicates that the nature, quality and extent of evidence relied upon by the prosecution against this accused are markedly distinct from those relied upon against the other accused persons. Unlike the case of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, where the prosecution sought to rely upon certain eyewitness accounts, identification evidence and surrounding circumstances, the case against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim rests substantially, if not exclusively, upon the confessional statements attributed to him during the course of investigation. The evidentiary foundation of the prosecution case against him is, therefore, required to be examined independently and with particular care, especially having regard to the settled legal principles governing the admissibility, voluntariness and probative value of confessional statements. It is in this backdrop that the correctness of the findings recorded by the Courts below insofar as they pertain to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim falls for consideration.
41.The first confessional statement attributed to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was recorded under Section 164 of CrPC on 9th September, 1997 in connection with the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case. Subsequently, more than five years later, another confessional statement came to be recorded on 21st October, 2002 in the present case arising out of the Samleti Bus bomb blast. The prosecution sought to place considerable reliance upon these statements as a crucial part of its evidentiary framework, to establish not only the involvement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, in the commission of the alleged offences, but also the participation of several coaccused persons in the alleged conspiracy. According to the prosecution, these confessional statements furnished important details regarding the planning, execution, and inter se roles of the accused persons, and were therefore relied upon to connect the various accused persons with the larger conspiracy alleged in the case.
42.However, the record discloses that the legality and evidentiary value of these statements became the subject matter of serious dispute. Upon an objection raised by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed regarding the manner in which the statement had been recorded, the trial Court, by order dated 30th November, 2010, directed that the statement be recorded afresh. The said direction itself reflected the Court’s concern that the earlier recording may not have satisfactorily met the procedural requirements necessary to ensure the reliability and admissibility of the statement. Pursuant thereto, a fresh statement was recorded on 4th January, 2011. Even thereafter, doubts persisted regarding compliance with the directions issued by the trial Court. Consequently, the statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was again recorded before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dausa on 19th February, 2011. Significantly, on that occasion, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim categorically disowned the earlier confessional statements attributed to him. He expressly repudiated the prosecution’s version regarding the circumstances in which those statements were allegedly made and questioned their authenticity. He denied having acted as an approver in any case and asserted that no statement had ever been voluntarily made by him before a Magistrate in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
43.The trial Court, while deciding the main case on 29th September, 2014, recorded a finding that Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had failed to satisfy the conditions governing tender of pardon under Section 306 of CrPC. Consequently, a separate trial was directed and a supplementary chargesheet came to be filed against him. The trial Court thereafter framed charges against him for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B, Section 307 read with Section 120-B and Section 193 of IPC, Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. Ultimately, vide judgment dated 7th March, 2017, he was convicted for various offences under the IPC, the Explosive Substances Act and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act and was sentenced, inter alia, to imprisonment for life for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 120-B of IPC, along with the other substantive sentences awarded thereunder. The High Court vide judgment dated 22nd July, 2019 affirmed the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence and dismissed the appeal preferred by him.
44.Having carefully examined the entire material on record, we are unable to persuade ourselves to concur with the approach adopted by the Courts below. In our considered opinion, the confessional statements attributed to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim are attended by serious legal as well as factual infirmities/lacuna which substantially erode their evidentiary value and render it unsafe to place reliance upon them. The record discloses that the said accused was subjected to repeated exercises for recording his confessional statements over a protracted period, commencing with the first statement recorded under Section 164 of CrPC in connection with the Jaipur Stadium Bomb Blast case, followed by the confessional statement recorded in the present case on 21st October, 2002, and thereafter by successive attempts to re-record the confession pursuant to judicial directions. Such an unusual and protracted course of recording confessional statements is wholly inconsistent with the safeguards ordinarily governing the recording of voluntary confessions and, by itself, raises serious doubts regarding their voluntariness, authenticity and evidentiary reliability.
45.More importantly, the voluntariness of the said statements stands seriously disputed. The maker of the confession, namely, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, when produced before the trial Court for recording of evidence as PW-95, i.e., as an approver in the main case, categorically disowned the statements attributed to him. He expressly denied having acted as an approver and asserted that no statement had been voluntarily made by him in the manner projected by the prosecution. The significance of this circumstance cannot be understated. A confession derives its evidentiary value primarily from its voluntary character. Once the maker himself challenges the circumstances under which the statement came to be recorded and repudiates its contents, the Court is duty-bound to approach such material with the utmost caution and circumspection.
46.Despite these glaring infirmities, both the trial Court and the High Court proceeded to place substantial reliance and implicit faith upon the alleged confessional statements for recording a finding of guilt. In our view, considered in light of the attending circumstances, such an approach was legally and factually impermissible. A retracted confession, particularly one whose voluntariness is seriously questioned and whose authenticity is rendered doubtful by repeated recording and subsequent repudiation, cannot constitute the foundation of a conviction unless it receives strong and independent corroboration from reliable evidence. The law is equally well-settled that such corroboration must be of a substantive character and must connect the accused with the commission of the offence in material particulars.
47.The doubts surrounding the voluntariness and reliability of the alleged confessional statements become even more pronounced upon an examination of the original confessional statement dated 9th September, 1997, recorded in connection with the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case. A careful perusal of the original confessional statement dated 9th September, 1997, recorded in connection with the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case, reveals certain features which cast serious doubt on the manner in which the mandatory safeguards prescribed under Section 164 of CrPC were observed. In particular, we find that the manner in which the statutory warning contemplated under Section 164(2) of CrPC has been recorded is not entirely free from doubt. A close scrutiny of the original document reveals that the endorsement containing the statutory warning clearly appears to have been inserted subsequently in the limited space available at the commencement of the document and, prima facie, appears to be in handwriting different from that employed in the main body of the confession. The placement and appearance of the endorsement are such that they give rise to a legitimate doubt whether the statutory warning was, in fact, administered in the manner and at the stage contemplated by Section 164(2) of CrPC, namely, before the recording of the confession commenced. This circumstance assumes considerable significance, for the statutory warning constitutes an essential safeguard intended to ensure that the confession is made voluntarily and with full awareness of its legal consequences.
48.We hasten to add that we do not propose to record any finding on this aspect, effecting the legality and validity of the said confession recorded in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case, since the said issue does not directly fall for determination before us. Nonetheless, the aforesaid circumstances cannot be regarded as wholly insignificant. They do give rise to a legitimate doubt as to whether the procedural safeguards intended to secure the voluntariness and authenticity of the confession were observed in their true letter and spirit. It is trite that where a confession is relied upon as a substantive incriminating circumstance, the Court must be satisfied that every statutory safeguard has been scrupulously observed. Any circumstance casting doubt upon such compliance necessarily diminishes the degree of assurance that may otherwise be derived from the statement and warrants a correspondingly cautious approach while assessing its evidentiary worth.
49.Tested on the aforesaid principles, the prosecution case against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is found to be woefully wanting and lacking in merit. Apart from the confessional statements, which themselves suffer from serious infirmities highlighted supra, the prosecution has failed to place any independent and reliable material on record capable of lending substantive corroboration thereto. As a matter of fact, once the confessional statements are eschewed from consideration, there is no independent evidence establishing the participation of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim in the alleged conspiracy, his involvement in the preparation or execution of the offence, or his connection with the explosive device allegedly used in the occurrence. No witness has deposed to having seen him participate in any conspiratorial meeting, procure or transport any explosive substance, provide logistical support for the commission of the offence, or otherwise perform any overt act indicative of his involvement in the alleged criminal design. Equally, there is no documentary, scientific or forensic material on record which could lend assurance to the prosecution’s theory regarding his role in the occurrence. The investigating officials have not stated about the collection of any incriminating evidence against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim during investigation except of course for the confessional statements.
50.In these circumstances, once the confessional statements are excluded from consideration, or even treated with the degree of caution required in law, the entire edifice of the prosecution case erected upon such foundation consequentially collapses. Needless to state that conviction of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim cannot be sustained solely on the basis of his own confessional statements whose voluntariness and authenticity remain shrouded in serious doubt. More importantly, the prosecution has failed to adduce any independent evidence capable of lending assurance to the truthfulness of the alleged confessions or connecting Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim with the alleged conspiracy in a manner known to law. We are therefore of the considered view that the alleged confessional statements attributed to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim do not possess the degree of reliability necessary for sustaining a conviction in a criminal trial.
51.The weakness of the prosecution case is further compounded by the complete absence of any incriminating recovery or discovery attributable to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. We may note that the entire record and evidence led by the prosecution do not refer to any recovery or discovery of an incriminating fact having been effected at his instance during the course of the investigation. Neither any explosive substance, weapon, incriminating document nor any other material object was recovered from his possession or pursuant to any disclosure statement attributed to him. The prosecution has also been unable to point out any physical, forensic or documentary evidence connecting him with the procurement, storage, transportation or deployment of the explosive substance allegedly used in the commission of the offence. Indeed, the evidence of the investigating officers themselves indicates that no material recovery linking the Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim to the alleged conspiracy was ever effected.
52.It is also pertinent to note that one of the persons whom the prosecution had sought to implicate on the basis of the very same confessional statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, namely, Accused No. 11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal, from whom the explosive material was allegedly procured and from whose premises explosive substances were purportedly recovered, stood discharged from the present proceedings much earlier. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, by order dated 9th November, 2013, allowed the petition preferred by the said accused and quashed the proceedings insofar as they related to him. In compliance with the said order, the trial Court, by order dated 9th January, 2014, dropped the proceedings against Accused No. 11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal. Consequently, the prosecution case, insofar as it concerned Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, thereafter proceeded in the absence of one of the principal persons whose alleged involvement had also formed part of the narrative emerging from the confessional statements relied upon by the prosecution.
53.The aforesaid circumstances assume considerable significance in the facts of the present case. The allegation against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is that he was an active participant in a largescale terrorist conspiracy involving the movement and use of explosive substances. In such a case, the recovery of incriminating articles or the discovery of material objects pursuant to information supplied by the said accused would ordinarily furnish important corroborative support to the prosecution version. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, including the investigating officers themselves, does not establish any recovery or discovery linking Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim to the alleged conspiracy. The complete absence of any such circumstance, when viewed alongside the doubtful and unreliable confessional statements discussed hereinabove, leaves the prosecution case devoid of any dependable evidentiary foundation. This constitutes a serious lacuna which substantially undermines the allegation of his involvement in the offence.
54.The evidentiary material brought on record against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, when viewed in its entirety, remains fragmented, inconclusive and incapable of establishing his guilt to the standard required in a criminal trial. The prosecution case rests substantially upon confessional statements whose voluntariness, authenticity and reliability stand seriously impaired and completely compromised, while the independent evidence necessary to lend assurance thereto is conspicuously absent. No coherent chain of circumstances emerges from the record connecting the said accused with the commission of the offence in a manner known to law. Such material falls far short of the degree of certainty required, particularly in a case resting substantially on circumstantial evidence, and cannot form the basis of conviction. To sustain a conviction on such tenuous and uncertain circumstances would be contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, which require proof beyond reasonable doubt and not mere suspicion, however strong it may appear to be.
55.Thus, when the evidence on record is evaluated in its entirety, what emerges is a case devoid of any reliable recovery or discovery, bereft of direct evidence, unsupported by a complete chain of circumstances, and founded principally upon confessional statements whose voluntariness and reliability stand seriously impeached. The prosecution has therefore failed to establish the guilt of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim beyond reasonable doubt. In our considered view, the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are unsustainable in facts as well as in law, being founded substantially upon conjectures and inferences rather than legally admissible and reliable evidence. Consequently, the benefit of doubt must necessarily enure to the accused and hence, the conviction and sentence recorded against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim cannot be sustained and deserve to be set aside.
56.Resultantly, Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019 preferred by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7th March, 2017 passed by the trial Court as well as the judgment and order dated 22nd July, 2019 passed by the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence awarded to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim are hereby set aside. The conviction of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and the sentences awarded to him by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are also set aside.
57.Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. The said accused shall be released forthwith, if in custody, unless required to be detained in connection with any other case.
58.In view of our conclusion acquitting Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim of all the charges levelled against him in the present case, the challenge laid by the State of Rajasthan to the judgment and order dated 29th September, 2020 passed by the High Court granting permanent parole to the said accused no longer survives for consideration. Consequently, Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3531 of 2021 has been rendered infructuous and is accordingly dismissed as such. C. Challenge to the Acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg
59.Having dealt with the appeals preferred by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, we shall now examine the challenge laid by the State of Rajasthan to the acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla, Mohammad Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood Keeley, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg. The question that falls for our consideration is whether the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the aforesaid accused persons can be said to be a reasonably possible view on the basis of evidence brought on record.
60.The entire fulcrum of the prosecution case against the aforesaid accused persons except Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg is the confessional statement of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan recorded under Section 164 of CrPC in connection with Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case [Exhibit P-153]. A careful reading of the said statement reveals that it primarily narrates the movements of certain individuals including Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt and Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain between Kathmandu, Delhi, Patna, Mumbai and Ahmedabad and refers to the alleged transportation of a bag said to contain explosive material. It further contains references to certain persons allegedly associated with Bilal Ahmed Baeg and other operatives. The broad tenor of the statement indicates, at best, an attempt to describe the movements and interactions of various individuals allegedly connected with numerous extremist activities under scanner of investigating agencies and being investigated at the relevant point of time. However, beyond such generic narrative references, it does not attribute any specific role, overt act or participation to the aforesaid accused persons in relation to the occurrence forming the subject matter of the present proceedings, i.e., the Samleti Bus bomb blast.
61.The statement is conspicuously silent regarding the Samleti Bus bomb blast. Neither does it contain any admission or disclosure therein concerning the planning, execution or facilitation of the occurrence in question nor does the statement disclose any role attributable to Accused No. 1-Javed Khan in the commission of the present offence. At its highest, the statement refers to events allegedly connected with the transportation of explosive substances and activities which formed the subject matter of other nefarious criminal activities. There is no reference whatsoever to the placement of any explosive device in the Rajasthan Roadways bus, to any meeting or discussion concerning the Samleti incident, or to any act suggestive of participation in the conspiracy alleged in the present case. Even if the entirety of the statement is accepted at face value, it merely discloses certain alleged antecedent events and movements of individuals at different locations, without establishing any discernible link with the bus explosion that occurred near Samleti village on 22nd May, 1996. The statement, therefore, does not furnish any substantive or tangible material connecting either Accused No. 1-Javed Khan or the co-accused persons referred to therein with the present crime.
62.Insofar as Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt and Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain are concerned, their implication also rests almost entirely upon certain references contained in the confessional statement of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan. As has been discussed above, a plain reading of the said statement reveals that these accused persons are referred to only in the context of their alleged presence at certain places or their movements alongside other individuals at different points of time. Significantly, there is no allegation therein that any of them participated in the conspiracy or planning of the Samleti Bus bomb blast, procured or transported the explosive device or substances used in the occurrence, facilitated its placement in the bus, or otherwise contributed to the execution of the crime. At the highest, the statement indicates acquaintance or association amongst certain individuals during the general corresponding period. Such instances, even if accepted in their entirety, are wholly insufficient to establish criminal culpability for the present offence. Mere association, companionship or travel with other accused persons cannot, by itself, establish participation in a criminal conspiracy and that too for a specific offence. In the absence of any independent evidence demonstrating a meeting of minds, an overt act, or any circumstance connecting these accused persons with the planning or execution of the Samleti Bus bomb blast, the generic references contained in the confessional statement of the co-accused would be wholly inadequate to sustain a conviction.
63.We also find that nothing material emanates from the alleged disclosure statements attributed to Accused No. 1-Javed Khan and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg. Though the prosecution has contended that certain places, including a Masjid and premises allegedly used by one Salaar, were identified pursuant to disclosures made by the aforesaid accused persons, such circumstances do not materially advance the prosecution case. The identification of a place, by itself, does not constitute incriminating evidence unless it leads to the discovery of a relevant fact previously unknown to the investigating agency and having a direct nexus with the crime under investigation. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to demonstrate that any recovery of incriminating fact or material, explosive substance, document, weapon, or other article connected with the Samleti Bus bomb blast was effected as a consequence of such disclosures.
64.At this stage, it would be apposite to notice the settled principles governing the evidentiary value of disclosure statements and the memoranda prepared pursuant thereto. The contents of a panchnama or memorandum do not constitute substantive evidence. As held by this Court in Murli & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan59, it is the testimony of the witness in the witness box, and not the recitals contained in such documents, that constitutes substantive evidence. The memorandum merely records what the investigating officer claims to have observed and cannot, by itself, prove either the disclosure allegedly made by the accused or the discovery said to have followed. The evidentiary value of such memoranda, therefore, is necessarily circumscribed and depends upon satisfactory oral evidence proving the precise information allegedly furnished by the accused and the discovery said to have ensued therefrom.
65.The principles governing the admissibility of information under Section 27 of IEA are equally well settled. In Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor60, it was authoritatively held that only that portion of the information furnished by an accused which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered is admissible in evidence. The discovery contemplated by Section 27 of IEA is not the mere pointing out of a place already within the knowledge of the investigating agency or the production of an object without any incriminating nexus, but the discovery of a relevant fact previously unknown, brought to light as a direct consequence of the information supplied by the accused. Unless the information furnished by the accused results in the discovery of a relevant fact previously not known and connected with the offence under investigation, the statutory exception carved out under Section 27 of IEA would not be attracted. Mere statements 60 Supra note 45. expressing willingness to identify places or locations, without resulting in the discovery of a relevant fact, do not satisfy the statutory requirements.
66.Examined in the light of the aforesaid settled principles, the disclosure statements attributed to Accused No. 1-Javed Khan and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg do not advance the prosecution case. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the memoranda and the consequential site verification proceedings, but has failed to establish, through cogent oral evidence, the precise information allegedly furnished by the accused which led to the discovery of any relevant fact. Nor has it been shown that the alleged disclosures resulted in the recovery of any incriminating article, document, explosive substance or other fact having a direct nexus with the Samleti Bus bomb blast. The alleged pointing out of certain places, by itself, does not constitute a discovery of an incriminating fact within the meaning of Section 27 of IEA. The memoranda and the consequential site verification proceedings do not satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 27 of IEA and are incapable of constituting an incriminating circumstance against the said accused persons.
67.Consequently, the alleged disclosures, the memoranda prepared pursuant thereto, and the site verification proceedings undertaken on their basis do not constitute incriminating circumstances capable of connecting Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg, or any of the co-accused with the commission of the present offence. The evidentiary value sought to be attached to such material is, therefore, extremely limited and incapable of advancing the prosecution case. Viewed in their entirety, these circumstances neither furnish a legally admissible link in the chain of prosecution evidence nor provide any meaningful corroboration to the allegations levelled against the accused persons. The said material, therefore, is of no assistance in dislodging the view taken by the High Court while acquitting the aforesaid accused persons.
68.Turning now to the case of Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg, we find that the prosecution primarily relies upon the confessional statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim as the principal circumstance sought to connect the said accused with the alleged conspiracy and the commission of the offence. However, we are of the considered opinion that the said confessional statements suffer from serious infirmities and do not inspire confidence. We are also of the opinion that the circumstances surrounding the recording of those statements render them unsafe to be acted upon. We have already concluded so while dealing with the appeal of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. Once the very foundation of that evidence stands discredited, the superstructure sought to be erected upon it must necessarily collapse. In such circumstances, no reliance can be placed upon the confessional statements for implicating another accused. Unquestionably, evidence in the form of confession of one accused which is itself found to be unreliable and unworthy of acceptance cannot be employed, either directly or indirectly, to establish the complicity of a co-accused. The prosecution has not pointed to any other independent or convincing material capable of lending assurance to the allegations against Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg. Consequently, the confessional statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim cannot furnish a legally sustainable basis for recording any finding adverse to Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg.
69.Even otherwise, a careful examination of the confessional statement attributed to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim does not disclose any specific role played by Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg in the Samleti Bus bomb blast. It is also relevant to note that once the status of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim as an approver stood withdrawn as he resiled from the confession recorded after the grant of pardon, his statement could, at best, assume the character of a confession of a co-accused. Such a confession is not substantive evidence and can only be used to lend assurance to a conclusion otherwise reached on the basis of independent and legally admissible substantive evidence.61 In the present case, however, the confessional statement is conspicuously silent as regards participation, specific act, or involvement of Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg in the execution of the Samleti Bus bomb blast. In the absence of any other proven circumstance connecting him with the offence, the statement furnishes no material capable 61 Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275 and Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337. of lending assurance to the prosecution case against the said accused.
70.The prosecution has not produced any independent evidence connecting him with the occurrence. His alleged involvement in other terrorist activity related cases cannot constitute proof of participation in the present offence. Criminal liability must be established on the basis of evidence relating to the offence under consideration and cannot be founded upon suspicions arising from other proceedings that are neither directly connected with nor cognate to the offence in question. In the absence of legally admissible direct evidence implicating him in material particulars, coupled with the lack of independent corroborative evidence, no incriminating circumstance can be said to have been established against Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg.
71.The principles governing interference with a judgment of acquittal are too well settled to require elaborate discussion. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor62, the Privy Council observed that while an appellate Court possesses full power to review the 62 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42. evidence, it must always bear in mind the presumption of innocence available to the accused and the reluctance ordinarily exercised in disturbing an acquittal. The same principles have consistently been reiterated by this Court in a long line of decisions.
72.The law accords a position of considerable sanctity to a finding of acquittal, and for good reason. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat63, this Court held that before interfering with an acquittal, the appellate Court must first conclude that the findings recorded by the Courts below are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. Unless such infirmities are shown to exist, the acquittal ought not to be disturbed. Mere possibility of a different view is insufficient. This principle was subsequently elaborated in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka64, wherein this Court explained that an accused who has secured an acquittal enjoys a double presumption in his favour. Firstly, the ordinary presumption of innocence available under criminal jurisprudence; and secondly, the reinforced presumption arising from the acquittal itself. This Court further held that where two reasonable views are possible on the evidence, the view favourable to the accused must prevail. Relevant extract from the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: -“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
73.Tested on the aforesaid principles, we find no justification to interfere with the acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg as recorded by the High Court. Far from dislodging the reinforced presumption of innocence operating in favour of the acquitted accused, the prosecution has failed to produce any cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence connecting them with the charged offence, i.e., the Samleti Bus bomb blast. The deficiencies in the prosecution case are not merely peripheral in nature but strike at the very foundation of the charges sought to be established against the accused persons. The chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution remains incomplete and falls woefully short of the standard required to record a finding of guilt in a criminal trial.
74.The prosecution has failed to point out any material circumstance or credible ground demonstrating that the appreciation of evidence by the High Court is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or otherwise warranting interference with the order of acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. On the contrary, upon an independent examination of the evidence on record, we find that the view taken by the High Court is reasonable, plausible and rather, the only permissible view based on the material available on record. Accordingly, we find no justification to disturb the acquittal of the aforesaid accused persons.
75.Resultantly, the Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 621 of 2020, 571 of 2020, 681 of 2020 and 143 of 2020 preferred by the State of Rajasthan challenging the acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood Keeley, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg fail and are accordingly dismissed. D. Conclusion
76.Having given our thoughtful consideration to the issues arising in the present batch of appeals and having recorded our conclusions thereon, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the present batch of appeals by issuing the following directions and consequential orders in the succeeding paragraphs.
77.Criminal Appeal Nos. 1827-1829 of 2019 preferred by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed are partly allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 29th September, 2014 and order of sentence dated 17th December, 2015 passed by the trial Court as well as the common judgment dated 22nd July, 2019 passed by the High Court to the extent that it upheld the conviction and sentences awarded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed are hereby set aside. The conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and the sentences awarded to him by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are also set aside. While setting aside the conviction and Hameed, we direct as under: -A. The matter is remitted to the Court of Sessions for conducting a de-novo trial against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. B. Having regard to the fact that the occurrence relates to the year 1996 and the matter has remained pending for nearly three decades, we request the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan to designate a Special Court at Jaipur for conducting the de-novo trial. The Special Court shall be presided over by an officer of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service having not less than seven years’ experience of conducting Sessions trials. The trial shall be conducted at Jaipur, and the Special Court shall make every endeavour to conclude the trial within a period of one year from the date of assignment of the case. C. The Special Court shall proceed with the case from the stage of recording of prosecution evidence and thereafter conduct the trial afresh in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations contained in the judgments of the trial Court, the High Court or in the present judgment on the merits of the prosecution case. D. Before commencing the trial, the Special Court shall ensure that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed is represented by a counsel of his choice. In the event the said accused is unable to engage a counsel, the Special Court shall secure competent legal representation for him through the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority by appointing an advocate having not less than ten years’ standing at the Bar as the lead defence counsel, assisted by another advocate having not less than seven years’ standing at the Bar, so as to ensure effective and meaningful legal assistance throughout the proceedings. The fees and other incidental expenses of the said counsel shall be borne by the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority as per Rules. E. The Special Court shall ensure that copies of all documents and other materials relied upon by the prosecution are furnished to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in accordance with law without any avoidable delay so as to facilitate the expeditious commencement and conduct of the trial. F. Since, we have set aside the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court qua Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed on the ground that the said accused was not provided effective legal representation at the time of recording of evidence during the trial, the Special Court shall take immediate steps for summoning all the prosecution witnesses and thereafter, provide Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed a full and effective opportunity to cross-examine them. The concerned police authorities shall extend full assistance to the Special Court and make every endeavour to secure the presence of the witnesses on the dates fixed for recording their evidence so as to ensure that the trial proceeds expeditiously and is concluded within the time stipulated by this Court. The defence counsel engaged to represent Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in the de-novo trial shall be provided sufficient time to prepare the case. G. It shall be open to the prosecution to seek the issuance of appropriate coercive process for securing the attendance of witnesses, and the Special Court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law to ensure their presence. H. The Special Court shall, upon commencement of the trial, proceed with the recording of evidence on a day-to-day basis, as far as practicable, and shall not grant unnecessary adjournments except for reasons to be recorded in writing. I. Once the prosecution evidence is concluded, the trial Court may, if it so desires, examine Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed under Section 313 of CrPC. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed shall thereafter be given reasonable opportunity to lead defence evidence. Thereafter, the trial Court shall proceed to hear the final arguments and pass a fresh judgment in accordance with law. J. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed shall remain in judicial custody during the pendency of the denovo trial. However, it shall be open to him to apply for bail before the Special Court. If any such application is preferred, the same shall be considered on its own merits, strictly in accordance with law and uninfluenced by the findings recorded in the judgments which have been set aside by this Court or by any observations contained in the present judgment. K. The Registry of this Court shall forthwith transmit a copy of this judgment to the Registrar General, High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, who shall place the same before the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice forthwith for appropriate administrative orders in terms of Direction B above and shall thereafter ensure due compliance with all the directions contained in this judgment. L. The Registry of this Court shall forthwith transmit the original records of the case to the Registrar General, High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, who shall, immediately upon the designation of the Special Court in terms of Direction B, ensure that the entire original record is transmitted to the said Special Court to facilitate the expeditious commencement of the de-novo trial. M. The Registry of this Court shall also ensure the translation of the present judgment into Hindi. A copy of the English version of the judgment shall forthwith be transmitted to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, who is lodged in Central Jail, Jaipur. Upon completion of the Hindi translation, a copy thereof shall also be forwarded to him.
78.Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019 preferred by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 7th March, 2017 passed by the trial Court as well as the judgment and order dated 22nd July, 2019 passed by the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence awarded to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim are hereby set aside. The conviction of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and the sentences awarded to him by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are also set aside. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. The said accused shall be released forthwith, if in custody, unless required to be detained in connection with any other case.
79.In view of our conclusion acquitting Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim of all the charges levelled against him in the present case, the challenge laid by the State of Rajasthan to the judgment and order dated 29th September, 2020 passed by the High Court granting permanent parole to the said accused no longer survives for consideration. Consequently, Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3531 of 2021 has been rendered infructuous and is accordingly dismissed as such.
80.Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 621 of 2020, 571 of 2020, 681 of 2020 and 143 of 2020 preferred by the State of Rajasthan challenging the acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood Keeley, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg fail and are accordingly dismissed.
81.It is clarified that all observations made in the present judgment concerning Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed are confined to the issue relating to the fairness of the trial and the legality of the proceedings culminating in his conviction. The Special Court shall independently appreciate the evidence that may be adduced before it and decide the matter strictly on its own merits, without being influenced by any observation contained in this judgment.
82.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. (VIKRAM NATH) (SANJAY KAROL) (SANDEEP MEHTA) NEW DELHI; JULY 21, 2026.