1.With all the respect at my command I am unable to persuade myself that a review; of the well-considered, well thought out decision of a three-judge bench, prescribing a three-year ‘practice’1 at the Bar, before embarking on a judicial career, is imperative.
2.The review of the judgment in the All-India Judges Association case (the 6th AIJA) is sought only to the extent of it having provided three years practice, as a necessary requirement for recruitment at the grass roots level of the Judiciary in the States; i.e. the entry point of the Civil Judge (Junior Division)2. Arguments raised, were omnibus as if it was a hearing proper on the merits, but I confine my 1 ‘Practice’, as an Advocate at the Bar 2 hereinafter referred to as, ‘CJ (JD)’ consideration to those relevant for a review; within its welldefined contours of ‘an error apparent on the face of the record’. There were also arguments addressed regarding equal opportunities to the persons with disabilities, which though quite impressive and imperative, in my opinion would have to be considered by the regular Bench hearing the matter.
3.The arguments addressed, which according to me are relevant to the review are as follows: -i) It was a three Judge Bench which removed the condition of a three-year practice for appearing in the CJ (JD) recruitment examinations, which has now been altered by a Coordinate Bench, which is not permissible. ii) There should be equation with other public services, where there is no requirement of an experience before recruitment even into the higher echelons of the Civil Services, being IFS/IAS/IPS etc. The rigorous training regime as stipulated therein definitely could be brought into Judicial Service also. iii) A three-year practice does not, in any way, equip the law graduates in dealing with the rigour of judicial service since in the initial gestation period, a fledgling lawyer would not be entrusted with briefs, and he/she would have little chance to argue in Courts. iv) There could be a strict training regime extending to more than the period now provided, with the new recruits being posted as an understudy to existing Judicial Officers, ensuring skill enhancement.
4.In seriatim, I answer the above questions put forth, in the following manner: -
i) (a) The argument raised is that the stipulation of three
years’ experience removed as per the 3rd All India
Judges’ Association v. Union of India case [ (2002) 4 SCC 247 ]; a decision by a three-judge bench, has
been restored in the 6th All India Judges’ Association
v. Union of India case [ 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184 ] by
a Coordinate Bench, which is not permissible. Quite
attractive, in the normal circumstances, but outrightly
fallacious in the scenario of a ‘continuing mandamus’. The 1st All India Judges' Association v. Union of India
case [ (1992) 1 SCC 119 ] also decided by a three-judge bench; issued directions to improve the conditions of
service of the judicial officers, found necessary to
maintain independence of the judiciary. Alive to the burden on the State exchequer, in justification,
extracted the observation of Professor Pannick that:
“Judges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do
what the rest of us seek to avoid; make decisions.” and held so: -
“45. These prescriptions for a Judicial Officer,
therefore, result in a restricted life. Austerity
is a quality to be practised by every Judge
personally as also in his public functioning.
This necessarily gives rise to a situation where
the Judge must have patience, perseverance
and painstaking habits. In order that a Judge
may be able to put in these aspects into his
public functioning it is absolutely necessary
that the Judge enjoys freedom from personal
worries. A reasonable salary, appropriate
allowances and manageable living conditions
are, therefore, required to be provided.”
i) (b) A Review was filed from the said decision which was termed the 2nd All India Judges’ Association v.
Union of India case [(1993) 4 SCC 288] in which the
three years’ service condition was introduced as a
uniform condition across the country; since the
stipulation varied from State to State and in some
States, there was no such requirement. A Coordinate Bench made modifications and held so: -
“56. Any clarification that may be required in
respect of any matter arising out of this
decision will be sought only from this Court
and from no other court. Further, the
proceedings, if any, for implementation of the
directions given in this judgment shall be filed
only in this Court and no other court shall
entertain them.”
i) (c) The 2nd AIJA case was by a three-judge bench and
the 3rd AIJA case which removed the stipulation was a
Coordinate Bench. The 3rd AIJA case also reiterated paragraph 56 of the 2nd AIJA case in paragraph No.40.
Hence this Court, in a three Judge Bench was
considering the augmentation and skill building of the
State Judiciary, issuing directions in the best interest of
preserving the independence of the judiciary, the
cornerstone of any functional and effective judicial
dispensation, by resorting to a ‘continuing mandamus’.
ii) (a) Judicial services cannot be equated with other
public services and, hence, the AIJA case has been
retained before this Court as a ‘continuing mandamus’
for decades together. Unlike in the public services,
there is no supervisory control exercised by the
officers in the hierarchy of the State Judiciary, insofar
as the essential duties of a Judicial Officer.
Adjudication of cases which involves procedural
aspects, recording of evidence, it’s analysis and
delivery of judgments; completely at the discretion of
the Officer, upon which/whom none can interfere or impinge. It is trite that a wrong judicial order cannot
even lead to a disciplinary enquiry and it can only be
corrected by the higher courts in statutory appeals or
revisions, or the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on
the High Courts by the Constitution of India. Though,
the general conduct of a Judicial Officer and her
integrity can be brought in question under the
administrative jurisdiction conferred on the High
Court, the judicial acts are removed from such
scrutiny, again to ensure independence of the
judiciary. There can hence be no equation to public
services; even recruitments to the higher echelons, where too there is a supervisory hierarchy of
administration in place, as distinguished from the
justice delivery system.
ii) (b) It was held in the 1st AIJA case itself that: -
“20. … There is a marked distinction between
the nature of work which executive officers
and judicial officers are called upon to
discharge. The work of the judicial officers is
usually sedentary while that of the executive
officers involves a lot of physical movement.
This is particularly so in the lower cadres of
both the services. In view of this feature
physical fitness is more important for an
executive officer than in case of a judicial
officer while in case of judicial officers, there
is thus necessarily more of a mental activity
than physical. Experience is an indispensable
factor and subject to the basic physical fitness
with growing age experience grows. …”
iii) (a) Much has been argued on the futility of the three-year
stipulation since no fledgling lawyer would be entrusted with a brief; which is to essentially say that she would not
be tasked with the job of conducting a trial or an argument in Court. The question that arises immediately
is that when a senior lawyer or litigant would not entrust a case to a lawyer who is fresh out of college, will it be
safe to entrust such persons with the decision-making process in a case; when even legal services require an
amount of experience to ensure; not mere
representation, but quality assistance. It is not the complete entrustment of a case for conducting the trial
or argument before Court, that moulds a lawyer in the
initial years. It is the familiarity with the files, a lawyer
acquires from the office of a Senior and the interactions she has with the fraternity of lawyers in the corridors of
the Court that initiates her in the profession. The knowledge garnered from witnessing how a trial is
conducted, the procedure shaped, as also arguments addressed within the courts, informs the keen student of
how to go about the profession. Though arguing a case, before the Court, provides visibility, that is not the be-all
and end-all of the profession. Behind every arguing counsel, whose ability is often measured by the felicity
of expression and dexterity, on feet, there are an abundance of skills acquired over the years. Proficiency
in drafting, adeptness at research, expertise in cross examination, precision in formulating arguments and
much more, are to be learned by the young; observing
first hand to become a complete professional. No
training schedule, before or after recruitment, can give
a budding jurist; be it a lawyer or a judge, the feel of the
life and its worries, throbbing in every brief; which she experiences in practise.
(iii) (b) It was held in the 2nd AIJA case that: -
“20. …The recruitment of raw graduates as
judicial officers without any training or
background of lawyering has not proved to be
a successful experiment. Considering the fact
that from the first day of his assuming office,
the Judge has to decide, among others,
questions of life, liberty, property and
reputation of the litigants, to induct graduates
fresh from the Universities to occupy seats of
such vital powers is neither prudent nor
desirable. Neither knowledge derived from
books nor pre-service training can be an
adequate substitute for the first-hand
experience of the working of the court-system
and the administration of justice begotten
through legal practice. The practice involves
much more than mere advocacy. A lawyer has
to interact with several components of the
administration of justice. Unless the judicial
officer is familiar with the working of the said
components, his education and equipment as
a Judge is likely to remain incomplete. The
experience as a lawyer is, therefore, essential
to enable the Judge to discharge his duties
and functions efficiently and with confidence
and circumspection. …”
(iv) (a) The suggestion to bring in a structured training
regime, rather than encouraging academically proficient students to opt for a judicial career, in my
opinion would deter them. First of all, they will have to continue for two years without pay and allowances and
without the period being reckoned as service. As of now, but for three States; all of the other States induct trainee
CJ (JD) into the judicial services, assign them specific
courts and enable full emoluments as applicable to a regular CJ (JD). Continuation for two years on half the
pay of CJ (JD) will be prejudicial to the new recruits, and a strain on the exchequer, without any constructive work
being elicited. The training hiatus would see the Courts unmanned and the vacancies unfilled; multiplying by
reason of retirements and promotions.
iv) (b) Further direction insofar as the satisfaction of the sitting Judge of the High Court under whose supervision,
the trainee judicial officer has to serve as a Law Clerk would create a further hurdle in the smooth transition
from training to an active service on probation. There would also be two classes created of the recruits from the
same source; lawyers with one year practice and those with two, three or more, in the identical recruitment. If
all were to be put to the same training regime, then there would be the issue of treating unequals as equals. If all
are not put under the same regime then there could be allegation of hostile discrimination.
5.In my humble opinion, there is no ground for review, and the controversy should rest there. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India has expressed an opinion that the judgment under review does not require to be reconsidered on the fundamental question as to whether some prior experience of the working of the Court is desirable for new entrants into the judicial service; to which I fully concur. Noticing some practical difficulties, a via media is arrived at. With all the respect at my command, despite deep contemplation, I am not able to agree with the structured training programme for two years, as suggested, for students who have one year experience at the Bar, for reasons stated hereinabove.
6.The decision under review, on this particular aspect was arrived at based on the opinion expressed by a vast majority of the High Courts and States, who shaped it by observing the working of the judicial system and the inputs garnered therefrom. Even today, the High Courts, a vast majority of them have opined that experience at the Bar is imperative before stepping on to a judicial career. The Universities, but for a few, have taken a contrary stance, understandably in the perceived interest of students, motivated by the anxiety to propel them into a career at the earliest.
7.I am of the definite opinion, as expressed in the unanimous opinion, that experience at the Bar is essential for students right out of college; steeped in academics, who should have a feel of the affairs of man and the travails of a litigant, before deciding their destinies. This was the earlier norm; the departure from which has proved counterproductive, as is evident from the opinion of the High Courts, a clear reflection and indication of the mind of the largest stakeholder; the litigant public. One of the written submissions, rather uncharitably refers to the decision having been based on ‘anecdotal-observations, prejudices and subjective reviews submitted by the High Courts’, without calling for an empirical, comparative study of the output of existing officers. For one, quality is not achieved, by mere academic excellence, nor can it be assessed based on the source from which the recruitments are made. Then, the High Courts are in administrative control of the District Judiciary, in constant touch with their general conduct and judicial dispensation. Assessment of performance of officers, evaluations for promotions; individually, by the Administrative/Portfolio Judges and collectively, by the Administrative/Standing Committee and the Full Court, which has administrative control of the District Judiciary provides the High Courts with valuable inputs and enlightening insights to evaluate the manner in which the justice delivery system can be bettered. The words employed in the written submissions, are disparaging and unbecoming, which are only to be rejected with the disdain it deserves.
8.The forensic and analytical skills of an adjudicator are better learnt in the profession by observing what happens in the Courts; not necessarily as a Presiding Officer controlling it, but as a keen and eager student of law; the Court room being the most profound of all classrooms. A Presiding Officer’s mistake puts to peril a litigant, and her remedy is only by way of an appeal. A lawyer’s mistake can be remedied by an experienced Presiding Officer, a seasoned Senior or an astute colleague, or even by a ministerial staff of the Court with first-hand experience of the proceedings. The requirement of experience is the need of the hour and essential in the immediate future, otherwise we would be accused of creating a cadre of careerists rather than of jurists capable of enriching a robust system, alive to the needs of the nation, society and its people.
9.With profound respect and intense regret, I beg to disagree and, in my opinion, there is no scope for a review of the well-considered judgment.
10.The Review Petitions, hence, stand dismissed.
11.The I.A.s and the Writ Petition to be posted before the regular Court concerned with the continuing mandamus. (K. VINOD CHANDRAN) NEW DELHI; AUGUST 21, 2026.